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Decisions: Political Theology and the Challenges of Postmodernity, argues that political 
theologies are both partially responsible for and responsive to the intrinsically related problems 
of racism, capitalism, and essentialist metaphysical thinking. Relying on dialectical materialist 
and post-structuralist theories, Decisions critically engages a wide range of classical and 
contemporary figures such as Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard, Carl Schmitt, Jacques Derrida, 
James Cone, Chantal Mouffe, Cornel West, Martin Hågglund, and Karl ove Knausgaard. These 
engagements are attentive to not only the particular theoretical and political decisions any one 
thinker makes, but also to the ways in which “decision” is itself understood as an important 
theoretical and political category. Although “decisionism” has become a popular motif in 
contemporary political theology, the concept remains under theorized. This is unfortunate, 
because contemporary ontological racisms and exploitative market structures aim to prevent 
political decisions: ontological racism decides in advance the essential “racial” characteristics of 
a person and market economies ensure that the distribution of goods is “decided” by the so-
called invisible hand of the market. Moreover, both racisms and capitalism can imply an 
underlying modern metaphysics of substance and essence. While the postmodern critique of 
metaphysics is often read as a challenge to religion, this reading suggests that postmodernity 
presents an opportunity for the reemergence of an historical and politically engaged form of 
religion. Such an emancipatory and non-metaphysical approach can be found throughout various 
religious traditions, but is especially prominent amongst black political theologians working out 
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Political Theology and the Challenges of Postmodernity 
 
Postmodernity aggravates the despair of a life lived under capital.1 
First, because the emancipatory myths and evolutionary promises of modernity have lost 
all credibility.2 The invisible hand of the market, the hand that is meant to promote societal 
interest, does not exist; or, if it does, it is because the invisible hand belongs to a capitalist who 
has hidden it.3 Rather than a rising tide lifting all boats, the rule of global capital has proven itself 
totally uninterested in and incapable of providing a decent standard of life for the vast majority 
of people alive today. Each day, billions of people sell their labor, work tedious and alienating 
jobs, have their wages exploited by their bosses, and are denied basic provisions by the capitalist 
state. Hour by hour, day by day, month by month, year by year, they work. Rarely, if they are 
lucky enough to fall ill or if a holiday appears, there is a break, likely unpaid. A sickness unto 
death, this is the rhythm of capitalist life. Never ending exploitation is a feature, not a bug. 
Capitalism, the great project of modernity, produces hope only to the extent that its defense 
functions ideologically; that is, insofar as capitalists reify the order of things, insofar as they 
convince the exploited that their best decision is to work harder.4 Postmodernity aggravates the 
																																																						
1 “Postmodernity,” and its cognates “postmodern” and “postmodernism,” will be defined toward the end of this 
introduction. 
2 For a Marxist critique of progressivism, see: George Novack, “The Rise and Fall of Progressivism” International 
Socialist Review 18.3 (1957), 83-88. For more on the relationship between progressivism and modernity, see: 
Angelos Mouzakitis, “Modernity and the Idea of Progress,” Frontiers in Sociology 2.3 (2017), 1-11. 
3 The phrase “invisible hand” first appears in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, part IV, chapter 1. The 
standard neoliberal critique is offered by Joseph Stiglitz, “Externalities in economies with imperfect information and 
incomplete markets," Quarterly Journal of Economics 101.2 (1986), 229-264.  
4 Jeffrey Butler, “Inequality and Relative Ability Beliefs,” The Economic Journal 126.593 (2016), 907-948. 
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despair of life under capitalism because what was a genuine improvement—for the serf, 
capitalism signified progress—is now an opiate.  
Second, postmodernity aggravates despair in the sense of radicalizing or agitating the 
despair inherent but hidden in capitalism itself. The problem is not just that modernity has failed 
to actualize its promises of universal emancipation. The problem is that modernity’s promises 
have always concealed pernicious violences. On the one hand, capitalism marked a genuine 
improvement in autonomy, efficiency, and labor rights over earlier feudal forms of production. 
On the other, capitalism necessitated colonialism and encouraged racism at a level hitherto 
unheard of in the history of everything: Never before capital had the need to colonize, racialize, 
and enslave been built into the infrastructural logic of any economic scheme.5 As modern 
philosophy reflected modern economy and spoke of freedom, rights, trade, autonomy, and so 
on,6 modern states, capitalists, scientists, and others enacted racialized oppressions and invented 
racial hierarchies that would have been impossible from out of premodern epistemes.7 
Unsatisfied with structural exploitation, economic and political elites inscribed a racial enmity 
																																																						
5 The literature on this point is too vast to adequately cite, but a couple of classic formulations deserve mention: 
Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to an Economic Explanation of Imperialism, trans. 
Schwarzschild (Routledge, 2003); Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Martino Fine 
Books, 2011); Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (UNC Press, 1994). Marx’s writings on slavery, which feature 
heavily in this text’s final chapter, are also crucial here. 
6 Ellen Meiskins Wood, Liberty and Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from the Renaissance 
to Enlightenment (Verso Books, 2012). 
7 This view is disputed by Benjamin Isaac in his The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton 
University Press, 2006) and by current Afropessimists who see anti-black racism in an ontological and transhitorical 
register. Moreover, the view is disputed from a different by Christian historians and theologians such as J. Kameron 
Carter argue that ancient anti-Semitism marks a form of ancient racism (a theme also explored by Isaac). See: J. 
Kameron Carter, Race: A Theological Account (Oxford University Press, 2008). However, such arguments have to 
ultimately be held to be anachronistic. While tribalism, prejudice, and xenophobia are as old as possible, I agree 
with Cornel West’s assessment in Prophesy Deliverance! (Westminster John Knox Press, 2002) that the distinct 
character of “racial” oppression is a necessarily modern invention. Race, as fictive and ideological category, is 
entirely politically dependent on not only capitalist motives, but is also cognitively dependent on modern biological 
categories first popularized by Carl Linnaeus in the mid 18th century. 
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within the working class, and so occluded the potential of a proletarian revolution.8 Identity, a 
bastion of liberalism and a partner to the modern philosophical turn to the subject, was 
racialized.9 The exploited class was racially segmented and turned against itself, and attempted 
lumpenization followed proletarianization. In this sense, the failure of modernity’s ostensibly 
emancipatory project of capitalism marks the possibility of an undoing of modernity’s actually 
oppressive racial structures. But this is a possibility that is far from certain, as the failure of 
capitalism typically brings about, and is certainly bringing about now, a reactionary retreat into 
racism.10 And so not only capitalism, but racism, too, is an opiate. 
Third, because the cognitive and theoretical matrix that informs and is informed by 
modernity’s capitalism-racism dyad is itself no longer a credible discourse. Where capitalism 
requires reifications and fetishizations, and where racism promotes ontologizations and 
essentializations, modern philosophy is happy to provide them. The postmodern critique of the 
metaphysical language of substance and essence, and so of fetishization and reification, arose 
concurrently with the black power movement and gained prominence in the face of Reaganism 
and the alleged neoliberal end of history.11 Modern metaphysics—with its ancient logocentric 
predecessors—was never a metaphysical enterprise, because, as Derrida shows, there is no such 
thing as a metaphysical concept. And so the modern metaphysical regime was only ever a double 
fake: it was both wrong—there is no thing as essence—and ideological—the fake substance 
																																																						
8 Satnam Virdee, “Racialized capitalism: An account of its contested origins and consolidation,” The Sociological 
Review 67.1 (2019), 3-27. 
9 Kwame Anthony Appiah briefly traces this development in his “Reconstructing Racial Identities,” Research in 
African Literatures 27.3 (1996), 68-72. 
10 Amy Krosch and David Amodio, “Economic scarcity alters the perception of race,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, accessible: https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2014/06/04/1404448111.abstract 
11 Just two examples: Of Grammatology was published the year Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated; Fredric 
Jamesons’ The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act was published the year Reagan took 
office. Of course, any sort of direct casual relationship is impossible to prove, but more on that later. For now, it is 
only pertinent to note that so-called postmodernism arose in both a revolutionary and counter-revolutionary context. 
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conceals an underlying exploitative structure: the substance of the commodity is the 
capitalization of exploited labor time; the substance of whiteness is the lie that white worker and 
white capitalist have more in common than workers of differing “races.” But where modern 
metaphysics once promised total understanding and a mastery of nature,12 postmodernity is 
typically marked by a shaking of the foundations of knowledge as such.13 Rather than a quest for 
truth and knowledge, any attachment to metaphysics in postmodernity can only be a reactionary 
attachment to the very categories that gave the appearance of intellectual credibility to capitalism 
and racism. Metaphysics is an opiate. 
These three regimes—capitalism, racism, metaphysics—are linked not only by their inner 
logics and mutual historical constitution, but also by their shared commitments to indecision. 
Contemporary ontological racisms and exploitative market structures aim to prevent 
emancipatory decisions at every turn: ontological racism decides in advance the essential “racial” 
characteristics of a person; market economies ensure that the distribution of goods is decided by 
the so-called invisible hand, which is actually the capitalist’s. Moreover, metaphysics, especially 
but not only analogical and substance metaphysics, the kind that has been called “logocentric,” 
acts as if the truth of truth exists, as if Being is identical to thinking and that the ontological 
status of everything is both essentially transhistorical and substantially self-identical. This truth 
of Being, in turn, is available for philosophical, theological, and theoretical analysis, which 
means that the truth of philosophy, theology, and theory is metaphysically decided in advance. 
The only “decision” to be made in such a structure—where racist ontologies are, where capitalist 
markets appear to decide in the passive voice in order to hide the active decisions of exploiters, 
																																																						
12 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Cress (Hackett Publishing, 
1999). 
13 Perhaps this solicitation of foundationalism was best expressed by Nietzsche’s claim in “On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense” that truth is “A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms.”  
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and where metaphysics determines truth before thinking, and certainly before praxis—is to 
accept and assent to the status quo. That is, the capitalist, racist, and metaphysical deferral and 
denial of decision serves to metaphysically reify capitalist exploitation and racist oppression. 
Indecisionism is an opiate. 
That the relation of these three modernist regimes resembles the relation between the 
ancient transcendentals of the good, the true, and the one—everything is ordered within and 
toward transcendental capitalist, racist, and ontologizing structures—is not accidental or totally 
extrinsic. Rather, the relationship between any transcendental structures and the relationship 
between these structures and empirical reality is always governed by a theology. Ultimately, the 
mutual constitution of capitalism, racism, and metaphysics calls upon a theology of truth 
according to which God, simultaneously empty master signifier and impossible transcendent 
signified, secures the intelligibility of this violent matrix. Decisions against capitalism, racism, 
and metaphysics are impossible—are said to be impossible by these regimes of indecisionism—
only because agentic possibility is totally saturated by the transcendent truth, which acquires 
both omnipotent and ostensibly benevolent force. That is, modernist indecisionism secures its 
ostensible necessity through a theological appeal to the transcendental truth of its own violent 
regimes of capitalism, racism, and metaphysics: Capitalism, racism, and metaphysics preclude 
the possibility of deciding otherwise because they, in a totalitarian gesture, claim the sort of 
ontological necessity and ubiquitous presence that is characteristic of a divine lawmaker. 
Because this theological structure secures exploitation, it has to be called political—and it is with 
this ideological step that religion is an opiate of the masses. The despair of a life lived under 
capital is aggravated by an indecisive trinitarian political theology. 
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Which is not to say that capitalism, racism, and metaphysics are effects of theology. To 
do so would too quickly countersign the idealist gesture of modernity. Rather, whenever a 
theological structure is at play, its appearance of logocentrism should be read as obfuscating and 
harboring particular material decisions. The invisible hand of the capitalist is a metaphysical 
fetish construct. This means that it does not actually have ontological status: there is no invisible 
hand, only the masked hand of the capitalist. As I will argue, this basic ideological structure—
according to which every metaphysical claim must by necessity always mask a hidden non-
metaphysical decision—is marked of every metaphysical gesture, including the metaphysical 
gestures of capitalism, racism, and metaphysics itself.  Modernity’s indecisive trinitarian political 
theology masks an underlying non-theological commitment: namely, the capitalist’s commitment 
to exploitation and, as a sort of begotten and consubstantial son of the capitalist, the racist’s 
commitment to oppression.  
If this is the structure of a modernist political theology, then a postmodernist political 
theology must be aggravating to it. Where modernity precludes decision through an ideological 
fetishization of indecision, postmodernity recognizes the unavoidability of decision—indeed, the 
commitment to indecision stands as one of modernity’s most pernicious decisions. In this sense, 
in postmodernity not only is everything political, but moreover everything is decidable. One can 
always say no to the capitalist, racist, and metaphysical regimes that say one has to say yes. In 
other words, where modernist political theology feigns a metaphysical defense—that is, offers a 
superstructural reification—of underlying capitalist and racist decisions, a postmodern political 
theology should look to aggravate and agitate on the infrastructural level. Postmodernity 
aggravates the despair of a life lived under capital in that it surely makes this laboring life more 
difficult: capital, pushed to its global limit, with no new territory left to colonize, with no new 
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labor markets left to exploit, with no new consumption markets left to infect, has no choice but 
to force slavery and violence, to call upon the forces of racism and hope to segment and prevent 
the workers of the world from uniting.14 A desperate and basically immoral actor, a cornered 
capitalist will gladly opt for war.15 And so, at the same time, postmodernity aggravates the 
despair of a life lived under capital in that the despairing capitalist, sensing a turn, becomes 
aggravated. A postmodern political theology rejects capitalism’s, racism’s, and metaphysics’ 
claims to ontological status and decides against them all.  
The postmodern critique of metaphysics is often read as a challenge to religious faith.16 
Likewise, growing research into the historical relations between, on the one hand, religion and 
capitalism,17 and, on the other, religion and racism further solidifies the identification of religion 
as an problematic modern project from which our postmodern age can gladly be rid.18 More than 
religion in general, it is Christian political theology in particular that is held to be problematic: 
the Christian divine right of rule,19 Christian racist supersessionism, and the Christian 
(Protestant) work ethic all support modernity’s failed and violent projects. In all of these ways—
the ways in which political theology is mutually constituted with the worst aspects of 
modernity—postmodernity presents a welcomed challenge to political theology. Yet, this project 
articulates an alternative line of flight. I am interested in a different sense in which 
																																																						
14 Such is the argument of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 2001). 
15 Gopal Balikrishnan, Antagonistics: Capitalism and Power in an Age of War (Verso Books, 2009); Yale Magrass 
and Charles Derber, Glorious Causes: The Irrationality of Capitalism, War, and Politics (Routledge, 2019) 
16 Martin Hågglund is a major contemporary proponent of this view, and will be a major interlocutor in this project’s 
second chapter. 
17 In addition to the classic Weberian texts, R.H. Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Verso Books, 2015) 
is an important historical analysis of Christianity’s influence on free market political economy.  
18 In addition to the aforementioned J. Kameron Carter, Willie James Jenning’s The Christian Imagination: 
Theology and the Origins of Race (Yale University Press, 2011) is a fine genealogical analysis of the relationship 
between Christian supersessionism, colonialism, and racism. Jenning’s genealogy is generally more specific and 
material than is Carter’s, but also occasionally falls prey to a romanticism that risks a reactionary agrarianism.  
19 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton University Press, 
1997). 
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postmodernity challenges political theology. In this reading, postmodernity, with its critiques of 
capitalism, racism, and metaphysics, presents an opportunity for the reemergence of an historical 
and politically progressive form of religion. Here, postmodernity challenges political theology to 
issue a response to the violences and failures of modernity. In the first sense, postmodernity 
challenges political theology because it renders it fortunately obsolete: political theology is a 
reification and superstructural fetishization of capitalism, racism, and metaphysics, and so 
political theology cannot decide against these regimes. This, in short, is Carl Schmitt’s political 
theology. But in the second sense, postmodernity challenges political theology because it forces 
political theology to make decisions: for or against capital, for or against racism, for or against 
metaphysics. In this sense, the failure of modernity does not mark a concomitant failure of 
political theology but instead marks the possibility of a decisively emancipatory, postmodern 
political theology. This project argues that such an anti-capitalist, anti-racist, and anti-
metaphysical approach can be found throughout various religious traditions, and is especially 
prominent amongst black Marxist political theologians and activists. This is the political 
theology for which postmodernity should decide. 
 
The Structure of the Argument 
 
The project’s first chapter begins by reviewing the recent attempt by some leftist political 
theorists, most notably Chantal Mouffe, to retrieve Carl Schmitt for emancipatory purposes. For 
theorists like Mouffe, Schmitt offers a “post-Marxist” politics capable of re-politicizing liberal 
parliamentary democracy. These left-Schmittians argue that Schmitt’s famous friend-enemy 
distinction is a useful heuristic by which the left can distinguish between emancipatory and 
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reactionary figures and projects. More, they hold that Schmitt’s formalism is sufficiently broad 
to address Marxism’s alleged economic reductionism. In all of these ways, left-Schmittians argue 
that Schmitt presents a decisionistic political theology that is useful for emancipatory politics. 
Against these views, I argue that left-Schmittianism falls short in part because left-
Schmittians do not engage with Schmitt’s underlying theological and metaphysical 
commitments. While Schmitt alleges himself to promote decisionism, his political theology is so 
thoroughly embedded within an essentialist metaphysical paradigm as to render all decisions 
“decided” in advance. Indeed, for Schmitt, whether one is a “friend” or an “enemy” is an 
ontological-racial condition that has been decided in advance—has been decided since the 
beginning of time—by God. To this end, the problem with Schmitt’s project is not only its 
obvious commitment to fascism, capitalism, and anti-Semitism, but is also its divinization and 
ontologization of these horrors. Moreover, and as the above suggests, this ontologization-
divinization serves the ideological function of hiding the true location of decision in Schmitt’s 
work. Where left-Schmittians applaud Schmitt’s decisionism, the only decisions actually 
operative in Schmitt’s works are his related decisions against Marxism and for anti-Semitism.  
And so Schmitt’s is the sort of modernist political theology against which an 
emancipatory postmodern political theology should decide. His political theology fittingly 
demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between capitalism (in Schmitt’s case, a vehement anti-
socialism), racism (anti-Semitism), and metaphysics. Far from a revolutionary thinker fit for the 
plurality of exploitations and oppressions of the 21st century, as Mouffe and other left-
Schmittians have it, Schmitt is a modern political theologian in the most problematic sense of the 
term.  
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The project then turns to Derridean deconstruction to argue that metaphysics as such, and 
so not just Schmitt’s reactionary metaphysics, is a theoretically problematic and politically 
dubious discourse in postmodernity. While the relationship between theology and metaphysics 
has received significant scholarly attention, Derrida’s direct contribution to this topic—which 
differs significantly from the projects of Jean-Luc Marion, Richard Kearney, and others—has not 
yet been fully appreciated. After briefly rehearsing Derrida’s argument against metaphysics and 
metaphysics’ implicit theology, the project’s second chapter adjudicates the debate between John 
Caputo and Martin Hågglund concerning Derrida’s relationship to religion. Here, I argue that 
both Caputo and Hågglund offer correct but incomplete readings of Derrida. Specifically, neither 
explicitly account for Derrida’s primary contribution to the critique of metaphysics: the 
deconstruction of the identity of thinking and being. It is within this identity that the theologic 
according to which God is truth and truth is the truth of God finds articulation. With this identity 
deconstructed, only a non-metaphysical religion remains possible. At the same time, it is only 
with this deconstruction of the identity of thinking and being that such a non-metaphysical 
religion becomes possible, because possibility requires that everything not be decided in 
advance. And so, perhaps unexpectedly, it is Derrida’s deconstruction of theology—his 
rendering impossible of theology—that makes a decision for religious faith possible. 
While the problems of racism and capitalism are not directly addressed in this chapter, 
their inner logocentric logics and relationship to a metaphysical paradigm is critiqued. That is, 
Derrida’s deconstruction of metaphysics implies a deconstruction of the metaphysical operations 
intrinsic to racism and capitalism—namely, the fetish construct of ontologized race and the 
general ideological structure of substantiation, wherein processes and power relations are given 
substantial, that is metaphysical, status. In other words, while my engagement with Derrida most 
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explicitly concerns his deconstruction of the possibility of theology—and especially of any 
logocentric theology that identifies God with truth—this deconstruction of theology is also a 
deconstruction of the theology of racism and capitalism. Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
possibility of a metaphysical theology points toward the need for a non-metaphysical—which is 
now also to say anti-racist and anti-capitalist—form of religion.  One possible manifestation of 
this form of non-metaphysical religion is exhibited in Derrida’s lived encounters with Judaism. 
Derrida’s non-metaphysical Judaism, I argue, demonstrates that any credible postmodern 
political theology must turn not to the metaphysical and ideal, but instead to the praxical and 
material. 
Before analyzing two such materialist and praxical forms of religion—Søren 
Kierkegaard’s and James Cone’s—the project offers a brief interlude on the secularism of the 
Norwegian novelist Karl Ove Knausgaard. While Kierkegaard and Cone demonstrate forms of 
religion responsive to the postmodern critique of metaphysics and the modernist regimes of 
capitalism and racism, Derrida’s deconstruction of theology prevents any sort of theistic 
methodological imperialism. That is, while Kierkegaard and Cone do offer credible responses to 
the challenges of postmodernity, not all credible responses need to be religious. As far as 
responding to the challenges of postmodernity is concerned, religion in general and political 
theology in particular are unnecessary.  
This claim that religion is unnecessary stands counter to some contemporary efforts in 
systematic theology to universalize both theological thinking and religious belief structures. The 
most prominent and influential of these views belongs to John Milbank and his “radical 
orthodoxy.” For Milbank, the secular lacks the transcendent dimension that is both constitutive 
of and necessary for human flourishing. Moreover, Milbank argues that transcendence is simply 
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ontologically the case, and so any secularism must be the result of a “violent” imposition. Such 
violence, according to Milbank, is reflected in the actual content of secular belief, which he holds 
to be “nihilistic.” Against this position, Knausgaard embraces an immanent secularism that is 
intentionally antagonistic to religious interpretations. In doing so, Knausgaard’s autofictional 
novels and essays demonstrate that a decision for the secular is not only intellectually defensible, 
but is morally and politically laudatory. Because he is interested in a secular peace and love, and 
pursues such without any necessary reliance on theological structures or motifs, religious 
rejections of Knausgaard’s position actually impose an imperialism and violence antithetical to 
the “ontological peace” allegedly defended by John Milbank and other Radical Orthodox 
theologians. Knausgaard’s love for the world can and should be embraced without sublating it 
within some ostensibly higher religious frame.  
After this engagement with Knausgaard, the project returns in its fourth chapter to the 
task of developing a political theology responsive to the challenges of postmodernity, and does 
so through a constructive engagement with the Christian existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard. In 
particular, I argue that Kierkegaard’s under-discussed political theology is both anti-
metaphysical and, at least incipiently, anti-capitalist. The standard narrative, from both Marxists 
and Kierkegaardians, is that Kierkegaard and Marx agree that religion and politics are 
antithetical to each other. Given this opposition, Kierkegaard is held to side with religion against 
politics; Marx, with politics against religion. According to this accepted distinction, Kierkegaard 
is best understood as a philosopher of abstract inwardness unconcerned with, or even antithetical 
to, worldly political projects. For most Marxists who engage with Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s 
relative popularity in the 20th century is itself evidence of Kierkegaard’s friendliness to capital: 
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Kierkegaard, in this view, is a supremely bourgeois, idealist, and irrational philosopher who 
argues for everything a Marxist materialist would argue against. 
I dispute this standard narrative by arguing that Kierkegaard is better understood as a 
dialectical materialist philosopher. The argument is made through a close reading of the 
Kierkegaardian distinction between “actuality” and “reality,” which is analogous to Derrida’s 
distinction between being and thinking. With this distinction, Kierkegaard resists philosophical 
idealism, which he associates with “reality,” in favor of a materialist existentialism that requires 
actual praxis. For Kierkegaard, idealist philosophers deny or avoid the necessity of making 
existentially meaningful decisions, which, by definition, must happen in “actuality.” Moreover, 
because Kierkegaard prioritizes materialist actuality over idealist reality, his understanding of 
truth is necessarily historical and social. For Kierkegaard, this privileging of historical actuality 
is marked of Christianity: Christianity divinizes actuality through Christ and so calls people to 
engagement with the actual world. All of this emphasis on actuality is entirely missed by Marxist 
critiques that portray Kierkegaard as an otherworldly philosopher. 
After establishing Kierkegaard’s philosophical materialism as found in the 
pseudonymous works, the chapter turns to Kierkegaard’s later authorship to demonstrate that 
Kierkegaard populated this materialist structure with decidedly anti-capitalist content. For 
Kierkegaard, this socialist materialism is mandated by scripture and the Christian prophetic 
tradition. Kierkegaard does not argue against socialism in favor of religion, but more radically 
argues against any conception of religion—like Schmitt’s—that is not itself socialist. 
Kierkegaard, then, offers a response to postmodern challenges to religion avant la lettre, even as 
he helped inaugurate what is considered postmodern philosophy. 
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While Kierkegaard’s historical materialist political theology is clearly aligned with 
socialist and emancipatory positions, Kierkegaard does not provide much by way of particular 
political content. In some ways, this lack of particularity and political analysis is itself part of 
Kierkegaard’s project: The poor should not be poor, and Kierkegaard does not think much more 
analysis than that is necessary. While wanting to maintain Kierkegaard’s sense of decisive 
urgency, the project’s final chapter looks to James Cone as a source for providing a more 
analytically rigorous and politically specific form of Kierkegaardian political theology. The 
introduction of Cone, and especially Cornel West’s Marxist development and specification of 
Cone, provides just that political theology. In other words, while Kierkegaard provides an 
explicitly anti-metpahysical theology, it is with Cone, helped by West, that we find a fully and 
explicitly anti-metaphysical, anti-racist, and anti-capitalist political theology. In other words, 
Cone’s political theology responds to the three problematic regimes of modernity and so offers a 
response to the challenges of postmodernity. 
The chapter begins by situating an anti-essentialist understanding of race—informed by 
the deconstructive and dialectical-materialist motifs articulated above—against current 
hegemonic “race relations” and “diversity” frameworks. I argue that these latter frameworks, 
rightfully wary of class reductionism, unhelpfully dissociate race from class and so are liable to 
create market-friendly anti-racisms. Moreover, these frameworks tend toward a fetishization of 
dialogue and conversation, and so idealistically misplace the actual site of racist oppression. In 
this sense, race relations frameworks operate within the (ideological) realm of Kierkegaardian 
reality, but never address the (infrastructural, materialist) machinations of actuality. Against 
these approaches, Cone provides the intellectual framework for an explicitly anti-racist and anti-
capitalist political theology. He does this primarily through an epistemological and moral 
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privileging of “the oppressed.” Cone, especially in his earlier works, radically orders all truth 
claims through reference to emancipation: something is only true to the extent that it supports the 
“truth” that the oppressed should be emancipated. If race relations frameworks do not actually 
produce the emancipation of the racially oppressed and economically exploited, then they are not 
“true” in Cone’s sense. 
Against such liberal idealism, for Cone, Marxism provides the best means by which one 
could understand and revolutionize racist and capitalist societies. Such a turn to Marxism as a 
source for anti-racism is especially important in the contemporary political climate, which seems 
to prefer to speak of socialism or anti-racism. Cone’s position, and it is one supported not only 
by West but by the entire trajectory of this project, is that this choice between anti-capitalism and 
anti-racism is a false one. However, and despite this embrace of a Marxist anti-racism, Cone was 
concerned that historical rifts and strategic disputes between Marxist anti-capitalists and black 
anti-racists would prevent the development of an emancipatory solidarity of anti-racists and anti-
capitalists. In its conclusion, this chapter addresses Cone’s concerns by turning to West, who 
articulates an explicitly anti-racist Marxism. In its prophetic and anti-metaphysical commitments, 
the political theology espoused by Cone and West addresses the challenges and opportunities 
presented by postmodernity. 
Finally, the project’s conclusion begins by recapitulating the arguments made so far in a 
decidedly normative register: A credible postmodern political theology should reject both 
reactionary politics (Schmitt) and metaphysics (Derrida), should leave open the possibility of 
embracing secularism (Knausgaard), should employ a dialectical materialist philosophy 
(Kierkegaard), and should establish the orthopraxic norms of anti-racist social democracy (Cone 
and West). Then, in an effort to demonstrate the immediately political consequences of this sort 
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of political theology, I provide a brief reading of the political theology of the abolitionist John 
Brown. While the majority of the project deals with texts, readings, theory, and intellectual 
positions, Brown demonstrates that such a decisive political theology is far from (only) an 
academic enterprise. Or, rather, Brown demonstrates that an academic enterprise can have actual 
effects. Although existing before the advent of postmodernity, Brown’s religiously motivated 
lust for freedom demonstrates the sort of political theology—non-metaphysical, emancipatory, 
anti-racist and anti-capitalist—for which this project argues. This turn to Brown, finally, brings 
the project full circle, back to the first chapter’s critique of left-Schmittians. More than Schmitt, 
it is Brown and other revolutionaries who make sporadic appearances throughout the project—
Ernesto Guevara, Stokely Carmichael, Jesus Christ—who best actualize an emancipatory 
political theology responsive to the challenges of postmodernity. 
 
Contribution to Existing Literatures 
 
As a study of the category of decision in political-theological responses to the challenges of 
postmodernity, this project is relatively unique. While studies of decisionism and decision are 
becoming more popular—largely because of left-Schmittianism—these studies typically do not 
engage the specific problematics of the relationship between capitalism, racism, and 
metaphysics—with a lack of attention to metaphysics and Schmitt’s metaphysical theology being 
most pronounced.20 When these projects do venture in this direction, they do not offer sustained 
																																																						
20 In addition to Mouffe, the resurgence of Anglophone interest in Schmitt and decisionism is partly explained by the 
influence of Gopal Balakrishnan’s The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (Verso Books, 2002). The 
classic critical interpretation of Schmittian decisionism is Paul Hirst’s “Carl Schmitt’s Decisionism,” in The 
Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed. Mouffe (Verso Books, 1999). 
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theological critique or reflection.21 This lacuna—that political and theoretical analyses of 
decisionism tend to avoid engaging decisionism’s metaphysical and theological commitments—
is partly explainable by the semantic overdetermination of the term “political theology.” On the 
one hand, political theology, as Schmitt has it, is a description of the latent theology of secular 
political concepts. Discourses that accept this understanding of “political theology,” and this is 
basically Derrida’s understanding, are primarily concerned with revealing and often critiquing 
the implicit and hidden theological motifs operative within ostensibly secular discourses. On the 
other hand, theologians of the aforementioned radical orthodoxy movement—and its cousin 
discourses that take Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age as formative—also accept that secular 
discourses conceal an implied theology, but wish to valorize or promote, not critique, these latent 
theologisms.22 This understanding of political theology is markedly different from the sense 
intended by mostly German theologians like Johann Baptist Metz, Dorothee Sölle, and Jürgen 
Motlmann.23 Metz, Sölle, and Moltmann each looks to develop a Christian systematic theology 
that requires political praxis, which is basically understood as intentional engagement in the 
public sphere for the sake of liberationist ends. This sense of political theology better represents 
the intention of Cone and West’s respective projects, which hold that theological commitments 
imply particular anti-racist and anti-capitalist praxes.  
																																																						
21 The best “postmodern” reading of the category of decision in modern philosophy and theory is Geoffrey 
Bennington’s two-volume Scatter. While offering sustained readings of Schmitt, Kierkegaard, and Derrida, 
Bennington is largely unconcerned with the possibility of a religious response to the challenges of postmodernity. 
Needles to say, my general thesis—that an anti-metaphysical, anti-capitalist, and anti-racist political theology, 
especially as found with American black political theologians, is credibly responsive to the challenges of 
postmodernity—is not shared by Bennington. See: Geoffey Bennington, Scatter: The Politics of Politics in 
Foucault, Heidegger, and Derrida (Fordham University Press, 2016) and his forthcoming Scatter 2: Politics in 
Deconstruction (Fordham University Press, 2021). 
22 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007). 
23 For an overview of this strand of German political theology, see: John Cobb, Jr.’s Process Theology as Political 
Theology, especially chapter one, “The Challenge of Political Theology” (Westminster Press, 1982). 
	 18	
 Part of my effort in this project is to demonstrate that these two senses of political 
theology are ultimately indissociable from each other: Schmitt portrays himself as simply 
describing, but is actually advocating for and constructing a particular political theology in the 
Metz-Sölle-Moltmann sense. Likewise, someone like Cone most obviously appears to be 
operating with this latter sense of political theology—and presents himself as doing so—but is 
also, in his own way, critiquing the latent (bad) theology of dominant secular power structures 
and institutions. Indeed, my close association of capitalism, racism, and metaphysics would 
imply that the two senses of political theology—which, respectively, seem to emphasis either 
“political” or “theology”—ultimately inform, if not constitute, each other: it is for this reason 
that a  postmodern critique of metaphysics, seemingly more “theological,” can help critique 
ideological regimes and decisions that explicitly endorse or defend capitalism and racism—
projects that are seemingly more “political.” While Derrida will closely identify metaphysics 
with theology, Cone and Kierkegaard demonstrate that an anti-metaphysical theology is possible. 
And so whether or not one is doing metaphysics is not determined by the particular sense of 
political theology to which one adheres. Simply affirming a secular intention or an atheistic 
methodology is not a safeguard against “theological” thinking, if theology is understood as 
metaphysics. Likewise, a proud and dogged commitment to theology over and against 
secularism, such as Milbank’s, is no safeguard against a reinscription of the seemingly secular 
problems of capitalism and racism. The distinctions between secularism and religion on the one 
hand and metaphysics and politics on the other are never clean. Neither, then, is the distinction 
between these two senses of political theology. In this sense, this project contributes to both 
strands of political theological literature by rejecting each strand’s claim to autonomy. 
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 In addition to these meta-discursive contributions, this project makes several distinct 
interventions into scholarship on Schmitt, Derrida, Kierkegaard, and Cone. Referenced above, I 
argue against dominant, or at least prominent, interpretations of each of these figures: Against 
left-Schmittians, I argue that Schmitt’s entire political-theological argument is reactionary from 
the ground up; against both theologizing and atheizing interpretations of Derrida, I argue that he 
is best understood as a deconstructor of the identity of thinking and being and so as securing the 
possibility of either religious or atheist decisions; against the standard interpretation of the 
allegedly antithetical relationship between Kierkegaard and Marx, I argue that Kierkegaard is 
best understood as an anti-capitalist and dialectical materialist Christian existentialist; finally, 
against liberal race relations receptions of Cone, I argue that Cone, at least in his early work, is 
better understood as a proponent of a dialectical materialist, and specifically Marxist, anti-
racism.  
 In each of the above cases, my arguments are driven by an overarching concern: What 
sort of political theology, understood in the semantically overdetermined sense just articulated, is 
best responsive to the challenges of postmodernity? My prescriptive argument is that such a 
postmodern political theology should be anti-capitalist, anti-racist, and anti-metaphysical. My 
descriptive and historical argument is that such a political theology is found especially amongst 
black American political theologians like James Cone and Cornel West, both of whom are anti-
racist, anti-capitalist and anti-metaphysical. Of course, part of a political project interested in 
these commitments is a persistent commitment to solidarity. Solidarity, and especially the 
solidarity of the exploited and oppressed with each other, is the category that best links the 
political Marxist and theological Christian commitments of this project. The challenges of 
postmodernity call for a renewed militant solidarity. It is with a decision for solidarity—an 
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existential decision on which one risks his or her whole being—that, to paraphrase Cone, we find 
an affinity between our grandparents’ religion and Marxist revolutionary politics. Postmodern 
political theology is not diffuse, abstract, or even “poetic.” It is actual. It is materialist, 
emancipatory, historical, and, most of all, decisive.  
 Finally, I intend this project to contribute to “postmodern” political theology and theory. I 
have already been using the term, but its notoriously slippery semantic intention demands an 
attempt at definition. The terms “postmodern,” “postmodernity,” and “postmodernism” are 
obviously related but ultimately differ in function. “Postmodern,” as an adjective, is typically 
used to describe a style of literature, theory, architecture, homebuilding, or any other activity as 
different from its (hegemonic) “modern” mode. Typically, this adjectival use of the term is 
meant to signify an emphasis on plurality, difference, and indeterminacy over uniformity, 
sameness, and determination. Such emphases also lead to the association of modernity with 
“universalism” and “postmodernity” with “relativism.” As I will argue, these particular 
adjectival uses are hardly helpful, as these distinctions are themselves destabilized in the sort of 
“postmodern” theology with which I am interested.  
In general, “postmodernism” is the nominative form of this adjectival use. As a noun, 
“postmodernism” operates as if the adjective “postmodern” does actually capture some essential 
characteristic of a relatively coherent and self-contained discourse—typically philosophical. That 
is, the inscribing of “postmodernism” reifies the already spurious adjectival use. Of course, the 
problem with this use is that there is no such substantial postmodernism. In fact, in typical use, 
this label more signifies 20th century French philosophy than it does an actual self-contained or 
coherent school of thought. But this reference, too, is not without its own sublating and eliding 
effects. Judith Butler, a typically considered practitioner of postmodernism whose own 
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philosophical interests and commitments differ from this project’s, describes the problem with 
this approach: 
A number of positions are ascribed to postmodernism, as if it were the kind of thing that 
could be the bearer of a set of positions . . . These characterizations are variously imputed 
to postmodernism or post-structuralism, which are conflated with each other and 
sometimes conflated with deconstruction, and sometimes understood as an indiscriminate 
assemblage of French feminism, deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Foucaudian 
analysis, Rorty’s conversationalism, and cultural studies. On this side of the Atlantic and 
in recent discourse, the terms “postmodernism” or “poststructuralism” settle the 
differences among those positions in a single stroke, providing a substantive, a noun, that 
includes those positions as so many of its modalities or permutations.24 
That is, the appeal to “postmodernism” obviates differences and disputes in contemporary 
philosophy, theory, and theology. Moreover, in its reactionary American use, users of the term 
might rely on a secret Europhobia—or, more specifically, on a Francophobia. The association of 
this French postmodernism with groundlessness, rootlessness, mystification, and subversion 
could imply an underlying anti-Semitism.25 At the very least, the term becomes a tool for the 
erasure of difference. As a typically modern move, this erasure of difference—that is, the 
invention and use of the term postmodernism—itself becomes a typically modern philosophical 
																																																						
24 Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations,” in Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader, ed. Bronner 
(Routledge, 2005), pgs 401-413. 
25 Such a possibility is explored by Adorno and Horkheimer in their The Dialectic of Enlightenment, which 
demonstrates the close association between modernity, enlightenment, and anti-Semitism. See: Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Cumming (Verso Books, 1997), especially pgs 168-208. 
See also: Arthur Hertzberg, French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origin of Modern Anti-Semitism (Columbia 
University Press, 1990).  
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gesture. Which is to say, postmodernism—as noun, as boogeyman—is an invention of an over-
anxious modernity.  
 To what influences is this anxiety responding? The answer to this question demands 
engagement with the other nominative form mentioned above, “postmodernity.” Here, 
postmodernity refers less to a coherent philosophical discourse or aesthetic style as it does refer 
to a burgeoning philosophical, economic, or cultural epoch. The difference between 
postmodernity and postmodernism is that the former refers to an historical development, while 
the latter refers to a mythic academic discourse. This epochal sense is the one intended by, for 
example, Fredric Jameson, who speaks of postmodernity as a “period” and who presents a 
general argument concerning the relationship between modernity and postmodernity as a 
“periodizing hypothesis.” Of course, and despite the sense of openness effected by Jamerson’s 
frequent use of the plural “postmodernisms,” Jameson’s descriptive effort includes its own 
substantive arguments: postmodernity, he says, is marked by “depthlessness,” “a weakening of 
historicity,” “schizophrenia,” and “a whole new type of emotional ground tone.”26 However 
Jameson’s attempted historicizing of the allegedly non-historicizing is ultimately evaluated, it 
seems to me that the turn toward an epochal understanding of postmodernity, even given its 
obvious flaws concerning necessary elisions, does reflect some empirical movement away from 
the norms of modernity.  
 Specifically here, I have in mind the infrastructural differences between, on the one hand, 
21st century political economy, and on the other hand, 19th and 20th century political economy. 
This difference is best understood as the advent of “late capitalism,” according to which global 
capital is structured according to the demands and interests of primarily financial, as opposed to 
																																																						
26 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Duke University Press, 1996). 
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industrial, capitalists. An argument that a shift of political economy results in a concomitant shift 
in culture, style, academics, and so on is pursued by David Harvey.27 For Harvey, late capitalism 
qualitatively differs from modern capitalism in that late capitalism relies on “post-Fordist,” that 
is, non-industrial, means of value creation and extraction. This decentralization of value creation 
and extraction, in turn, coheres with mass consumption, the production of signs and simulacra, 
anti-hierarchicization as high and low culture conflate, and a theatricalization or performatization 
of daily life. Yet, ultimately, Harvey argues that this post-Fordist, post-modernist political-
economical-cultural complex should not deceive us: what we have is still capitalism, still a 
productive scheme reliant on private property, value extraction, and labor exploitation. Anti-
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic subcultures, even explicitly anti-capitalist and anti-modern 
ones, as critic Nato Thompson notes, are themselves quickly commodified and so capitalized.28 
 And so Harvey argues that a qualitative shift in the form and manifestation of capitalist 
productions associates with a qualitative shift in cultural, artistic, and theoretic productions. 
Uninterested in proving a causal link, and wary of arguing a deterministic one, between economy 
and thought, Harvey is satisfied to point out this correlative association—even if he strongly 
implies, but does not quite declare, a more basic causal relationship. For this project, such a 
causal relationship between capitalist forms of production and theory should be more strongly 
affirmed—even if the causation proves mutual, as theory and capital mutually constitute, reify, 
and motivate each other. It is capitalism’s need to exploit and the internalization of anti-
solidaristic ideologies that drive the oppressions of racisms, and it is this capitalist-racist dyad 
that relies on and promotes a substantialist and logocentric metaphysics. As Marx notes, the 
																																																						
27 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Wiley-
Blackwell, 1991). 
28 Nato Thompson, Seeing Power: Art and Activism in the 21st Century (Melville House, 2014). 
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ruling ideas of an epoch are the ideas of the epoch’s rulers. And so we would expect that a new 
capitalism—a more fluid one, a more decentralized and affective one—would bring about and 
encourage new metaphysics—perhaps a more fluid process variant, or a “poetics.” At the same 
time, a resistance to capitalism-racism would require a resistance to metaphysics, now 
understood as the superstructural-ideological supplement to capitalism-racism, in all of its new 
and evolving manifestations. Complementarily, part of the claim that we have entered into an age 
of postmodernity is that capitalism’s last breaths and most recent violent reactions are those of 
metaphysics, too.  
In this sense, “postmodernity” not only signals Jameson’s depthlessness and Harvey’s 
post-Fordism, but also a change in the metadiscursive critique of metaphysics. Indeed, this 
wariness and suspicion of modern metaphysics and all of its comforts—foundationalism, truth, 
progress, essence, God—is, it seems to me, what is ultimately intended by the previously 
mentioned uses of “postmodernism.” Surely nobody has characterized Judith Butler, for 
example, as a postmodernist because of her engagement, if it exists, with post-Fordist models of 
production. Instead, a sense, true or not, informed by style or substance, that Butler is somehow 
subverting established and comfortable metaphysical norms seems operative in the labeling of 
her as a postmodern theorist. Rather than dispute this vague sense that “postmodernity” is 
antithetical to metaphysics, this project gladly and full-throatedly endorses anti-metaphysics. If 
this position raises alarms that “postmodernity” is thus antithetical to modern and western 
structures and practices—if not “western civilization” itself—then all the better, especially if 
modernity and the west signify capitalism and racism.  
And so, finally, I can offer something like a provisional definition of postmodernity as it 
concerns my intentions in this project: Postmodernity is the deconstruction, the critique and 
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overturning, of modernity’s trinitarian political theology—capitalism, racism, metaphysics. In 
this way, not only Harvey and Jameson, but theorists critical of modern philosophy become 
theorists of the postmodern. I have in mind here not only Boris Groys’ sense of “anti-
philosophy,” but also Kierkegaard and Derrida, both of whom will take philosophy to and 
ultimately past its breaking point.29 Theirs is a philosophy critical of philosophy; that is, theirs is 
postmodern. And with these philosophical reifications deconstructed, we become more free to 
look nakedly at the horrors that take place under  and because of capital—to feel and resist the 
















29 Boris Groys, Introduction to Antiphilosophy (Verso Books, 2012). 
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Chapter One 
Polemical Ontology: Decision in Carl Schmitt  
 
Introduction: Is there a left Schmitt? 
In 1987 Telos, an English language post-Marxist critical theory journal, published two 
special issues on the work of Carl Schmitt.30 Featuring both original translations of Schmitt’s 
work and commentaries on it, the issues helped inaugurate what is now known as “left 
Schmittianism.” Although not a clearly defined or even always coherent movement, and even 
less a “school,” left Schmittians typically accept two features of Schmitt’s political project: First, 
it is held that Schmitt offers a compelling and relevant critique of the failures of political and 
philosophical liberalism, and that this critique is somehow useful for those who either wish to 
preserve the longevity of liberalism or else attack liberalism from the left. Second, Schmitt’s 
famous friend/enemy distinction is held to offer a way of understanding, or even a way of 
fomenting, emancipatory subjectivities by clearly demarcating friends and enemies of liberation. 
The most prominent contemporary left Schmittian is the French political theorist Chantal 
Mouffe.31 For Mouffe, left Schmittianism offers an important corrective to what she calls the 
																																																						
30  Telos 71 (1987) and Telos 73 (1987). Table of contents for both are accessible here: 
http://journal.telospress.com/content/by/year/1987. 
31  But she is by no means the only one. See, for example, Matthew Gayetsky’s “Partisans in Empire, or, Carl 
Schmitt as Revolutionary?” Theory and Event 18.4 (2015), wherein Gayetsky writes that “Schmitt offers a rough 
outline for those forms of subjectivity which can act in opposition to Empire.” Or Banu Bargu’s “The Predicaments 
of Left-Schmittianism,” South Atlantic Quarterly 113:4 (2014), 713-727. Bargu’s account is more sympathetic to 
Marx than is Mouffe’s. Drawing on Jodi Dean’s The Communist Horizon (Verso, 2018), Bargu argues that the 
“formalism” of “the Schmittian point that the political is based on a fundamental antagonism” can be “injected . . 
.  with an economic analysis and normative orientation that is derived from Marxism” (717). While I agree that the 
Marxist distinction between proletariat and capitalist—or Dean’s distinction between “the 1% and the rest of us”—
appears to structurally resemble Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy, my reading of Schmitt will argue 
that he is not at all a formalist. That is, his “formalism” cannot be “injected” with a different content because his 
formalism is always already deeply imbued with an ontologized pro-capitalist and anti-Semitic content. I support 
Bargu’s and Dean’s attempt at repoliticization, but only insofar as this politicization is distinctly inspired by Marx, 
not Schmitt. For example, only the overlooking of Schmitt’s deeply anti-Marxist commitments can allow for Bargu 
to write that the “paradoxical but productive convergence of the far Right and the far Left and invites deeper 
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Marxist left’s “class essentialism” (FLP, 2).32 Writing of the phenomenon in the past tense, 
Mouffe states that this “essentialist perspective dominant in left thinking” argued that “political 
identities were the expression of the position of the social agents in the relations of production 
and their interests were defined by this position” (ibid). According to Mouffe, this class 
essentialism, which allegedly reduces all non-economic identity to superstructural expressions of 
an essentially economic infrastructural reality, could not account for democratic struggles that 
apparently took place outside of an exclusively economic sphere. In Mouffe’s anti-essentialist 
perspective, allegedly essentialist Marxism failed to offer a helpful analytic regime for 
understanding—or a helpful political regime for promoting—either the French unrest in May, 
1968 or the 1960s civil rights movements in America (FLP, 1). Indeed, this inability to engage 
democratic struggles without reducing them to epiphenomena of class “has always been . . . the 
fundamental mistake of the ‘extreme left’” (FLP, 50). 
And so unable to rely on Marxism either to explain or promote non-economic democratic 
struggles, the left had a “need to take account of all the democratic struggles which have 
emerged in a variety of social relations and which could not be apprehended through the 
category of ‘class’” (OTP, 53).33 It is with Schmitt, and specifically with Schmitt’s more 
generalized understanding of antagonism, that Mouffe finds the potential resources for just such 
an account. According to Mouffe, “antagonism, as Schmitt says, is an ever present possibility” 
(OTP, 16). That is, rather than result from a particular historical class struggle, political 
antagonism is an irreducible ontological fact: “the political belongs to our ontological condition” 
																																																						
reflection on this current of thought” (726). There cannot be any convergence between Marxism and anti-Marxism 
on the point of Marxism, and so I fail to see how the inclusion of Schmittian logic or rhetoric adds anything—
material or intellectual—to Bargu’s or Dean’s emancipatory projects. 
32 Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (Verso, 2018). 
33 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (Routledge, 2005). 
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(ibid). While class struggle might be one possible ontic manifestation of this ontological 
condition, it cannot, according to Mouffe, be raised to the ontological level of generalized 
antagonism. Such an elevation of class to an ontological level—class essentialism—is what 
prevented Marxism from addressing other forms of democratic struggles. Marxists allegedly 
ontologize an ontic condition; they elevate one type of “politics” to the status of “the political” as 
such (OTP, 17). This ontologizing of class, according to Mouffe, colonizes and so reduces the 
inherently pluralistic “the political” to one particular form. In this sense, Marxism not only does 
not account for non-economic democratic struggles; more strongly, Mouffe suggests that a 
Marxist account of “the political” is itself antagonistic toward these struggles.34 Schmitt’s 
recognition of the unavoidability of antagonism, then, is held to prevent the sort of economic 
reduction of “the political” made possible by Marxist class essentialism. 
Yet, Mouffe is aware of the fascist and violent contours of Schmitt’s understanding of 
antagonistic politics. To this end, she offers no blind acceptance of Schmitt’s program, but 
instead proposes “to think ‘with Schmitt against Schmitt’” (OTP, 14). If Mouffe thinks “with 
Schmitt” by agreeing that political antagonism is an ontological fact, she thinks “against 
Schmitt” by inscribing this antagonism not between the nation and the Jew—as does Schmitt—
but instead more generally within any established political identity. That is, whereas Schmitt 
conceives of antagonism as occurring between political peoples or identities, Mouffe (rightly, in 
my view) argues that each and every political identity is always already marked by internal 
contradictions and antagonisms. Again, Mouffe’s interest here is post-Marxist: she is resisting 
																																																						
34 Along these same lines, Susan Buck-Morss turns to Schmitt as a corrective to “Marxian preoccupations with the 
global economy” that allegedly do not address “the specifically political nature of global power—political in the 
old-fashioned, institutional sense of the word, meaning sovereignty, legitimacy, violence, and war.” See: “Sovereign 
Right and the Global Left,” Cultural Critique 69 (2008), 145-171. 
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the allegedly Marxist position that economic liberation will necessarily lead to universal 
emancipation:  
When I wrote On the Political I suggested reviving the left/right frontier, but I am now 
convinced that, as traditionally configured, such a frontier is no longer adequate to 
articulate a collective will that contains the variety of democratic demands that exist 
today. The populist moment is the expression of a set of heterogeneous demands, which 
cannot be formulated merely in terms of interests linked to determinate social categories. 
Furthermore, in neoliberal capitalism new forms of subordination have emerged outside 
the productive process. They have given rise to demands that no longer correspond to 
social sectors defined in sociological terms and by their location in the social structure. 
Such claims – the defense of the environment, struggles against sexism, racism and other 
forms of domination – have become increasingly central. This is why today the political 
frontier needs to be constructed in a ‘populist’ transversal mode (FLP, 6). 
That is, Schmitt’s ontologized antagonism offers a “populist” framing for understanding a 
plurality of democratic struggles, but only insofar as this ontologized antagonism remains critical 
of every political identity and so is not itself reduced to an anti-Semitic nationalism—that is, 
only insofar as Schmittian antagonism remains ontological and is not reduced to any particular 
ontic manifestation. To distinguish between these two possible senses of populist antagonisms, 
Mouffe often refers to the antagonism existing within every identity as “agonism”: “What is at 
stake in the agonistic struggle (note: as opposed to the Schmittian ‘antagonistic’ struggle) is the 
very configuration of power relations around which a given society is structured: it is a struggle 
between opposing hegemonic projects which can never be reconciled rationally” (OTP, 21). By 
noting that these struggles can never be rationally reconciled, Mouffe again affirms the 
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unavoidable ontological condition of antagonism as such. In all, Mouffe’s project is a left 
Schmittian one because it (1) accepts the unavoidability of antagonism and the use-value of the 
friend/enemy distinction, and (2) locates this ontologized antagonism within every political 
order, and (3) identifies the “friend” as the friend of democracy in each and every agonistic 
struggle. 
In my view, Mouffe’s program has merit as a corrective against allegedly post-political 
third way programs (FLP, 79). Wary of consensus politics, Mouffe provides a decidedly non-
proceduralist and non-parliamentarian account of politics that the oppressed and exploited ought 
to welcome. However, Mouffe’s account, especially in its relation to Marx, faces at least three 
challenges.  
First, Mouffe’s critique of Marx, in both its generalities and particulars, falls short in a 
couple of significant areas. According to Mouffe, Marxism cannot address non-economic forms 
of oppression. Against “class reductionism,” Mouffe suggests a pluralist praxis wherein differing 
interest groups align on the basis of defending democracy as such. Unfortunately, this is a 
necessarily internally contradictory program. As will become important in this project’s final 
chapter, programs of class solidarity, gender solidarity, and race solidarity necessarily exclude 
one another: members of any ascriptive identity—race or gender—stand in agonistic relations to 
other members of said ascriptive identities who hold differing and competing material interests. 
Thus, programs of ascriptive solidarity necessarily run counter to programs of economic 
solidarity, because economic solidarity demands cross-racial and cross-gender alliance. But this 
necessity of cross-racial and cross-gender praxis runs antithetical to, and is impossible in the face 
of, racial and gender solidarity. That is, simply, it is impossible for any person to consistently 
show race, gender, and class solidarity because each category cuts through—in Mouffe’s 
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language, creates agonisms within—each other category. Put another way, while it is possible for 
a person of any “race” to be an anti-racist, and while it is possible for a person of any “gender” to 
be a feminist, it is definitionally impossible for a capitalist to be pro-labor unless said capitalist 
gives up his or her privileged economic position as capitalist. Because economic “identities” are 
structural and not primarily ascriptive, the logic of class solidarity is qualitatively different than 
other forms of emancipatory struggle.35 
Along these lines, Mouffe’s repetition of the “class reductionism” critique of Marxism 
does not adequately address the complexity of Marx’s account of either dialectical materialism 
or socialism. As will be explored in detail in this project’s final chapter, Marxist dialectical 
materialism does not “reduce” all forms of exploitation and oppression to an economic 
infrastructure as much as it does elevate material concerns to the position of measure of 
liberation: liberation is a historical and material event, and that is all Marx means.36 Obviously, 
racism, for example, is not (only) produced on the factory line and a classless society would not 
necessarily be a society without racism. But none of this is a reason to dismiss Marxism, because 
																																																						
35 See: Adolph Reed Jr., “Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism,” New Labor Forum 22.1 (2013), 49-57; as well as Ellen 
Meiskins Wood, “Class, Race, and Capitalism,” Political Power and Social Theory 15 (2002), 275-284 
36 For an example of a Marxist materialist treatment of racist and sexist forms of oppression, see: David Harvey, 
Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (Verso Books, 2012); esp. pgs 132-136, wherein 
Harvey writes that “the way capital differentiates and divides populations ethnically, racially, and across gender 
lines produces marked disparities in the economic dynamics of dispossession in the living space (thanks to the 
circuits of money and commodity capital). While the median loss of household wealth in the United States for 
everyone was 28 percent over the period 2005-2009, that of Hispanics was 66 percent, and that of blacks 53 percent, 
while for whites it was 16 percent. The class character of ethnic discriminations in accumulation by dispossession, 
and the way these discriminations differentially affect neighborhood life, could not be plainer, particularly since 
most of the losses were due to falling housing values.” Here, Harvey provides a class analysis—the dispossession of 
real estate by the capitalist class—of a racially differentiated oppression. What makes Harvey’s analysis materialist, 
though, is not just the use of class struggle to explain capital dispossession, but also that his measure of analysis is 
itself material: household wealth. Framing racialized economic disparities as economic exploitations insures that 
Harvey is treating racism as the phenomena to be explained, and not as itself explanatory. This difference in analytic 
causality—racism as needing to be explained and not as explanatory in and of itself, as if it had ontological force—
will prove important in this project’s final chapter. in For a more general theoretical Marxist defense against the 
charge of class reductionism, see: Adolph Reed Jr., “The Myth of Class Reductionism,” The New Republic, 
accessed: https://newrepublic.com/article/154996/myth-class-reductionism.  
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neither of those positions were Marx’s. In fact, the suggestion that Marxism precludes anti-racist 
praxis erases the long history of black socialists who found an intimate and organic connection 
between economic justice and anti-racism: W.E.B. Dubois, Ella Baker, A. Phillip Randolph and 
the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Bayard Rustin, Kwame Ture, Barbara Smith, Huey 
Newton, Fred Hampton, Angela Davis, the young Eldridge Cleaver, Cornel West, and countless 
others were and are prominent black socialist anti-racists who recognized that anti-capitalist 
struggle, insofar as it requires cross-racial class solidarity, requires anti-racism. That necessity of 
anti-racism to the socialist project—perhaps more important now than ever—is unhelpfully 
denied in Mouffe’s claim that Marxism does not address non-economic forms of oppression. 
Other particularities of Mouffe’s critique of Marx also deserve scrutiny—for example, her 
suggestion that Marxism accounts for only the “productive process” is based on a myopic 
reading of only the first volume of Capital, and does not at all address the second and incomplete 
third volumes of Capital, which are about not production, but instead consumption and credit, 
respectively—which is still to say nothing of Marx’s vast engagement with racist and colonialist 
injustices.37 
Second, on a more thematic level—abstracting from these particularities of her critique of 
Marx—what is worrisome from an emancipatory perspective is that Mouffe has explicitly sided 
with Schmitt against Marx. According to the German historian Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Mouffe is 
not alone among left Schmittians in her anti- or “post-”Marxist positioning: 
The attention that Schmitt’s work has received during the last two decades marks a 
phenomenal shift in his standing in anglophone academic discussions . . . To a large 
extent, this process was facilitated by the need to find an oppositional theory after the 
																																																						
37  For an overview of these writings, see: Kevin B. Anderson, Marx on the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and 
Non-Western Societies (University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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demise of state socialism in Eastern and Central Europe and the subsequent 
marginalization of the Marxist tradition. Schmitt was discovered as a fierce critic of 
liberalism when the victorious West claimed that liberal capitalism was the final answer 
to the world’s problems (181).38 
That is, the western left turned to Schmitt as a resource for critiquing post-political liberalism 
when Marxist theory and Marxist praxis no longer seemed viable options. With the decline of the 
USSR in the late 80s and early 90s, formally marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, and 
with the proclamation of the “end of history” found in Francis Fukuyama and his post-political 
followers,39 the left found itself in a position desperate to reclaim some theoretical ground from 
which to launch critique. Schmitt, allegedly, offered such a ground. 
However, as my reading in this chapter will argue, Schmitt’s polemic was never 
primarily directed at liberalism. Indeed, he himself subscribed to a type of liberalism—
“ordoliberalism”—that favors an authoritarian state tasked with securing and preserving the 
health of private capitalist markets. Schmitt was not an anti-liberal polemicist. He was an anti-
democratic and an anti-Marxist one. These polemics, in turn, were guided by an ontologized 
racist anti-Semitism. With this in mind, the left’s turn to Schmitt marks not a post-Marxist 
attempt at critique of the post-political liberal consensus, but an (unintentional) endorsement of a 
racially ontologized anti-democratic anti-Marxism. But if Marxism is taken as a critique of 
capitalist exploitation in all of its forms, as it is and should be, then the left cannot credibly call 
itself both left and anti-Marx. 
Finally, Mouffe does not offer any theoretical or theological critique of Schmitt’s 
theology. This is unfortunate, because Schmitt’s ontologized racism, mentioned above, is 
																																																						
38  Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Perilous Futures: On Carl Schmitt’s Late Writings, (Cornell University Press, 2018). 
39  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Simon and Schuster, 1992). 
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informed by and informs his highly metaphysical theology. Schmitt everywhere subscribes to a 
substance metaphysics and relies on such metaphysical categories as autonomy, potential, 
actuality, substance, essence, unity, beauty, transcendence, and the good. While the theoretical 
problems of these terms—their incredibility in a postmodern context—will be clarified in this 
project’s next chapter, the important point for now is simply that, in Schmitt’s texts at least, these 
metaphysical concepts serve to undermine the sort of open and democratic pluralism of which 
Mouffe is rightfully after. Schmitt’s reactionary politics and his substance metaphysics, 
especially when this metaphysics reifies and fetishizes identity and unity, inform each other. 
Mouffe’s lack of engagement with Schmitt’s metaphysics seems to prevent her from fully 
grasping the depth of reaction in Schmitt’s politics. 
But as Hohendahl also notes, Mouffe is not alone in not engaging with Schmitt’s 
metaphysical theology: 
One of the amazing features of this revision is the almost complete occlusion of the 
theological element, which was clearly crucial to the historical Schmitt. Accordingly, the 
new American Schmitt is as secular as his liberal and socialist opponents . . .The Anglo-
American Left has focused its appropriation of Schmitt on his critique of liberalism and 
liberal democracy, avoiding, by and large, contact with Schmitt’s theological thought as 
the basis of his theory as a whole. The Left prefers a secular Schmitt (181/184). 
As this chapter argues, Schmitt’s political theology implies and requires a fascistic and 
authoritarian theology of a transcendent lawgiver who has ontologically enmitized Jews and has 
eternally chosen Europe as the site of law, order, and beauty. Moreover, Schmitt identifies 
Christian theology, which he grounds in a transcendent lawgiving sovereign, with anti-Marxism 
and anti-democracy—that is, with capitalism. And so the problem with Schmitt’s political 
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theology is not just its metaphysical form or its fascistic and capitalist content, but is the way 
these two dimensions mutually inform and reinforce each other. This is a complicated associative 
matrix, and the next part of this chapter will describe its inner structuration and its hold on the 
entirety of Schmitt’s program. For now, the pertinent claim is that Schmitt’s political theology is 
a reactionary one, both politically and theologically.  
As a leftist political theology interested in promoting a certain type of decisionism, this 
project might have risked embracing such a left Schmittianism. But as should now be clear, such 
is not at all my intention. Nor, however, does any of this mean that decisionism should be ceded 
to reactionaries. That is, I would like to defend a type of decisionism that does not cosign 
Schmitt’s reactionary politics and theology. In the final analysis, a decisionism without Schmitt 
is possible—the decisionist baby does not need to be thrown out with the Schmittian bathwater—
because Schmitt himself, despite his rhetoric and his traditional reception, did not offer a theory 
of decisionism worthy of the name. Because of his penchant for ontologization, indicated above, 
the problem with Schmitt is not an excess of decisionism, but a dearth of it. Where Schmitt does 
make decisions in the strong sense of the term—deciding in an undecidable context—he decides 
for capitalism, fascism, the state, the law, and so on. More typically, though, he defers his own 
responsibility for deciding through appeals to a mythical ontological law. Here as elsewhere, and 
as will be a motif throughout this project, a metaphysical theology and a reactionary politics 
mutually inform each other in their joint rejection of decision. A left political theology credible 
in postmodernity must be decisive and it must decide for total emancipation. It can find neither 
in Schmitt. 
And it is to this important category of decision that this chapter will now turn. Through a 
careful reading of Schmitt’s use of the category in three major texts—Dictatorship, The Concept 
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of the Political, and Political Theology—this chapter warns against a leftist appropriation of 
Schmitt for all of the reasons gestured toward above: where Schmitt makes decisions, they are 
bad ones; where Schmitt makes provocative and attractive moves—e.g., his insistence on 
politicization and antagonism—he does so for the sake of preserving markedly exploitative 
structures. Throughout, Schmitt’s anti-decisionism is informed by a traditional metaphysics and 
a reactionary understanding of theology as ontologically opposed to democratic socialism and 
aligned with fascistic capitalism. In the final analysis, a left political theology cannot credibly 
decide for Schmitt, because Schmitt has already decided against the left.  
Decision in Dictatorship 
1922 saw the publication of the second edition of Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the 
West. In it, Spengler writes: 
The idealist of the early democracy regarded popular education as enlightenment pure 
and simple—but it is precisely this that smooths the path for the coming Caesars of the 
world. The last century was the winter of the West, the victory of materialism and 
skepticism, of socialism, parliamentarianism, and money. But in this century blood and 
instinct will regain their rights against the power of money and intellect. The era of 
individualism, liberalism and democracy, of humanitarianism and freedom, is nearing its 
end. The masses will accept with resignation the victory of the Caesars, the strong men, 
and will obey them. Life will descend to a level of general uniformity, a new kind of 
primitivism, and the world will be better for it (395).40 
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The year also saw the publication of the second edition of Karl Barth’s The Epistle to the 
Romans, a dialectical—and Kierkegaardian—assault on German liberal Protestantism. In it, 
Barth writes: 
The Gospel is not a religious message to inform mankind of their divinity or to tell them 
how they may become divine. The Gospel proclaims a God utterly distinct from men. 
Salvation comes to them from Him, because they are, as men, incapable of knowing Him, 
and because they have no right to claim anything from Him (28).41 
And also: 
Religion is the possibility of the removal of every ground of confidence except 
confidence in God alone. Piety is the possibility of the removal of the last traces of a firm 
foundation upon which we can erect a system of thought (88). 
Spengler’s articulation of imminent epochal decline was grounded in race science and a 
mythology of archetypes. Barth’s articulation of dialectical theology rejected any theology, 
especially those “natural theologies” with immanent and philosophical foundations, not 
grounded exclusively in God’s unique and salvific decision for humanity. In Spengler, Germany 
read about the decline of liberal parliamentarism. In Barth, the shortcomings and hubris of liberal 
Protestantism. In Spengler, the displacement of a culture. In Barth, the importance of radical 
decision.  
Schmitt, a recently appointed professor in the law faculty, would have absorbed this 
postwar German intellectual climate in the small university town of Greifswald, eighty 
kilometers from the Polish border on the Baltic coast. Schmitt’s experience in Greifswald was 
marked by a strong sense of provincial alienation: 
																																																						
41 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Hoskyns. Oxford University Press, 1968, 28. 
	 38	
Griefswald was a particularly alienating environment for Schmitt: the university at the 
bottom of the hierarchy of German universities, the town a dreary and inclement cultural 
backwater. From his correspondence with Ernst Robertus Curtius, it is easy to discern 
that Schmitt was in a despairing mood during his brief stay, not knowing how brief it 
would be: ‘I keenly sympathize with your Greifswald situation . . . That you will be 
buried there seems highly unlikely. For both of us it is a matter of a short-term evil’ 
(42).42 
It was from within this short-term evil that Schmitt published Dictatorship: From the Beginning 
of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle.43 In that text, relying on 
the thought of sixteenth-century French political theorist Jean Bodin, Schmitt delineates two 
types of dictatorship: commissarial and sovereign. The commissarial dictator is placed in 
dictatorial command by an agent of the state and for the purpose of reestablishing legal norms in 
exceptional times: “the commissary dictatorship suspends the constitution in order to protect it in 
its concrete form” (188). The commissarial dictator responds to the command of a sovereign 
agent. That is, the commissarial dictator is granted permission to act lawlessly, but, precisely as 
granted, this lawless freedom operates from within an order carefully circumscribed by a 
sovereign agent “outside” and, in some sense, “above” the very order suspended. It is a 
lawlessness that preserves the foundations of law. 
 The primary difference between this commissarial type of dictatorship and the sovereign 
type is that the sovereign dictator does not rectify an already existing order but instead 
inaugurates a new one: 
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The entire existing order is a situation that dictatorship will resolve through its own 
actions. Dictatorship does not suspend an existing constitution through a law based on the 
constitution; rather, it seeks to create conditions in which a constitution—a constitution 
that it regards as the true one—is made possible (189). 
That is, whereas the commissarial dictator responds to an emergency by rectifying the current 
order, the sovereign dictator responds to such an emergency by creating a new order. Both 
dictators respond to an emergency, but the one looks to rectify and the other looks to create. One 
is a “dictatorship of reformations” and the other a “dictatorship of revolutions” (xliv).  
While Schmitt relies on Bodin’s theorizing for articulating this “crucial distinction” 
conceptually or definitionally (xliv), he is not content with a purely structural distinction. To this 
end, Schmitt’s historical argument is that the late eighteenth-century—Schmitt has in mind the 
French revolution—inaugurated a shift in the meaning of dictatorship from primarily 
commissarial to primarily sovereign. While Schmitt presents this development as primarily a 
change in the dominant meaning of dictatorship, or as a “transition” from one type of 
dictatorship to another, his ostensibly descriptive historical argument masks an implicit 
normative critique against, not this shift in the meaning of dictatorship, but more powerfully 
against the new form of sovereignty that such a shift implies. Specifically, Schmitt is worried 
that a sovereign dictatorship has actually, somewhat paradoxically, democratized sovereignty. In 
Schmitt’s view, such a democratization ultimately leads to an undermining of not only the state, 
but also politics in the proper—that is, Euro-Christian—sense. The object of his descriptive 
historiography is “dictatorship,” but the polemical target of his normative theorization is 
something like “mass sovereignty.” 
	 40	
Despite its peculiarity, Schmitt’s concern that sovereign dictatorship might democratize 
sovereignty does adhere to a certain logic. Noting the different structural locations of sovereignty 
in the two models of dictatorship points toward this logic. In the commissarial model of 
dictatorship, the sovereign—in the singular, a king or emperor, typically, or for Schmitt what 
amounts to the same, God—functions as an outside anchor of order, and the dictator as the 
sovereign’s representative and carefully appointed tool. This ordering of representation, 
sovereignty, and utilization is upended in the sovereign model of dictatorship: the place once 
held by the outside sovereign is now held by the constituting power of the people, who, 
somewhat paradoxically, empower as their representative a sovereign dictator with total freedom 
to create a new legal order and regime. In the commissarial model, the sovereign operates from 
an as if untouchable outside. The sovereign creates, declares, suspends, and reimplements the 
legal order as he or she wishes. Dictatorship is constituted by and responsive to the sovereign, 
who, much like the Cartesian god, decides freely and without necessary consideration of the 
desires or arguments of the world over which he or she rules. In the sovereign dictatorship 
model, on the other hand, the dictator creates a new order with no regard for or loyalty to any 
pre-established outside location or anchor of sovereignty. With the old privileged position of 
transcendent sovereignty effaced, the sovereign dictatorship’s political order operates with its 
own foundations, legitimations, and juridical norms.  
For Schmitt, such a radical and revolutionary form of sovereignty undermines the 
ideality—the substantial continuity—of the state. The commissarial dictator preserves the state’s 
identity by adhering to the commands of the sovereign, who transcends the accidental ebbs and 
flows of political variation. The sovereign dictator, however, does total violence to the state’s 
identity in that this dictator entirely rejects the power and legitimacy of the old transcendent 
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sovereign in favor of a new regime. And so the machinations of sovereign dictatorship lead to 
the decline of not only a particular state—for example, the Kingdom of France—but more 
radically to the rejection of the model of substantial statehood grounded in transcendent 
sovereignty.  To the extent that such a statist model coheres with the European tradition of divine 
right, then sovereign dictatorship can also be read as a moment in the Spenglerian decline of the 
West.  
And so Schmitt’s critique of sovereign dictatorship and its commitment to mass 
democratic sovereignty is in part informed by a substance metaphysics: It is both the substance 
of the state and the fact that the state is a substance that must be defended. Here we see an early 
example of the confluence of Schmitt’s metaphysical theology and his politics—that is, his 
political theology: that the state is a substance is the allegedly Euro-Christian political-
theological model of sovereignty that Schmitt promotes and defends. This is the theological and 
metaphysical dimension—indeed, for Schmitt theology is metaphysics—with which left 
Schmittians typically do not critically engage.44 This lack of engagement is unfortunate because, 
as is typical of Schmitt, these political-theological concerns are most clearly expressed in a 
polemic against Marxism. 
 First, Schmitt charges that Marxism, via its hope for the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
explicitly identifies sovereignty not with a single sovereign agent but with a collective:  
In Marxism, where the agent of all real political activity is not an individual but a whole 
class, it is not difficult to define the proletariat as a collective entity—that is, the genuine 
agent—and therefore to see it as the subject of a dictatorship (xxxix). 
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Against the norms of Christian political theology grounded in a transcendent sovereign, atheist 
Marxism identifies sovereignty with the collective, not an individual.45 Marxism indicates a 
grammatical shift from the singular concrete “the dictator” or “the sovereign” to the abstract 
collective “dictatorship” and “sovereignty.” When Schmitt provides a historical account of 
European sovereignty, the dictator is a “he.” When Schmitt provides an account of Marxist 
political theory, dictatorship is an “it.” For Schmitt, this depersonalization is a retreat from 
politics proper into an impersonal Hegelian metaphysics of progress. The extent to which 
Schmitt’s own political theory, his ideal politics proper, is too embedded in an impersonal 
metaphysical structure will become clear in time. 
Second, Schmitt directly links this collectivization with an undermining of the state:  
From the perspective of a general theory of the state, the dictatorship of a proletariat 
identified with the people at large, in transition to an economic situation in which the 
state is ‘withering away,’ presupposes the concept of a sovereign dictatorship, just in the 
form it stands at the root of the theory and practice of the National Convention. What 
Engels required for his ‘praxis,’ in his address to the League of Communists in March 
1850, also held for a political theory of the state of this transition to statelessness: it was 
the same situation ‘as in France 1793’ (179). 
In a defensible reading of Engels, Schmitt traces a line from the French Revolution to the specter 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For Schmitt, what links Robespierre to Marx is first and 
foremost their acceptance of the sovereign model of dictatorship—a model that explicitly rejects 
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two tenets of, according to Schmitt, classical Christo-European culture: the identification of 
sovereignty with a transcendent agent and the substantial ideality of the state. 
Dictatorship, then, quietly constructs a reactionary conceptual matrix. On the one side, 
and valued positively, Schmitt associates concepts such as substance, exteriority/the outside, the 
transcendent sovereign, European monarchy, culture, and Christianity. On the other side, and 
valued negatively, stand concepts such as revolutionary change, immanence, collective 
sovereignty, anti-statism, “decline,” and, perhaps, the Jewish atheism of Marx and the anti-
Catholic deism of Robespierre. Schmitt opposes Marxism to what he considers to be Christian 
culture and theology. In other words, in Schmitt’s text there is a positive affinity between the 
theological motifs of transcendence, substance, and exteriority, on the one hand, and the fascist 
motifs of the superiority of European culture, permanence, and fidelity to the state and the 
sovereign, on the other. Although published a year before the text titled Political Theology, 
Dictatorship has already constructed a political-theological hermeneutic. 
Decision in Political Theology 
 “Sovereign is the one who decides on the exception.”  
 So begins Political Theology. The goal of this section is to explicate the meaning of 
decision in this definition and to show that Schmitt has conceived of decision in a decidedly 
undemocratic and anti-Marxist way. To start a reading of decision with this definition might 
seem misguided: the definition is not, at least not at first glance, a definition of decision, but of 
sovereignty. Schmitt is using the concept of decision to help define the concept of sovereignty; 
he is not, at least not explicitly or intentionally, defining decision through an appeal to 
sovereignty. Yet, my argument is that this appearance serves an ideological function: Schmitt 
ostensibly uses the concept of decision to inform a definitional understanding of sovereignty; yet 
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Schmitt actually abuses the ambiguity of the concept of decision to reify a particular political-
theological sense of sovereignty. 
The opening of this ambiguity is the prepositional indeterminacy of “on.” The definition 
states not only that “sovereign is the one who decides,” but more curiously that “sovereign is the 
one who decides on.” What does to decide on mean? The German reads: Souverän ist, wer über 
den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.46 What is the meaning of über?  
Schmitt’s definition necessarily relies on this prepositional indeterminacy because he 
wants to emphasize the “exceptional” nature of sovereignty. The sovereign decides “on the”—
that is, either whether or when there is an—exception. He is not concerned with quotidian 
decisions. Nor is he concerned with the sort of sovereignty one might expect to find in the home 
or workplace. For Schmitt, sovereignty is a high stakes game. It is a concept that associates with 
the highest and most dramatic moments of life and operates at the extreme limits of the already 
extreme “spheres” of theology and politics. It is a “borderline concept”: 
Only this definition can do justice to a borderline concept. Contrary to the imprecise 
terminology that is found in popular literature, a borderline concept is not a vague 
concept, but one pertaining to the outermost sphere. This definition of sovereignty must 
therefore be associated with a borderline case and not with routine (PT, 6). 
On the one hand, we read of borders and the outermost: the sovereign is found in the outermost 
border or sphere—and here the difference between residing on a border and residing within an 
outer sphere is curiously, and for Schmitt’s purposes helpfully, elided. On the other hand, we see 
a rejection of vagueness, folk theorizing, and common or routine sense. It is a concept that is 
either on “the border” or “pertains” to “the outermost sphere,” and does so with precision. That 
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the appeal to precision occurs immediately after a declaration of liminality only further suggests 
that Schmitt does not succumb to as much as dominate and control semantic and logical play and 
indeterminacy. He defines the concept vaguely and declares that he has done so precisely. 
These appeals to precision, specificity, and rigor feign an air of philosophical objectivity 
that obfuscates Schmitt’s underlying polemical motivations: according to Schmitt, neither 
parliamentary democracy or Marxism can account for sovereignty as a border concept. Schmitt’s 
anti-parliamentarian polemic argues that this type of democracy rejects true sovereignty through 
a fetishization of proceduralism. For Schmitt, obsession with procedure immanentizes and 
democratizes, and ultimately permanently defers, real, which is to say “bloody,” decision. 
Parliamentary democracy “discusses and negotiates every political detail” (64). Because of this 
fetish, the parliamentarian can only ever advocate for “a cautious half measure, in the hope that 
the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate 
and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion” (PT, 64). 
Devastatingly, and relying again on the counter-revolutionary Catholic Donoso Cortes, Schmitt 
says that parliamentary democracy exists “only in that short interim period in which it was 
possible to answer the question ‘Christ or Barabbas?’ with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a 
commission of investigation” (63).  
The appeal to the Passover amnesty story is more than rhetorical flourish. The Gospel of 
Mark tells the story like this: 
Now at the feast he used to release for them any one prisoner whom they requested. The 
man named Barabbas had been imprisoned with the insurrectionists who had committed 
murder in the insurrection. The crowd went up and began asking him to do as he had 
been accustomed to do for them. Pilate answered them, saying, “Do you want me to 
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release for you the King of the Jews?” For he was aware that the chief priests had handed 
Him over because of envy. But the chief priests stirred up the crowd to ask him to release 
Barabbas for them instead. Answering again, Pilate said to them, “Then what shall I do 
with Him whom you call the King of the Jews?” They shouted back, “Crucify Him!” But 
Pilate said to them, “Why, what evil has He done?” But they shouted all the more, 
“Crucify Him!” Wishing to satisfy the crowd, Pilate released Barabbas for them, and 
after having Jesus scourged, he handed Him over to be crucified (Mk 15:6-15). 
The importance of the reference hinges on the word translated here as “crowd,” ochlos. In 
Matthew’s more theologically-motivated retelling of Mark’s account, the crowd/mob/masses 
become identified with the Jews: 
The governor said to them, “Which of the two do you want me to release for you?” And 
they said, “Barabbas.” Pilate said to them, “Then what shall I do with Jesus who is called 
Christ?” They all said, “Crucify Him!” And he said, “Why, what evil has He done?” But 
they kept shouting all the more, saying, “Crucify Him!” When Pilate saw that he was 
accomplishing nothing, but rather that a riot was starting, he took water and washed his 
hands in front of the crowd, saying, “I am innocent of this Man’s blood; see to that 
yourselves.” And all the people said, “His blood shall be on us and on our children!” 
Then he released Barabbas for them; but after having Jesus scourged, he handed Him 
over to be crucified (Mt 25:21-26). 
Pope Benedict’s exegesis of the passage argues that “Matthew, going beyond historical 
considerations, is attempting a theological etiology with which to account for the terrible fate of 
the people of Israel in the Jewish War, when land, city, and Temple were taken from them.”47 
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That is, the ochlos to whom Pilate’s question is addressed is identified, at least in Matthew, with 
the Jews. And so the passage becomes important in anti-Semitic accusations of deicide.48 
Schmitt’s use of the passage might reinscribe this anti-Semitic trope—it would not be 
surprising—but the more immediate object of his critique is not the Jew, but the parliamentarian. 
Whereas the Jewish mob is accused of killing God, the parliamentarian is fantasized as not being 
able to do even that. For Schmitt, whereas the Jewish mob, precisely in their act of killing, is 
capable of some sort of political-theological decision, the parliamentarian cannot even reach the 
“outermost” level of sovereign decision, deicidal or not. According to Schmitt, the 
parliamentarian and the Jew are both enemies of Christian political theology and sovereignty—if 
not the Christian God—but the parliamentarian’s enmity is all the worse for his or her 
valorization of discussion in the face of the necessity of decision. Which is finally to say, the 
parliamentarian does not so much mount a political attack as he or she attacks politics itself: 
“Today nothing is more modern than the onslaught against the political . . .   the political 
dissolves into the everlasting discussion of cultural and philosophical-historical commonplaces” 
(65). Political Theology begins and ends with this defense of sovereignty and the political 
against a perceived encroachment of the “popular” and the “common.” 
Important here is that Schmitt is not critiquing liberalism. Although it has become almost 
a trope to say that Schmitt is an anti-liberal—Mouffe, for example, writes that Schmitt “is one of 
the most brilliant and intransigent critics of liberalism” (OTP, 4)—his critique here is not aimed 
at liberalism as much as it is at democracy. It is the “democracy,” rather than the “liberal,” in 
“liberal democracy” that Schmitt takes as his object of critique. Here my argument supports the 
minority—but by no means non-existent—reading of Schmitt that sees in him a type of liberal: 
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namely, an “ordoliberal.”49 While “neoliberalism”—the reliance on the private market to solve 
public problems—is currently the object of much critical discussion, Schmittian ordoliberalism, 
sometimes misleadingly referred to as “German neoliberalism” or less-misleadingly as 
“authoritarian liberalism,” offers just as much cause for contemporary concern. Ordoliberals, as 
Schmitt decisively put it, argue for a “strong state and a free economy.”50 Whereas neoliberals 
argue that the state should use the capitalist market for the sake of addressing public problems—
this looks like, for example, the reliance on public-private partnerships, the proliferation of 
NGOs, and the privatization of public good distribution through the implementation of austerity 
measures—ordoliberals argue that the state should interfere in the market only for the sake of 
preserving capitalism in the face of its internal contradictions. In practice, such an ordoliberal 
program might endorse anti-trust legislation, corruption regulation, and structural reforms 
necessary for the preservation of free and fair markets. That is, whereas neoliberals look to 
economize the state through privatization, ordoliberals recognize that the state must be kept free 
of capitalist influence for the sake of maintaining regulatory governance over capitalism, and this 
for the sake of saving capitalism from itself. As we will see in this chapter’s next section, this 
ordering of political control over the economy only for the sake of preserving the integrity of the 
market economy totally coheres to Schmitt’s dual efforts to defend both the purity and the 
supremacy of the political. 
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Of course, in addition to its own internal contradictions—the falling rate of profit, the 
necessary discrepancy between the appropriation of surplus value and the need for increasing 
aggregate demand, the tendency towards monopolizations and so towards non-competition, and 
so on—capitalism’s security has also been threatened historically by mass democratic 
movements. Calls for and implementations of redistribution, nationalization, and other tools of 
democratic control over the market all chip away at capital sovereignty. In this way, the 
ordoliberal is faced not only with governing capitalists for the sake of securing the freedom of 
the market against itself, but are also faced with squashing democratic intrusions into the market. 
In smashing democratic control of the economy, the ordoliberal also secures the strength of the 
state against democracy—a democracy which, in this anti-capitalist trajectory, is starting to 
resemble a Marxist sovereign dictatorship of the proletariat more and more. That is, the 
ordoliberal mandate to protect the market economy from democratic control requires a state 
willing and able to protect itself from democratizations. For an ordoliberal, the worst case 
political scenario would be a democratic takeover of the state for the sake of a democratizing of 
the market. Against this worst case scenario, the ordoliberal argues for a state strong enough to 
suppress democracy in both the political and the economic spheres. A democratic political 
economy—a Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat—is this worst case scenario.  
The German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck puts Schmittian ordoliberalism’s antagonism 
toward democracy like this: 
Schmitt’s authoritarian state, as Heller rightly notes, was a liberal authoritarian state, one 
that was, in the classical liberal way, strong and weak at the same time: strong in its role 
of protector of ‘the market’ and ‘the economy’ from democratic claims for 
redistribution—to the point of being able to deploy the public power to suppress such 
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claims—and weak in its relationship to the market as the designated site of capitalist 
profit-seeking, which government policy was to protect and if necessary expand without, 
however, entering it . . .Both Schmitt and the ordoliberals differ from Anglo-American 
liberalism in that they never believed in a market economy independent from state 
authority” (HWCE, 152-153).51 
If liberalism implies individualism, then liberalism is not and never was Schmitt’s object of 
critique. On the contrary, Schmitt defends a type of sovereign individualism—there is literally 
for Schmitt, one sovereign—that squashes collective democratic movements. This clarification 
on Schmitt’s position regarding liberalism is important for evidencing the extent to which 
Schmitt’s entire political-theological program is designed, from beginning to end, as a polemic 
against the democratic sovereignty of Marxism. 
For an example of just how pervasive Schmitt’s anti-democracy and anti-Marxism is, 
consider his arguments concerning the relationship between sovereignty, decision, and juridical 
theory. For Schmitt, every normal situation implies a prior abnormal, or exceptional, decision: 
“Every legal order is based on a decision, and also the concept of the legal order, which is 
applied as something self-evident, contains within it the contrast of the two distinct elements of 
the juristic—norm and decision. Like every other order, the legal order rests on a decision and 
not on a norm” (PT, 10). This specification of the legal order is important: Schmitt writes of 
“every order,” but quickly narrows the discussion to “the legal order.” He goes on to write of 
“decision in absolute purity” as “a specifically juristic element” (PT, 13), and to declare that 
sovereign is the one “who is entitled to decide those actions for which the constitution makes no 
provision; that is, who is competent to act when the legal system fails to answer the question of 
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competence” (PT, 11). Legal orders, juristic elements, the constitution, and legal systems: 
Schmitt is clear in his desire to associate sovereignty not only with transcendence, but with the 
juridical as such. Working from within a long theological tradition, Schmitt reveals that his 
concept of transcendent sovereign is also a concept of a transcendent law-giver. And so another 
element of Schmitt’s complicated political-theological matrix is established: the side of 
transcendence, Christianity, and Europe is also the side of the law and the side of legal norms.  
Through this juridical reduction, Schmitt has effectively removed economics, and 
certainly any sort of economic populism à la Mouffe, from his account of sovereignty. Neither 
the market “laws” of ordoliberalism nor the class interests of Marxism, in Schmitt’s account, rise 
to the level of exception and decision. The quotidian horrors of capitalism—the constitutive theft 
that is wage labor, the need to exchange labor time for necessary services, the need to let the 
market decide how this labor should be exchanged, the imposition of debt, the meaninglessness 
of work, the ritualized and normalized violence of the prison and military industrial complexes, 
and so on—are not exceptional, and so not worthy of political decision, because of their juridical 
normalcy. Schmitt is in favor of decisions constitutive of norms, so long as these decisions are 
made by the transcendent sovereign. Decisions that the norm ought to be revolutionized, though, 
are dismissed as instances of sovereign dictatorship, that is, dismissed as the stirrings of the 
ochlos.  
And so the sovereign, as the transcendent lawgiver, stands outside of both the legal order 
and the masses placed under control of this order. Samuel Weber clarifies this relationship by 
stressing the importance of the decision’s exteriority to norms, and so norms’ dependence on 
decision:  
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The sovereign decision marks the relationship of the order of the general—the law, the 
norm, the concept—to that which is radically heterogenous to all such generality. In this 
sense, the decision as such is sovereign, that is, independent of all possible derivation 
from or subsumption to a more general norm. It is a pure act, somewhat akin to the act of 
creation except that what it does is not so much to create as to interrupt and to suspend . . 
. The salient trait of (the legal order) is, as we have already seen, its dependence upon a 
certain transcendence, upon that which exceeds its self-identity, upon an irreducible 
alterity and exteriority: just as the miracle in Augustinian doctrine both exceeds and 
explains the created world (10-11).52 
Without doubt, this is one stream of decision in Political Theology. The decision is prior to, and 
so exterior to, the normal order that it inaugurates through its performance of deciding, where 
deciding is basically synonymous with creating. Such an account of decision as active is 
privileged in those moments in Political Theology where Schmitt describes the radically novel, 
non-derivable, and irreducible element of decision. The “decision in the true sense of the word” 
cannot be “derived from this (legal) norm” (6).  “The decision frees itself from all normative 
ties” (12). A sovereign decision “should not be mixed up with calculability,” nor should it be 
“derived from the necessity of judging a concrete fact” (30). The decision is “from the 
perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien . . . Looked at normatively, it 
emanates from nothingness” (31).  
This is a rather strong sense of decision opposed to calculation or deliberation. The motif 
might be borrowed from Kierkegaard (PT, 15), and will inform Derrida’s later discussions of the 
indeterminacy of every decision “worthy of the name.” Yet, we should not be too quick to read 
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this understanding of sovereignty in a deconstructive register. It remains primarily polemical. 
Schmitt, whose interest remains in defending a strong sense of transcendent sovereignty, here 
relies on a sense of decision as radical for the sake of opposing both parliamentarian discussion 
and an alleged class-reductionism constitutive of Marxism: He does not reject these democratic 
forms because of his notion of decision—which is flexible at best and equivocal at worst—but 
defines decision anti-democratically because he has always already rejected the ochlos.53 
In other words, Schmitt’s rejection of decision-as-calculation is not, as it will be with 
Derrida, a rejection of determining in advance, according to a strong teleological orientation, the 
effects of decision. Nor is it, as it will be with Kierkegaard, a rejection of quantifying a 
qualitative difference. Instead, it is a rejection of both political economy and an immanentism 
that Schmitt sees as constitutive of democracy in general and Marxism in particular. Echoing 
later critiques of class reductionism, Schmitt’s argument here is that Marxist historical 
materialism reduces politics to an epiphenomenon derivative of infrastructural economic 
antagonisms: 
Instead of being conceived from the outside according to fantasies and splendid ideals, 
social and political reality was to be analyzed from within, according to its actual and 
correctly understood immanent circumstances . . . Convinced Marxism holds that it has 
found the true explanation for social, economic, and political life, and that a correct 
praxis follows from that knowledge; it follows that social life can be correctly grasped 
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immanently in all of its objective necessity and thus controlled . . .  Socialism retains the 
structure of Hegelian dialectics (CPD 53, 60). 
As in Dictatorship, the argument is one in favor of transcendence and against immanence: “The 
essential point (about Marxism) is that an exception never comes from outside into the 
immanence of development . . . the either/or of moral decision, the decisive and deciding 
disjunction, has no place in this system” (CPD 63). Even the apparently decisive radicalness of 
the Bolsheviks is judged too immanent, if not, shockingly, too parliamentarian:  
This vanguard does not wish to escape from the immanence of world-historical evolution 
at all, but is, according to the vulgar image, the midwife of coming things . . .  Even the 
diktat of a dictator becomes a moment in the discussion and in the undisturbed 
development as (the immanent world spirit) moves further (CPD 56, 58).  
Without an outside point from which to judge and decide on immanent economic struggles, the 
Marxist—even Lenin—becomes structurally analogous to the fetishist of discussion, the 
parliamentarian. Schmitt’s accusation that the vanguard “does not wish to escape from” 
immanence reveals the theological orientation of the critique: Schmitt is able to loosely identify 
bourgeois parliamentarianism and Marxism not because of economics—how could he?—but 
because of their apparently shared rejection of the transcendent, law-giving, Euro-Christian 
sovereign. 
Slavoj Zizek, a contemporary Marxist theorist who frequently engages critically with 
Schmitt, notes that such an emphasis on the exteriority of decision causes yet another problem 
for Schmitt: namely, substance-less formalism.54 Zizek argues that Schmitt’s emphasis on the 
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exteriority and irreducible novelty of the decision leads Schmitt to valorize the pure form of 
decision:  
The basic paradox of Carl Schmitt’s political decisionism . . . is that his very polemics 
against liberal-democratic formalism inexorably gets caught in the formalist trap . . . 
There is no longer any positive content which could be presupposed as the universally 
accepted frame of reference (CCS 18, 19).  
My reading of Schmitt’s anti-democratic and anti-Marxist polemics basically coheres with 
Zizek’s critique. In those instances, Schmitt apparently offered no critique of the substance or 
content of Marxist or parliamentarian thought. Instead, he offered a critique only against the 
regimes’ formal structures. That is, Schmitt’s critique focused on the immanence and 
indecisiveness of parliamentarianism and Marxism without arguing what this missing 
transcendent element should look like. What was important was the presence of an outside as 
such. 
While accepting the thrust of Zizek’s reading, it should be modified in at least two ways. 
First, we should not be too quick to accept that Schmitt’s formalistic decisionism is actually 
without content, or that a too clean distinction between form and content is possible. Schmitt’s 
apparently pure description of a pure outside is neither a pure description nor is it of a pure 
outside. Because of the political-theological matrix Schmitt has developed in both Dictatorship 
and Political Theology, we should read this “formalism” as not just an endorsement of an 
outside, but more specifically of an endorsement of an outside associated with law, Europe, and 
Christianity. Complementarily, Schmitt’s critiques of parliamentarianism and Marxism on these 
decisionistic grounds should not be understood as a critique of only a lack in those regimes—a 
lack of decision, or even, in this more expanded sense, of transcendent sovereignty, European 
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culture, Christianity, and so on—but more directly a critique of a positive feature or 
identification, namely democratization. This distinction is important for understanding the 
privileged place of Schmitt’s polemical articulation of sovereignty. On the one hand, Schmitt 
does critique democratic regimes for lacking a place for decision, or even for being intentionally 
antagonistic toward political decisions. On this account, Zizek’s formalist critique works. But on 
the other hand, Schmitt does not simply critique Marxism for having no place for decision, but 
rather critiques Marxism for having an improper, because democratic and immanent, model of 
decision. Schmitt is against Marxism because it implies a democratic—and so, according to 
Schmitt, an anti-theological—sovereignty, not because it lacks the formal characteristic of pure 
decision. Schmitt’s apparently formalist critique is actually an apologetic for the privileging of 
transcendent sovereignty.  
Consider the following passage from Political Theology, which makes precisely this anti-
democratic argument: 
In the struggle of opposing interests and coalitions, absolute monarchy made the decision 
and thereby created the unity of the state. The unity that a people represents does not 
possess this decisionist character; it is an organic unity, and with national consciousness 
the ideas of the state originated as an organic whole. The theistic as well as the deistic 
concepts of God become thus unintelligible for political metaphysics (49) 
Two things to note. The first is not new: Schmitt comes as close as possible to stating that 
democracy as such is antithetical to theology. For a properly theological politics, the “unity” of a 
people must be imposed from the outside position of the monarch. It should not arise 
“organically” through immanent processes, such as the constituent power of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. The second point is that Schmitt’s formal decisionism is not only an argument for 
	 57	
an outside but is also, at the very same time, an argument for the unity and coherence of the 
“inside,” of the state or people. Zizek does note this fascistic privileging of unity, but he does not 
consider that such a privileging belies—from within, as it were—Schmitt’s alleged formalism.55 
Zizek notes that the decision that Schmitt privileges is “primarily the decision for the formal 
principle of order as such” (CCS 18). In my view, such a decision for order is not without “any 
positive content.” Instead, such a decision is a decision for a fascistic allegiance to unity 
grounded in the presence of a transcendent sovereign.56 
Yet, at times, Zizek seems to realize the material political consequences of Schmitt’s 
“formalism.” For example, my political theological critique of Schmitt’s project can fully 
endorse Zizek’s reading when he writes: 
Let us begin with a question: what is politics proper? Schmitt’s well-known answer (a 
social situation which involves opposition between friend and enemy), radical as it may 
appear, is not radical enough, in so far as it already displaces the inherent antagonism 
constitutive of the political onto the external relationship between Us and Them” (CCS 
27). 
Such a critique correctly and helpfully presents Schmitt as a sort of nationalist anti-Marxist. 
Schmitt’s emphasis on unity is a direct reproach against the Marxist slogan that all history is the 
history of class struggle. Whereas a Marxist approach views appeals to unity as ideological 
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attempts to impose erasure on struggle and oppression, Schmitt’s transcendent political theology 
views discourse on struggle and oppression as attempts to undermine unity.  
And so my reading of Schmitt is close to Zizek’s, but with the caveat that the primary 
critique is not a logical or philosophical one against the “paradox” of Schmitt’s alleged 
formalism but, instead, is a Marxist political-theological critique of Schmitt’s fascist political 
theology. This distinction between a critique of Schmitt’s formalism and a critique of Schmitt’s 
reactionary apology for transcendently grounded unity is important for the advancement of my 
thesis: A postmodern political theology cannot satisfy itself with neutral critique or idealism. 
Pointing out Schmitt’s inconsistencies and paradoxes is not difficult. Nor is it particularly 
meaningful to a leftist political theology. “No one has ever died from contradictions.”57  Rather 
than note the philosophical and logical problems with Schmitt’s program—as if a correction of 
intellect will lead to a change in praxis, as if a contradiction in thinking will lead to a failure in 
being—a postmodern political theology should decide against Schmitt’s identification of 
Christianity with a fascistic allegiance to a transcendent lawgiver and decide for an identification 
of Christianity with a left political praxis of total emancipation. The critical point is not that 
Schmitt was a formalist, but that he was a Christian fascist. 
Schmitt explains that decisions create, and so in some sense stand outside of, legal norms 
and systems. This is the element of exteriority and novelty stressed by Weber and discussed 
above. In this model, the sovereign is the decider who freely and voluntarily—unbound by 
preexistent obligations or immanent logics—creates norms. Such a pure and creative exteriority 
gives the appearance of formalism, as if Schmitt’s concern was to preserve a structure of 
transcendent sovereignty. Yet, I have just argued that Schmitt’s concern was not to preserve a 
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formal structure of transcendent sovereignty, but to preserve and defend a particular content: a 
political theology of transcendent sovereignty. Schmitt argues not on behalf of a structure of 
sovereignty but on behalf of the sovereign. Schmitt’s alleged formalism is actually a material 
argument in favor of a fascist political theology that identifies form and content in the motif of 
unity. 
It is only with such an a priori allegiance to a particular content that Schmitt can say: 
“Sovereign is the one who definitively decides whether this normal situation actually exists” 
(13). Which situation is this normal situation? The one wherein “the sovereign produces and 
guarantees the situation in its totality.” The argument is entirely circular: “Sovereignty resides in 
determining definitively what constitutes public order and security, in determining when they are 
disturbed, and so on” (13). But, in making the sovereign decide such, the content of the public 
interest has been decided in advance: it is in the public interest to be ruled. The normal situation 
is the situation wherein the sovereign decides. Which is to say, the normal situation is the 
articulation of a fascist political theology of transcendent rule and unity. 
Which is to say: The sovereign is now, as exterior and transcendent, outside of the 
political-theological-juridical norms on which he decides. Which is to say: The sovereign is now, 
as exterior and transcendent, an important and essential element inside the political-theological-
juridical norms on which he has decided. Which is to say, about the sovereign: “Although he 
stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it” (7). The 
“sovereign” is free, only truly sovereign, in so far as he rules from a position of simultaneous 
exteriority and interiority: in so far as he issues particular norms, the Euro-Christian norms of 
Schmitt’s political theology, and, via his position as external law-giver, follows them. In this 
	 60	
sense, the political decision has been decided in advance: the sovereign makes decisions, and the 
sovereign must.  
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” because otherwise the ochlos might 
decide to make an exception.  
Decision in The Concept of the Political 
First published in essay form in 1927,58 and expanded in book form in 1932,59 The 
Concept of the Political reinscribes, and sometimes intensifies, many of the structural features 
found in Political Theology: anti-democratic and anti-Marxist polemics, a strategically ordered 
internal incoherence, an emphasis on the relationship between decision and sovereignty, and so 
on. At the same time, the text relies on a couple of new motifs: namely, the purity and superiority 
of “the political” over other spheres of life. These new motifs directly affect the function of 
decision in Schmitt’s text: as “the political,” which largely does the work of “the sovereign” in 
Political Theology, becomes increasingly rarefied, decisions are rendered more and more 
passive. Eventually, as Derrida argues, “Everything seems to be decided where the decision does 
not take place” (PF, 99).60  
The Concept of the Political presents itself as an explication of the specificity of the 
political. Such an explication finds articulation in two complementary strategies or lines of 
thought. On the one hand, Schmitt is concerned with describing the purity of the political from 
other “realms.” On the other, he is concerned with describing the supremacy of the political over 
those realms. Derrida describes these two “stratifications”: 
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Two stratifications of the political: sometimes the political is a particular and grounded 
stratum . . .  sometimes the political, qua real possibility, invades the entire fundamental 
or grounding stratum of existence, whether individual or communal . . . This 
fundamentalist stratification makes the political at once both a regional stratum, a 
particular layer, however grounding the layer is, and the supplementary or 
overdetermining determination cutting through all other regions of the human world or of 
the cultural, symbolic, or spiritual community (PF, 125). 
At one time unique and underived ground, at another guiding and determining telos of all 
opposition: such is the duality of the Schmittian political. In this section I will read the moments 
in the text where these two stratifications are most clearly distinguished from each other. Yet, as 
has been one of my running arguments, I do not want to suggest that the presence of two 
competing understandings of the political undermines the philosophical legitimacy of Schmitt’s 
text—at least not to the extent that we could dismiss Schmitt’s arguments on grounds of 
contradiction. Above, I argued that the inconsistencies of Political Theology were the result of a 
polemical desire to preserve the transcendent sovereign and all that this sovereign stood for—
especially in the face of the possibility of Marxist democratizations. Here, I argue in a similar 
way that the two stratifications of the political are moments in a polemical defense of the unity of 
the state, which is to say moments in the articulation of Schmitt’s political theology. On the one 
hand, purity. On the other, supremacy. Schmitt’s concept of “the political” is a defense of the 
supremacy of purity and the purity of the supreme. Arguing at once for both of these 
stratifications is not an accidental trait in The Concept of the Political; rather, it is the point. 
Schmitt most concisely describes the political as pure early in the text: 
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The political must rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to which all action with a 
specifically political meaning can be traced. Let us assume that in the realm of morality 
the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in 
economics profitable and unprofitable. The question then is whether there is also a 
special distinction which can serve as a simple criterion of the political and of what it 
consists. The nature of such a political distinction is surely different from that of those 
others. It is independent of them and as such can speak clearly for itself. The specific 
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between 
friend and enemy (26). 
That is, the political is the “realm” defined by the distinction between friend and enemy. 
Inversely, the distinction between friend and enemy is the political distinction. Although one 
cannot help but see a flexible analogical structure at work—beautiful is to ugly as friend is to 
enemy, and so on—and although one cannot help but to read into this analogical structure the 
entire political theological matrix articulated in Schmitt’s earlier works—which would now add 
“beautiful,” “good,” and “profitable” to the association of transcendence, unity, law, Christianity, 
Europe, and so on, and would add “ugly,” “evil,” and “unprofitable” to the other association—
Schmitt’s intention here is distinction. His argument is that, despite appearances—common, 
popular—the beautiful is not (always) the friend, and the friend is not (always) the good or the 
profitable.  
The argument abounds: “If the antithesis of good and evil is not simply identical with that 
of beautiful and ugly, profitable and unprofitable, and cannot be directly reduced to the others, 
then the antithesis of friend and enemy must even less be confused with or mistaken for the 
others” (26). Once again, the political and politics are reduced to the political distinction of 
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friend and enemy, and no other: “The specific political distinction to which political actions and 
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (26). And finally: “the inherently 
objective nature and autonomy of the political becomes evident by virtue of its being able to 
treat, distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses” 
(27).61 
In these instances, Schmitt, by defining the purely political as non-derivable, is resisting 
what he sees as the simultaneous hyperpoliticization and depoliticization, or “neutralization,” of 
nineteenth-century society. The argument is that parliamentarianism’s fetishization of discussion 
and permanent deferral of decision results in a conception of politics as dialogical. The terms can 
easily invert, and “politics is dialogical” can become “dialogue is politics.” Given such an 
inversion, anything that can be discussed can be discussed by parliament and/or civil society 
interest groups, and so the political has no object proper. In this sense, Schmitt preemptively 
critiques later feminist arguments that “the personal is the political,” and later “poststructural” 
arguments that “everything is political.” But Schmitt’s point of contention here is not the 
expansion of the political into the “private” realm of performed identities and social scripts. 
Rather, he is concerned that this expansionist move results not in a strengthened, but rather in a 
neutered and abstract sense of politics. If the political is primarily dialogical or communicative, 
then, as Habermas will later normatively argue in reaction to Schmitt, political decisions will be 
made and judged by the norms of dialogue and communication. For Schmitt, such a dialogically 
normative ordering of the political is equivalent to replacing political norms with dialogical, 
which is to say, aesthetic, moral, or economic, ones.  
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On the one hand, Schmitt suggests, but only in an elliptical manner, that such attempts to 
“neutralize” politics are, in actuality, political attacks. Schmitt writes that “all the typical 
distinctions and depoliticizations characteristic of the liberal nineteenth century,” for example the 
distinction between religion and politics that would result in an immanentization of sovereignty, 
are “thoroughly polemical and thereby again political antitheses” (CP, 23). The argument is 
philosophical and descriptive: attempts to order politics by dialogical norms are actually attempts 
to replace—fight, defeat—politics with dialogue. In this sense, the parliamentarian has made a 
friend out of dialogue and has made an enemy out of Schmittian political theology, and so has, 
despite pretenses to the contrary, performed a political act. Yet, such a descriptive and 
philosophical argument runs into the same problems as the “descriptions” offered in Political 
Theology. Namely: Schmitt’s descriptions are always normatively and polemically guided by a 
prior commitment to a specific political theology of transcendent sovereignty. When Schmitt 
argues that liberal dialogue is a political attack against politics, then he is arguing that liberal 
dialogue is an attack on his fascist political theology.  
On the other hand, Schmitt, echoing his treatment of the Barabbas story, argues that the 
democratic neutralization of politics enacts a cowardly evasion of true political decision. The 
argument is similar to, but differs slightly from, the one found in Political Theology. Where 
Political Theology was mostly concerned with securing the presence of a transcendent, anti-
democratic lawgiver, The Concept of the Political raises the stakes: this transcendent sovereign 
does not give only law, but also gives life and has the authority to demand death. For Schmitt, 
the distinction between friend and enemy is an answer to the question of life and death. This is 
Schmitt at his most existential: the real enemy is the one who poses “an existential threat to one’s 
own way of life” (49). In this view, the parliamentarian avoidance of political decision is now 
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also an avoidance of recognizing friends and enemies—which is to say, an avoidance of fighting 
existential threats. 
Here we see an instance of Schmitt’s critique that is decidedly anti-liberal, at least if 
liberalism is understood as a sort of libertarian individualism. Schmitt is concerned that 
liberalism’s penchant for individualism will prevent the formation of friendship, by which 
Schmitt intends the patriotic “friendship” of state unity: “The question is whether a specific 
political idea can be derived from the pure and consequential concept of individualistic 
liberalism. This is to be denied” (70). The political potential of this sort of liberalism is to be 
denied because the individualist has no friend on whom he can call to help fight potential 
existential threats, and has no friends who can call upon him to do the same: “In case of need, the 
political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by the 
individualism of liberal thought” (71).62 If the enemy is the one who presents an existential 
threat, then the friend is the one who is willing to die to preserve “one’s way of life.” The liberal 
has no such friend. This liberal world, then, is a depoliticized world—which is now to say, a 
world without existential enemies or friends—that “might contain many very interesting 
antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of every kind” (35). However, this world 
would not contain “a meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, 
authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings” (35). Without a strong sense of friends 
participating in a unified “way of life”—and without the identification of “existentially 
something different and alien” (26) as an “existential threat”—“men,” individualist liberals, 
could not “be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood.” One might consider this 
depoliticized world without sacrifice or authorized bloodshed a promising one. That Schmitt 
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does not consider it promising gives witness to the depth of his thought’s fundamentally 
reactionary nature. 
It is on these existential grounds that Schmitt distinguishes the political distinction from 
those of the “depoliticized” realms of life. The ugly, the evil, and the unprofitable might be 
offenses, and they might even be deeply hated, but they are not existential threats, and they are 
not grounds for political, which is to say sacrificial, friendship. At the same time—and despite 
the obvious analogical structuring that suggests otherwise—the existential, political enemy need 
not be ugly, evil, unprofitable, or deeply hated at all. Politics is a pure realm, unaffected by 
feeling or extra-political norms. Such norms do not, and by Schmitt’s definition cannot, rise to 
the level of killing others or sacrificing one’s self. 
The immediate consequence of this constructed distinction between feelings of enmity 
(of which the parliamentarian, the liberal, and the Marxist are all capable) and the political 
declaration of enmity (of which they are not) is that the political actor can kill without regard for 
morality. In fact, such an actor can only kill amorally:  
If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to 
one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified. Just as little can war be justified by 
ethical and juristic norms. If there really are enemies in the existential sense as meant 
here, then it is justified, but only politically, to repel and fight them physically (49).  
If an enemy cannot be killed for non-political means, and if political means are their own criteria, 
then such a limitation of the “physical destruction” of enemies to political norms thoroughly 
ontologizes the enemy. That is: Schmitt says that the enemy is the one who poses an existential 
risk to one’s way of life, but this risk is determined as if by transcendent sovereign decision, not 
by particular circumstances. Whether or not one is a “threat” has nothing to do with economics, 
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morality, aesthetics, or anything else. Whether or not one is a threat is, instead, decided. In his 
private writings, Schmitt acknowledges that even the aforementioned reactionary appeal to the 
threateningness of otherness is, in the final analysis, irrelevant to the political decision of enmity: 
“Jews always remain Jews . . . Just the assimilated Jew is the true enemy.”63 Schmitt identifies 
the Jew as the enemy, especially after assimilation. For him, conforming and assimilating have 
no bearing on the Jew’s ontological status as a political threat.64  
Such an ontologizing of enmity serves the function of basically absolving Schmitt, or any 
political actor, of responsible agency. The Jew is a raced-other-enemy, and this has been decided 
as if transcendentally, ontologically, and not, therefore, by Schmitt or indeed anyone in 
particular. Whatever the Jew does or does not do, and whatever Schmitt feels, wishes, or does, 
the Jew will remain an enemy, and Schmitt will be “justified” in “physically destroying” the Jew. 
In this sense, “Everything seems to be decided where the decision does not take place, precisely 
in that place where the decision does not take place qua decision, where it will have been carried 
away, where it will have got carried away in what has always-already taken place: at birth, in 
other words the day before birth” (PF, 99).  
This reactionary politics is, however, and as we should now expect of Schmitt, not 
actually the result or effect of a logical or philosophical deduction. Anti-Semitism is not the 
necessary conclusion of Schmitt’s distinguishing the private and the political. The opposite is the 
case: Anti-Semitism and the fascism of which it is a part is prior to and motivating of Schmitt’s 
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distinction between personal feelings of enmity and political declarations of it. Schmitt invents 
the distinction for the sake of defending Jew-hatred. He argues: Hating the Jew does not make 
one ugly or evil; nor does hating the Jew imply a judgment of the Jew’s ugliness or evil. 
Schmittian anti-Semitism depends upon no psychological ill will, unconscious bias, or anything 
of the sort. One is to hate the Jew because he is ontologically a Jew, not because of anything the 
Jew has or has not done. By Schmitt’s reasoning, one could quite like a Jew but also be 
politically obligated to kill him. Indeed, to hate the Jew for anything less than ontological 
reasons is, Schmitt says, unjustified.  
When Schmitt does act as if this distinction is natural or axiomatic, he is led to 
incoherence. This is most apparent in Schmitt’s eisegesis of Jesus’s command to love one’s 
enemies. The passage in Matthew, part of the Sermon on the Mount, reads: 
“You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ 
But I say to you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you 
may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for He causes His sun to rise on the evil 
and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. For if you love those 
who love you, what reward do you have? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? If 
you greet only your brothers, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the 
Gentiles do the same? (Mt 5:43-47). 
In response to which Schmitt, in a rhetorical feat, writes: 
The enemy is ‘hostis,’ not ‘inimicus’ in the broader sense; ‘πόλεμος (polemios),’ not 
‘ἐχθροὺς (echthrous)’ (sic). As German and other languages do not distinguish between 
the private and the political enemy, many misconceptions and falsifications are possible. 
The often quoted ‘love your enemy’ (Matt 5:44; Luke 6:27) reads ‘diligite hostes vestros, 
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agapate tous ekhthrous umon’ and not ‘diligite inimicus vestros.’ No mention is made of 
the political enemy. Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and Muslims 
did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of love toward the 
Saracens or Turks. The enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, and in 
the private sphere only does it make sense to love one’s enemy, i.e., one’s adversary. The 
Bible quotation touches the political antithesis even less than it intends to dissolve, for 
example, the antithesis of good and evil or beautiful and ugly. It certainly does not mean 
that one should love and support the enemies of one’s own people” (29). 
The most charitable reading could not but find this “it certainly does not” absurd, and not only 
because of the incredible hermeneutic that interprets “love your enemies” as “certainly not” 
meaning “love your enemies.” More structurally, the entirety of the eisegesis rests on Schmitt’s 
distinction between private and political enmity, which he finds in the difference between the 
Greek ekthros and polemios and in difference between the Latin hostis and inimicus. As an 
exegetical heuristic, the distinction is specious for several reasons. 
First problem: Schmitt’s German reads: “Feind ist hostis, nicht inimicus im weiteren 
Sinne; ‘πόλεμος,’ nicht ‘ἐχθροὺς’ (29).” This is wrong. Matthew and Luke use ἐχθροὺς, not 
πόλεμος, for enemy.65 Granted, a few sentences later Schmitt correctly writes: “Die viel zitierte 
Stelle ‘Liebet eure Feinde’ heisst ‘diligite inimicos vestros,’ ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν . . . 
(29).” This correction—which now has ἐχθροὺς despite Schmitt’s earlier claim that the gospels 
used πόλεμος—might be evidence that the mistake was a copy error. Yet, the sloppiness with 
which Schmitt appeals to Greek points toward the dilettantish—that is, not rigorous, not 
precise—nature of Schmitt’s interdisciplinary endeavors. The jurist is not a biblical scholar. 
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Second problem: If Schmitt were a biblical scholar, his position on this question would 
be a minority one. Schmitt relies on a distinction between a personal foe—toward whom one has 
enmity grounded in non- or a-political reasons—and a political enemy. Schmitt’s claim is that 
Jesus instructs the disciples to love their personal foes, not their political enemies. The 
distinction is an imposition onto the meaning of ἐχθροὺς. Warren Carter argues that the word 
refers, sometimes more and sometimes less explicitly, to both “types” of enemies: The Hebrew 
Bible speaks of enemies as sometimes recognizably private—Psalm 18, 31, and 41; Sirach 6, 12, 
17—and sometimes explicitly political—Deuteronomy 20. More troublingly for Schmitt, Carter 
also notes that the distinction between personal and political is an anachronistic imposition onto 
the biblical text. Early Christians would have struggled to cleanly delineate between personally 
and politically despising an enemy: “Enemies include those who persecute followers of Jesus, 
opponents of God’s purposes enacted in Jesus and his people” (155). Given the nation status of 
the Jewish people, it is not at all clear if such persecutors of God and God’s followers would be 
considered personal or political enemies.  Carter concludes: “Enemy is not limited to national 
opponents and foreigners but includes personal foes” (154).66  
Beyond these problems of translation and semantics, Schmitt’s myopic interpretation can 
also be critiqued for ignoring the love command’s immediate context. According to Ulrich Luz, 
Jesus’s sermon distinguishes the hyperbole of Christian morality from an alleged formalism of 
Platonic ethics. Jesus does not command a love of the Platonic form of humanity, but more 
specifically and radically a command to love each person in their particularity. On this front, the 
semantic range of ἐχθροὺς cannot be reduced without doing violence to the hyperbole of the 
love command:  
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Jesus speaks explicitly of the love of enemies. The hyperbolic imperatives cannot be seen 
as extreme cases of a general commandment of love of human beings. Jesus speaks 
emphatically of the enemy in all his or her maliciousness . . . It is inappropriate to limit 
the enemy to the sense of personal enemy, the Greek ἐχθροὺς is a comprehensive word 
for enemy on the basis of the LXX. The intensification which lies in the three examples 
of Luke 6:27 speaks in favor of including even quite extreme types of enmity. Jesus’ 
demand is a demand of contrast.”67 
That is, ἐχθροὺς must refer to the most extreme types of enmity or else the command to love 
would lose its contrastive and hyperbolic force. 
Granted, both Carter and Luz are aware of Schmitt’s interpretation, and are potentially 
reacting against it. Gerhard Kittel, a fellow Nazi and avowed anti-Semite, though, would have no 
such interest in using the occasion of interpretation as an opportunity to criticize Schmitt. He 
writes: 
In the NT ἐχθροὺς is used for personal enemies in the various relationships of everyday 
life. More important is the use which follows the OT and the LXX. Thus ἐχθροὺς can be 
used for the foes of Israel . . . ἐχθροὺς is particularly used, however, for what is hostile 
to God and His Christ” (813).68 
Kittel might agree with Schmitt’s view that ἐχθροὺς, in the New Testament, means something 
like personal enemies, and so the command to love ἐχθροὺς would be a command to love 
personal, not political, enemies. However, such a reading would overlook the distinction Kittel 
makes between the sense of “enemy” in the Hebrew Bible and “enemy” in the New Testament. 
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According to Kittel, the Hebrew Bible typically speaks of enemies in precisely the national or 
political sense of existential threat intended by Schmitt. Moreover, the Hebrew Bible, in Kittel’s 
reading, advocates not for love of these enemies, but for violence:  
There are many commands to hate national enemies in the OT, e.g., the command to 
exterminate the Canaanites as well as passages like Ps. 31:6. It is the widespread view of 
Rabbinic Judaism that the enemy, i.e., the ungodly, the Epicurean or whoever else it 
might be, is to be hated, and this is in keeping with OT teaching (814).  
And so Kittel argues that the Hebrew Bible interprets enemies as national enemies and advocates 
their destruction. Thus, Schmitt’s politics would be Jewish. The properly Christian view, 
according to Kittel, is to consider the enemy all those who are hostile to “God and His Christ.” 
Kittel’s reference to “personal enemies in the various relationships of everyday life” refers, then, 
to the Christian’s daily struggle against the enemies of God. At this point, Schmitt could argue 
that the specification of enmity to daily relationships coheres with his view that ἐχθροὺς refers 
to personal enemies—indeed, Kittel uses the word. The problem with such an argument is that 
Schmitt’s entire political theological matrix is a polemic against precisely these enemies of God. 
Kittel’s use of “personal” implies a distinction between the personal spiritual difficulties of the 
Christian and the national political difficulties of the Jew. Because it has identified the 
theological and the political, Schmitt’s program cannot make sense of this distinction: For 
Schmitt, the enemy of God is the political enemy. The Concept of the Political wants to purify 
the political of the other “realms” of life, yet Political Theology has already inscribed a specific 
religious content within the structure of politics. By insisting on a “political theology,” Schmitt 
has foreclosed in advance the possibility of Kittel’s distinction between the theological enmity 
toward God’s enemies and the political enmity toward threatening nations. All of which is to say: 
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When Jesus commands to love the enemy, he commands to love the enemy of God. When 
Schmitt argues for the physical destruction of the anti-Christian forces of democracy and 
Marxism, he argues for killing the enemy of God. Unless Schmitt wants to argue that loving and 
killing are interchangeable—or perhaps especially if he wants to argue this—he has lost control 
of his argument to the point of absurdity. To this point, Derrida writes: “Killing would be an 
affair of love . . . To love in love or friendship would always mean: I can kill you, you can kill 
me, we can kill ourselves” (PF 122). 
So much for the purity of the political, which is not so much a philosophical argument for 
conceptual rigor as it is a political argument for the killing of the impure, of the enemies of God, 
of the enemies of Schmitt’s political theology. The other “stratification of the political” in The 
Concept of the Political concerns not the political’s purity from other realms, but rather its 
supremacy over them. In this argument, any distinction that rises to the level of killing and 
sacrificing becomes, by definition, political. If an originally non-political distinction becomes 
intense to the point of killing or sacrificing, “then the relevant antithesis is no longer purely 
religious, economic, or moral, but political” (36). Again: “That grouping is always political 
which orients itself toward this most extreme possibility” (38). One might despise a religious 
other, an economic oppressor (although Schmitt does not speak of economic oppressors, only, in 
a thoroughly capitalist mode, competitors), or an evil actor, but such an other, oppressor, or actor 
is not an enemy in the political sense of the word. If, however, one decided that “physically 
destroying” such a person is justified, and acts on this justification, then one is acting politically.  
The distinction is terminological, and so reads with a certain artifice: an antithesis 
becomes political when it induces or justifies a friend-enemy distinction, thus any friend-enemy 
distinction is a political one. Granted, Schmitt seems to think that this terminological distinction 
	 74	
reflects at least some aspect of social reality: “To demand seriously of human beings that they 
kill others and be prepared to die themselves so that trade and industry may flourish for the 
survivors or that the purchasing power of grandchildren may grow is sinister and crazy” (48). To 
kill for nonpolitical reasons, and perhaps especially for economic reasons, is immoral or insane. 
It is a judgment that reintroduces or reveals a certain ethics and logic within the realm of the 
“purely” political: if nonpolitical killing or sacrificing is immoral and insane, then, Schmitt 
suggests, political killing and sacrificing is, at least potentially, moral and sane. The dismissal of 
nonpolitical killing and sacrificing on these ethical and psychological grounds is only another 
instance of the allegedly pure political’s impurity.  
At other moments in the text, Schmitt is less satisfied with presenting the relationship 
between the political and other realms as one of binary opposition (either political or not, either 
willing to die and to kill, or not). In these moments he writes of the political as the—sometimes 
necessary or unavoidable—intensification of any antithetical relationship: “every concrete 
antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, 
that of the friend-enemy grouping” (29); “religious, moral, and other antitheses can intensify to 
political ones and can bring about the decisive friend-enemy constellation” (36). Any antithesis 
can intensify—and in both directions, friendship and enmity, at once—until the antithesis takes 
on the political form of the friend-enemy distinction:  
The real friend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that the 
nonpolitical antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomes political, pushes 
aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely economic, purely cultural 
criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the political situation at hand 
(38). 
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The argument is that all antitheses or oppositions are weakened forms of politics that can take on 
a properly political form if given enough intensity. All antitheses are potentially political, but the 
political is not potentially other than itself—indeed, the political is the actualization of the 
potential hostility embedded in any other antithesis. Such an asymmetrical articulation of 
actualization and potential—which is classically metaphysical—clarifies Schmitt’s earlier 
suggestion that not all realms are pure in purely the same way. There, Schmitt described the 
political as the least derivable, or most independent realm. The political was the most pure of the 
pure realms, because its content was also one of purity. The other realms were structurally and 
formally independent, but contained democratic, immanent, and so in some sense inferior, 
contents. It was the political, and the political only, that was pure in both content and form: 
Schmitt’s politics is, allegedly, a pure politics of purity.  
“Allegedly,” because what could a pure content be? For Schmitt, as we have seen, the 
hyperpurity of the political is a claim to the ontological status of friend and enemy. The enemy, 
the Jew, is pure enemy. And so on the one hand we have an ontologization of content—the 
ontologization of Jew-as-enemy. In this sense, the “intensification” of antitheses into a political 
mode is not quite the actualization of dormant political potential, but is the realization or 
revealing of the ontological enemy who was always already there. On the other hand, the 
actualization of potential enmity happens as “intensity” increases, making opponents or 
competitors quantitatively more hostile, until eventually the decisive moment takes place, and 
the qualitative move—leap, Kierkegaard might say—from economic, moral, or religious to 
political, that is, to life and death, happens. In either case all of the antitheses of “human 
endeavor” increase in intensity, and so lose their particular content, on the path toward pure, 
ontological politics. The only subtlety is that Schmitt sometimes describes this as a fulfillment of 
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a teleological ordering (the actualization of potential) and sometimes as the revelation of an 
original arche (the Jew as eternal real enemy). In either case, though, the purity of the political is 
made possible by its inscription in a thoroughly metaphysical regime. In either case, this 
metaphysical regime supports Schmitt’s ordoliberal interests: the realms are kept pure from each 
other, economics stays out of the state, and the state keeps out of the economy unless to preserve 
economic purity. 
And so Schmitt has the antitheses of every “realm” intensify until the realm cedes its own 
content in a process of becoming-political.  Religion, aesthetics, morality, and economics, and 
especially economics, lose the specificity and purity of their contents when they become more 
antagonistic, which is to say, either more final or more original, more metaphysical, more 
political:  
A class in the Marxian sense ceases to be something purely economic and becomes a 
political factor when it reaches this decisive point, for example, when Marxists approach 
the class struggle seriously and treat the class adversary as a real enemy and fights him 
either in the form of a war of state against state or in a civil war within a state. The real 
battle is then of necessity no longer fought according to economic laws but has—next to 
the fighting methods in the narrowest technical sense—its political necessities and 
orientations, coalitions and compromises, and so on (37). 
The serious Marxist has nothing to do with dialectical materialism, political economy, or 
international class struggle, and certainly has nothing to do with the working day, wages, or rent. 
In other words, the serious Marxist is not a Marxist in any recognizable sense. Instead, the 
serious Marxist “fights” according to political, not economic, “orientations, coalitions, 
compromises, and so on.” These “compromises and so on” are not only vague, but are seemingly 
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impossible. What compromises could the Jew—the assimilated, that is, the compromising, 
Jew—offer to overcome his or her status as ontological, “real enemy”? The “intensification” of 
all antitheses that results in a qualitative shift is an ideological reduction of all political-historical 
content to ostensibly ontological content. It is Schmitt, not the nineteenth century 
parliamentarian or the Marxist, who, by constructing a political theology of ontological enmity, 
has neutralized politics in any historical material sense.  
It is a teleology and an archeology. In the end, there is the fulfillment of pure hostility 
and pure friendship, killing enemies and dying for friends. In the beginning, there are the 
antitheses whose potential will be fulfilled in the end, the already politically oriented antitheses 
of ostensibly apolitical realms, the eternal enemy and eternal friend, the potential and promise of 
killing and dying, of a time where “I can kill you, you can kill me, we can kill ourselves.” 
Schmitt’s archeo-teleo-onto-theologico politics imagines an ontological narrative wherein true 
enemies are locked in perpetual warfare, where the lack or absence of war is only a temporary 
and weakened condition. In the beginning and the end are the Jew and the Aryan. All history, all 
economics, all aesthetics, all morality, even, sometimes, all religion, all non-ontological-racial 
content of every kind, all are nothing but attempts, and in the 20th century, Jewish Bolshevik 
attempts, to displace this pure field of political battle. 
Before concluding, it is worth clarifying that, despite appearances, Schmitt does not view 
this ontological metanarrative as one of struggle or violence, but instead as one of friendship and 
peace. Indeed, much has been made of the ontologization and privileging of enmity that this 
structure apparently involves, that in the beginning and the end is the Jew as enemy, that all 
politics involve an enemy decision, and so on. Derrida, for one, seems to make the point 
throughout The Politics of Friendship: “Politics could never be thought without knowing what 
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enemy means, nor a decision made without knowing who the enemy is” (106); “the major 
moments of political decision are those of the response to the question: who is the enemy?” 
(125). Derrida argues that this privileging of the enemy question is not accidental but is a 
constitutive structural element of Schmitt’s thought: “What is said of the enemy is not 
symmetrical and cannot be said of the friend, even under the heading of structural or shared 
conditions of possibility. Friendship would consist in the suspension of this structure of 
possibility” (122). But Derrida’s point here is not just that Schmitt has privileged enmity over 
friendship, but more that Schmitt has conceived difference as antagonistic: the difference 
between friend and enemy is a difference of enmity; the one term of the pair comes to dominate 
and determine the internal relation of the two terms; there is no pure difference, but only the 
structural dominance of enmity; there is no difference between friendship and enmity, there is 
only enmity, and so on. 
There is a subtle but important difference between the reading that critiques Schmitt for 
privileging enmity over friendship and the one that critiques Schmitt for inscribing enmity into 
the structure of difference. Derrida argues the latter but has been read as arguing the former. For 
example, Jeffrey Robbins speaks of Derrida’s “deconstruction of the concept of the political 
itself” as “the basis for what Derrida calls ‘the politics of friendship’” (111)69—as if “the politics 
of friendship” were a concept in the regulatory Kantian sense or as if “the politics of friendship” 
were a norm upheld by Derrida. Such readings are misguided: “the politics of friendship” is not 
Derrida’s political program but is the object of Derrida’s deconstruction. In this sense, the 
political problem with Schmitt’s text is not just in the way that he figures the enemy but also in 
the way in which he figures the friend. 
																																																						
69 Jeffrey Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology. Columbia University Press, 2013. 
	 79	
For Schmitt, the friend is self-same, uniform, not “existentially alien and other.” Fighting 
against the enemy is only possible given the unity of a friendship formed by the transcendent 
sovereign. Only such a friendship—a friendship that is not an association of singularities but is 
an ontologically uniform and identified entity—is capable of fighting the enemy. As it is “crazy” 
to kill for economic reasons, it is “in no way justifiable” to ask a non-uniform individual to die 
for me. One can only ask this of the friend: 
The political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way 
justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. No consistent individualism can entrust 
to someone other than to the individual himself the right to dispose of the physical life of 
the individual. An individualism in which anyone other than the free individual himself 
were to decide upon the substance and dimension of his freedom would be only an empty 
phrase (71). 
This political entity is never more than one: “In reality there exists no political society or 
association but only one political entity—one political community” (45). It cannot be more than 
one, because difference is thought of as antagonistic. Any internal difference is the mark of the 
enemy and must be physically destroyed. Any internal difference is a perverted or weakened 
form of the substantial, ontological identity of the nationalist friend group. Precisely this threat to 
the unity of friendship—this threat to a substantial metaphysical racism—is the threat posed by 
Marxism. Schmitt is concerned with “international movements, for example, the Third 
International,” which “transcend the borders of states and ignore the territorial integrity, 
impenetrability, and impermeability of existing states” (56). Such international movements 
undermine the unity of a people and so undermine friendship. They look to create transnational 
and transracial economic friendships, but, in doing so, they undermine the truly political 
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friendship of national and racial unity. In this sense, Mouffe and other left Schmittians who turn 
to Schmitt for a model of agonistic politics are misguided. In an effort at “post-Marxism,” they 
decide for Schmitt against Marx for the sake of intersectional and pluralistic democratic 
struggles. But, as is now clear, Schmitt himself decided against Marxism because Marxism—not 
Schmittianism—promoted just these intersectional and pluralistic struggles. Marxism, not 
Schmittian political theology, disrupts fascistic nationalism and ontological racism from within. 
Marxism, not Schmittian political theology, finds a friend in the exploited everywhere and an 
enemy in the exploiter anywhere. 
Mouffe and other left Schmittians have relied on Schmitt as a source for repoliticizing, 
through a strong decisionism regarding friendship and enmity realigned as a democratic agonistic 
politics, the post-political status quo. This project of a left-Schmittianism is misguided not only 
because of its decision for Schmitt over a misconstrued and reductionist Marx, but because the 
decisionistic Schmitt in whom it finds an ally is imaginary: Schmitt’s decisionism is a fake twice 
over. First, all relevant decisions as to friend—the nation—and enemy—the Jew—are made in 
advance. This is why Schmitt can coherently write that the real “decision” is to “clearly 
evaluate” and “distinguish correctly the real friend and the real enemy” (37). The political 
consists not in forging friendships and enmities, but in “being able to treat, distinguish, and 
comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis” (27). The distinctions have been drawn in advance, as 
if by God. The political decision, then, is not to enact a state of exception, nor to make friends or 
enemies. The political decision is, for Schmitt, entirely reactionary, entirely determined in 
advance by the material content of his fascist political theology, which creates ontological races 
of friend and enemy. The decision is not: There are two sides, friend and enemy, on which side 
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will you align? But is: You are either a friend or an enemy already, will you recognize it, will 
you assume your role? And either way—does it matter? 
Second, Schmitt believes or pretends to believe—either way, writes—that the side of 
right and friendship is also the side of the transcendent sovereign. Indeed, that there is a 
transcendent sovereign—and not a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat or a conversing 
parliament—is what marks this side as right: This order is grounded in the transcendent 
sovereign. But I have argued that Schmitt’s sovereignty is rooted not in the transcendent but in 
the particular and pathetic nationalisms and racisms of a 20th century Spenglerian ideologue. 
The appeal to the outside is an appeal to ontologize and naturalize the national friendship, forged 
in blood and soil, over the international friendship of the proletariat.  
On both counts, Schmitt’s project is plagued by a fascistic and reactionary political 
theology that associates the transcendent, ontology, theology, sovereignty, racial superiority, the 
good, the beautiful, order, law, capital, and the friend. Against this association stands another of 
immanence, history, Judaism, weakness, inferiority, evil, ugliness, chaos, anarchy, socialism, and 
the enemy. Schmitt would like us to believe that the most relevant political decision is to decide 
for the first association. In actuality, the matrix has been so constructed as to have been decided 
as if in advance, by God, to predestine our fates, Of course, this matrix was not decided in 
advance by anyone but Schmitt in his own historical attachment to an allegedly Christian fascism 
and capitalism. The task of a contemporary political theology is first and foremost to decide 
against this associative matrix, to reject its claims to both formal, sovereign transcendence and its 
polemical, material content.  
Each of the next four chapters will contribute to that project. Among other resistances: 
Derrida will reject the possibility of grounding any order or law, or anything, in an outside. 
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Knausgaard will reject the opposition between immanence and love. Kierkegaard will lampoon 
the notions of both a metaphysical and a capitalist Christian. Cone will reject the opposition 
between Marxism and Christianity, indeed, will demonstrate their near total convergence. 
Schmitt’s political theology operates through ideological appeals to the transcendent and pure 





















Deconstructing Theology: Undecidability in Jacques Derrida 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Carl Schmitt’s alleged decisionism is a fake twice 
over. First, Schmitt’s constant appeals to and reliance on the metaphysical categories of 
substance, identity, transcendence, truth, and law—all of which inform his equally metaphysical 
understanding of race—undermine his purported decisionism. For Schmitt the metaphysician, 
everything is decided ontologically in advance; the truth of things is ontologically secured a 
priori through its subjection to sovereign transcendence. Which is to say, the alleged political 
decisions that Schmitt calls for are only ever fakes, because one can only ever decide to assent to 
an ontological order that is always already present.  
At the same time, though, I argued that this ontological foundation was itself a fake. 
Schmitt’s appeals to transcendent sovereignty did not, in actuality, appeal to an already existent 
outside, but instead produced this alleged outside as an authority and ground of argumentation in 
the very process of appeal. Schmitt’s discourse produces its own God, and so cannot possibly be 
an legitimate response to this God. Rather than theologically informed, then, Schmitt’s 
decisionism proves itself a fake in the double sense of hiding the real decisions at work in 
Schmitt’s project: Schmitt decides for fascism and capitalism, but claims that he has decided for 
God. Only in this double sense is Schmitt a decisionist: Schmitt does perform a decisionism, but 
not in the sense in which he claims; indeed, Schmitt claims metaphysical decision in order to 
hide and reify his actual political decisions. 
It should be uncontroversial to argue that these commitments to fascism and capitalism 
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run contrary to the goals of any emancipatory political theology. By definition, neither the fascist 
nor the capitalist can inspire or support a democratic socialist program. Yet, Schmitt’s 
reactionary commitments have not prevented certain left Schmittians, most notably Chantal 
Mouffe, from attempting an appropriation of his thought. Such an appropriation requires that 
Schmitt’s particular political commitments can be somehow detached from his general program, 
that Schmitt can be read against himself, and that his project’s potentially revolutionary form can 
be purified of its decidedly reactionary content. But as I argued in the previous chapter, such a 
separation of form and content is impossible because Schmitt identifies the two through a deep 
ontologization of his most important categories: for Schmitt, God chose Europe, unity, and 
capitalism, and any disturbance to this order is a direct attack on the theological truth of the 
political as such. The ontologization of Euro-Christian-fascist-capitalist supremacy is Schmitt’s 
project, and so a failure to engage with this metaphysical dimension is a failure to engage with 
Schmitt.  
This reference to the metaphysical gestures toward another sort of critique. While it is 
clear that the political content of Schmitt’s political theology is reactionary, it is less obvious that 
the theological structure is the same. While the fact of Schmitt’s ontologization of reactionary 
political categories makes it impossible to ultimately distinguish his politics from his theology—
the attempt to do so, indeed, was Mouffe’s mistake—it is possible to critique his political 
theology from directions both political and theological. That latter critique is the goal of this 
chapter. In the final analysis, Schmitt’s metaphysical rendering of political theology should be 
avoided because metaphysics as such, understood in the classical sense of a true description of 
the logos, which is to say as a “science” of the truth of being, is a basically indecisive discourse. 
Or, more specifically, all metaphysics—and not just Schmitt’s—must necessarily follow the 
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double-false structure of decisionism that Schmitt exemplified: First, any apparently 
metaphysical decision will prove a lie because metaphysics—again in the strict, classical sense—
is incapable of making actual reference to, description of, or in any way engaging with the truth 
of being. Instead, metaphysical texts can only ever be just that: texts. Second, this necessary 
failure of metaphysics to achieve its goal must mean that any alleged metaphysical decision or 
deduction is actually informed by some other and prior non-metaphysical decision. This double-
fake structure of metaphysical (non)decisionism makes metaphysics an incredible discourse in 
postmodernity—and “incredible” in the strongest sense, meaning not only that metaphysics is 
currently unpopular and unattractive as a narrative style, but more directly that metaphysical 
discourses are ultimately epistemologically incoherent, theoretically indefensible, and politically 
suspect for the simple fact of their necessary elision of their own motivating decision. 
Relying primarily on the work of the 20th century philosopher Jacques Derrida, this 
chapter explicates and defends this claim as to metaphysics’ necessary double-fake structure in 
regards to the possibility of decision. This critique of metaphysics in general is different than the 
previous chapter’s critique of the particular metaphysics of Schmitt. In other words, and to 
momentarily stay with Schmitt for the sake of clarification, this critique of the fact of 
metaphysics in Schmitt’s work is a critique on a different order than the (political) critique of the 
particular contents ontologized in Schmitt’s work. While Schmitt’s particular commitments are 
reprehensible from an emancipatory political perspective, my claim is decidedly not that Schmitt 
could have saved the theoretical credibility of his program by plugging in more acceptable 
political content: the theoretical problem with Schmitt is not that he did metaphysics wrong, but 
is rather that he did metaphysics at all. In arguing this, my intention is not, as it is with some 
commentators, idolatry critique. Such a critique would argue that Schmitt’s failure lies not in the 
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fact of his metaphysical appeal to a transcendent outside, but instead in his particular 
interpretation of this outside. It would argue that if only Schmitt had referred to the outside 
properly, which is to say non-idolatrously, then his project of political theology would have 
found success.70 While the charge that Schmitt has idolatrously identified God with the German 
state is plausible—although, as the next chapter will argue, we should be careful of any such 
charge of idolatry, not only because of the potential imperialism implicit in any accusation of 
idolatry but also because of its possible figuration of Christianity as a primarily doctrinal and 
orthodoxical affair—my immediate concerns are more theoretic and general. It is not as though a 
better interpretation of God-as-transcendent-sovereign would have saved Schmitt’s formal 
structure, because any and all attempts to metaphysically refer to God-as-transcendent are 
theoretically indefensible and politically (in)decisive as such. 
The distancing from idolatry critique also means that, especially against some streams of 
contemporary Catholic systematic philosophy, I am not arguing that the metaphysical treatment 
of God is itself idolatrous. This is the approach taken, for example, by Jean-Luc Marion, for 
whom “only an idol could be identified with the concept” (75).71 Marion’s concerns with 
conceptual idolatry—the reduction of God to “god,” to a concept of God—are related to but 
ultimately differ from my own Derridean-inspired deconstruction of metaphysics. While Derrida 
would certainly agree with Marion that no metaphysical concept can be identified with God—
																																																						
70 This is the strategy pursued, for example, by Ted Smith, in his Weird John Brown: “(Schmitt) is right to open up a 
space for deliberating about sovereignty. But his own candidate for filling that space can only be described as 
idolatrous . . . In using the structure of theological thought to open up a space outside the rule of law, but then losing 
any politically relevant sense in which theology can be outside or other to the order of human history, Schmitt opens 
the door to political theologies that would put humans, individually and collectively, in the role theologies have 
traditionally set aside for God” (65).   
71 Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance, trans. Carlson (Fordham University Press, 2001). See also page 24 of 
this text, wherein Marion relies on chapter 17 of Acts to argue that “philosophers” have “purified (idolatry), that is, 
having conceptualized it.”  
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indeed, for Derrida, “there is no such thing as a metaphysical concept” (D, 6)72—Derrida would 
just as certainly disagree with Marion that metaphysical treatments of God should be avoided for 
the sake of preserving a properly religious distance from God. To this end, the two are critical of 
metaphysics for essentially diametrically opposed reasons: whereas Marion is worried that 
metaphysics reduces God to “God,” Derrida argues that there is only ever “God,” that the 
quotation marks that allow for citation are essential to “God” as God, and, moreover, that “God” 
is the metaphysical signifier par excellence. While a precise adjudication of this debate is just 
outside the scope of this chapter—which is primarily concerned not with conceptual idolatry but 
with metaphysical indecision—I hope to demonstrate that Derrida has good and compelling 
reason to argue his position that the dichotomy of God and “God” is always already 
metaphysically, which is to say textually, inscribed. Moreover, this impossibility of non-textual 
metaphysics is antithetical to Marion’s project, as Marion’s anti-idolatry framing seems to 
suggest that a non-idolatrous metaphysics is possible. This, indeed, is the argument he makes in 
his essay “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” wherein Aquinas’ analogical metaphysics are 
saved from the Heideggerian critique that ontotheology reduces Being to a being (and, in parallel 
for Marion, God to “God”) by virtue of this metaphysics’ apophatic commitments.73  
And so neither arguing for a particular metaphysics over another or that metaphysics 
(particularly or in general) is idolatrous, this chapter makes the more general critique that all 
metaphysical discourse is theoretically indefensible and politically (in)decisive. Indeed, it is 
because metaphysics are theoretically indefensible—because, as Derrida says, there is no such 
																																																						
72 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Johnson. University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
73 Jean-Luc Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” in Mystics: Presence and Aporia, ed. Kessler & 
Sheppard (University of Chicago Press, 2003), 38-74. 
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thing as a metaphysical concept—that metaphysics can only ever presuppose, hide, and derive 
itself from a prior non-metaphysical decision. Metaphysics as such cannot be decisive, because 
there is no such thing as metaphysics as such, but only ever a textual production that calls itself 
metaphysical for the sake of displacing the real site of decision. 
This turn to a Derridean critique of metaphysics might seem old, stale, or otherwise 
repetitive. Indeed, the relationships between the three terms Derrida, metaphysics, and theology 
invokes at least two substantial bodies of pre-existing literature: that of post-metaphysical 
theology, on the one hand, and the related set of discourses that more directly relate Derrida to 
theology on the other. A complete bibliographic treatment of these literatures is impossible, but a 
few comments to distinguish my argument from ones commonly found in this space should be 
made. First, the general conversation concerning the relationship between theology and 
metaphysics more typically engages Heideggerian “destruction” than it does Derridean 
“deconstruction.” That is, with some notable exceptions—Richard Kearney and John Caputo 
being perhaps exemplary here—theologians receptive to a critique of metaphysics seem in 
general responsive to Martin Heidegger’s arguments concerning ontotheology.74 This is certainly 
the case with the aforementioned Marion, for whom Heidegger stands as a primary interlocutor.75 
Likewise, Jason Alvis’s recently published The Inconspicuous God: Heidegger, French 
Phenomenology, and the Theological Turn not only associates the French theological turn with 
the German Heidegger, but mentions Derrida only once in passing—and this to note that Jean-
																																																						
74 For a treatment of Heidegger’s own involvement in the double-fake structure of metaphysical—or, in his case, at 
least ontological—decision, see: Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology (Verso 
Books, 2009), pgs. 3-77. 
75 For an overview of this relationship, see: John Betz, “After Heidegger and Marion: The Task of Christian 
Metaphysics Today,” Modern Theology 34.4 (2018), 265-297. 
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Luc Nancy offers a philosophy that is “reflective of Derrida’s deconstruction” (147).76 Kevin 
Hector’s Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language and the Spirit of Recognition, which 
sets itself up as a response to Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, likewise mentions Derrida 
only sparingly—and once to note that Heidegger “anticipated” Derrida (15).77 More examples 
could be given interminably. 
Undoubtedly, this attention given to Heidegger and the Heideggerian critique of 
ontotheology reflects a real and important development in a critical understanding of theology’s 
relationship to metaphysics. Heidegger is an important figure in 20th century continental 
philosophy and the critique of ontotheology deserves serious engagement. That does not mean, 
however, that engagement with Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics can stand in for an 
engagement with Derrida’s. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, Derrida’s critique of 
metaphysics, and especially the critique of logocentric metaphysics that identifies thought and 
being, offers a unique and marked challenge of its own. Importantly, Derrida is able to offer this 
challenge without explicit reliance on the apparently metaphysical categories of Being, being, 
concealment, truth, and so on that occupy Heidegger. As my distinction from Marion suggested, 
Derrida’s main concern is not that Being is reduced to a being or that metaphysics will lead to 
conceptual idolatry, because Derrida does not believe metaphysics is possible. 
At the same time, and again with a couple of notable exceptions, those theologians and 
philosophers of religion who do engage Derrida typically do not focus on Derrida’s critique of 
metaphysics. The standard narrative informing this lacuna is that Derrida’s early work—where 
the critique of metaphysics is most explicit—differs radically from his later works, which more 
																																																						
76 Jason Alvis, The Inconspicuous God: Heidegger, French Phenomenology, and the Theological Turn (Indiana 
University Press, 2018). 
77 Kevin Hector, Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language and the Spirit of Recognition (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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explicitly engage topics of religion and politics.78 Recently, Clayton Crockett has gone so far as 
to argue that Derrida’s early texts on “writing” need to be surpassed or put behind in order to 
engage more explicitly with Derrida the religious thinker: “To read and think about Derrida 
beyond the motor scheme of writing is to engage with the religious and political significance of 
his later work.”79 And so theologians generously treat Derrida on topics such as hospitality,80 the 
gift,81 apophasis,82 the secret,83 animality,84 and so on, but spend comparatively little time 
wrestling with motifs like the trace, citation, dissemination, and the supplement.85 The reception 
																																																						
78 For a brief overview and critique of this standard argument, see: Steven Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology (T&T 
Clark, 2009), pgs. 5-7. Yet even Shakespeare, who is aware of the artifice of this distinction, cites Of 
Grammatology, the text to which most of my attention will be aimed, only a handful of times. Given that Of 
Grammatology states that theology is the obstacle to grammatology, this relative oversight is unfortunate.  
79 Clayton Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing: Political Theology and New Materialism (Fordham 
University Press, 2017). Crockett fully endorses the standard view that there is a shift in Derrida’s work: “Derrida’s 
philosophy works mostly within the motor scheme of writing. At a certain point, however, during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, this cultural-intellectual-technological scheme of writing evolves into a motor scheme that Malabou 
describes as one of plasticity . . . . there is a kind of transition from an intellectual motor scheme based on writing in 
a broad sense to one based on what Derrida sometimes characterizes in terms of the machinic, teletechnology, or 
technoscience” (1-2). Beyond its questionable coherence to empirical reality—Derrida critiques ethnocentrism in the 
very first pages of Of Grammatology, his earliest lecture on la différance engages negative theology—Crockett’s 
particular rendering of Derrida’s turn should be criticized for its reliance on questionable theoretical categories: 
How, for example, does Derrida’s “philosophy” “evolve” “at a certain point” “during the late 1980s and early 
1990s”? What is the meaning of evolution here, which implies a basically un-Derridean progressive frame? What 
sort of “certain point” happens over two decades—what is the certain point? More generally, in what sense does 
Crockett intend “writing” if “writing” is of a different “motor scheme” than is machinery, teletechnology, or 
technoscience? As I will argue, Derrida’s sense of writing is more than general enough to incorporate all of these 
“schemes.”  
80 Hans Boersma, “Iraneaus, Derrida, and Hospitality: On the Eschatological Overcoming of Violence,” Modern 
Theology 19.2 (2003), 163-180. 
81 Andrew Shephard, The Gift of the Other: Levinas, Derrida, and a Theology of Hospitality (Pickwick Publications, 
2014). 
82 Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Coward & Foshay. (SUNY Press, 1992).  
83 Ian Almond, “Derrida and the Secret of the non-Secret: On Respiritualizing the Profane,” Literature and Theology 
17.4 (2003), 457-471. 
84 Divinanimality: Animal Theory, Creaturely Theology, ed. Moore (Fordham University Press, 2014), especially 
pgs 17-36. 
85 Some notable exceptions to this trend are typically found in the earlier theological receptions of Derrida—works 
published in large part before the English translations of Derrida’s “later” works were available, and, in some cases, 
works published before Derrida’s later works. For example, Mark C. Taylor’s initial reception of Derrida as a source 
for theology dealt extensively with writing and grammatology—although perhaps Taylor’s penchant for wordplay 
reduces some of the analytical rigor of Derrida’s own contributions to the topic. Taylor’s classic treatment of the 
topic is Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (University of Chicago Press, 1984). Kevin Hart’s The Trespass of the 
Sign: Deconstruction, Theology, and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1990), although still partly guided by 
Heidegger’s concerns, offers extensive and careful treatment of these “early” Derridean themes. While Hart’s 
engagement with the early Derrida is exemplary, he ultimately reinscribes deconstruction within the tradition of 
negative theology. This move ultimately denudes the radicality of deconstruction’s anti-theological critique.  
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of this gap has led to several unfortunate misleading interpretations. In my view, the discursive 
force and even semantic intention of Derrida’s “religious” motifs typically treated by theologians 
cannot adequately be captured without a prior coming to terms with Derrida’s radically anti-
metaphysical and anti-theological arguments.86 And so it is to a reading of these anti-
metaphysical and anti-theological arguments—sidestepped both by theologians overtly 
concerned with the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics and by those who are concerned only 
with the “later” Derrida—that this chapter will offer. 
In the chapter’s first section, I will argue that all appeals to an “outside”—and so not just 
Schmitt’s—will necessarily fail. Relying on a close reading of Derrida’s arguments concerning 
“writing” found especially but not only in Of Grammatology, I argue that rejecting the possibility 
of an outside-text—“text” understood in the general sense that will be developed shortly—
implies and requires a concomitant rejection of any discourse that structurally relies on such an 
outside. This rejection of all outside-oriented metaphysics—and it is Derrida’s argument that all 
metaphysics in the classical and strong sense do structurally rely on an outside—is why I can 
claim that all metaphysics necessarily follow the double-false decionisitic structure: metaphysics 
must rely on an outside, but cannot actually do so. Metaphysical theologies that think of God as 
self-fulfilled and transcendent truth—theologies that identify God and truth through an 
																																																						
86 For example, Mark Fisher, who was not a theologian but who is influential in contemporary postmodern theology, 
conceived of Derridean “hauntology” as a sort of positive force: “Haunting can be seen as intrinsically resistant to 
the contraction and homogenization of time and space. It happens when a place is stained by time, or when a 
particular place becomes the site for an encounter with broken time.” A closer reading of hauntology according to 
the logic of the trace developed in Derrida’s early works would not have led to this understanding of hauntology, 
which suggests that “haunting” “happens.” Derrida’s more immediate point with the discussion of hauntology is that 
all ontology is always already a fake, is conjured. The object to be studied as (a) being in any ontology must be 
conjured up, and so can only ever be a spectral entity. This is a critique of hauntologies posing as ontologies. 
Derrida is not, as Fisher suggests, endorsing some notion of ghosts disrupting the present; rather, the “present” is 
always already self-deconstructing, is never an entity or a being and so is never the object of ontological—only 
hauntological—study. This reversal and subsequent misreading, where Derrida’s object of deconstructive critique is 
somehow taken as his normative position, was also seen in the previous chapter’s discussion of Jeffrey Robbins’ 
pseudo-Derridean endorsement of “the politics of friendship.” See: Mark Fisher, “What is Hauntology?,” Film 
Quarterly 66.1 (2012), 16-24. 
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identification of God as truth and God as the God of truth—will be particularly vulnerable to this 
critique precisely because of their interest in divinizing the outside.  
Beginning with Aristotle, and extending especially but not only to the transcendental  
Thomisms inspired by or reliant on him, these  theologies all translate the identity of God and 
truth into a coincidence—even if sometimes “hyperbolic”—of being and thought. This 
coincidence is held together by the “logos,” which is then read back into the structure that 
produced it in order to secure the (actually presupposed) identity of God and truth. Such is the 
formal model of all logocentric metaphysics and theologies: two identities, God is Truth and 
Being is Thought, inform and reinforce each other. To this end, the chapter’s first section argues 
that Derridean deconstruction, through a reading of textuality and the textual production of 
philosophy, radically dissociates this alleged coincidence of thought and being. In so doing, 
deconstruction presents a real challenge to the credibility of any theology that takes logy in a 
sense that harbors or grounds this coincidence. The problem with metaphysics, then, turns out to 
be more basically the problem of all metaphysics’ implicit reliance on theology. Notably, this 
locating of metaphysics’ problem in its implicit theology is what makes Derrida’s project 
fundamentally different from Marion’s, which argues that metaphysics is not theological enough. 
The chapter then turns to consider two competing responses to Derrida’s critique of 
theology. If theology is the reason metaphysics should be rejected, then it would seem that no 
Derridean theology is possible. This is the position taken by Martin Hågglund, who argues that 
Derridean deconstruction articulates a “radical atheism” that not only argues against the 
existence of God, but also argues that God is an undesirable reality.  Against this interpretation, 
John Caputo argues that deconstruction is “structured like a religion.” After adjudicating this 
debate—and challenging the extent to which Hågglund and Caputo actually disagree with each 
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other—I suggest that neither Hågglund nor Caputo adequately account for the dissociation of 
being and thought suggested above. Despite their “radical” intentions—Hågglund writes of a 
radical atheism and Caputo of a radical hermeneutics—both ultimately imply a logocentric 
philosophy that obscures the truly radical potential of Derridean deconstruction.  In the final 
analysis, I agree with Hågglund that Derrida’s work offers a sustained critique of theology. Yet, 
different from Hågglund, I argue that such a posture precludes, rather than requires, a radical 
atheism. If Derrida has convincingly deconstructed the identity of God and truth that secures the 
coincidence of being and thought, Hågglund has unconvincingly articulated a new identity of 
“no-God” and truth. Caputo, despite the tone of his “poetics,” has done the same. Rather than 
displace the logic of identity thinking and logocentric metaphysics, Hågglund and Caputo have 
each reinscribed the structure with new terms. Thus, whereas I ultimately side with Hågglund 
over Caputo that Derridean deconstruction precludes theism, I argue that it is a mistake—and 
one ultimately grounded in metaphysical thinking and the principle of non-contradiction—to 
assume that a critique of theism implies atheism. 
In other words, and like Schmitt, both Hågglund and Caputo have offered a theory of 
decision wherein all “decisions” are decided in advance. For Hågglund, a decision for religious 
faith is a priori precluded by “deconstructive” philosophy. For Caputo, a decision for religion, 
albeit a curious “religion without religion,” is demanded by it. Both positions avoid an 
understanding of decision as aporetic. This aporetic position, which is Derrida’s, argues that 
decision is possible only in undecidable situations. The chapter’s third and final section returns 
to Derrida’s generalized account of writing to show the ways in which he has made religious 
decision—for or against, Caputo or Hågglund—impossible, because any framing of the question 
of religious decision must itself already imply a theologically informed metaphysics. However, 
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and at the very same time, because the metaphysical thinking that secures the coincidence of 
thought and being has been rejected, the logical and philosophical impossibility of theology does 
not imply the actual, existential impossibility of God or of faith in God.87 In other words, 
deconstruction makes theology impossible by critiquing the identity of thought and being, but 
this very critique makes possible a decision against the mandates of a priori philosophical and 
structural barriers. More strongly, this critique reveals that a decision against—or at least not 
reliant on—philosophical reasoning is unavoidable: As the double fake structure of decisionism 
has shown, a non-philosophical decision, including the decision for or against God, has always 
been at work in every metaphysics.  
 Before beginning in earnest, it is worth briefly posing a couple of questions that this 
chapter will never attempt to answer. For a Derridean, appeals to biography must necessarily fall 
short: as we will see in reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his mother, the meaning and play 
of a text cannot be reduced biographical or psychoanalytic determination. However, given the 
current suspicion that “high theory” in general and “French theory” in particular are abstract 
discourses with no practical or pragmatic considerations—that is, given the suspicion that theory 
is a pastime for the privileged and the comfortable at best and a white bourgeois tool of 
obfuscation and canonical imperialism at worst—it is perhaps worthwhile here to point out that 
Jacques Derrida was an Algerian Jew who spent his formative high school years under Nazi 
occupation. Derrida the name might now be associated with the comforts of academia, but 
Derrida the person, “a little black and a very Arab Jew,” was not.88 And so the unanswerable, at 
least for me, question is this: Why is it that an Algerian Jew would be so interested in showing 
																																																						
87 This difference between the reality of thought and the actuality of existence will be explored in depth in this 
project’s engagement with Kierkegaard. 
88 Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” in Jacques Derrida, trans. Bennington, ed. Bennington (University of Chicago 
Press, 1993). 
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the violence inherent in the western philosophical condition? And, complementarily, what is 
there to be lost—or, perhaps, who is to be lost?—if this violence, grounded in theology, 
witnessed and resisted by a victim of fascism, is not fought? And these two questions raise a 
third, which is more simply put: What decision is to be made? 
Writing Theology 
 The task of this section is to briefly explicate Derrida’s argument concerning the 
relationship between writing and theology. In brief, Derrida argues that all classical metaphysics 
rely on theology, and especially on the theologeme of the coincidence of thinking and being. 
This reliance on theology should not be read in the Radical Orthodox sense by which theology is 
the secret truth of all secular philosophy. On the contrary, theology’s involvement with 
philosophy is the reason Derrida theoretically problematizes philosophy’s claims as to its own 
knowledge.; that is, theology is the secret fake of all secular philosophy. In the final analysis, 
according to Derrida, theology, and so all philosophy that depends on theology, is impossible 
because all theology depends on an impossible transcendental signified. Which is to say, 
theology depends on something outside of writing. As itself writing, theology cannot do so. As I 
hope to show, this deconstruction of the coincidence of thinking and being because of the 
impossibility of theology is a much more subtle and rigorous gesture than is sometimes granted. 
John Milbank, for example, describes Derrida’s argument like this: 
Derrida’s critique of metaphysics is centered around an assault on the notion of a 
‘meaning’ that can be separated from the play of signs and referred to the original 
‘presence’ of a thing or a thought. Signs do not denote pre-existing realities, but are 
caught up in a chain of connotations that can be infinitely extended. Hence the 
transcendental premise of all language is a logic of ‘supplementation’ and of ‘deferral’ 
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(310).89 
While Milbank is correct that Derrida argues that “signs do not denote pre-existing realities,” this 
is not because signs are “caught up in a chain of connotations” but because signs, understood as 
the unity of signifier and signified, do not exist. Whereas Milbank is suggesting that Derrida 
thinks of meaning as always deferred through “a chain of connotations,” Derrida’s more salient 
point, as I show below, is that the intelligible and secured meaning of something called a “sign,” 
which is to say the sign itself, is always already a chimera, a fake. There is no sign, and so no 
meaning of the sign, because there is never a determined or determinable signified. Derrida 
locates the indeterminacy of meaning not in the relationship between signs, as Milbank suggests 
and as his later affirmative gestures toward Hans Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics confirm (312), 
but rather within the sign itself.90 It is this destabilization of the possibility of signification, more 
than the deferral of meaning, that poses a problem for theology. And it is this mislocating of the 
site of indeterminacy—Milbank’s thinking of difference as between two signs, as opposed to 
Derrida’s thinking of difference as productive and disruptive of any “sign” as such—that 
ultimately leads Milbank to accuse Derrida of being a “nihilist” who promotes “red-guard 
politics of ceaseless negativity” wherein “only a fascistic politics remains viable” (319).91 Given 
the previous chapter’s discussion of the relationship between unity and fascism, the accusation 
that an attention to difference leads to fascism can only be read as misplaced. What fascism has 
ever privileged difference? There have been none, by definition. Ultimately, the trope that 
																																																						
89 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 
90 For an overview of this difference between Derridean deconstruction and Gadamerian hermeneutics—that 
deconstruction finds indeterminacy in text and that hermeneutics finds indeterminacy residing between text and 
reader—see: Ernst Behler, “Deconstruction Versus Hermeneutics: Derrida and Gadamer on Text and 
Interpretation,” Southern Humanities Review 21.3, 1987 (201-223). 
91 On the misreading of Derrida as promoting only negation, see Derrida’s “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” wherein 
Derrida explains that and why deconstruction is “not a negative operation.” From: A Derrida Reader: Between the 
Blinds, ed. Kamuf (Columbia University Press, 1991). 
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Milbank is reiterating here—that Derrida’s “assault” on metaphysics is that meaning is 
deferred—basically misreads Derrida’s fundamental point: all philosophical and theological 
structures that ground themselves in something outside themselves do so through their own 
textual inventions. The textual invention that most occupies me in this section is the invention of 
the theologeme of the coincidence of thinking and being. In this way, Derrida is not 
deconstructing metaphysics by “assaulting” something called “meaning,” as much as he is 
demonstrating that the metaphysical conception of meaning is always already theological—a 
point on which Milbank would vigorously agree—and that this theological formation is precisely 
the problem for metaphysics.  
The argument might begin with Aristotle, who writes that “spoken words are the symbols 
of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.”92 That is, according to 
Aristotle—but not only Aristotle—there exists first a mental content to which every person has 
direct intuition. This content is then represented by verbal speech, which is in turn represented by 
writing. Writing, now twice removed from the pure realm of pure content, is a representation of a 
representation, a sign of a sign. The same derivative structure is found wherever writing is held 
to represent something that comes before it or something that exists outside it. What is writing 
according to philosophy? “’Sign of a sign,’ said Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel” (OG 29). And 
so the classical model of writing claims to adhere to the following generic structure: A 
prelinguistic content is represented by first a verbal and then a written sign.  
Such a structure provides a sort of inverse mirror of Schmitt’s decisionism. Whereas 
Schmitt claimed that he was making political decisions but was actually doing indecisive 
metaphysics (even as his metaphysics was actually hiding other political decisions), Aristotle and 
																																																						
92 Aristotle, On Interpretation, Section 1 part 1. 
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the philosophers’ of writing claim to not make any decision. They accept that, for metaphysics, 
all is decided in advance, that all that is left to do is the inscription and communication of 
content: the philosopher writes that writing is non-necessary and external to the truth that it 
represents. Philosophical texts, then, at least insofar as they adhere to the idealist structure 
identified by Derrida, present themselves as representing their own other, as representing some 
truth that is pre- or non-philosophical.  
The basic deconstructive gestures suggests that this self-presentation does not account for 
the philosophy already inscribed within this allegedly pre-philosophical structure. That is, the 
appearance of the classical model of writing is that philosophy relates to some outside content as 
an exterior and non-necessary inscription. We have, according to this appearance, a relationship 
between philosophy and its other. Like Schmitt’s relationship between friend and enemy, the 
classical model of writing is presented as a relationship of both alleged difference and alleged 
equality: philosophy and its other are different, because without difference no inscription would 
be possible; but philosophy and its other are the same, because nothing essential is changed or 
last in this process of transcription. Yet, also like Schmitt’s relationship between friend and 
enemy, this appearance of difference and equality is actually the elision of a more fundamental 
dominance by one term over the other. The basic deconstructive claim is that philosophy 
dominates—or at least secretly tries to dominate, for actually non-philosophical decisions are 
always at work—its relationship to its other. More specifically, the structure that is said to relate 
philosophy-as-external to pre-philosophical content already relies in its own articulation upon 
several discrete and identifiable philosopheme: namely, content, structure, relation, difference, 
and expression. Or, closer to Aristotle’s description, the structure that allegedly relates 
philosophy to its other relies on the philosophemes of symbol, mental, symbol, and word: 
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“spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of 
spoken words.” What is a symbol, what is an experience, what is the mental, and what is a word 
that does not already involve within itself an entire philosophy? Which is to say: the philosophic 
model reads itself into what is allegedly before or outside itself. Philosophy must refer to 
particular philosophic concepts—including the concept of the concept—in order to provide itself 
an allegedly pre-philosophical ground that it claims to find in intuitive mental experience. 
Moreover, this reliance on a cluster of philosophemes means not only that the allegedly pre-
philosophical structural relationship between philosophy and its other calls upon and relies on 
philosophy, but that this structure itself articulates an entire philosophical theory of truth, 
expression, and being. That is, philosophy is not one part of this structure that relates philosophy 
to its other, but is instead itself articulated in this presentation of philosophy’s relation to its 
other. Philosophy appears to be an element in a more general and encompassing structure, but 
philosophy is actually the control that this structure displays over what it calls philosophy and 
what it calls truth. Or as Derrida puts it, in the classical model of writing, “not only is a 
philosophy implied, but also a conceptual network in which philosophy itself has been 
constituted” (MP 230). 
Aristotle continues:  
Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, 
but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also 
are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been 
discussed in my treatise about the soul (OI 1.1) 
Here, Aristotle accords temporal and logical priority to “mental experience” over the “speech 
sounds” that express them—and so twice over the “written words” that express the speech 
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sounds. Without this pre-philosophic mental experience—the existence of which we have 
already questioned—translation and interpretation would be impossible, because “men” would 
be confined to speak and listen to only those with the same speech sounds. Between groups with 
different speech sounds, according to Aristotle, mental experience works as a sort of 
transcendent and mediating term. In other words, the “sameness” of mental content that allows 
its identical representation in different languages refers to the content’s exteriority to its 
allegedly subsequent and unnecessary inscription. Structurally, this exteriority of writing makes 
of it a transport of something other and higher than itself, and writing becomes a transport of 
meaning and truth. This pre-inscribed content of mental experience, which writing transports and 
communicates, is given as intuitively true, as immediately present to the mind of either the 
philosopher or God or both. Derrida describes the structure like this: 
All signifiers, and first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative with regard to 
what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified 
sense, indeed to the thing itself (whether it is done in the Aristotelian manner that we 
have just indicated or in the manner of medieval theology, determining the res as a thing 
created from its eidos, from its sense thought in the logos or in the infinite understanding 
of God) (OG 11).  
In the pages immediately following this claim, Derrida will speak of this “signified sense” as 
also “presence,” “substance,” “the proper,” “the primary,” and “the transcendental signified.” In 
each case, some element—the transcendental signified—is presented as outside of language in 
general and writing in particular. That this element is given intuitively in mental experience can 
only mean that its subsequent inscription is only a temporary pedagogic detour: one writes in 
order to express an intuition so as to help others reach the same intuition. More precisely, in such 
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a scheme, that which the other reaches is not the object of writing, but is the intuitive truth of 
which writing is a representation twice removed. In this sense, writing effaces itself in its process 
of pedagogical communication—philosophers write in order that writing will not be necessary; 
complementarily, intelligible writing is possible only because it is unnecessary. 
Derrida detects in this philosophical structure a theological moralism of sin and of purity: 
Morally, writing—and so communication and pedagogy—are thought according to a model of 
the fall. It is only when one falls from direct intuition of the truth that writing becomes 
necessary. Only as fallen and removed from truth, only when truth is absent, is one forced to 
momentarily use the material things of the world, and this only for the sake of once again 
transcending these things. Derrida notes that philosophers as methodologically diverse as Hegel, 
Saussure, Levi-Strauss, and Husserl all employ some variation of this analogy of writing and 
sin.93 For them, writing “always seem(s) to make an apparent, provisional, and derivative notch 
in the system of first and last presence . . . The sign is always a sign of the Fall. Absence always 
relates to distancing from God” (OG 283).94 The human person would then need to purify him or 
																																																						
93 Derrida is reacting against this identification of writing with fallenness and sin. For Derrida, writing is not sinful 
because there was never a pre-textual or pre-inscribed Edenic utopia. As will become more important in this 
project’s next chapter, Derrida’s anti-sin position problematizes John Milbank’s critique of Derrida. For Milbank, 
Derrida and other “nihilists” have assumed an ontology of violence, wherein the truth of all language and all 
meaning is violence. Indeed, according to Milbank, for Derrida “violence is what there is to be known” (314). As 
should be clear, though, Derrida is arguing against what he sees as the classical identification of writing with 
violence. Later in Of Grammatology, Derrida will speak of an originary violence, but this is in an expanded and 
generalized sense meant to undo—through affirmation and hyperbolization—the classical claim that writing is 
violence. There, it is as if Derrida were saying: You say writing is violence? Fine, then everything is violence. This 
same reversal-through-affirmation structure is at work in Derrida’s claim that there is no outside text, which is 
discussed in depth below. For more on Milbank’s critique of Derrida, see: Theology and Social Theory (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2006), esp. pages 309-317. For a rigorous critique of Milbank’s reception of Derrida, see: Marika Rose, 
A Theology of Failure: Zizek Against Christian Innocence (Fordham University Press, 2019), esp. pages 37-44. In 
this text, Rose convincingly argues that Derrida enacts a “radicalization” of Christian apophaticism—this opposed to 
Milbank’s monolithic construction of “Christianity” that makes of Derrida a fundamentally anti-Christian nihilist.  
94 Derrida leaves open here the possibility of a rethinking of distance from God not according to sin, but to prayer 
and adoration. Such would be one form of Marion’s argument. As I will argue in this chapter’s final section, 
Derrida’s position does not preclude this positive valuation of distance, but it does preclude a structure that looks to 
use this distance for the sake of maintaining an identity of thought and being. The question of distance, sin, and 
prayer would then turn not primarily on how distance is thought, but more generally on the possibility of writing 
“distance” outside of text. 
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herself of this sinful character of writing in order to return to God. All writing would be done 
only for the sake of overcoming itself. Such a self-overcoming is possible only because the 
difference between immediate intuition of truth and writing as removed from truth has no 
essential effect on truth as such: this is a truth that does not depend upon closeness or proximity, 
and this is a fall with no noetic consequence.95 
Importantly, this self-overcoming done in an effort to achieve moral purity structurally 
resembles Schmitt’s model of the purification of “realms” as they become more and more 
political. Recall that for Schmitt the realms of economics, ethics, aesthetics, and so on, all 
denude themselves of particular content as their inherent antagonisms intensify into their 
properly ontological-political condition. The proletariat only becomes political when it stops 
engaging economics and starts living out is divinely-ordained ontological position. And so with 
Schmitt in the last chapter and Aristotle in this one, we have two discrete instances of the 
coimplication of a transcendental signified—the sovereign, direct intuition of being—with the 
structure said signified is meant to authorize and guide. Derrida’s argument in Of Grammatology 
is that such a coimplication is not an empirical accident particular to these or any other writers, 
but is a structural effect of writing. As soon as the element allegedly outside the structure, the 
transcendental signified, relates to the structure in any way—including the very basic relational 
position of being outside—it cannot help but refer to elements “within” the structure. In other 
words, in order for the transcendental signified to represent the truth available to writing, it must 
use the conceptual resources—above all, the concept of truth—of said writing. There is no entity 
in autochthonous isolation, there is no determination of meaning outside of reference to a 
received conceptual apparatus, be it scientific, philosophical, theological, or whatever else. There 
																																																						
95 This project’s chapter on Kierkegaard will present an entirely different understanding of truth as existential. 
	 103	
is no non-philosophical structure that relates philosophy to its other. 
Because of these necessary problems—this impossibility—of grounding a discourse of 
truth in a truth that resides outside of discourse, Derrida argues that reading: 
Cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent 
(a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified 
outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of 
language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in 
general (OG 158). 
Neither reading nor writing can any longer be thought on the model of a detour ordered toward a 
transcendental truth, meaning, or signified. This impossibility of leaving the text and finding rest 
in its transcendental referent—a model followed by both Aristotle and Schmitt—is not an 
empirical effect of language’s imperfectibility. Derrida is not arguing that there is a transcendent 
being, truth, or reality that we cannot “reach” because of our fallen state. Such is precisely the 
“theological” structure that is subjected to deconstruction in Derrida’s readings of Saussure, 
Hegel, and Husserl.96 Rather, Derrida is generalizing the deconstruction of the transcendental 
signified and making of it a “quasi-transcendental” condition of all reading and writing: Every 
alleged signified is a signifier, every signified is part of the chain of associations, differences, 
																																																						
96 It is also the logic of hyperessentialism that Derrida finds in Dionysius’ negative theology. A full discussion of 
Derrida’s relationship to negative theology is not possible in a footnote, but his major argument in those discussions 
does not radically differ from what I am developing here. In terms of negative theology, Derrida worries that the 
purification and rarefication of language is performed for the sake of securing a higher purity. The hyper-being that 
Derrida finds in Dionysius would still be subject to the generalized account of writing developed here: God could 
not be a transcendental signified, and God as hyper-being is no different. That negative theology apparently strips 
language of its descriptive capabilities does not change this necessity. Nor does such a program dissociate being 
from thinking: like Augustine’s program, what is known in negative theology, according to Derrida, is God as 
unknowable. The link between thinking and being that allows for reference is not fundamentally challenged: even 
when speaking of a learned ignorance, negative theology speaks of controlling the relationship between language 
and its outside, God. The question would then always be, what authorizes this control? See: Jacques Derrida, “How 
to avoid speaking: denials,” from Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Coward & Foshay. State University of New 
York Press, 1992, pgs 73-143. 
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and deferrals that constitute text.97 If this were not the case, if there were to be a self-present and 
absolute transcendental signified, then signification would be impossible. We would not even 
have the “direct symbols” that Aristotle thought he found in speech, for, as Derrida has 
demonstrated, such symbolizations immediately open syntactical relations between signifiers; 
that is, symbolization always articulates text. Such a plentitude without signifying would be an 
absolute presence without difference or movement, it would be “another name for death” (OG 
71).98 
And so the rejection of the transcendental signified immediately becomes a rejection of 
the possibility of the signified as such: the full presence of any signified anywhere would 
absolutely cease the movement of signification and would thus be “another name for death.”99 
																																																						
97 John Betz has argued that Christian theology is not primarily interested in the coherence of the signifier and the 
signified in any sign. Rather, Christian theology operates with an analogical metaphysics wherein all of creation 
functions as a sort of fallen, incomplete, and improper signifier of God. In this way, creation partakes in the divine 
without immediate or direct access to the divine. Creation is then somehow a part of, and so somehow refers to, the 
creator, but the creator always and everywhere exceeds creation. But this program does not alleviate Derrida’s 
concerns. Rather, it illuminates them: Betz’s analogical metaphysics makes of God the only signified. That God is 
the ultimate transcendental signified is not an argument against Derrida, because it is Derrida’s primary argument in 
Of Grammatology. Whereas Betz sees this locating of God in the transcendent as a cure to metaphysics’ perceived 
ills, Derrida sees it as the source of metaphysics’ problems. As Betz notes, the ultimate question concerning the 
relationship between metaphysics and theology is this: “to what extent is theology qua theo-log , as ‘reasoned 
speech’ about God, even possible?” It is precisely this “about,” this structure of reference, which, as allegedly 
secured by God, is critiqued by Derridean deconstruction. Of course, and importantly, the claim that reference is 
only ever a reference of future reference is not quite the same as the claim that one cannot speak about God—this 
will be clarified in this chapter’s final section. However, by reinscribing the signifier/signified structure within the 
creature/creator relationship, Betz’s metaphysics does ultimately conceive of God as an impossible transcendental 
signified, that is, as a fake. See: John Betz, ““Theology without Metaphysics? A reply to Kevin Hector,” Modern 
Theology 31.3 (2013), 488-500. For more on Derrida’s critique of analogy—which is a figure, and is textual, and so 
cannot be used to secure reference to an outside text—see Derrida’s “White Mythology: Metaphor in the text of 
philosophy,” in the aforementioned Margins of Philosophy. 
98 In this sense, the condition of the impossibility of a transcendental signified, of an absolute and present truth, is 
the condition of possibility of writing and life. Against Pickstock, for whom Derrida is “a necrophiliac,” Derrida’s 
rejection of the sovereign and arresting power of the would-be transcendental signified is an affirmation of life. See: 
Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Blackwell, 1997), especially 
pages 101-114. 
99 One could question even this determination: “And death, to what does that refer?” Among other texts, Derrida 
takes up this question in “Rams: Uninterrupted Dialogue—between Two Infinities, the Poem,” from Sovereignties in 
Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan (Fordham University Press, 2005). In “Rams,” Derrida argues that the 
possibility of death makes possible friendship: it is only with the knowledge that friendship is finite and 
asymmetrical, that one will die before the other, that one can pledge friendship to the other. Only if I know you 
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That is, without the absolute signified that would arrest movement and signifying, we come to 
see that any alleged signified is “always already in the position of a signifier” (OG 73). 
Bennington puts it like this: “Without a transcendental signified, the difference between signifier 
and signified cannot be rigorous. A 'signified' is just a signifier positioned by other signifiers as a 
signified” (97).100 If writing is the sign of a sign— “said Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel,” said 
Derrida—then every signified, precisely as a signifier, that is, as a sign of other signs, is writing. 
It is this generalized sense of writing that leads Derrida to write that “one cannot abstract from 
the written text to rush to the signified it would mean, since the signified is here the text itself” 
(OG 150). And it is in this sense of a generalized writing that allows us to read the infamous 
claim that “there is no outside-text” (OG 158).101 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s translation, of course, offers “There is nothing outside the 
text.”102 Derrida, for his part, wrote: “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte.” The problem with Spivak’s 
preferred translation, as I see it, is her use of the definite article. Derrida’s sentence occurs in a 
larger discussion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions. In it, Derrida is arguing that the 
“meaning” of Rousseau’s text cannot be determined through reference to any transcendental 
signified. This for the reasons discussed above; namely, that any alleged transcendental signified 
																																																						
might die first can I promise to carry you beyond death. And so despite this suggestion in Of Grammatology, and 
despite what Hågglund will have to say shortly, even the question and possibility of death seems to find itself in text. 
100 Geoffrey Bennington, “Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very Idea)” Oxford Literary Review 10.½ 
(1988), 73-130. 
101 Derrida could have written that there is no inside text, either. The point is not that language is a prison from 
which we cannot leave. Rather, the critique of an “outside” should also be read as a critique of the structure that 
depends on a distinction between outside and inside. The notion that there could be a pure immanence of text—of 
anything—is totally foreign to Derrida’s project. Indeed, in “Outwork,” the opening essay of Dissemination, Derrida 
explicitly rejects it: “To allege that there is no absolute outside of the text is not to postulate some ideal immanence, 
the incessant reconstitution of writing’s relation to itself. What is in question is no longer an idealist or theological 
operation which, in a Hegelian manner, would suspend and sublate what is outside discourse, logos, the concept, or 
the idea. The text affirms the outside, marks the limits of this speculative operation, deconstructs and reduces to the 
status of effects all the predicates through which speculation appropriates the outside” (35). 
102 For more on the difficulties of Spivak’s translation, see : Geoffrey Bennington, “Embarrassing Ourselves,” LA 
Review of Books (March, 2016). 
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will itself be found to be a signifier of something else, which itself will be a signifier, and so on, 
endlessly. Even psychoanalytic and pseudo-psychoanalytic discourses that would argue that 
Rousseau’s text is “about” his mother would fail to make non- or pre-textual reference, precisely 
because Rousseau’s mother herself functions within a series of substitutions and references. This 
is not to say that Rousseau’s text invents his mother in any vulgar sense, or that Rousseau has no 
mother, but is to understand text and writing in the generalized sense articulated above: 
Rousseau’s mother is not present to herself. The claim “This text is about Rousseau’s mother” 
can always be questioned: “And who is Rousseau’s mother? What is she about?” This sense of 
generalized writing is lost, or possibly lost, in Spivak’s use of the definite article: Where, in this 
generalized sense, does Derrida write about “the” text? “The text” implies Rousseau’s 
Confessions. Derrida does not say that Rousseau’s mother does not exist outside of Confessions, 
but that there is no “outside text” which somehow articulates or contains the full “meaning” of 
Rousseau’s mother. 
That Derrida does not argue that there is nothing outside of “the” text, Confessions, is 
important in order to grasp the generality of his critique of all structures of knowing grounded in 
the truth of a transcendental signified: These transcendental signifieds—the sovereign, being as 
directly intuited, the inexpressible God, Rousseau’s mother—are not only held to be outside the 
texts that they direct, but more importantly function to secure the intelligibility of textualiy as 
such. That is, they function to secure the coincidence of the knowledge articulated textually and 
the being-outside-text with which said knowledge coincides—it is a coincidence implied in every 
model of writing that holds on to the difference/equality structure displayed in Aristotle’s 
classical discussion of writing. In this authorizing and securing sense, all transcendental 
signifieds are simultaneously the content to be communicated and the guarantee that 
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communication is possible. They are simultaneously the truth which writing represents and the 
promise that the truth can be represented. They claim: the truth is, being can be known.  
And so Derrida has seemingly articulated two competing and antagonistic models of 
writing: On the one hand, we have the logocentric philosophic model, which argues for a direct 
coincidence between the knowledge given by writing and the being that exists in full presence 
outside of writing. On the other hand, we have not logocentrism and the metaphysics of 
presence, but an attempted grammatology: a reading of the writing—the interminable deferral of 
the truth and meaning—of all transcendental signifieds.  
Throughout Of Grammatology, Derrida clearly associates theology—and not only 
“ontotheology”—with the logocentric metaphysics of presence. Indeed, it is the “logos” of 
logocentrism that, as alleged pure and absolute ground of purity and the absolute, is held to be 
the most pernicious of all theologemes. Echoing Marx, for whom religion is the archetype of all 
ideology,103 Derrida argues that theology is primarily responsible for the promotion of all 
transcendental signifieds: “God is the name and the element of that which makes possible an 
absolutely pure and absolutely self-present self-knowledge” (OG 98). This concept of the 
absolute, which is another name for the self-presence of truth, wherever it is found, “always 
leads to an infinitist theology and to the logos or the infinite understanding of God” (OG 78). 
And reversing the causal arrow, relating not logocentrism to theology but theology to 
																																																						
103 “The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call 
on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires 
illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is 
the halo. Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that 
chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The 
criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded 
his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the 
illusory Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself.” Karl Marx, A Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Accessed: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm#05 
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logocentrism: “Infinitist theologies are always logocentrisms” (OG 71). “The age of the sign,” 
that is, the age of the coincidence of the knowing signifier and the being signified, which is 
deconstructed, “is essentially theological” (OG 14).  “The intelligible face of the sign remains 
turned toward the word and the face of God” (OG 13). Finally, Derrida tells us plainly, this 
theology constitutes “the major obstacle to all grammatology” (OG 76). 
If theology’s “theo” names God as transcendental signified, if theology’s “logy” secures 
the isomorphism of its own discourse with its own exteriority, and if it then follows that 
“theology” means the truth of God—where the genitive is double, truth about God and God’s 
truth, which would be identical—then theology is, without doubt, the major obstacle to all 
grammatology. Which is the same as saying that all deconstructive readings that dissociate God 
and truth, and so undermine the theological coincidence of thought and being, render theology 
impossible. Philosophy and theology become partners in the double-fake structure of all 
metaphysical “decision”: Philosophy presents itself as responding to and recovering direct 
intuition of an immediate and present truth; this presentation, though, masks its own prior and 
pre-philosophical reliance on the theological security of the identity of truth and God, of thought 
and being. That is, theology is nothing more than philosophy’s secret attempt to hide its own 
inability to know. Theology is the fake of philosophy, a fake of a fake, a sign of a sign of a sign 
forever. 
 
“Radical Atheism” or “Religion without Religion” 
 
The previous section argued that Derrida’s generalization of writing—the argument that 
all signifieds are signifiers—undermines all structures of truth that are grounded in a notion of 
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truth as exterior to writing. Such an exteriority of truth marks a simultaneous difference and 
coincidence between being, which is outside of writing, and thinking, which isomorphically 
represents being. As theology is the discourse that most explicitly affirms the authority of a 
transcendental signified, grammatology traces or retraces the deconstruction always latent in 
theology. As “the outside” is a theologeme upon which all metaphysical structures of truth 
depend, theology is “the major obstacle” to grammatology. 
In his book Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, Martin Hågglund argues that 
Derrida critiques not only theological discourse and the theological element of all discourse, but 
more strongly critiques the possibility of theism in general. Hågglund’s book makes primarily 
two arguments, which are related. The first, from which Hågglund will eventually distance 
himself, concerns the impossibility of God’s existence. This anti-theist argument is meant to be 
descriptive and value neutral. The second argument concerns not the nonexistence of God, but 
the undesirability of God. It is this second argument that most occupies Hågglund, and, in his 
view, is what marks Derrida’s atheism as “radical.”  
Concerning the nonexistence of God, Hågglund precedes from an argument about the 
necessity of temporality and the consequent impossibility of eternity: 
The temporal can never be in itself but is always disjoined between being no longer and 
being not yet. Thus, time itself is constitutively out of joint. Or more exactly: time itself 
is the impossibility of any ‘itself’ . . . To think the tracing of time as the condition for life 
in general is to think a constitutive finitude, which from the very beginning exposes life 
to death, memory to forgetting, identity to alterity, and so on (RA 79). 
Hågglund’s argument here is that every “now” is only possible as the passing of a “past” and the 
coming of a “future.” This passing and coming are not accidents that affect the present from 
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without, but are rather constitutive elements of all temporality that give rise to the phenomenon 
of the present. Rather than think of the past as a past present, as if yesterday is gone because we 
are no longer present to it and it no longer present to us, and rather than think of the future as a 
future present, as if tomorrow will be soon present to us as a “now,” Hågglund wants to think all 
time as constantly passing and coming, constantly “out of joint.” Any sense of immediacy and 
presence is a derived effect of this originary “out-of-joint” temporality. 
For Hågglund, identity is an effect of this out-of-joint temporality, of this necessary 
passing and coming of time. To reach this conclusion, Hågglund argues that one’s spatial 
continuity through time—the “spatialization of time”—allows for a sense of identity as that 
which repeats in space at different temporal moments. In other words, identity arises as a means 
by which one can secure and explain a sense of spatial continuity through temporal difference: 
There is an identity between the “I” that I now am, the “I” who I was as a child, and the “I” that I 
will be in the future precisely because there is an irreducible difference between these moments. 
Without this difference, the repetition through time that constitutes the “I” would not be possible; 
there would be only unchanging plentitude, no temporal difference by which spatial continuity 
could be measured. The upshot of this argument is that identity, “I,” comes about after the fact of 
difference. Identity does not precede difference, but follows it. Difference “itself,” the 
spatialization of time and the temporalization of space, is both ontologically and logically prior 
to identity. 
Implementing a classic Derridean motif, Hågglund then argues that these conditions that 
allow for identity also make for the impossibility of identity. In the sense that identity is an effect 
of difference understood as temporalization and spatialization, difference functions as the 
condition of possibility for identity. Yet, precisely because difference is prior, temporalization 
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and spatialization also function as the conditions of impossibility of any identity understood as 
consummated or eternal self-presence. Everything that “is,” “is” only to the extent that it “is” its 
own passing and coming: “No moment is given in itself but is superseded by another moment in 
its very event and can never be consummated in a positive infinity” (RA 3).  
Hågglund applies this quasi-transcendental condition of difference as temporalization—
the “ultratranscendental condition from which nothing can be exempt” (RA 19)—to God, and 
does so for the sake of rendering God impossible. For Hågglund, and for Hågglund’s Derrida, 
temporalization “entails that nothing—including whatever is posited as ‘God’—can be exempt 
from temporal finitude” (RA 142). Because temporalization is an “ultratranscendental ” condition 
for anything to be, God could only ever arise as an effect of difference. Because God would then 
be subject to the higher laws of temporality, God would not be God in any theologically 
recognizable sense. God would be one fleeting and temporary signifier on par with any and all 
other so-called identities. God would only ever be “God.” 
In his response to Hågglund’s text, Caputo criticizes this temporalization argument 
against God:  
(Hågglund) simply uses différance to stipulate that life is mortal and that being is spatio-
temporal but he offers no non-circular argument that there is no life or being outside 
space and time. He simply assumes the conditions of space and time and then complains 
that eternity does not meet them. His objection to eternity is that it does not abide by the 
conditions of space and time. But that is not an objection to eternity; it is the definition of 
eternity.104 
In my view, Hågglund does more than merely “stipulate” that life is mortal: Hågglund presents 
																																																						
104 John Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to Radical Theology,” JCRT 11.2 (2011), 32-
116, pg 116. 
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an a priori argument for the priority of difference over identity by demonstrating identity’s 
logical and ontological dependence on difference. Yet, Caputo’s point that Hågglund has not so 
much criticized “eternity” as he has described it is well taken, and seems to cause Hågglund to 
distance himself from this ontological version of his anti-theist argument. Indeed, in his response 
to Caputo, Hågglund claims that, “radical atheism does not dispute the existence but rather the 
desirability of God and eternity . . . Whether or not such a state can exist is not decided by 
radical atheism and nothing in my argument depends on deciding it” (RED 134).105  
While contradicting his earlier claim that “the absolute being of God is unattainable” (RA 
111), the move to desire is helpful in understanding what is at stake between Hågglund’s and 
Caputo’s respective interpretations of deconstruction. This help is welcome, because the 
difference between the two is not always clear. About Radical Atheism’s critique, Caputo writes 
that he “would say that it is a perfect misunderstanding of my work but for the fact that nothing 
is perfect” (RAR 42). Yet, in the same essay,  Caputo claims that “Hågglund describes quite 
felicitously what is in fact my present project” (RAR 111). Both accuse the other of articulating a 
“systematic misreading of everything I say” (RAR 36 / RA 120). Yet, both are quick to clarify 
that neither believes that God “exists,” and both are, at least ostensibly, avoiding any sort of 
“metaphysical” commitment. Neither believes that Derrida believed in God. Both are critical of 
religion’s influence on culture and politics (although Hågglund, the professed atheist, less so: 
“There are any number of situations in which the given structure of a society makes religious 
discourse the most powerful tool for mobilizing a struggle against injustice” [RED, 149]). At one 
curious point in his text, Caputo seems to agree that deconstruction makes “the case for 
atheism,” and note the definite article, but denies that this atheism is “a case against religion” 
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(RAR 47). This turn from theism to “religion” is muddled when Caputo, again and again, assures 
Hågglund that his “religion” is “only structured like a religion,” that it is properly “without 
religion” and “without the God of classical religion” (RAR 35). Yet, if Caputo’s religion is 
without God and without religion, Hågglund’s atheism is not without faith: in This Life, his 
follow-up to Radical Atheism, Hågglund speaks of a “secular faith . . . in the future and in those 
on whom I depend” (47). Indeed, his life’s “commitments” are “sustained by faith” (197).106 
Parsing the debate, one gets the sense that each are eager to prove their atheist bonafides to the 
other. 
Apparently, then, the dispute between Hågglund and Caputo is not primarily about 
personal religious belief or practice. Neither believe God exists; both are comfortable with the 
language of faith; both demur when tasked with making metaphysical commitments. What is at 
stake, instead, is the question of how best to read and understand Derrida. On this front, both 
Hågglund and Caputo offer coherent, if incomplete, readings of some Derridean motifs. Neither, 
however, address the issue with which this chapter has been occupied: the deconstructive critique 
of the coincidence of thought and being. Indeed, both offer examples of precisely this 
coincidental thinking. 
Throughout his corpus, Caputo’s master-signifier for interpreting deconstruction as 
religious, as “structured like a religion,” is “the impossible.” Both deconstruction and religion 
are, for Caputo, structurally related to “the impossible” in that both demonstrate a “passion for 
the impossible.” In both cases, deconstruction and religion, Caputo speaks of a “passion” that is 
“evoked or provoked” “when the tensions of the impossible are raised to their highest pitch, 
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when the easy routine of the possible is shattered by the impossible” (LI 4).107 By so closely 
defining the two, Caputo renders deconstruction and religion convertible: Caputo can and does 
speak of both religion as deconstructive and deconstruction as “structured like” a religion.  
Caputo holds that this “passion” is the originating and driving motivation of both 
deconstruction and religion, and thus speaks of an “axiom of impossibility” from which both 
discourses operate (LI 3). It is an axiom that produces two discourses that are more than 
analogically associated. The liberality with which Caputo transitions between the two is most 
clear when he associates Derrida with Kierkegaard and the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms:  
The rule is that only the impossible will do, and anything less will result in a mediocre 
fellow; only the impossible will produce results that are truly worth the effort. A passion 
or a desire is maximized, reaches what Climacus calls ‘the ultimate potentiation,’ only in 
extremis, under the harshest, the most inhospitable and impossible conditions. It is only 
when a passion is pushed beyond itself, to the breaking point, that it is moved to make a 
radically new move, impelled to another plane or register. This paradoxical movement 
constitutes, if this is possible, a certain ‘law’ of the impossible, which must mean a 
certain outlaw, an archic rule without rule, an auto-interrupting law, or perhaps a ‘logic’ 
of the impossible, which would only be a paralogic or a paradoxical logic. We can thus 
identify a certain quasi-method to the sublime madness of Derrida and de Silentio, 
Climacus and Constantin, who are, I would say, kindred poets, pranksters and 
paralogicians extra ordinaire, transgressors and trespassers sensu eminentiore (LI 4). 
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Besides the circular reference to “inhospitable and impossible conditions,” Caputo does little 
here to provide any semantic determination of “the impossible.” Instead, Caputo offers a few 
heuristics by which one might be able to recognize or describe the impossible: the impossible 
will be without rule, self-interrupting, and so on.  A couple of pages later, Caputo will write of 
the impossible as “representing” “an absolute interruption in the regime of the possible, an 
exposure to and an opening upon an absolute heterogeneity, a wholly other” (LI 6). The subtle 
shift to representational language, where the impossible is no longer that which “evokes or 
provokes” passion but is instead a representation of that which “evokes or provokes” passion, 
further distances Caputo from any determination of content. Granted, a refusal to define the 
impossible makes some degree of sense, and certainly Caputo would dismiss any demand to do 
so. After all, defining the impossible would be to render it, in some semantic sense at least, 
possible. But this move to representation has evoked a familiar pattern: “the impossible” is now, 
as representational, a signifier. Religious passion, in this register, is not impassioned by “the 
impossible” as an outside inbreaking of “the wholly other” as much as it is part of a chain of 
substitutions and significations—that is, writing.  
On the one hand, Caputo has found himself treating “the impossible” in a fairly equivocal 
manner. It is sometimes the unknown and unpredictable that can break into our quotidian 
existence, and, in doing so, create unprogrammable and anarchic effects. The impossible is “a 
wholly other” that or who provokes a religious passionate response. It is in this sense that the 
impossible most closely resembles the “God of classical religion.” It is Caputo not as a 
postmodern Catholic, but as a Barthian. On the other hand, “the impossible” is not God, but is a 
sign of something that might perhaps be God—but, Caputo assures us, not the God of religion at 
all. We have in this sense not a wholly other breaking in from afar, but a sort of auto-
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deconstructive play constitutive of any alleged identity. It is in this sense that the impossible 
most closely resembles the Derridean motifs of khora and différance, and, incidentally, most 
closely resembles Hågglund’s notion of difference-as-temporalization. 
Caputo treats both deconstruction and religion as “passions for the impossible,” and so 
grants himself some degree of leniency in liberally translating one into and out of the other. Yet, 
such a posture of translation elides an underlying equivocation: Caputo has not so much rendered 
God and khora translatable as he has made “the impossible” equivocally refer to both. In Caputo, 
“the impossible” is the transcendental signified that harbors the translatability of God and khora. 
As the previous section’s critique of all transcendental signifieds makes clear, this structure is 
impossible in a sense much more straightforward than Caputo’s. 
Such an equivalency seems to have been put into question in advance by Derrida himself. 
In “Sauf le nom,” Derrida discusses the relationship between khora, understood as “the barren, 
radically nonhuman and atheological” nonplace that allows for the possibility of spatialization 
and temporalization, and God. Whether khora precedes God or God precedes khora is, Derrida 
says, ultimately and necessarily undecidable: 
It remains to be known if this nonsensible (invisible and inaudible) place is opened by 
God, by the name of God (which would again be some other thing, perhaps), or if it is 
‘older’ than the time of creation, than time itself, than history, narrative, word, etc. It 
remains to be known (beyond knowing) if the place is opened by appeal . . . or if it 
remains impassively foreign, like Khora, to everything that takes its place and replaces 
itself and plays within this place, including what is named God (76).108 
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To this extent, Caputo might be in agreement. However, this undecidability does not mean that 
the two possibilities are equivalent or interchangeable; indeed, they are exclusive of one another. 
Derrida clarifies this antagonism: 
But it is true that these two ‘places,’ these two experiences of place, these two ways are 
no doubt of an absolute heterogeneity. One place excludes the other, one (sur)passes the 
other, one does without the other, one is, absolute, without the other . . . on one side, on 
one way, a profound and abyssal eternity, fundamental but accessible to messianism in 
general, to the teleo-eschatological narrative and to a certain experience or historical 
revelation; on the other side, on the other way, the nontemporality of an abyss without 
bottom or surface, an absolute impassability (neither life nor death) that gives rise to 
everything that it is not (77). 
In reference to this antagonism—even if an antagonism with something of a supplemental 
structure—Kearney notes that Caputo distances himself from Derrida, even if trying to appeal to 
him: 
I suspect that Caputo thinks that we don’t have to choose—since the issue remains 
radically undecidable. But I would like to disagree and suggest that we do whenever we 
opt to believe in God or not believe. A religious belief, I submit, is hardly worthy of the 
name unless it calls for a choice. And Derrida himself, it seems, has little hesitation about 
declaring his own personal option, namely, for atheism (SGM 201).109 
Whether or not Derrida “has little hesitation about declaring his own personal option” is not of 
particular importance for this project.110 Indeed, a concern with Derrida’s personal religious or 
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atheistic conviction might be one of the problems with Caputo’s treatment of deconstruction and 
Derrida—it is a treatment that, as Graham Ward argues, often borders on hagiography.111 What is 
more immediately important is Caputo’s treatment of decision in relation to this equivocal notion 
of “the impossible”: Kearney suggests, and my reading has agreed with his suggestion, that 
Caputo decides to not decide between khora and God. As I will argue in this chapter’s final 
section, Derrida performs a similar decision-to-not-decide in terms of faith. But there is a 
decisive distinction between Derrida’s refusal to decide and Caputo’s: Caputo’s non-decision is 
actually a plethora of mutually exclusive decisions. Faced with the undecidable choice between 
khora and God, Caputo collapses the distinction in equivocation. Caputo chooses, or wants to 
choose, both. The disjunctive “or” in the question “God or Khora” becomes, in Caputo’s work, 
conjunctive. It is a conjunctive hidden in the equivocation harbored by “the impossible”: God 
and khora are both the impossible  
Is such an equivocation and such a conjunction possible? Above, Derrida argued that it is 
not: God and khora exclude each other. And so the reader of Caputo is faced with a choice: 
Either Caputo thinks that Derrida is wrong that God and khora exclude each other, in which case 
Caputo’s deconstruction disagrees with Derrida’s on this important point; or Derrida is right and 
Caputo’s equivocation is actually only in appearance. In this latter case, Caputo’s apparent 
indecision masks a prior decision for either God or Khora.  
There is good reason to choose the latter option. Consider Caputo’s treatment of the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation as it functions for Kierkegaard: 
That is precisely the point where, much as I love him, I jump the Kierkegaardian ship—
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where Kierkegaard identifies the ‘Paradox,’ which is a structure of passion, desire, 
existence, and temporality, with the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. That would be like 
the Messiah actually showing up (which in fact it precisely is) and that would ruin 
everything. For me, the truest form of Christianity is the one in which the Messiah can as 
a structural matter never show up (RAR 36). 
Which is to say, the truest form of Christianity—and why this introduction of truth as a 
measure?—would be a structural atheism. As Hågglund also posits an a priori, structural 
argument against the possibility of a messiah, Caputo and Hågglund are in complete agreement. 
The only difference here is that Caputo wants to call this structural atheism a religion, and 
Hågglund, more plausibly, does not.  
I see little reason to side with Caputo over Hågglund on this point—and not just because 
of Caputo’s reliance on equivocation, wherein the “without religion” so far overpowers the 
“religion” in the phrase “religion without religion” as to render the phrase’s tension resolved. 
More troublesome for Caputo’s entire argument is his apparent dismissal of the possibility of 
incarnation. It is a dismissal with which Caputo seems to find pleasure, especially as it distances 
him from “the Christian right.” Because Caputo strongly distinguishes between the “specific 
messianisms” of particular religions and the structure of “the messianic” which allows for the 
possibility of such messianisms, he forecloses in advance the possibility of deciding in favor of 
any messianism. For Caputo, such messianisms are not only always violent, “bloody,” but are to 
be excluded a priori because they would materially determine the promise of “the messianic,” 
which is always, for Caputo, open-ended and without fulfillment. At its extreme, this rejection of 
any particular messianism is, according to Caputo, also a rejection of any particular faith: 
“deconstruction keeps a safe distance from any ‘determinable faith,’ even if it is not 
	 120	
fundamentalist or even religious in the conventional form” (PTJD 150).112 By so removing the 
possibility of coincidence of the particular and the universal, though, Caputo has seemingly 
opted for a Kantian-esque religion within the boundaries of reason alone. Caputo’s religion is 
never particular, material, or historical, but is only ever formal and determined by the “law 
without law” of “the impossible.” 
This a priori privileging of the formal over the material undermines Caputo’s 
commitment to his two primary motifs: passion and the impossible. Caputo has rendered the 
Incarnation impossible. And he has rejected it on those grounds. “The impossible,” then, turns 
out to be that which is possible within the a priori structural confines of a rational formalism. Is 
not such a reduction of the impossible also a foreclosure of passion? Caputo explicitly rejects 
Kierkegaard precisely at his most passionate: At the moment when Kierkegaard finds faith in the 
passionate and existential commitment to the objective absurdity of the incarnation. Quite 
literally, Captuo’s faith is without Passion.113  
Caputo’s project ought to be subjected to one more turn of the screw. By now, we are 
																																																						
112 This interpretation of Derrida, which depends upon a distinction between “revealability” and “revelation” and a 
privileging of revealability, leaves Derrida susceptible to critiques of escapism. Robyn Horner, whose “real point is 
that locating God in the absolute future, even if this promotes a kind of generally ethical or even religious impulse, 
is insufficient to sustain faith of any sort— even faith so unspecified as Derrida’s might be.65 No thinking of God 
can be meaningful without a thinking of revelation, for faith is a response to how God has passed in the past as much 
as a desire for God to come in the future,” makes just this critique. Caputo’s interpretation gives credibility to this 
critique but, as I hope to show especially in the chapter’s next section, the opposite interpretation of Derrida is 
possible: Derrida does not forbid faith, but makes it possible through a dissociation of thinking and being. See: 
Robyn Horner, “Theology After Derrida,” Modern Theology 29.3 (2013), 230-247. 
113 Žižek finds in Caputo’s dismissal of the possibility of any particular faith, and especially in his dismissal of the 
possibility of a Kierkegaardian absurd, a dismissal of Christianity at large. For all of his talk of the impossible, 
Caputo is only ever at best able to approach religion ironically, with his “fingers crossed”: “The paradox of Christian 
Incarnation: in Christ, wthis miserable individual, we see God himself . . . The properly Christian choice is the ‘leap 
of faith’ by means of which we take the risk to fully engage in a singular instantiation as the Truth embodied, with 
no ironic distance, no fingers crossed. ‘Christ’ stands for the very singular point excluded by Caputo: a direct short 
circuit, identity even, between a positive singularity and the divine Event.  Caputo professes his love for 
Kierkegaard—but where here is the central insight of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, his insistence on the 
central paradox of Christianity: eternity is accessible only through time, through the belief in Christ’s Incarnation as 
a temporal event?” (258). That is, by foreclosing the possibility of paradox, by rejecting the possibility that the 
messiah might “actually show up,” Caputo robs faith of its truly passionate potential.  
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aware that any allegedly pure transcendental signified will prove itself to be a signifier of some 
other specific and material inscription. To this point, Caputo has gone to great lengths to purify 
his transcendental signified, “the impossible.” The impossible is pure of religion, of God, of the 
Incarnation. It is even, in a move that associates Caputo with Schmitt’s distaste for the ochlos, 
pure of “ordinary fellows.” But if, for example, the Incarnation is not “the impossible,” and 
precisely because it is impossible, then what, for Caputo, is? The question can always be asked: 
What is this transcendental signified about? When Caputo writes of a passion for the impossible 
that separates “saints” from “ordinary fellows,” what does he have in mind? Responding to 
Zizek, a frequent critic of Caputo despite being a fellow partisan of the impossible, Caputo 
writes: 
I  would be perfectly happy if the far left politicians in the United States were able to 
reform the system by providing universal health care, effectively redistributing wealth 
more equitably with a revised IRS code, effectively restricting campaign financing, 
enfranchising all voters, treating migrant workers humanely, and effecting a multilateral 
foreign policy that would integrate American power within the international community, 
etc., i.e., intervene upon capitalism by means of serious and far-reaching reforms . . . If 
after doing all that Badiou and Zizek complained that some Monster called Capital still 
stalks us, I would be inclined to greet that Monster with a yawn (ADG 124).114 
Caputo would be perfectly happy if the “far left” revised tax codes, among a few other reforms. 
Apparently, for Caputo, the political partner of deconstruction’s passion for the impossible is a 
program of bureaucratic readjustment. Religion’s passion for the impossible is “evoked or 
provoked” by a structural atheism with mildly social-democratic aspirations.  
																																																						
114 John Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, After the Death of God (Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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Hågglund also critiques Caputo’s use of “the impossible,” but for a different reason than 
the one I have articulated here. Where I argue that Caputo’s use of “the impossible” seemingly 
equivocates between referring to God and khora but actually functions as an a priori reduction of 
the possible to exclude both material religious beliefs and radical politics, Hågglund opts to take 
Caputo at his word. The result of doing so is that Hågglund believes that Caputo conceives of the 
impossible as an inbreaking of the wholly other. This model of inbreaking, though, proves no 
more convincing as a deconstructive reading:  
According to Caputo, ‘the impossible, being impassioned by the impossible, is the 
religious, is religious passion,’ since ‘our hearts are burning with the desire to go where 
we cannot go, to the impossible.’ It is easy to see how misleading this argument is once 
we realize that the impossible for Derrida is not somewhere we can never go—or 
something we can never reach—but rather where we always find ourselves to be. The 
impossible is what happens all the time, since it designates the impossibility of being in 
itself that is the condition of temporality (RED 141). 
According to Hågglund, Caputo’s distinction—as opposed to equivocation—of the possible from 
the impossible constitutes “the matrix for Caputo’s misunderstanding of Derrida” (RED 136). 
Such a distinction relies on and introduces a series of binary oppositions—“inventive or 
uninventive, exceptional or routinized, generous or mundane, surprising or preprogrammed, 
unexpected or predictable, excessive or merely normative,” and I would add the binary of heroic 
or ordinary—that are “utterly deconstructible” (RED 144).  
Hågglund’s critique of Caputo’s reliance on binary distinctions is not an a priori or 
dogmatic dismissal of binary thinking. Indeed, Hågglund himself sometimes relies on such 
distinctions, even if only for the sake of deconstructing them—such as the dichotomy between 
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eternity and temporality, or that between identity and alterity. Hågglund’s real concern here is 
that Caputo has constituted an oppositional matrix wherein each side offers an associative cluster 
of analogous terms. Each cluster takes as its master signifier either the impossible or the 
possible; that is, these two terms function as a master binary by which all other antagonisms 
make sense. And so the inventive, the exceptional, the generous, the surprising, the unexpected, 
the excessive, and the heroic are all associated together as having something to do with “the 
impossible”; whereas the uninventive, the routinized, the mundane, the preprogrammed, the 
predictable, the merely normative, and the ordinary are all governed by “the possible.”  
For Hågglund—and it is a point to which I subscribe, although I question if it takes 
Caputo too literally—such a structure undermines the necessary coimplication of the possible 
and the impossible. Hågglund argues for this coimplication because, unlike Caputo, Hågglund 
does not identify the impossible with a permanently futural alterity or with a series of center-left 
reforms. Instead, Hågglund argues that “the impossible” in Derrida primarily refers to the 
impossibility of identity and plentitude. Here, Hågglund is consistently implementing his critique 
of temporalization: the passing and coming of time makes any “in-itself” impossible. Against 
Caputo, then, Hågglund argues that the impossible is not that which will (never) come, but is that 
which happens, quite literally, all the time. Indeed, anything that happens only happens within 
this context of the temporal impossibility of identity. The possible and impossible are not bipoles 
constituting an antagonistic binary, but are each other’s supplemental pairs. Each is the condition 
of possibility, and so impossibility, of each other. 
By arguing that the impossible happens—indeed, happens all the time—Hågglund 
presents a thoroughly non-ontological understanding of the impossible. It is one that coheres 
with an argumentative structure common in Derrida’s texts: the conditions of possibility of a 
	 124	
phenomenon are also found to be said phenomenon’s conditions of impossibility.  Examples—
instances of deconstruction—abound: Derrida will write of the im/possible conditions of giving 
gifts (a gift must be given outside of conditions of exchange, but precisely this is to say that gifts 
must be given without being given),115 of signing signatures (each signature must mark a unique 
event and unique commitment, but must also be infinitely repeatable and tied to the signatory),116 
of offering hospitality (one cannot offer hospitality to the other with conditions, for to do so 
would be to domesticate the other, yet such an unconditional hospitality necessarily risks its own 
demise as the other could be a monster),117 of implementing and defending democracy 
(unconditional democracy necessarily makes possible democracy’s undoing),118 of asking 
forgiveness (one must consider oneself unforgivable in order to ask for forgiveness),119 and 
countless other autoimmune and autodeconstructive structures, commitments, or events. In each 
case, the coincidence of possibility and impossibility marks an initial destabilization or 
deconstruction of the metaphysical principle of noncontradiction—according to Aristotle, the 
“most certain of all principles,” and one which  “a man must know if he knows anything.”120 
Granted, precisely: It is this possibility of knowing anything, and especially anything grounded in 
a metaphysical axiom held to be self-evident and undeniable, that is at stake in the deconstructive 
gesture. 
Which is not to say that a deconstruction of the metaphysical determination of the 
meaning or possibility of, say, forgiveness, implies a denial of the fact of forgiveness. This is 
																																																						
115 Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Kamuf (University of Chicago Press, 1994) 
116 “Signature Event Context,” from Margins of Philosophy, trans. Bass (University of Chicago Press, 1982) 
117 “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides,” trans. Brault & Nass, from Philosophy in a Time of Terror, ed. 
Borradori (University of Chicago Press, 2004) 
118 “Taking a Stand for Algeria,” College Literature 30.1 (2003), 115-123; Rouges: Two Essays on Reason, trans. 
Brault & Nass (Stanford University Press, 2005). 
119 The Gift of Death & Literature in Secret, trans. Wills. (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 
120 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, 1003a 
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where Hågglund is especially helpful. These deconstructive conditions of impossibility are 
peculiar: these structural impossibilities do not determine whether or not something happens. 
Regarding signatures, for example, Derrida asks: “Does the absolute singularity of an event of 
the signature ever occur? Are there signatures?” And answers: “Yes, of course, every day” (SEC 
328). And on the im/possibility of forgiveness? “God forgives Noah” (GD 150). Gifts are given, 
democracies run, and hospitality is offered. As Hågglund has it, the impossible happens all the 
time. 
What all these arguments concerning transcendental possibilities and impossibilities 
articulate, when faced with the undeniable fact of happenings, is a dissociation of knowledge 
from being. That one cannot know if forgiveness is possible—even if one knows that it is 
impossible, at the same time that one knows it is possible—does not mean one cannot forgive. 
Which is to say, with a slightly different emphasis, the critical object of this thinking of the 
indissociability of possibility and impossibility is a metaphysics of truth grounded in the 
coincidence of being and thought. Derrida is attempting to articulate a “logic” without reference 
to truth understood as the transcendental content of thought, a logic without reference to truth as 
available in plentitude and self-identity, a logic without reference to “Being qua Being,” that is, 
without “qua,” without metaphysics. It is an im/possible task, and one whose effects should not 
be underestimated. This is not wordplay, which is sometimes the impression effected by 
Derrida’s reflections on the impossibility of forgiveness, gifts, and so on. Instead, this total 
solicitation of fundamental metaphysical axioms—noncontradiction, the coincidence of thought 
and being—induces the terrifying possibility of a thinking without security, without truth. Not 
wordplay, but a rejection of the Aristotelian myth—which has been carried through the history of 
metaphysical thinking—of the unity of word and thing. That which cannot happen does, that 
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which should happen does not, and knowledge has no governance over either case. 
While I question whether Caputo’s texts actually perform an understanding of the 
impossible as a futural exteriority—that is the gesture of the text, but a reading of the letter 
demonstrates that Caputo’s equivocal play masks an underlying univocity between the possible 
and the impossible, wherein “the impossible” is a euphemism for the very possible—Hågglund’s 
criticism is compelling on Caputo’s terms. And to the extent that Hågglund has made explicit the 
coimplication of the possible and the impossible, he has contributed a positive development in 
the generalization of Derrida’s specific arguments concerning hospitality, the gift, and so on. 
However, when arguing his case for radical atheism, Hågglund does not pursue this line of 
inquiry, and instead opts for a reontologization of deconstruction through a reinscription of a 
sharp distinction between the possible and impossible. 
The problem arises when Hågglund makes his second argument for atheism. What makes 
his atheism radical, Hågglund says, is that it not only denies God’s existence—which, as we have 
seen, is a claim on which Hågglund vacillates—but that it denies that God is desirable. For 
Hågglund, the two arguments are related in that the argument from desire follows the argument 
from temporalization. Hågglund argues that if everything that happens only happens insofar as it 
is subject to temporalization, then temporalization is the “ultratranscendental” condition for 
anything to happen. To desire a cessation of temporalization—to desire eternity—would be to 
deny and reject life, which can only be temporal: “Radical atheism proceeds from the argument 
that everything that can be desired is mortal in its essence . . . The absolute being of God is not 
only unattainable but undesirable, since it would annul the mortality that is integral to whatever 
one desires” (RA 111). In This Life, Hågglund presents a version of this same argument, but now 
concerned more with “care” than “desire.” Here, the argument is not only that to desire eternity 
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is to desire death, but that care is only possible given mortality: “Absolution is not only 
impossible to attain but also not a goal worthy of our striving, since it would remove the care that 
animates our lives” (TL 47). If one were immortal, then there would be no need to take care to 
preserve life. It is for this reason that one can neither care for nor be cared for by an immortal 
God: if nothing happens to an immortal or eternal being, then such a being cannot care about 
what happens. Hågglund then proceeds to argue that such care, which is only possible given 
finitude, is that which motivates existential projects and commitments. Pursuing and preserving 
these commitments in the face of mortality is what Hågglund means by “secular faith”: “Secular 
faith is a necessary uncertainty. In being committed to someone or something, I must have faith 
in the future and in those on whom I depend” (TL 50). And so not only is desire possible only 
given mortality, but so too care and faith.  
An effect of the argument is a demonstration of the credibility of secular living. 
Hågglund makes this element of his argument explicit only once: “I take issue with the idea that 
there is an essential human need for something called ‘religion’ or ‘the religious,’ which a 
secular life will try in vain to fulfill” (TL 55). By demonstrating a secular logic of desire, care, 
and faith, Hågglund has convincingly argued that these activities need not presuppose a prior 
religious orientation or commitment. This project’s final chapter will argue for the possibility of 
convergence between secular and religious political projects, and this argument against the need 
for religious orientation will prove important to that effort. Hågglund’s argument for the non-
necessity of “religion” also functions as a welcome curb to the colonizing tendencies of 
apologetic theologies that seek to unveil the religious commitments of secular morality or that 
argue against the possibility of nonreligious morality.121 Such a curbing will also be necessary for 
																																																						
121 For example, Bernard Longeran argues that “liberation” from structures of oppression is only possible if 
individuals order their ethical projects (Lonergan prefers to speak of ethics and not politics) by a religious 
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my later argument that Marx’s atheism does not foreclose the possibility of a Marxist political 
theology. 
Unfortunately, this strength is undermined when Hågglund ontologizes his argument. 
There is a difference in content and tone between an argument defending secularism and one 
advocating for atheism. While This Life tends to speak of the former, both it and Radical Atheism 
ultimately argue for a thoroughly ontologized atheism. Even the arguments concerning care, 
desire, and faith—which are apparently more existential than the obviously ontological argument 
concerning temporalization—presuppose the authority, the sovereignty, of temporalization: 
ultimately for Hågglund, desire for God is impossible because God is impossible because time 
does not allow God. In Hågglund’s project, there is no time for God. This is subtly but crucially 
different from arguing against a need for religion, and it is with this move from a critique of 
religion to a critique of God that Hågglund reintroduces an “utterly deconstructible” ontology. 
Rather than dogmatically argue for theism against atheism, or even argue for the impossibility of 
atheism, as Marion has done, my concern is that such an ontologization undermines that which is 
truly radical in any deconstructive project: the dissociation of knowing and being.  
Both of Hågglund’s atheist arguments—from time and from care—are ontological in that 
																																																						
commitment. Responding to the “problem” of the possibility of ethical living, Lonergan writes: “The solution has to 
be a still higher integration of human living. For the problem is radical and permanent; it is independent of the 
underlying physical, chemical, organic, and psychic manifolds; it is not met by revolutionary change, nor by human 
discovery, nor by the enforced implementation of discovery . . . Only a still higher integration can meet such 
requirements. For only a higher integration leaves underlying manifolds with their autonomy yet succeeds in 
introducing a higher systematization into their nonsystematic coincidences. And only a still higher integration than 
any that so far has been considered can deal with the dialectical manifold immanent in human subjects and the 
human situation” (655). In such a view, the “manifolds” of life must be “integrated” religiously if they are to 
adequately respond to the problem of oppression. Hågglund’s argument is that such “integration,” if it is necessary, 
is possible totally secularly. One’s commitment to any cause can order and integrate the “underlying manifolds,” 
which I take to refer to specific existential projects—that is, if “integration” is even a helpful ethical category, a 
claim which any deconstructive reading could question. See: Bernard Lonergan, Insight (University of Toronto 
Press, 1992). Similar arguments concerning the religious or theological underpinning of secular projects are found in 
the radical orthodox figures already addressed, and by Charles Taylor, especially in A Secular Age (Belknap Press, 
2018). Hågglund’s demonstration that deconstruction leaves open the possibility of a secular politics perhaps 
explains why Derrida serves as something of a villain for both Taylor and the radical orthodoxy movement. 
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they cohere to a logic of identity and imply a coincidence between knowing and being. Each 
version of the argument ultimately claims that desire is determined by knowledge. The argument 
from time runs like this: We can only desire what happens, and happening is made possible by 
temporalization. God, who would be eternal, cannot be—nothing eternal can be. Thus, God, who 
does not exist, cannot be desired. Hågglund’s argument from care subtly differs but relies on the 
same basic logic: We cannot care about God because we cannot care for an eternal being, who 
would be free from vulnerability and lack. Thus, on the one hand, we cannot desire God because 
God does not exist. On the other hand, even if God did exist, we could not desire God, because 
God would be outside of the temporal structure of desire. Such an argument could be disputed on 
theological grounds—and grounds on which one might find Derrida, at least insofar as the 
aforementioned claim that “God forgives Noah” might be read as an attempt to temporalize God. 
Indeed, the possibility of God acting in and through history will be a major topic of the coming 
discussion concerning James Cone, and the possibility of understanding “eternity” differently 
than Hågglund will feature prominently in the discussion concerning Kierkegaard. These 
approaches will challenge Hågglund’s understanding of theology as necessarily a metaphysics of 
the eternal.122 For now, though, Hågglund’s arguments can also be critiqued on his own 
deconstructive terms.  
In both versions of his argument—time and care—Hågglund determines the possibility of 
desire by its adherence to a prior and exterior philosophical judgment. Either we cannot desire 
God because temporalization forbids it or we cannot desire God because to do so would result in 
definitional absurdity. Implicit in both claims is the impossibility of desiring against knowledge: 
																																																						
122 In this sense, Žižek’s critique of Caputo—from note 29 above—could also be read as a critique of Hågglund. 
Neither Caputo nor Hågglund allow for the possibility of God entering time, and so both foreclose the possibility of 
a passionate and paradoxical faith. That both Hågglund and Caputo argue that “God” has to do strictly with eternity 
is just another example of the similarity of their respective projects. 
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we cannot philosophically authorize desire, and so desire is rendered impossible. In this sense, 
Hågglund’s logic of desire is traditional and metaphysical, it must cohere to independent 
philosophical judgment. For Hågglund, only the philosophically possible can be desired. Indeed, 
for Hågglund, such a qualifier is unnecessary: the philosophically possible—that which coheres 
to a philosophical argument concerning time or care—is the possible. Which is to say, there is no 
longer a gap in Hågglund’s argument between thinking and being: desire cannot be if thinking 
shows it impossible. 
What is lost in this reduction of the object of desire to the possible-as-determined-by-
thought is Hågglund’s earlier thinking concerning the coincidence of the possible and the 
impossible. In response to Radical Atheism, Naas asks if it might “not make more sense to talk 
about an aporia or denegation of desire” (AA 61). That is, wouldn’t it make more sense—at 
least, wouldn’t it be more consistent with Hågglund’s own deconstructive project—to speak of a 
coincidence of the desirable and the undesirable? Much as how the only true gift is the gift that 
isn’t, might not the only true object of desire be that which is, fully and completely, undesirable?  
The argument is Derrida’s. If the debate between Hågglund and Caputo ultimately 
concerns how to best read Derrida on the related questions of desire, impossibility, and God, then 
it would perhaps be helpful to read Derrida on the matter: 
What I am interested in is the experience of the desire for the impossible. That is, the 
impossible as the condition of desire. Desire is not perhaps the best word. I mean this 
quest in which we want to give, even when we realize, when we agree, if we agree, that 
the gift, that giving, is impossible, that it is a process of reappropriation and self-
destruction. Nevertheless, we do not give up the dream of the pure gift . . . We continue 
to desire, to dream, through the impossible. The impossible for me is not a negative 
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concept” (OTG 72).123 
Derrida is clear here that there is no opposition between desire and the impossible. Against 
Hågglund’s interpretation, the knowledge of impossibility does not prevent the desire of being: 
we know that a gift is impossible, yet we still desire one. While Derrida is circumspect 
concerning the possibility of real gifts given, his comments on the reality of forgiveness, 
signatures, and hospitalities suggest that these comments could be extended: not only is desire of 
the impossible possible, but so too is an impossible desire possible. Derrida’s argument here is 
not the basic phenomenological or anthropological one that people do desire God or pure gifts. 
To this point, Hågglund argues that such purported desires for eternity are actually dissimulated 
desires for survival.124 Derrida might well share these suspicions about purported desire for God. 
As the previous section argued, such desires would be subject to deconstructive (and 
Augustinian) solicitations of the referent of desire: one could always ask, “What does ‘God’ 
mean when you say you desire God?” To this extent, a Derridean deconstruction of 
transcendental signifieds would also suggest Hågglund’s conclusions concerning dissimulation. 
However, this is not what Derrida is doing here: He is arguing that the impossible makes desire 
possible. Derrida speaks of desire, which is “perhaps not the best word” for what he is after, as 
occurring “through” the impossible. Such an understanding of desire as occurring through and 
made possible by the impossible also implicitly critiques Caputo’s project, where desire is 
primarily for the impossible—at least, ostensibly. This desire-made-possible-by-the-impossible 
brings us closer to Kierkegaard’s absurd faith than it does either Hågglund’s secular faith or 
																																																						
123 Jacques Derrida and Richard Kearney, “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Marion, moderated by Richard Kearney,” from God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. Caputo & Scanlon (Indiana 
University Press, 1999). 
124 See Hågglund’s discussion of Augustine in This Life, pgs 69-124. Here, Hågglund argues that Augustine’s 
purported love for God dissimulates a prior love for Monica. 
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Caputo’s religious atheism. 
Such a faith is absurd in that it is a faith without reference to truth, perhaps without a 
referent at all. Still on the topic of the gift, Derrida writes: 
The gift is totally foreign to the horizon of economy, ontology, knowledge, constative 
statements, and theoretical determination and judgment . . . The gift, I would claim, I 
would argue, as such cannot be known; as soon as you know it, you destroy it. So the gift 
as such is impossible. I insist on the ‘as such.’ I will explain why in a moment. The gift as 
such cannot be known, but it can be thought of. We can think what we cannot know. 
Perhaps thinking is not the right word. But there is something in excess of knowledge 
(OTG 60). 
And elsewhere, in a discussion explicitly about Caputo’s work, Derrida grants that whether or 
not God or khora is prior is ultimately undecidable, but argues that this undecidability is of a 
certain type: 
To be in undecidability does not mean simply that I don’t know. It means, firstly, that it 
does not belong to the order of knowledge and, secondly, that I don’t want to know. I 
know that I should not know. If I could rely on this translatability there would be no God 
anymore. Now, when the God comes, when the Messiah comes, we will see! But I cannot 
foresee and program this. That is why I am an atheist in a certain way—a faithful one! I 
am faithful to this sort of atheism. So I agree with Jack Caputo when he says there is this 
undecidability, but to say that there is such undecidability doesn’t mean that the two 
terms are replaceable one for the other (BPI 50). 
The claim disputes Hågglund’s account on two points. First, Hågglund does not argue that 
whether or not God or khora is prior is an undecidable question. For Hågglund, khora—which he 
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thinks of as temporalization—must always be prior. God is only ever an effect, only ever “God.” 
Second, Derrida displaces the privileged place that Hågglund accords to knowledge. Whereas 
Hågglund determines the question of God on the grounds of knowing, Derrida claims that the 
question “does not belong to the order of knowledge.” This deconstruction of knowledge is 
consistent with the previous citation, wherein Derrida associates knowledge with “the as such”—
indeed, it is a point on which he “insists.” The “as such,” the possibility of a signified, the 
possibility of knowledge, the coincidence of thinking and being, all effaced by Derrida’s account 
of generalized writing, all of this does not belong to the question.  
 
The Decision of the Other 
 
So far, I have argued that Derrida’s account of generalized writing renders theology not 
only impossible, but also antagonistic to the deconstructive impetus. This impossibility and this 
antagonism are the effect of the deconstruction of the theological structure of truth that harbors a 
coincidence of thinking and being in the assured self-presence of a transcendental signified. 
Rejecting the possibility of any transcendental signified, then, also affects a rejection of any 
structure of truth that depends on the theologeme of the logos as exteriority of truth.  
Hågglund and Caputo then offer two competing—at least, allegedly competing—
responses to this deconstruction of theology. Hågglund looks to radicalize the critique of 
theology by making of it a critique also of God. Caputo, on the other hand, believes that 
deconstruction is motivated by the same passion for the impossible as religion, and so argues that 
deconstruction is “structured like a religion.” The disputed point in this debate was found to be 
the interpretation of “the impossible.” For Hågglund, God is impossible because all that is is 
	 134	
subject to the laws of temporalization. In this sense, the impossible happens, because it is 
constantly governing the possible. For Caputo, on the other hand, the impossible is that which 
deconstruction/religion strive for and are motivated by.   
Each of these understandings of the impossible ultimately fails because it presupposes a 
coincidence between thinking and being. For Hågglund, that which is possible is determined by 
philosophical argumentation. His is an idealism that ignores the possibility of not only desiring 
the impossible, but also the possibility of impossible desire. If thinking knows something to be 
impossible, then it cannot be. For Caputo, the impossible—for all of its “poetic” charge—turns 
out to obey a priori considerations of both philosophy (there can be no incarnation) and politics 
(the reference to tax codes). By equivocating between “God” and “khora” as respective referents 
of “the impossible,” but also simultaneously rendering the impossible an object of rationalist 
bourgeois reflection, Caputo rewrites religion as a structural atheism devoid of any radical 
political potential. For Caputo, the impossible is only that which thought renders possible.  
And so each response shirks the radical consequences of dissociating thinking and being. 
From the moment he denies the possibility of a transcendental signified, this dissociation is 
implicit in Derrida’s work. The effects of such a dissociation are perhaps most pronounced in 
precisely the place Hågglund and Caputo ignore them: religion. Whereas Hågglund prioritizes 
khora—or différance, or temporalization—over God, and whereas Caputo renders the terms 
interchangeable, although in an interchangeability governed by the privilege of khora, Derrida 
insists that the question as to the priority of God or khora remains necessarily undecidable. The 
answer to the question cannot be known, because knowledge itself imposes a theological regime 
of truth. Knowing and truth beg the question: to speak of knowing the answer to this question, to 
even speak of knowing the question, to speak of the truth of God or the truth of atheism, is 
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already to stack the deck with theologemes.  
In this sense, Derrida is in agreement with the transcendental theologians who speak of 
knowing as constitutively ordered toward God. But this is, for Derrida, all the more problematic 
for theology and for knowledge. Indeed, it is with this recognition of the theological structure of 
truth that Derrida presents theology with its biggest challenge. The question of whether or not 
this ordering toward God is an effect of language or an effect of God is ultimately undecidable. 
More precisely, every possible answer to this question, and indeed even the structure of the 
question itself, is “undecidable” in that the meaning and intention of every question and every 
answer is ultimately indeterminable. Before deciding whether or not God or différance is prior, 
one would have to determine what is meant by God and by différance. But this is precisely the 
impossibility articulated by Derrida’s generalized account of writing. One cannot determine the 
relative privilege of God or différance not only because to do so would be to claim direct access 
to the truth of being, but more immediately because to do so would be to impossibly determine 
the meaning of God and différance, it would be to make of them transcendental signifieds, that 
is, nothing. 
Of course, while rendering both God and différance undecidable and indeterminable, 
Derrida has also brought the two unimaginably close together. The gap between God and khora 
is as small as the gap that constitutes itself in the repetition of the same. This is différance at its 
most basic: the difference constitutive of any identity. It is the recognition of both this non-
dialectical, irreducible difference and this amazing proximity between God and khora that leads 
Kearney to write that, 
There is, after all, a fundamental decision to be made between reading the desert place as 
khora or as God. Even if that choice is never final or assured. For if the theist does choose 
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God it is always in fear and trembling and can never be more than a hair’s breadth from 
the underlying, undecidable abyss of khora—a common pre-original void from which 
faith issues and from which it is never definitively removed, to its dying day. Indeed, 
were it so definitively removed it would no longer be faith (SGM 210). 
And it is what leads Derrida to write that “sometimes you have to be an atheist of this sort,” the 
sort outlined here, the sort that cannot determine what it means by atheism and what it means by 
the “theism” of its own atheism, “if one is to be true to faith” (12).125 Faith and atheism become 
not only undecidable, but also now indissociable. The dissociation of thinking and being effects 
the indissociability of atheism and faith. Derrida, then, helps us rigorously think the conditions of 
im/possibility of religious decision. God or khora—it is radically undecidable. At the same time, 
it is with the dissociation of thinking and being—that is, it is with the making impossible of 
theology—that the possibility of religious decision is freed from the very a priori metaphysical 
determination that renders decision impossible by deciding everything in advance.  
 And so a careful following of the effects of deconstruction leads to a perhaps surprising 
result, which is all the more surprising when juxtaposed with Schmitt’s political theology. 
Schmitt claims to be a theorist of decision, and is, but only in the sense that his true decision is 
not theological or metaphysical, but is rather political. Wherever Schmitt writes metaphysics—
which is everywhere he pretends to describe the natural order of things—no decision is possible. 
Schmitt identifies thinking and being, and so the product of his thought is identified with the 
ontological truth that is always decided in advance without concern for actual decisions—at 
least, this holds until a further turn of the screw is applied and Schmitt’s ontology is itself found 
out to hide his real decisions. Derrida, on the other hand, shows the ways in which metaphysics 
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always harbors the theological motif of truth as guarantor of the identity of thinking and being, 
and demonstrates that this theologeme is always an actual impossibility. There is no outside-text, 
there is no and has never been any transcendental signified, all metaphysics is a fake. In this 
sense, Derrida makes a religious decision entirely impossible. Yet, the impossible is no longer 
governed by the metaphysical law of non-contradiction. The relationship between the possible 
and the impossible is no longer one of antagonism, but is rather, more strongly, one of mutual 
constitution. In terms of religious decision, this mutuality of possibility and impossibility has the 
following effect: A decision for God is only possible when God, theology, and truth are rendered 
impossible, because without this impossibility the ontological identity of thought and being 
decides everything in advance and so renders decision impossible. Thus, the Derridean discourse 
concerning religion is neither affirmative as Caputo has it, nor prohibitive as Hågglund has it, but 
instead reveals the ways in which affirmation and prohibition mutually and paradoxically inform 
and make each other possible, even as, and only as, they render each other impossible. A 
decision for God requires that God no longer secures the truth of thought—such a decision for 
the transcendent and sovereign truth can only ever follow the double-fake structure of 
metaphysical decision; that is, it can only ever be a fake decision for a fake.  
 None of which answers the question as to what this (im)possible decision without the 
security of truth, and without the identity of thinking and being, could possibly look like. For 
that, the project’s next three chapters offer various possibilities. In each case, the sort of double-
fake decisionism demonstrated by Schmitt will be avoided and the sort of groundless decision 
without truth effected by deconstruction will be promoted. With Karl ove Knausgaard we will 
see that the question of religious decision, so long as religion is to remain actually possible, can 
always earnestly and coherently be answered in the negative; that is, God can actually be 
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rejected. With Kierkegaard we will see that a different sort of truth, one not grounded in 
ontological identity but in existential actuality, is possible. Finally, with Cone, we will see that 
the riskiness of choosing God refers to not only epistemological risk, but also deep and profound 
political risk; that is, the (im)possibility of God is not only a theoretic and metaphysical 
proposition, but is more immediately a political one (as the priority of politics over metaphysics 
that I am promoting here would indicate). Importantly, in all of these cases religious decision is 
affirmed or denied in actual, material reality. The paradox that possibility and impossibility are 
mutually constitutive and not mutually exclusive of one another is basic, and no further 
epistemic, ontological, metaphysical, or logical synthesis of these two positions is possible. 
Paradox, especially understood in this Derridean sense of the priority of difference over identity, 
is fundamental and not derivative of self-same substance. And so any political-theological 
engagement with decision cannot look to resolve this paradox into more basic components, 
because these more basic components do not exist. Instead, a political theology of decision must 
take place in lived reality, in text, not outside of it. In other words, that the truth of decision 
cannot be know does not mean that decisions are avoidable—indeed, they are necessary. It is, 
after all, Caputo’s attempt to avoid decision that led him, in a way totally consistent with the 
double-fake structure of all metaphysical decision, to secretly privilege khora over God. 
 And while this chapter has not been concerned with Derrida’s biographical choice for or 
against God but with the effects of his deconstruction of metaphysics for political theology, it is 
the case that Jacques Derrida the person subscribed to some form of this materialist response to 
the aporetics of decision. In his haunting essay “A Silkworm of One’s Own (Points of View 
Stitched on the Other Veil),” Derrida develops a relationship to religion that is not ordered on the 
logic of “the veil,” the metaphysical (and Heideggerian) logic of veiling and unveiling truth, but 
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instead of “the shawl,” a textile:  
My reference cloth was neither a veil nor a canvas, but a shawl. A prayer shawl I like to 
touch more than to see, to caress every day, to kiss without even opening my eyes or even 
when it remains wrapped in a paper bag into which I stick my hand at night, eyes closed . 
. . It veils or hides nothing, it shows or announces no Thing, it promises the intuition of 
nothing (19).126 
The shawl is “without truth, or veracity, or veridicity, without the slightest promised 
reappropriation” (48). No Aristotelian return to unity, no Schmittian God of the transcendent, but 
a thing in a bag that he touches darkly. The rest of Derrida’s discussion deserves to be quote at 
length: 
Mine was white first, completely white, only white, virgin and without those black or 
blue stripes that are printed, it seems to me, on almost all the talliths in the world. It was 
in any case the only white tallith in my family. It was given to me by my mother's father, 
Moses. Like a sign of having been chosen. But why? I say it was white because with time 
it is going a little yellow. I do not know why, but after I left the house in El Biar where I 
had left it, my father borrowed it from me for a few years. It is true that he still had 
reason to wear it, and he took it across the Mediterranean at the time of the exodus. After 
his death, I took it back as though I were inheriting it a second time. I hardly ever wear it 
(is wear the right word? Do you wear this thing? Does it need it? Does it not carry off 
before being worn?) So I no longer wear it. I simply place my fingers or lips on it, almost 
every evening, except when I'm travelling to the ends of the earth, because like an animal 
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it waits for me, well hidden in its hiding place, at home, it never travels. I touch it without 
knowing what I am doing or asking in so doing, especially not knowing into whose hands 
I am entrusting myself, to whom I'm rendering thanks . . . What will become of the one 
my grandfather had given me if he did not know what he was doing when he chose a 
white one, and if he chose me for the choice of this white tallith? The decision is not yet 
taken, and will not be mine: ashes after fire? Earth? Virgin soil with a burial in the white 
tallith? I ought to have pretended to dictate this decision, but I have suspended it 
designedly. I have decided that the decision would not be mine, I have decided to dictate 
nothing as to my death. Giving myself up thus to the truth of the decision: a verdict is 
always of the other. Life will have been so short and someone is saying to me, close to 
me, inside me, something like: ‘It is forbidden to be old’ (19/20). 
And so Derrida relates to his shawl with neither theological affirmation or atheistic prohibition 
but with a recognition of ignorance, and a faith in, a “giving myself up” to, the wholly other 
otherness of the other. His tallith, we are told, is yellow with age. It was only ever white, “pure,” 
according to the witness of Moses. He does not know why he touches it, he does not know to 
whom his touch is addressed—Moses, God, nobody at all—he does not even know if he wears it, 
this animal thing that was given to him from before his birth, by someone who “did not know 
what he was doing.” The tallith is not the source of intelligible theologizing, it grounds no 
identity between thinking and being because it cannot be thought and the “truth” of its being is 
permanently indeterminable—which is to say, not deferred, but more simply not. The tallith is a 
stained thing of which Derrida cannot be rid. Without knowledge, without identity, without truth, 
Derrida’s tallith is with him, unavoidably, inexplicably, until the end.  
Now, I do not know where his tallith is, but in text, of which there is no outside. A 
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religion responsible to this tallith is not responsible to a metaphysical truth that precludes 
decision in advance, but to a materiality that carries the possibility of faith without the security of 
truth. It is a possibility of faith that imposes neither either affirmative nor prohibitive necessity, 
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Introduction 
And so the possibility that Martin Hågglund is right—that there is no God and that there 
can be no God, that deconstruction requires atheism, that the deconstruction of the transcendental 
signified is the deconstruction of God—must be defended from a religious point of view: without 
an atheist deconstruction of theology and logocentric metaphysics (the two are the same), no 
religious faith is possible. Indeed, as the previous chapter suggested, anyone interested in 
believing in God should hope that Hågglund is right. If theology is not deconstructed, then it 
remains metaphysical. But if theology remains metaphysical, then any theological decision can 
only ever be a fake: there is no metaphysical decision because there is no metaphysics. On the 
other hand, the deconstruction of logocentric metaphysics, in its very rendering impossible of 
theology, frees us from the fetters of the (theo)logic that identifies thinking and being. Now 
thought as modes of difference and not as concepts situated within a transcendental schema, 
possibility and impossibility show themselves to mutually constitute, not mutually exclude, each 
other.  And so the impossibility of theology—which effects the impossibility of logocentric 
metaphysics—becomes a necessary condition for the possibility of faith, which is only possible 
without the ontological necessities of metaphysics. 
But any talk of conditions of possibility should be immediately restrained by the 
complete impossibility of theology—which means that theology’s impossibility should be taken 
in the strongest sense possible. Elsewise, there is a risk of a sort of conceptual imperialism in the 
claim that the deconstruction of theology becomes a condition for the possibility of faith. 
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Without a strong—or as Hågglund would have it, a radical—commitment to the impossibility of 
theology, all of the deconstructive insights effected by the critique of theology are lost. If the 
“impossibility” of theology is interpreted and sublated by a “higher” theologizing hermeneutic, 
then theology is “impossible” only in the sense that it is necessary, and so has nothing to do with 
possibility at all. This reinscription of religion as always already overcoming and sublating its 
own negation, perhaps Christianized by a metaphorical reading of the death and resurrection of 
Jesus as the death and resurrection of ontotheology, would reassert a higher metaphysics on the 
back of the discourse, deconstruction, that renders metaphysics obsolete.  
Which is to say, faith must recognize the necessary possibility that Hågglund is right—
that there is no God, that deconstruction is the deconstruction of God, and that the absolute 
annihilation brought by death is the inescapable and mute horizon of life. Right without 
qualification: theology is impossible and metaphysics is only ever a textual invention with no 
ontological relationship to its own object of study, Being, at all. More materially, this 
philosophical recognition implies the concomitant existential recognition that one can always 
decide against God and against religion. With thinking and being dissociated, the actual, 
existential decision for or against God cannot be grounded in ontological truth claims, because 
the truth of metaphysics and the actuality of being have nothing to do with each other. As an 
irreducible and basic option, then, the decision against God can only be prevented or occluded 
through violence. 
Anglican theologian John Milbank’s “radical orthodoxy” project risks this violence. 
Whereas the debate between Hågglund and Caputo concerned the difference between theism and 
atheism, Milbank’s concern maps more neatly onto the distinction between religion and 
secularism. His basic argument is that “secular reason” is not a neutral procedure that has freed 
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itself from religious contamination. Rather, Milbank argues, contemporary secularism is itself a 
type of explicitly anti-Christian, and so heretical, theology. Although his genealogy is complex, 
Milbank typically claims that medieval nominalism—especially as found in Duns Scotus’ 
conceptualization of the univocity of being—is responsible for a “horizontal” leveling of the 
“vertical” difference between God and humans. This leveling then made possible the secular 
rejection of transcendence. Secular reason sees this rejection of transcendence as both a mature 
and an emancipatory act: the secular person—and Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory 
provides intricate readings of many such or allegedly secular social theorists and philosophers, 
including Weber, Durkheim, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Derrida—maturely rejects the juvenile 
myths of the divine and, in doing so, reveals that humankind is not hierarchically subservient to a 
transcendent divine master. Milbank argues that this emancipatory argument relies on a 
sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit identification of difference and violence.  
According to Milbank, the notion that a rejection of hierarchical difference is itself 
emancipatory is only sensible if hierarchical difference is thought of as oppressive or violent. 
But, according to Milbank, this identification of transcendence with violence and the subsequent 
rejection of transcendence can only ever lead to nihilism. Although he occasionally states and 
appears to endorse the point, Milbank’s general argument here is not simply that immanentism 
necessarily leads to nihilism because it lacks the semantic security of a transcendental signified. 
More subtly, Milbank argues that the secular and “postmodern”—he reads figures as diverse as 
Deleuze, Derrida, Baudrillard, and Lacan as “neo-Nietzschean” “postmoderns”—identification 
of difference with violence is itself nihilistic because it accepts violence as primordially and 
necessarily the case. It is only theology, and specifically only Christian Trinitarian theology with 
its conceptualization of difference as peaceful, loving, and harmonious, that can offer an 
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alternative to secular nihilism: “Only Christian theology now offers a discourse able to position 
and overcome nihilism itself. This is why it is so important to reassert theology as a master 
discourse; theology, alone, remains the discourse of non-mastery” (TST 6).127 
The upshot of Milbank’s argument is that secularism, in its alleged attempts to present an 
“autonomous secular realm, completely transparent to rational understanding” (TST 1), has come 
into conflict with “the critical non-avoidability of the theological and the metaphysical” (TST 2). 
For Milbank, there is no such thing as the non-theological, there are only good and bad 
theologies. In other words, theological and metaphysical thinking are unavoidable, and so any 
attempt to avoid the two can only lead to “violence.” Of course, part of Milbank’s argument is 
that secularism considers violence a basic phenomenon, and so an accusation of violence would 
not be troubling to a secular theorist. Because of this, Milbank describe his task as one of 
constructing a Christian “metanarrative” that is “persuasive” to secular people. Secularism, for 
Milbank, “is only a mythos, and therefore cannot be refuted, but only out-narrated, if we can 
persuade people—for reasons of ‘literary taste’—that Christianity offers a much better story” 
(TST 331).  
Milbank’s presentation leaves much to be desired. It has been critiqued for its 
Islamophobia,128 its cultural imperialism,129 its interpretation of its own major theological 
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antagonist,130 and its interpretations of its own major sociological antagonists.131 More directly, 
Theology and Social Theory has failed on its own grounds. If Milbank wished to “persuade” 
social theorists of their implicit heretical theology and so convince them of the superiority of 
orthodox Christian theology, then he has unquestionably failed. Theology and Social Theory has 
never been reviewed in any of the American Sociological Association’s several journals. Nor 
does Milbank’s name appear as a serious interlocutor in the work of any contemporary social 
theorist or in any standard handbook.132 If persuasion is Milbank’s measure of success, and if 
“this book is addressed to both social theorists and theologians” (TST 1), then the book has 
succeeded in neither convincing of its argumentative goal nor in reaching its desired audience.  
For these reasons, and others, it might be time to finally let go of Milbank’s theological 
project. Indeed, he himself seems to have let go of the necessity to theologically situate every 
discourse. Milbank’s recent critiques of capital, for example, do not feign any theological 
grounding.133 However, Milbank’s argument concerning the Christianly informed nature of 
secularism—unintentionally bolstered by Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, which also finds in 
secularism a sort of perverted theology—is still influential in theological discourses of “post-
secularism”134 and “political Augustinianism.”135  And more to the point of this project, 
Milbank’s rendering universal of theology—both secularism and religion are theological—
makes a theological decision absolutely impossible. All of which is to say that Milbank’s 
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arguments that theology is universal and that Christianity is universally true must be disputed for 
the sake of theology and Christianity. 
Against Milbank, this chapter defends secularism as a credible and relatively independent 
discourse and way of life. Its independence is only relative because, as Milbank demonstrates, 
secularism does draw from theological language and religious practice. But a non-imperial 
response to these moments should be: So what? Europe in many ways evolved with 
Christianities (as well as Islams, of course), and so it is not surprising that ideas common in 
Europe today were articulated by Christians in years past.136 This is not an argument for the 
unavoidability of theology or the universality of Christian truth. It is only evidence of some bare 
minimal continuity of culture.137  To most social scientists, of course, this claim—that one does 
not need to believe in God and that theology is not necessary—is not controversial. But Milbank 
is clear that social scientific arguments do not hold sway over his program. Instead, he is 
interested in constructing a narrative with high “literary taste.” And so it is to the work of 
contemporary Norwegian novelist and essayist Karl Ove Knausgaard, whom does have high 
literary taste, that this chapter turns. Knausgaard offers a response to Milbank on at least two 
fronts. First, Knausgaard provides a compelling “narrative” of secular life that is aware of its 
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own Christian heritage while remaining decisively atheistic. Second, Knausgaard performs a 
critique of Milbank’s identification of secularism with nihilism and violence; indeed, it is 
precisely because there is no God that, for Knausgaard, this life has meaning at all.  
Knausgaard is primarily known for his six volume autofictional novel My Struggle (Min 
kamp—the reason for the proximity to Hitler’s Mein Kampf is not addressed until volume six, 
and will be discussed toward the end of this chapter).138 The novel, which is over 3,600 pages 
long, has drawn comparisons to Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu,139 and has been 
translated into at least 35 languages. Knausgaard has followed My Struggle with his Seasons 
Quartet, four texts—Autumn, Winter, Spring, and Summer—that stray from My Struggle in both 
form and content.140 Knausgaard’s “struggle” in My Struggle is multiple—the death of his father, 
parenting, love, childhood, sexuality, writing—but typically concerns Knausgaard’s psyche. 
They are, he says, books about the inner life. It is this Knausgaard—Knausgaard as keen 
observer of himself—that has solicited the comparison with Proust. In the Seasons Quartet, on 
the other hand, Knausgaard turns his gaze outward: with the exception of Spring, each of these 
novels consist of short reflections not (immediately or obviously) on himself but on “objects” 
Knausgaard encounters in his daily life—winter boots, coins, the brain, labia, but also fainting, 
intelligence, Vincent van Gogh, and so on. More recently, Knausgaard has produced works on 
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the 20th century Norwegian painter Edvard Munch141 and on soccer.142 The two sets of texts—My 
Struggle on the one hand, the Seasons Quartet, Munch, and soccer on the other—relate to each 
other, Knausgaard says, like Dostoevsky to Tolstoy. 
Despite their differences, these two sets are each occupied by the im/possibility of 
belonging to the world. That is, Knausgaard, in nearly every text, describes himself as outside of 
life, as outside of the world. In doing so, Knausgaard articulates a structure that is near opposite 
to what is classically considered the religious problem. Knausgaard does not find himself stuck 
in the world and hoping to transcend it. Rather, he finds himself stuck in the world as always 
already a bit out of the world. Although not widely celebrated, the theme of permanent exile is a 
Derridean one,143 and so Knausgaard can be read as pursuing a strand of Derridean thought 
radically other to those pursued by both Hågglund and Caputo. In that Knausgaard resists a 
religious interpretation of this development, he can also be read as pursuing a Derridean response 
to Milbank’s categorization of Derrida as violent nihilist.  
 
Nature, Society, Infancy, and Walpurgis Night 
This desire to be in the midst of the world is expressed throughout his oeuvre, but is 
perhaps nowhere articulated as well as when Knausgaard recalls a recent Walpurgis Night 
celebration. The cathartic passage comes toward the end of Spring, which is written as an 
extended note to his newborn daughter and is primarily about her mother’s debilitating 
																																																						
141 So Much Longing in So Little Space: The Art of Edvard Munch, trans. Burkey. Penguin Books, 2017. 
142 With Fredrik Ekelund, Home and Away: Writing the Beautiful Game, trans. Bartlett & Kinsella. Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2017. 
143 See: J. HIllis MIller, “‘Don’t Count Me In’: Derrida’s Refraining,” from For Derrida (Fordham University Press, 
2009), 174-190; and Emily Eakin, “Derrida: The Excluded Favorite,” New York Review of Books, March 25, 2013. 
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depression. Here, the existential themes of My Struggle and the phenomenological reflections of 
the Season Quartet collide, and Knausgaard comes to find the two strands inseparable: 
One moment I saw the flag, heard the march, saw the little parade of people, all of it 
gathered into one whole beneath the darkening sky in an agricultural landscape that 
opened up in every direction, while the sun hung like a reddish ball behind a veil of haze 
in the west, and then it felt as if something lifted inside me, a feeling that we were here, 
now, that this was our time. Then, in the next instant, I saw the idiotic handcart with its 
ugly sound system, the tracksuit bottoms, the all-weather jackets, the heads that seemed 
shrunken inside their caps, big nodes, little eyes, fat cheeks, the old people trying to keep 
time to the music with stiff, faintly dragging steps, the smell of fertilizer, which was 
really the smell of shit, the hair of the woman in front of me, which a breath of wind 
flung across her face and which she couldn’t quite get back into place, she tried once, but 
it blew back, and then again with an annoyed jerk of her hand, the father who shouted a 
reprimand to his daughter (174). 
The unity and cohesion that Knausgaard initially describes—and it is a unity not only with his 
fellow celebrants, but more strongly is that between nature and society, where the landscape and 
the parade seem to reinforce each other—leads to what will become one of his favorite motifs: 
the replacement of the “I” with the “we.” The “something” that “lifted inside me,” is a “feeling” 
that “this was our time.” This collapse of the self into the community and of the community into 
nature, which is an experience for which Knausgaard longs, though, immediately gives way to 
distance. The “idiotic handcart” pulls Knausgaard out of his immersion, and he resorts to 
description of—as opposed to identification with—those around him. He retreats from 
participant to spectator. 
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The turn from participation to description undoes both senses of unity mentioned above. 
Not only is Knausgaard removed from those around him, but he no longer sees natural and social 
phenomena as convergent: 
The triviality of the ketchup and mustard bottles, the blackened hot dogs, the camping 
table where the soft drinks were lined up, was almost inconceivable there beneath the 
stars, in the dancing light of the bonfire. It was as if I was standing in a banal world and 
gazing into a magical one, as if our lives played out in the borderland between two 
parallel realities (174). 
This is a sense of “borderland” radically opposed to Schmitt’s. Whereas Schmitt spoke of the 
border as the place that separated the pure from the impure and the sovereign from his subjects, 
and so spoke of the border as a place worth defending, Knausgaard laments his border position. 
The border becomes a place of separation, and it is a separation that Knausgaard continually 
longs to overcome. Although Knausgaard’s brief valorization of “the flag” might imply a 
nationalism at home with Schmitt, this impression is misleading: the celebration is taking place 
in Sweden, and so the flag is foreign to, not representative of, the Norwegian Knausgaard. The 
reverence for this foreign flag suggests that Knausgaard’s true desire is not national belonging, 
but rather a desire for the quotidian and familial belonging made possible by this Swedish 
celebration. That is, the “we” that lifts inside him is not a national collective, but is the very 
particular and irreplaceable “collective” of him and his daughter, and of all the other families and 
irreplaceable bonds around him. Such an embrace of quotidian and common familial love could 
not be further from Schmitt’s project, which explicitly rejects the common. 
 So far, Knausgaard could be read as a sort of romantic writer: he wishes for unity and 
belonging, valorizes the sublimity of nature, and bemoans his distance from it. This romanticism 
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would be accented only by an equal longing for and valorization of immediate quotidian 
experience (and so Knausgaard would be a romantic with a Scandinavian accent). But 
Knausgaard is not a romantic. After noting the gap between himself and others, and noting the 
gap between nature and society, Knausgaard makes the dialectical move of including this gap 
into the thing itself:  
We come from far away, from terrifying beauty, for a newborn child who opens its eyes 
for the first time is like a star, is like a sun, but we live our lives amid pettiness and 
stupidity, in the world of burned hot dogs and wobbly camping tables. The great and 
terrifying beauty does not abandon us, it is there all the time, in everything that is always 
the same, in the sun and the stars, in the bonfire and the darkness, in the blue carpet of 
flowers beneath the tree. It is of no use to us, it is too big for us, but we can look at it, and 
we can bow before it (175). 
The beauty that he longs for as distant from daily life is not, in fact, distant. This beauty “does 
not abandon us” but is “there all the time.” What has changed in the move from unity to distance 
is not an ontological adjustment in the status of the presence of beauty, but instead the mode in 
which beauty presents itself. At first, Knausgaard experiences a unity with beauty—and it is a 
unity both within the social realm and between the social and the natural. Then, these unities are 
undone by the gritty banality of daily life: hot dogs, camping tables, and angry fathers. However, 
Knausgaard does not read this distanciation in a Kantian manner, wherein the thing itself—social 
unity, natural beauty—would be kept off limits due to Knausgaard’s particular apperceptive 
limits. Rather, Knausgaard makes the more Hegelian move of sublating this distance and 
otherness into the thing itself: distance and otherness do not prevent experience of the beauty of 
nature and of social belonging; rather, distance and otherness are constitutive of any experience 
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of the beauty of nature and of social belonging. To experience social belonging as fleeting is to 
experience social belonging; to experience the beauty of nature as alien is to experience the 
beauty of nature—and so, contra Milbank, an entirely immanent difference is read not as violent, 
but as constitutive of beauty. 
 Which is not to say that this incorporation of difference means that longing for 
immediacy is negated. The longing remains, but Knausgaard recognizes that the immediacy for 
which he longs—to be in the world, to be present to himself—is not a longing for a return to an 
originary state. After declaring that one could bow to the inaccessible and terrifying beauty that 
is both set off against and always found concomitantly with daily life, Knausgaard does not bow 
to the heavens, but to his daughter: 
I stood there for a long time, looking at all the people standing about in the dusk, talking 
and laughing, the children scampering between them, the orange flames of the bonfire 
stretching into the darkness. When I bent down over you, tears were running down my 
cheeks. You smiled as you saw my face approaching, because you didn’t know what tears 
were either (175). 
This is Knausgaard at the height of his artistic struggle. In mere moments—and surely, as is 
typically the case with Knausgaard, the act of reading must take more time than had elapsed in 
the “original” experience of which Knausgaard writes, and this temporal asymmetry must imply 
that Knausgaard’s memorialization of the phenomena is adding more noematic content than was 
originally intuited—Knausgaard has approached a romantic unity both within the social order 
and between society and nature, has found this unity effaced by the grittiness of a burnt hot dog, 
has sublated this effacement into nature itself, and then, finally, has turned, with tears, away from 
it all, toward his daughter. 
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 What makes Knausgaard’s work so fascinating—and that his often meandering and 
unstylish prose has no apparent right to fascinate has been commented on at length—is precisely 
this tearful turn to his daughter. To read this turn as Knausgaard giving up on his dream of 
belonging—or as a conservative turn toward the familial and quotidian and away from the 
theoretical and utopian—would be a mistake. Knausgaard never stops desiring immediate 
belonging. What Knausgaard describes is a desire for the banal and the magical to cohere. He 
wants to not “stand there for a long time, looking at the people talking and laughing,” but wants 
to be one of the people talking and laughing, absorbing and belonging to the night immediately. 
To share this absorption with his daughter—for him and his daughter to experience the night 
together as a “we”—is an irreplaceable part of this desire. Knausgaard wants nothing more than 
to laugh with his child. That he discovers a constitutive gap in experience, and so discovers the 
impossibility of immediacy, does not diminish Knausgaard’s desire: he turns to her and cries 
because there is a permanent distance, which he will never stop wanting to overcome.  
 Crucial here is that Knausgaard does not fantasize that his daughter reinscribes some state 
of fullness or completion. Her lack of knowledge prevents this. On the one hand, the daughter’s 
ignorance—that she does not know what tears are—saves her from sharing her father’s 
realization that simple unity and belonging are impossible, that to belong is always also to not 
belong, or that to belong is to belong as not belonging. On the other hand, the very thing that 
saves her is that which makes it impossible for her to recognize her own salvation. Her ignorance 
is bliss, but this is a bliss that doesn’t know its own father. Much as he sublated the gap between 
culture and nature into culture and nature themselves, Knausgaard here makes ignorance of 
salvation constitutive of salvation itself. His daughter is saved from tears, but only because she 
does not know them. To be saved is to not know it; to be is not to know. 
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Materialism, Life, and Death 
 This turn to his daughter is just one of the ways that Knausgaard responds to his desire 
for belonging. As a solution to a problem, the appeal fails: if what Knausgaard wants is 
immediate belonging, he cannot find it through children. He is not a child and they themselves 
present an immediate belonging only of an unknowing kind: to belong in this infantile sense 
would not satisfy any desire for belonging, precisely because such a belonging would efface 
knowledge and so also knowledge of the desire as such. As Hågglund argued relative to God in 
the last chapter, this belonging would be indistinguishable from death—which does not mean 
that Knausgaard does not desire it. Unlike Hågglund, though, Knausgaard does not operate from 
within a strict distinction of finitude on the one hand and infinitude/death on the other. Whereas 
Hågglund opposes death to life on the grounds of desire—recall that, for Hågglund, we can only 
desire the mortal, finite, and living—Knausgaard is quick to describe the immanence of death to 
life. This immanence is not meant to be figurative. Knausgaard does not argue that death and 
finitude give meaning to life, that life would be without struggle and purpose if it did not expire, 
but more radically that life and death are modes of the same material substrate. The two are 
indissociable in a very real sense: 
The abyss is inside us. I saw it the first time I stood in front of a dead body. I didn’t 
understand it, but I saw it and knew. Death is not the abyss, but exists in the living, in the 
space between our thoughts and the flesh through which they pass. In the flesh, thoughts 
are a kind of intruder, conquerors of a foreign land, who leave it just as quickly again the 
moment it becomes inhospitable, which is to say when all movements cease and all 
warmth seeps away, as it does in death (MS 6, 177). 
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Knausgaard here reflects on a new type of belonging: a mute materialism. Whereas infantile 
belonging is without both existence and nonexistence, and so is ontologically indeterminate, 
flesh is here conceived as being without thought. Even to speak of flesh is misleading: 
Knausgaard’s argument is that the matter of living beings and the matter of inanimate objects is 
the same. The difference between the two—that which makes matter flesh—is the fleeting and 
ephemeral “warmth” of life, which temporarily colonizes matter as a conqueror. What these 
passages articulate is not just that flesh once was and once will be again dead matter, but that life 
is always already composed of mute, nonliving matter.144 Even those organs that are essential for 
life are themselves quite unknown and alien to this very life that they allow: “the dismal gray 
twins that are these lungs, we are unthinkable without them, yet they live within themselves and 
do not know us, for they know no one, and the muscles cannot tell if their twitching occurs in 
someone dead or someone alive” (MS 6, 702). Muscle is muscle with or without the life that it 
animates and that animates it. Complementarily, this life can seemingly persist with or without 
any particular organ. Particularity does not matter, the body is not jealous: “We may feel the 
heart to be ours, but if our heart should falter, it has been shown that we can insert a new one, 
from a dead person, and go on living” (ibid). And not only can the body’s alien inside be 
replaced, but the body can internalize what is foreign, and make its own what is typically thought 
of as its other:  
Nothing that enters the baby, mostly milk but also a little mashed banana and potato, 
bears the slightest resemblance to teeth, which in contrast to the food are hard. Yet this 
must be what happens—that certain substances are extracted from this partly liquid, 
																																																						
144 Or as the narrator of Knausgaard’s A Time for Everything puts it: “Everything belonged in the category of dead 
things, but some dead things were alive.” A Time for Everything, trans. Anderson (Archipelago, 2009), pg 193. 
	 157	
partly soft nourishment and transported to the jaws, where they are assembled into the 
material used to make teeth (Autumn, 23). 
Knausgaard’s point here, as elsewhere, is that a sort of belonging is possible if the authority of 
knowledge is undermined. As the muscle does not know if it is living or dead, the substances that 
make the tooth do not know if they are soft potatoes or hard teeth. Lungs, muscles, teeth, 
bananas, potatoes, milk—these all belong together and in some sense are interchangeable with 
each other, but only in a non-cognizant way. It is a belonging without the experience or 
knowledge of belonging. 
 This discussion of teeth—and Knausgaard is frequently interested in the ways in which 
the body is open to and sometimes indistinguishable from its other—is important for radicalizing 
his sense of materialist belonging. Once the living and the dead are considered not hierarchically, 
but as different modes of matter, and once this matter is freed from any scientific or philosophic 
presupposition that determines its status in advance, the subject, the human person, loses its 
perceived ontological privilege.145 This, perhaps, is the grand thesis of the Seasons Quartet, a 
phenomenology of objects: not just the body, but the person, too, is an object among others. With 
death, the object that the person is will lose its pretense of privilege and will “take the final step 
into the world of things, becoming a thing among other things, like a fallen leaf, a stick, a 
mound” (Inadvertent, 31).  
Or like a table. The dead body referenced above, the first one Knausgaard ever saw, is his 
father’s. At the end of the first volume of My Struggle, Knausgaard elaborates on this realization 
of the shared matter of the living and the dead: 
																																																						
145 “What is the world? Where does it come from? What is the meaning of life? Where does this meaning come 
from? Who am I? These questions, which are more important than all the rest, no one knows the answers to. That 
truth is beyond reach of the insights of science, whose movements in this respect perhaps most of all resemble those 
of a clown who as he bends down to pick up his hat ends up kicking it even farther away” (Inadvertent, 77). 
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There was no longer any difference between what once had been my father and the table 
he was lying on, or the floor on which the table stood, or the wall socket beneath the 
window, or the cable running to the lamp beside him. For humans are merely one form 
among many, which the world produces over and over again, not only in everything that 
lives but also in everything that does not live, drawn in sand, stone, and water (MS 1, 
441). 
The person is a form of the world’s productive processes and has no necessary privilege over any 
other. This is a leveling of not only the binary of life and death, which are made mutually 
constitutive of each other, but of the living-dead person and all other phenomenal objects. 
Perhaps echoing Ecclesiastes, Knausgaard argues that all is always already drawn in sand, stone, 
and water, as if all came from and return to dust. Unlike Milbank, though, Knausgaard alludes to 
scripture for the sake of describing a fundamentally atheistic world of the mute and purely 
material living dead. 
 And so Knausgaard’s materialism offers another way of belonging not to God, but to the 
world. It is a belonging that emphasizes the shared origin and fate of all—not just all people or 
all creatures, but of everything that is and could be. This material sense of belonging differs from 
Knausgaard’s pseudo-romantic and infantile senses in that Knausgaard seems to think that this 
description is apodictically the case. Whereas Knausgaard permanently longs for the impossible 
romantic unity of society and nature, and whereas the immediate belonging of infancy is no 
longer possible, and in any case was never experienced as such, Knausgaard does believe that 
this understanding of a shared material origin and fate is actually the case. Whether we want it or 
know it to be so, our teeth belong to the same material world as the potatoes, bananas, and milk 
that made them. Granted, it is a belonging that suffers the same problem of unthinking as that of 
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infantile belonging. A muscle does not know if it twitches in a living or a dead body, and the 
matter of the soft potato and the hard tooth knows nothing, either. And so the recognition of this 
material belonging, despite being the case, does not satisfy a longing to experience belonging: it 
is but it is not thought, and so whatever belonging it offers cannot be experienced or known. 
Knausgaard’s dead father does not and cannot know that he is exactly like the table on which 
“he” “lies.”  
 
Literature against Fiction 
 The passage about his father’s body continues: 
And death, which I have always regarded as the greatest dimension of life, dark, 
compelling, was no more than a pipe that springs a leak, a branch that cracks in the wind, 
a jacket that slips off a clothes hanger and falls to the floor (MS 1, 441). 
Later, in the sixth volume, Knausgaard reflects on this passage: “I wrote, ‘And death . . .’ That 
was beautiful, it was something, whereas what it described was nothing, empty, neutral, as 
hopeless as it was merciless” (MS 6, 177). Knausgaard is worried that his description of the 
materiality of death articulates a poeticism that undermines the very point he wants to make: that 
matter is unknowing, uncaring, more silent than silence. The concern brings Knausgaard close to 
reinscribing the Aristotelian model of writing, wherein his words would temporally and logically 
follow a prelinguistic experience. If this were the case, then Knausgaard would be arguing that 
his written words do not live up to the full significance of the experience which they represent. 
Indeed, Knausgaard occasionally writes of the artist as grasping for an external and prelinguistic 
truth, and in doing so seems to adhere to this model. But this Aristotelian proximity and those 
comments concerning truth betray, in my reading, that which is more fundamental to 
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Knausgaard’s project: he wants to experience belonging. The problem is that the methods of 
belonging so far described—romanticism, infancy, and now materialism—preclude, for the 
reasons already explained, experience. There is no experience of belonging, although 
Knausgaard wishes that there was. Recognizing this impossibility of experiencing belonging, 
Knausgaard’s comments about the failure of writing should not be understood in an Aristotelian 
way. Knausgaard cannot be maintaining that his words fail to live up to the experience of 
belonging because he maintains that there is no experience of belonging. 
 If not a discrepancy between word and experience, what, then, is Knausgaard’s complaint 
with his own description of his father’s death? The concern that his language is too “beautiful” 
betrays a more fundamental concern that his writing does not accurately reflect his life. 
Knausgaard’s concern, after all, is not that his writing is beautiful but that the beauty of the text 
does not cohere with the nothingness that it attempts to describe. That no text—ugly, beautiful, 
figurative, literal, or whatever—could cohere with nothingness means that Knausgaard’s concern 
here is less with his own idiosyncratic style than it is with the formal and structural relationship 
between life and text.  
 In the second volume of My Struggle, Knausgaard reveals his project’s aim: “The idea 
was to get as close as possible to my life” (MS 2, 582). Fredric Jameson has called the style of 
writing that Knausgaard uses to pursue this aim “itemisation,” by which he means a type of 
writing that is primarily a reporting of life without privilege for the exciting over the mundane.146 
It is this desire to report the quotidian that leads Knausgaard to write about “things (that) happen 
all the time, every single day, and everyone knows they do: alcoholism, infidelity, mental illness, 
and masturbation” (MS 6, 1007).  
																																																						
146 Fredric Jameson, “Itemised,” London Review of Books 21.8.  
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While admitting that he is attracted to this style of writing because it comes easy to him, 
Knausgaard is also motivated by ethical concerns, which do not feature in Jameson’s 
depiction.147 Namely, Knausgaard’s concern for the quotidian serves the function of specifying 
what kind of belonging—fascist—he is not interested in. In volume six, Knausgaard 
differentiates his My Struggle from Hitler’s: 
It is not his father’s life as such that is significant to him, the person he was in real life, 
the man whose smell could be described in such and such a way, who walked and stood 
and sat like this or like that, who expressed himself in this way rather than that and who 
filled a room with his very own presence, but rather what he in his life represented . . . 
Hitler turns his problematic social background to his advantage, at the same time as he 
keeps private that which would ruin the trajectory, the striving to surmount, that which 
takes place in the material world among real people, who not only belong to a lineage, 
but also belch and shit and yell and lash out, and with a certain regularity drink 
themselves senseless; who slurp and spit and reek of piss and sweat, who drag their sons 
here and there by their hair (MS 6, 511). 
Coming at the end of the novel, the passage winks at the reader, who by now knows that 
Knausgaard’s own father was prone to belch and shit and yell and lash out, and with a certain 
regularity drink himself senseless. Knausgaard wants to report these sometimes embarrassing 
																																																						
147  “I have no idea what writing is. That’s true! The more I write, the less I know about what it is that makes 
something good. I normally think, you know, this is complete shit. And I sent it to my editor or someone else, and 
sometimes they say, ‘No, this is alive.’ Maybe two or three months later I can see that it was good. But I don’t know 
why. Really, I’ve developed a method, which is being in the present, sitting here, drinking some coffee, thinking of a 
memory. That’s the only way I know how to write. I don’t know how to write a novel. But I know that, if I just try, 






phenomena because to do otherwise would not respect the irreplaceable particularity of his 
father. Whereas Hitler made his abusive father into a sort of plot device, Knausgaard wishes to 
preserve the irreplaceability of his father. In terms of belonging, Knausgaard does not want to 
make his father belong to a constructed fiction, but aims to make himself belong to the world of 
which his father is a part. The treatment of his father’s particularity is governed by the same 
desire that Knausgaard felt on Walpurgis Night: Knausgaard wants to belong to the world of 
grittiness and particularity, of burnt hot dogs and abusive fathers. In his reflections on Hitler, 
Walpurgis Night celebrations, the body, and death, Knausgaard always demonstrates a deep 
desire to belong “in the material world among real people.”  
 Among “real people,” that is, with “the concrete, singular life. That’s the only thing that 
really exists” (KOKLB).  The world to which Knausgaard longs to belong is this world of real, 
concrete people. In this sense, he articulates a desire for belonging antithetical to the Schmittian 
belonging to ontological metanarratives that racially classify individuals. Such metanarratives—
which Knausgaard shows serve a fundamental role for Hitler as well as Schmitt—rely, 
Knausgaard says, not on the “I” and the “you,” but on the “we.” The belonging implied by this 
metanarratalogical “we” is the opposite of the belonging—particular, individual, real, material—
for which Knausgaard longs and about which his project writes: “That ‘we’ is general—it 
doesn’t really exist, it’s a fiction. So the duty of literature is to fight fiction. It’s to find a way 
into the world as it is” (KOKLB). The fleeting “we” that Knausgaard experienced at Walpurgis 
Night is contraposed to the “we” of Schmitt and Hitler as literature is to fiction, as mute 
materialism is to ontological narrative, as the quotidian is to the grand, and as his daughter below 
is to the heavens above.  
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 Yet, it is one thing to reject an explicitly fascist metanarrative of explicit ontological war. 
It might be another to reject Milbank’s Christian metanarrative of ontological peace. For while 
Milbank also preserves the privilege of a “we”—Christians—and although Milbank also 
interprets all of material history as scenes in the higher Christian drama of salvation, his 
argument is not in favor of the formal structure of metanarratives as such. Rather, Milbank 
argues in favor of the unique peacefulness and unique credibility of the Christian, and by this he 
ultimately means Augustinian, metanarrative. The question would then concern not the 
credibility of metanarratives as such—Milbank knows the arguments against metanarratives and 
rejects them on faith—but instead would concern the particular attractiveness of Milbank’s 
Augustinian metanarrative. In other words, and using Knausgaard’s distinction, it remains to be 
seen, for now, whether Milbank’s metanarrative is fiction or literature.   
 
God and Belonging 
And so Knausgaard searches for belonging through quotidian existence, mute 
materialism, and literature. In each case, he finds that belonging entails an openness and an 
alienation that Knausgaard once thought would be overcome by belonging to the world. He still 
wants to belong in the naive sense: he never stops writing literature in the hope of dispelling 
fiction. This is the tension that animates Knausgaard’s whole project: on the one hand, the 
recognition that “belonging” is possible only if belonging is understood in a rather alienating 
sense; on the other hand, the unceasing hope to experience full belonging in the world anyway.  
 As we would expect, though, Knausgaard submits this tension to one further turn of the 
dialectical screw. In 2018, an interviewer with the New Yorker asked Knausgaard what “spiritual 
possibilities” his sense of materialism allowed. Knausgaard responds: 
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A friend of mine has wood pigeons who build a nest, lay eggs, have chicks, and there’s a 
hawk that comes and takes them. That’s happened four years in a row. But the pigeons 
still go to the same place because, for them, the future doesn’t exist. Maybe they’re in 
what Kierkegaard would say is the kingdom of God. 
His friend’s pigeons seem to experience the sort of unreflective and immediate belonging for 
which Knausgaard apparently longs. Of course, Kierkegaard does not write about pigeons, but 
about “birds.” In Knausgaard, the lilies of the field and the birds of the air become the burnt hot 
dogs of the pushcart and the pigeons of the hawk’s dinner. Lilies and birds belong to the 
kingdom of God, but Knausgaard has trouble enough belonging to the gritty, material, and 
uncaring world that he has described. So far, everything runs as expected: Knausgaard resists a 
too easy acceptance of belonging that does not account for the particularity and materiality of the 
world.  
Knausgaard continues this reflection on his friend’s pigeons by noting the difference 
between them and us humans. Unlike the pigeons, “we’re not in the world—we’re looking at the 
world, longing for it.” At this point, the familiar reader would expect Knausgaard to say that he 
longs to be like the pigeon, even if doing so would fundamentally alter his understanding of 
himself and would rob himself of the possibility of ever experiencing the belonging for which he 
longs. But this is not what happens. Instead, Knausgaard puts the whole project into question. He 
continues: “Do we want in there? Is that where God is?” 
In the sixth volume of My Struggle, Knausgaard straightforwardly declares that he does 
“not believe there to be a God, nor that Jesus was the son of that God” (MS 6, 639). Given this 
apparent atheism, and it is a specifically anti-Christian atheism, Knausgaard’s question can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways. First, the question could be meant as a simple profession of a 
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philosophical position. Knausgaard, who does not seem to think that experiencing belonging to 
the world is humanly possible, asks if God is in this belonging and means by this that there is 
neither belonging nor God. But Knausgaard’s question might be more straightforwardly earnest: 
We cannot experience belonging, but there is belonging—the pigeons belong to the world—and, 
perhaps, God is in this inaccessible, non-experiential place. That he does not believe there to be a 
God would not, in this register, imply an ontological judgment concerning the impossibility of 
God.  
But a third interpretation is more fitting. I read Knausgaard as saying:  If God is there, 
then all the better for God, but I live here; perhaps I want to belong there, perhaps I want that 
more than everything, but I want that and burnt hot dogs, that and my daughter. This reading is 
consistent with Knausgaard’s emphasis on desiring the quotidian and the common: he does not 
want to enter the kingdom of God if doing so means leaving behind all that he loves. When 
Knausgaard recognized the possibility of bowing to the sublime heavens above but immediately 
turns instead to his daughter below, he raised this question: “Do we want in there?” And 
answered it: no; at least, not without this, too. 
This is the question with which Knausgaard’s project confronts the reader: Where do you 
want to belong? Understood in this manner, Knausgaard’s repeated dialectical troubling of ways 
of belonging read less as descriptions or “itemizations” of the world as they do read as defenses 
of it. Knausgaard wants to belong in the world. He wants this so much that he is skeptical of any 
belonging that might elide the world’s particularities: In each case of potential belonging, 
Knausgaard worries that the world might slip, that a hot dog will go unaccounted for, that his 
daughter won’t recognize him. Which is not to say that Knausgaard is merely inventing trouble 
for himself and sabotaging the fulfillment of his own desire. I am not providing a psychoanalytic 
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reading of Knausgaard. The dialectics of belonging that Knausgaard describes are real: the world 
is, his writing convincingly shows, mute, alienating, and ruptured from within. It is also full of 
irreplaceable others, laughing children, and love. And it is precisely the reality of all of this that 
Knausgaard wants to save, and it is to this that Knausgaard wishes to belong.  
As Marx thought of religion as providing the structural prototype for all ideology, as 
Derrida thought of theology as providing safe harbor for the metaphysical coincidence of 
thinking and being, so does Knausgaard think of religion as providing the highest means of 
effacing the world by belonging to its outside. The logic is different than that articulated in this 
project’s first two chapters, and differs from what is usually considered religion’s postmodern 
difficulty: For Knausgaard, the religious problem is not the problem of finding the outside 
despite our epistemological limits. Unlike Hågglund’s, Knausgaard’s atheism is not grounded in 
the philosophical impossibility of God. Rather, for Knausgaard, the religious problem is the 
problem of rejecting the religious temptation of leaving the world. Unlike Hågglund’s, 
Knausgaard’s atheism is an ethical choice against belonging to a world other than this one—
really, it is a choice against his own desire for such a belonging.  
For Knausgaard, to believe in God would be to belong to the world in a way that would 
efface his fleeting attachments to those he loves in this world. To belong to the world would be 
to lose the world. This world is fleeting and unknowing, offers little by way of comfort, and does 
not offer any hospitality and does not ask us to belong. Looking at the world he loves, 
Knausgaard sees almost nothing: 
—‘There’s almost nothing there?’ 
—‘Yes.’ 
—‘But it’s good anyway?’ 
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—‘In a way’ (SML, 169). 
In a way, the world is good. In the ways it is not good, we can, as political people, improve 
things: “Humanity requires at least some minimum of material comforts. As Mackie Messer says 
in Bertolt Brecht’s Threepenny Opera, erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral” (MS6, 
585); “Economic inequality: That is what we should talk about, nothing else” (KOKLB). 
Granted, Knausgaard, now an economically and culturally wealthy cosmopolitan 
European, spends relatively little ink discussing this necessity of material comfort. Indeed, his 
desire for the world in all of its grittiness might well display a material privilege that affords him 
some safety from a grittiness too gritty. Yet, in a more profound sense Knausgaard’s desire to 
belong to the world in its entirety and his position against inequality are not at all antithetical: 
Knausgaard’s position is that life is hard enough, that people are dying and in a sense dead 
already, that belonging is impossible—one certainly does not need poverty on top of it all. The 
complexity and particularities of the world can be appreciated, can be held on to, without also 
accepting exploitation and dispossession. In fact, such exploitation might impede the possibility 
of choosing to belong to the world by impeding choice as such. In this sense, Knausgaard’s 
argument against religion is totally consistent with the standard Marxist argument: a turn to the 
heavens is a fictive, not literary, flight from difficulties here below. Which is to say, what all 
political regimes and all literary projects must care for is this world, and no other. For 
Knausgaard, bowing to the heavens belongs to fiction—and bowing to this world belongs to 
literature. 
 Of course, there is a long tradition for which this turn to the world would be sympathetic 
with, not antipathetic to, religion. A religious struggle to embrace and correct the world will be 
found in this project’s next two chapters. But Knausgaard’s decision is clear: he decides against 
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God. To dispute Knausgaard’s minor premises—to argue, as indeed the next chapters will risk 
doing, that a decision for faith is also a decision for, not against, the world—in order to sublate 
his thought into an allegedly higher religious metanarrative would be an entirely unnecessary and 
violent imposition. This imposed sublation would be violent not only because it would be 
unwelcome, but more fundamentally because to do so would reinscribe a basic identity between 
thought and being: to demonstrate theoretically that Knausgaard has misread religion’s 
relationship with the world, and to do so for the sake of religious apologetics, would imply that a 
theoretical construction can and should dictate both desire and praxis. Knausgaard has already 
recognized that one can bow to the heavens. And he has chosen not to do so. A reinscription of a 
metaphysical logic in order to argue against this decision would undermine, not fortify, the 
possibility of religious decision as such: To argue that his turn to his daughter masks some 
underlying religiosity or that he has described himself as secular only because he misunderstands 
religion would serve to make religious decision impossible by rendering it necessary. If religious 
decision is to be a true decision—and so not necessary, not observing the iron metaphysical laws 
of noncontradiction, not determining an outcome in advance—then Knausgaard’s decision 
against religion has to be not only respected, but more strongly confirmed as necessarily possibly 
correct. 
 In addition to these deconstructive reasons, there are more obviously theological reasons 
to not only respect, but more strongly valorize Knausgaard’s secular decision. And Knausgaard 
reminds us of them, via a note to his daughter, which comes at the beginning of Spring: 
I want you to know this—that you were born into love, and that it will envelop you, no 
matter what happens, as long as your mother and I are alive. It may happen that you don’t 
want anything to do with it. It may happen that you turn away from it. And one day you 
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will understand that it doesn’t matter, that it doesn’t change anything, that unconditional 
love is the only love that doesn’t bind you but sets you free (Spring, 4). 
The passage echoes Paul’s from Corinthians, and so can be read as a message to his religious 
readers. In this case, what matters is the content of Paul’s—and Knausgaard’s, the question of 
authorial ownership here is complex at least—claim concerning the liberating function of love. 
Knausgaard appeals to religious discourse for the sake of telling religion: Set me free. It is as if 
he is saying, if you care for love, then do not bind me. Again, the argument concerns belonging: 
Knausgaard wants to belong to the world; to force him to belong to religion is, then, an unloving 
imposition of inclusion. Not all welcomings are welcome. 
Surely this is the place where Milbank could respond that Knausgaard’s secularism is 
inextricably bound to Christian theology. Not only is Knausgaard here responding—consciously 
or not—to Paul, and not only did he earlier allude to Ecclesiastes, and not only was his 
discussion of Walpurgis night a necessary reference to Saint Walpurgis, but more generally 
Knausgaard’s commitment to matter and the world is itself a reflection of the Christian motif of 
incarnation. Milbank could claim that Knausgaard’s ethical positions are grounded not in 
immanent secularism, but in a higher mysticism of love, and that it is only because of this 
“vertical” integration that Knausgaard is able to do anything like ethics at all.148 In all of these 
instances, Milbank could argue that where Knausgaard argues against religion, he must use 
religious arguments and the material given him by religious traditions. Knausgaard would only 
ever be a theologian. 
																																																						
148 “There is always a religious beyond the ethical which nonetheless grounds every ethic not reducible to the 
naturalistically pre-ethical. To be horrendously summary, one could say that ethics, like politics for Péguy, begins in 
the mystical and is exceeded by that which must nonetheless engender some sort of ethical practice in order to be 
authentic.” “Wild Side,” pg 95. 
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But in what sense would any of these claims theologically position Knausgaard’s 
secularism? The case of Walpurgis Night is especially illuminating. Walpurgis Night is 
celebrated on the eve of the feast day of Saint Walpurga, niece of Saint Bonafice. In Sweden, 
where Knausgaard celebrated, the night is now associated with the pagan ritualistic welcoming 
of spring, typically through song and the lighting of bonfires. Milbank’s metanarrative could 
interpret this bonfire celebration as a heretical and pagan derivation from the primary and 
orthodox significance of the saint’s feast day. But bonfires and song long pre-existed 
Christianity, and they certainly pre-exist the feast of Saint Walpurga. And so a plausible 
interpretation could the opposite of what I am imagining Milbank’s to be: The pagan celebration 
of which Knausgaard took part is not a heretical derivation of Christianity; rather, the feast of 
Saint Walpurga, a saint celebrated for, among other things, warding off witchcraft, was a 
temporary and fleeting colonization of local pagan traditions. Where Milbank’s metanarrative 
requires a heretical deviation from truth, the phenomenal reality suggests an inescapable 
inextricability of pagan, secular, and formally religious dimensions. In a limited sense, Milbank’s 
narrative does recognize this inextricability. He does not argue that Christianity is a distinct and 
discreet way of life superior to an antagonistic totally atheistic and totally secular way of life. 
Instead, Milbank is quick to point out the religious allusions and implied theology of 
secularism—indeed, this is his argument. What Knausgaard’s Walpurgis Night celebration 
shows, though, is that “the religious” is likewise full of secular information and sedimentations. 
If there is an implied theology in “the secular,” then this is only because there is also an implied 
secular philosophy in “the religious”—as Milbank’s Platonism confirms.  
Importantly, this recognition of the inextricability of the religious and the secular—which 
is opposed to the Schmittian logic of the purity and supremacy of one “realm” over all others, 
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which appears to be Milbank’s logic—is not an argument for the superiority of a secular 
metanarrative. Knausgaard decides against God, but he does not look to situate or position 
religious belief within some higher metanarrative. There is no apology for any metanarrative in 
Knausgaard. If he is suspicious of God and religion—and he is—then his is a suspicion that does 
not look to “master” religious discourse, because it holds that mastery is itself one form of 
religious discourse. And so there are narratives in Knausgaard—many thousands of pages of 
narratives—but there is no desire to efface the antagonisms and irreducible differences between 
these narratives. Knausgaard presents a “literary” description of life as cold and violent, but also 
as warm and loving. It is a complexity and antagonism that is more reflective of quotidian 
experience than is the mythical ontological peace preached by Milbank. To this end, as 
descriptions of reality, Knausgaard’s multiple secular narratives are entirely more “persuasive” 
than Milbank’s universalizing and rigidly orthodox metanarrative. Indeed, part of the literary 
value of Knausgaard’s project is found in the ways in which he slides in and out of religious 
praxis—his children are baptized, he is a socialist—and makes use of religious motifs. But this 
always as a sort of bricoleur, not an engineer of a dominant master metanarrative. In this secular 
recognition of irreducible difference, and it is only with irreducible difference that a truly 
multiple bricolage is possible, Milbank detects a violence and a nihilism. As I have tried to show, 
the violence that a Milbankian metanarrative detects is the violence it imposes by subjecting 
Knausgaard’s secular love for the world to a mythically pure and allegedly superior theological 
regime. Mastery and violence are produced, not uncovered, by Radical Orthodoxy’s Christian 
metanarrative. 
Applauding Knausgaard’s secularism for its attachment to the world resists Milbank’s 
pseudo-religious colonization of love as always a religious, and so not also a secular, 
	 172	
phenomenon. Knausgaard, because of and not in spite of his secular love for the secular world, is 
an ally to the left political theology this project develops. Which does not require incorporating 
him into a Christian metanrrative. Indeed, it requires a refusal to incorporate at all. Contra 
Milbank, a truly peaceful conceptualization of difference recognizes the irreducible doctrinal and 
creedal difference between Knausgaard’s secularism and Christian orthodoxy, and yet recognizes 
the possibility of political and praxical convergences anyway. A theological interpretation should 
not be imposed, because imposing it might force Knausgaard to walk away: 
We continued drinking in Peter’s room. He tore the phone loose and used it as a window 
stopper, so we could smoke without being fined, and handed me his book with photos of 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which he had covered for a decade, and of the lives of 
the veterans back in the U.S. I leafed through it while I tried to come up with something 
to say to him. I ended up saying that he sought complexity, not the iconic, and that this 
gave his photos enormous distinction. The expression on his face didn’t change when I 
said it, so it was impossible to tell whether I had pleased or insulted him. 
He put the book on the bed and opened a new beer. 
“So what’s your position on the question of God?” he asked. 
I got up, put out my cigarette and set the half-empty beer can on the coffee table. 






149 Karl Ove Knausgaard, “My Saga: Part 1,” New York Times Magazine, March 1, 2015. 
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Chapter Four 
Orthodoxy is Orthopraxy: Kierkegaard and Political Theology 
 
Introduction 
To review, this project’s first chapter argued that Carl Schmitt provides a compelling 
critique of the conversational and basically apolitical nature of modern liberal democracy, but 
does so by relying on an ontologized political theology that undermines any possibility of real 
decision. Moreover, Schmitt conflates liberalism and Marxism as versions of the same 
neutralization of politics and the same rejection of (Christian) political theology. This rejection 
of Marxism and dialectical materialism, in turn, serves to bolster Schmitt’s preference for 
ontology. That is, Schmitt critiques Marxism through a retreat to ontology. The project’s second 
chapter turned to Jacques Derrida, who was found to convincingly critique the very ontological 
political theology offered by Schmitt. Because of the relationship between Schmitt’s anti-
Marxism and his metaphysics, Derrida’s critique of metaphysical political theology suggests the 
possibility of a materialist alternative. Such an alternative might be the only hope for political 
theology as a credible 21st century discourse, because, after Derrida, any theology, including any 
political theology, that grounds itself in a metaphysical or logocentric discourse of truth must be 
dismissed on deconstructive grounds. That is, Schmitt provides a critique of modern liberalism 
and Derrida a critique of modern metaphysics. Any credible postmodern political theology must 
respond to these two critiques. 
Finding these critiques of liberalism and metaphysics basically convincing—although 
marked by a deep and clear rejection of Schmitt’s anti-Marxist fascism and ontologization of 
theology, both of which are anyway undermined by Derrida’s critique of logocentrism—my 
	 174	
commitments are to a political theology both deconstructive and Marxist. This chapter argues 
that Soren Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialism provides material for just that. Specifically, 
Kierkegaard, (1), offers an existentialist alternative to the metaphysical theologies critiqued by 
Derrida, and (2), offers a dialectical-materialist alternative to Schmitt’s ontological politics.  
These two strands find common articulation in Kierkegaard’s conception of decision: For 
Kierkegaard the existentialist, any decision worthy of the name does not take place in the ideal 
realm of philosophical deduction, but in the material realm of actual existence. That these 
existential decisions cannot be grounded in the ideal metaphysical identity of thinking and being 
makes Kierkegaard’s project a deconstructive one. That such decisions, for Kierkegaard, ought 
to be guided by the explicit norms established by Jesus and recorded in scripture makes his 
project not only deconstructive, but also Christian.150 That these norms are clearly, for 
Kierkegaard, a critique of private property and the political-economic regime secured by the 
right of private property—that is, capitalism—and that these norms clearly demand a political 
privileging of the poor, makes his project not only deconstructive and Christian, but also 
socialist. All of which is to say, the three traditions that primarily inform this project—Derridean 
deconstruction, Christian existentialism, and Marxist democratic socialism—find coherence in a 
Kierkegaardian political theology. 
While there might be tensions between deconstruction’s anti-theological position and 
Kierkegaard’s Christianity—and these tensions will be explored through reference to the work of 
not only Derrida, but also contemporary deconstructive theorists Caputo, Hågglund, Bennington, 
and Agacinski, all of whom write extensively about Kierkegaard—it is the association of 
																																																						
150 The possible tension between a scriptural norm and a deconstructive rejection of truth regimes will be addressed 
throughout this chapter. 
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Kierkegaard with Marxism that is most nearly novel, if not controversial, in my argument.151 
Indeed, the relationship between Marxists and professional Kierkegaardians could reasonably be 
described as often hostile—and this from both parties. 
The suspicion of Kierkegaard in Marxist circles begins with the Hungarian philosopher 
György Lukács, who made Kierkegaard a prominent antagonist in his 1954 text Die Zerstörung 
der Vernunft.152 Importantly, Lukács confines his study to only Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
works, which he holds as “the only crucial ones philosophically.” In reading these texts, Lukács 
argues that Kierkegaard responds to the limitations of Hegelian idealism—and Lukács is clear 
that Kierkegaard’s critiques on this front are compelling—not by turning to the materialist 
dialectics of Marx, but through “the construction of a subjectivist pseudo-dialectic” (250). With 
this charge of a “subjectivist pseudo-dialectic,” Lukács issues his two primary critiques. First, in 
critiquing Hegel’s introduction of movement into logic—and this introduction is an object of 
critique for Lukács, too—Kierkegaard falls into irrationalism: “In that the leap is divided from 
the transition of quantity, its irrational character comes about as a matter of necessity” (252). 
That is, Lukács holds that the Kierkegaardian category of the leap, upon which Kierkegaard 
relies in his critique of Hegelian logic, is a basically irrational, and so not properly dialectical, 
																																																						
151 To date, there are only a few substantial studies that might support my argument. Two come from Jamie Aroosi: 
The Dialectical Self: Kierkegaard, Marx, and the Making of the Modern Subject (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2018) and his “The Causes of Bourgeois Culture: Kierkegaard’s Relation to Marx Considered,” Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 42.1 (2016), 71-92. Aroosi argues against the typical story that places Kierkegaard and Marx in an 
antagonistic relationship. For Aroosi, the two are better understood as offering complementary responses to the 
problem of modern alienation. I would like to go further, and argue not that Kierkegaard and Marx are complements, 
but that their political projects more nearly converge entirely. The other study worth mentioning in this regard is 
Eliseo Pérez-Álvarez’s A Vexing Gadfly: The Late Kierkegaard on Economic Matters (Princeton University Press, 
2009). In my view, Pérez-Álvarez’s account unequivocally demonstrates the extent to which Kierkegaard held anti-
capitalist positions. To that end, A Vexing Gadfly has not received the attention it deserves in Kierkegaard studies. 
That said, Pérez-Álvarez’s project does not attempt a theoretical reading of “the early Kierkegaard,” and so does not 
attempt to demonstrate the intrinsic connection between Kierkegaard’s philosophical, theological, and economic 
positions. That is, Pérez-Álvarez convincingly shows that Kierkegaard the person harbored leftist political positions, 
but does this without substantially engaging Kierkegaard’s theoretical works.  
152 All citations are from: György Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, trans. Palmer (The Merlin Press, 1980). 
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category. Second, Lukács’ depiction of Kierkegaard’s dialectic as “subjectivist” is meant to 
critique Kierkegaard’s alleged anti-Marxist use of abstraction: here, the argument is that 
Kierkegaard’s “single individual” is only ever an abstraction from the particularities of real 
people in the midst of class struggle. This alleged abstraction from socio-economic reality is read 
as a retreat into idealism: “idealist dialectics . . . became with Kierkegaard the cornerstone of the 
most highly advanced irrationalist philosophy which had hitherto existed” (256). In the final 
analysis, Kierkegaard’s subjectivist/idealist pseudo-dialectic, in its withdrawal from material 
reality, is held to support capital’s ideological machinery: Kierkegaardian philosophy is 
popularized in the 20th-century in order to support “the imperialist bourgeoisie's increasingly 
reactionary needs,” and Kierkegaard himself is proven to only ever have been a “pure apologist 
of bourgeois decadence, and nothing else” (296). 
Eight years after Lukács’ work, Theodor Adorno published his Kierkegaard: 
Konstruktion des Asthetischen.153 Adorno’s engagement with Kierkegaard is more subtle and 
more careful than is Lukács’, but ultimately Adorno, too, finds in Kierkegaard an idealist 
opponent to anti-capitalist struggle.  An early work, this text was written before Adorno’s later 
turn to a more conventionally Marxist position. Yet even here, Adorno makes some of the same 
critiques as Lukács; namely, that Kierkegaardian inwardness is a retreat from material reality. 
Adorno writes that Kierkegaard has a “lack of any developed concept of praxis,” and that, 
without such a concept, Kierkegaard positions himself at a distance from “the external world,” 
which is “condemned in general as ‘the external world,’ and not as a specifically capitalist 
world” (49). This removal from the specifically capitalist world is, according to Adorno and 
echoing Lukács, at least partially the result of Kierkegaard’s idealism. According to Adorno, 
																																																						
153 All citations are from: Theodor Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. Hullot-Kentor 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
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Kierkegaardian idealism is grounded in the identity—and “identity” is the catchword for 
idealism in all of Adorno—“of truth and person” (49). Such an idealism occludes the possibility 
of rational, scientific critique of the capitalist world, and so “in Kierkegaard’s philosophy the 
knowing subject can no more reach its objective correlative than, in a society dominated by 
exchange-value, things are ‘immediately’ accessible to the person” (39). That is, Adorno is in 
agreement with Lukács in that Kierkegaard presents an idealist and irrational alternative to 
Hegel’s idealism: “Reason, which in Hegel as infinite reason produces actuality out of itself, is in 
Kierkegaard, again as infinite reason, the negation of all finite knowledge: if the former is 
mythical by its claim to universal sovereignty, the latter becomes mythical through universal 
annihilation” (119).154  
Finally, this Marxist critique of Kierkegaard as an anti-worldly irrationalist is perhaps 
most succinctly articulated by George Novack, who, in his Understanding History, confidently 
states that, “Soren Kierkegaard did contend that it was neither possible nor desirable to think 
systematically about the reality of life.”155 Like Lukács and Adorno, Novack credits Kierkegaard 
with responding to a real problem, but critiques him for opting for an unreal solution: “It must be 
said that the heresies of the existentialists do not always succeed in shedding completely the 
values of the society they rebel against. Kierkegaard assailed the sluggishness and self-deception 
of the smug citizens around him only to embrace the Christian God with more passionate 
intensity.” It is easy to see how this structure, wherein religion operates as an ideal response to 
																																																						
154 For an excellent overview of Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard, see: Roland Boer, “A Totality of Ruins: Adorno 
on Kierkegaard,” Cultural Critique 83 (2013), 1-30. Boer’s argument that Adorno associates theology with 
ideology, and so finds in Kierkegaard’s theology a pro-capitalist apologetic, is similar to the reading I gave of 
Derrida’s anti-theology. 




material injustice, has found favor in Marxist interpretations of Kierkegaard. Eventually, I will 
attempt to show that this reading of Kierkegaardian religion is misplaced: far from otherworldly 
and subservient to the demands of capitalism, Kierkegaard’s political theology requires critical 
engagement precisely with capitalist structures of oppression. These critical Marxist readings, in 
short, read a bourgeois understanding of religion into Kierkegaard. 
This classic Marxist characterization of Kierkegaard remains largely unchallenged by 
contemporary Marxist theorists. Tom Carter, writing for the Trotskyist International Committee 
for the Fourth International, states that “Kierkegaard’s thinking, as it emerged in the arena of 
philosophy, took on a truly reactionary and backward form.”156 Even Marxists comfortable in 
continental philosophy and theory—Fredric Jameson, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt—rarely, if 
ever, engage Kierkegaard as a serious political thinker.157  
In the rare occasion when a contemporary Marxist does engage positively with 
Kierkegaard, the engagement is largely treated with suspicion from within the Kierkegaard 
scholarly community. Consider the case of Slavoj Zizek, who is perhaps the only committed 
contemporary Marxist theorist who positively engages Kierkegaard’s work. For Zizek, unlike 
Adorno, Lukács, and Novack, there is “only a thin, almost imperceptible line that separates 
Kierkegaard from dialectical materialism proper” (PV 75).158 Zizek holds that Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical and theological projects, insofar as they relate to immanence, are materialist in 
method and scope. This materialism is only prevented from being “dialectical materialism 
proper” by Kierkegaard’s theological commitments: for Zizek’s Kierkegaard, God is a 
																																																						
156 Tom Carter, “A Closer Look at Kierkegaard.” World Socialist Web Site Accessed: 
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/04/kier-a17.html 
157 When looking for a religious interlocutor, Hardt and Negri prefer St. Francis of Assisi. See: Hardt and Negri, 
Empire (Harvard University Press, 2001), 413. 
158 Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (MIT Press, 2009). 
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transcendent spectator who possesses final knowledge of all human history. In this transcendent 
perspective, history and truth are identified in the person of God. Such a posited identity, which 
is totally removed from existence from our human perspective, is the “thin, almost imperceptible 
line” that prevents Kierkegaard from adopting a fully (atheist) Marxist materialism. But this 
lingering idealism, Zizek argues, is not a reason for Marxists to dismiss Kierkegaard. Indeed, by 
placing the identitarian thought of idealism in such a transcendent—and so removed—position, 
Kierkegaard has freed actual human history from idealist baggage. Where Lukács, Adorno, and 
Novack, see a withdrawal from the world, Zizek sees a freeing of the world: with no prior ideal 
philosophical or theoretical commitments, the political actor is free to truly decide how to 
proceed, is free to leap into the future: “In the last resort there is no theory, just a fundamental 
practico-ethical decision about what kind of life one wants to commit oneself to” (PV 75). 
Zizek sees this emphasis on decision as a corrective toward deterministic tendencies in 
some forms of Marxist theorizing. Zizek is arguing: Kierkegaard is right, movement does not 
come about on its own, but must be forced. It is for this reason that Zizek is able to read certain 
leftist revolutionaries—most notably Robespierre, Guevara, and, above all, Lenin—as enacting 
“works of love in the strictest Kierkegaardian sense of the term” (PD 30).159 Adjudicating this 
claim would require precise historical evaluation of the specific acts done by these 
revolutionaries, and such a study is not within the scope of this project. What is within scope, 
though, is the more general point that Zizek—who clearly valorizes the above revolutionaries—
is finding in Kierkegaard, not Marx, the decisiveness necessary for revolutionary praxis. That is, 
Zizek is rejecting—strongly—the received Marxist position that Kierkegaard is an entirely 
reactionary idealist. 
																																																						
159 Slavoj Zizek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (MIT Press, 2003). 
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One would think, then, that Kierkegaardians might be interested in engaging with Zizek 
on this point—after all, Zizek is elevating Kierkegaard to a central role within a philosophical 
program typically resistant to Kierkegaard. However, this community has mostly met Zizek with 
suspicion, if not scorn. In his “Risible Christianity? Kierkegaard vs. Zizek,” Leo Stan, a 
contributor to Jon Stewart’s Kierkegaard: Sources and Reception series,160 describes Zizek as a 
“cultural critic” primarily interested in “pop culture, classical opera, smut, revolutionary 
Marxism,161 cyberspace, and Hitchcock’s films.”162 According to Stan, Zizek’s program is both a 
“challenge to” and a “deconstruction of” Christianity. It is both of these things because Zizek 
“puts forward a secularistic reading of Christian theology in accord with the demythologizing 
hermeneutic of psychoanalysis. This approach is rooted in a violent, immanentist, and 
narcissistic ontology of the void.” Throughout this same article, Zizek’s “hermeneutic” is held to 
be “aggressive,” “groundless,” “unwarranted,” “unjustifiable,” and “quite erratic.” As I hope to 
demonstrate shortly, several of these negatively charged adjectives might actually receive a 
positive valence in Kierkegaard’s work, and so Zizek’s unwarranted, groundless, and so on 
reading of Kierkegaard might not be as “arbitrary” as Stan thinks. Regardless, Stan’s major 
critique of Zizek is that his “secularizing” reading is a “reductionistic” one. From Stan’s 
perspective, Zizek’s secularized, materialist, and heterodox interpretation of Christianity can 
only ever be a challenge to and deconstruction of Christianity, because Christianity is essentially 
																																																						
160 The series consists of 21 volumes, some of which are further broken into multiple “tomes”: 
https://www.jonstewart.dk/krsrr.html 
161 In Stan’s view, psychoanalysis is a “Marxian tradition.” Additionally, dialectical materialism is held to be 
“unusual, if not sophistic.” This is unfortunate, because the trope that Marxists are unusual and sophistic 
psychoanalysts is a common one in anti-Semitic discourses.  
162 Leo Stan, “Risible Christianity? Kierkegaard vs. Zizek,” Toronto Journal of Theology 28.2 (2012). See also: 
Leon Stan, “Slavoj Zizek: Mirroring the Absent God,” in Kierkegaard’s Influence on the Social Sciences, ed. 
Stewart (Ashgate Publishing, 2011).  
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not secular, materialist, or heterodox. This chapter will challenge each of these associations, 
especially in their polemical—and Schmittian—use. 
As noted above, Stan’s view, taken as a rejection of a Marxist Kierkegaard on the 
grounds that Marxism is antithetical to either Christianity in general or Kierkegaardian 
Christianity in particular, or both, is widespread in the Kierkegaardian academic community. 
Saitya Brata Das’s recent manuscript The Political Theology of Kierkegaard approvingly cites 
Karl Lowith’s claim that Kierkegaard wrote Two Ages as an “anti-communist manifesto.”163 For 
Brata Das, who is inadvertently echoing the early communist critiques of Kierkegaard, 
Kierkegaard and Marx are each responding to the same problem of a tyrannical “world order.” 
Yet, “while for Marx the ‘outside’ of the system is in the world, for Kierkegaard the ‘outside’ of 
the system is the ‘outside’ of the world” (33). Kierkegaard’s position here as other-worldly, in 
turn, is meant to radicalize the critique of immanent worldly powers. Kierkegaard’s other-
worldly political theology delegitimizes by contextualizing all earthly claims to power; that is, 
his political theology is, “an eschatological delegitimation of the worldly power on theological 
foundation” (75).” Unfortunately, Brata Das is here reinscribing Kierkegaard within the very 
idealist paradigm that served as an object of critique for the early Marxists. Especially after 
Derrida’s critique of such transcendental structures, a responsible postmodern political theology 
must side with the Marxists in this debate. That is, reinscribing Kierkegaard within an idealist 
paradigm, and so reinscribing the Marx/Kierkegaard relationship as one of antagonism, should 
be resisted if Kierkegaard is to function as a credibly emancipatory thinker in postmodernity. 
																																																						
163 Saitya Brata Das, The Political Theology of Kierkegaard (Edinburgh University Press, 2020). The Lowith 
citation, which is popular, is from Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), 151. 
On this front, Gregor Malantschuk writes that “It is more accurate to say that this (the anti-communist manifesto) 
came later with Works of Love.” From: Gregor Malantschuk, Controversial Kierkegaard, trans. Hong & Hong 
(Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980).  
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Citations of this kind could be given interminably. For example, George Pattison writes 
that “Marx and Kierkegaard may be representatives of two essentially irreconcilable positions. 
They can scarcely both be right in their radically divergent accounts of what is truly human in 
our humanity” (31).164 And Jacob Taubes, neither a Marxist nor a Kierkegaardian, writes: 
“Kierkegaard aims at essentially the same relationship between religion and politics as Marx, 
though admittedly in inverse valuation” (173).165 The recently published volume of the 2018 
annual meeting of the Soren Kierkegaard Society, the theme of which was “Kierkegaard and 
Political Theology,” mentions Marx only once, and that to note that Marx had not been 
mentioned.166 Needless to say, the standard narrative, from Marxists, Kierkegaardians, and the 
political-philosophical literature in general, is that Marx and Kierkegaard articulate basically 
incompatible philosophical, political, and a/theological programs. The two are said to be in 
agreement that religion and politics exist in a confrontational and basically competitive 
relationship. Marx, the story goes, sides with politics; Kierkegaard, with religion. When a 
partisan attempts bipartisanship, as with the case of Zizek, he or she is more often scorned than 
appreciated. My position is that this standard narrative is not only unhelpful, but that, more 
straightforwardly, it offers an incorrect view of Kierkegaard’s political theology. In short, I am 
arguing here that both the Marxists (except Zizek) and the Kierkegaardians have gotten 
Kierkegaard wrong: his political theology is a dialectical materialist one, and his explicit political 
sympathies are socialist. If correct, then the ramifications of my argument are this: for the 
Kierkegaardians, a deep reevaluation of their own biases against Marxist political economy and 
secular political projects in general; for the Marxists, a deep reevaluation of their own biases 
																																																						
164 George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (McGill University Press, 2005). 
165 Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans. Ratmoko (Stanford University Press, 2009). 
166 Truth is Subjectivity: Kierkegaard and Political Theology, ed. Walsh Perkins (Mercer University Press, 2019), 
pg. 90. 
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against religion and religious thinkers as essentially other-worldly, idealist, and so on. Again, my 
sympathies are with a deconstructive and Marxist political theology. This is only anti-religious if 
religion is fundamentally metaphysical and anti-Marxist. As Kierkegaard shows, it is neither. 
The chapter moves in two parts. 
First, relying primarily but not only on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
to Philosophical Fragments (CUP),167 I will explicate Kierkegaard’s theoretical critique of the 
identity of thinking and being. This critique relies on a distinction between “reality” (Realitet) 
and “actuality” (Virkelighed). For Kierkegaard, thinking is identical to being if and only if being 
is thought of as an ideal thought content. In this idealist sense, thinking has “reality.” However, 
such an ideal reality is not actual if it is not actualized in existence. And so the Kierkegaardian 
version of the critique of the identity of thinking and being is more properly a critique of the 
identity of thinking and actuality. This identity is possible not in ideal thought, but only in actual 
existence. This privileging actual existence over ideal thought is one of the senses in which I 
consider Kierkegaard a materialist: the privileging of existence means that all truth must be 
actualized in the world. Here, truth is not an objective content secured by the identity of thinking 
and being. Nor is truth an intellectual coherence secured by a transcendental signified. 
Kierkegaard, then, is not an other worldly idealist, but is instead a materialist who is himself 
critical of ideal attempts—like the ideal identity of thinking and being—to undermine the 
importance of actual existence. 
In this chapter’s second section, I develop Kierkegaard’s critique of the identity of reality 
and actuality along politically materialist lines. If the first section demonstrates that Kierkegaard 
is a dialectical materialist—that is, that he employs a materialist and not an idealist dialectic, and 
																																																						
167 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Hong & Hong 
(Princeton University Press, 1992). 
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that such a dialectic is at least partially constituted by his existential privileging of actual 
existence—then this section demonstrates that this dialectical materialism coheres explicitly with 
a leftist material politics. This is done by arguing that Kierkegaard’s materialist understanding of 
truth destabilizes the classical religious privileging of orthodoxy over orthopraxy. More 
specifically, Kierkegaard reinscribes orthodoxy as itself a type of orthopraxy: to be a Christian, 
for Kierkegaard, is to belong to an orthopraxic community concerned with improving the actual, 
material conditions of the poor and dispossessed. Far from Christianity and Marxism 
representing antithetical programs, for Kierkegaard, and for me, a credible Christian political 
theology suggests that orthodoxy is demonstrated by one’s enactment of the political praxis 
elaborated by both Marx and the prophetic Christian tradition, beginning most of all with the 
Gospels. This reinscription of orthodoxy along the lines of orthopraxy is important for this 
project in general in that it helps articulate the ways in which religious and secular political 
projects can align in the struggle for political emancipation. 
 
Thinking and Being: “The identity of thinking and being is won in pure thinking.”168 
 
Kierkegaard writes the sentence that names this section about halfway through Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (CUP). The book, published in 1846, is 
written as a “postscript” to Kierkegaard’s much shorter 1844 text, Philosophical Fragments 
(PF).169 In Fragments, Kierkegaard, writing under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, responds 
to the question of how the eternal relates to the temporal. More specifically, Fragments asks how 
eternal happiness, which Christianity promises, can be grounded in an historical event, which 
																																																						
168 CUP, 335. 
169 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Hong & Hong (Princeton University Press, 2013). 
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Christianity is. The presentation of this argument involves two parts. First, the actual written 
argument should be rehearsed and its logic understood. This involves a rather straightforward 
exposition. Second, and more intricately, the argument must be placed within Kierkegaard’s 
larger political-theological project. That is, not only what the argument says, but what it does, 
how it functions in and what it is doing for Kierkegaard, will prove important. These two 
readings, which also resemble the deconstructive distinction between saying and wanting to say, 
could be described as addressing first Climacus and second Kierkegaard. 
In terms of exposition, Climacus’ argument runs like this: According to Climacus, the 
elevation of the historical to an essential, as opposed to accidental, element of eternal salvation is 
what most marks Christianity as different from philosophy. For philosophy, “any point of 
departure in time is eo ipso something accidental, a vanishing point, an occasion” (PF, 11). In 
contradistinction, and as is “well known,”  
Christianity is the only historical phenomenon that despite the historical—indeed, 
precisely by means of the historical—has wanted to be the single individual’s point of 
departure for his eternal consciousness, has wanted to interest him otherwise than merely 
historically, has wanted to base his happiness on his relation to something historical . . . 
no philosophy has ever had this idea (PF, 109). 
The majority of the rest of Fragments goes on to discuss and embrace this paradoxical nature of 
Christianity. In brief, the explicit philosophical argument—which, again, is not the only 
argument—goes like this: That an eternal decision is based on a temporal moment is absurd. It is 
absurd because historical knowledge can only ever be an approximate knowledge, and so only 
ever a knowledge subject to interminable revision. An eternal decision, by nature of its eternity, 
must not deal with calculations, approximations, and revisions. As revision is a change, and as 
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time is marked by change, and as eternity is timeless, so an eternal decision cannot, strictly 
speaking, have anything to do with an historical event that can only ever be known in 
approximation. 
Climacus’ renders the absurd in general, and this paradoxical relationship between the 
eternal and the temporal in particular, constitutive of faith. Only an absurdity can truly be held in 
faith. Historical knowledge, for instance, could not be held as an object of faith. The distinction 
here is between, on the one hand, faith as an existential, subjective, and passionate 
commitment—and to just what this is a commitment will become clear shortly—and, on the 
other hand, a tentative or provisional acceptance of objective knowledge as the result of 
calculations and approximations.  
This rejection of historical and calculable knowledge does not mean that faith should turn 
to its opposite, to allegedly eternal truth. For Climacus, where historical knowledge appears as 
somehow below faith, eternal knowledge appears as somehow higher than or above faith. This 
argument against eternal knowledge is made through a proxy argument with the Socratic theory 
of recollection, which is formulated as a response to the problem of acquiring knowledge in time. 
Climacus states the problem like this: 
A person cannot possibly seek what he knows, and, just as impossibly, he cannot seek 
what he does not know, for what he knows he cannot seek, since he knows it, and what 
he does not know he cannot seek, because, after all, he does not even know what he is 
supposed to seek (PF, 9). 
What is Socrates’ solution to this problem? “Socrates thinks through the difficulty by means that 
all learning and seeking are but recollecting” (PF, 9). That is, the Socratic theory of learning 
posits that all knowledge somehow pre-exists within each person, and merely needs to be 
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recalled or recollected in order to be “learned.” Socratic pedagogy, then, becomes a strategy for 
bringing the learner to a place of recollection. In Fragments, Climacus critiques this theory on 
two fronts.  
First, Christian salvation, which elevates an historical moment to the status of an essential 
occasion for salvation (and this notion of an “essential occasion” is precisely the absurd that 
philosophy cannot accept), is a repudiation of the Socratic theory of recollection’s implicit 
pedagogy: For Socrates, the teacher is a self-erasing mediator between the learner and that which 
the learner has forgotten that he or she already knows. For Christianity, on the other hand, the 
teacher is not self-erasing, but is the object of knowledge. The Christian teacher is not the 
Socratic ironist, but is Christ, the eternal God become person in time. Christ does not remind the 
learner of what he or she already always knows, but presents the disciple with the absurd offer of 
eternal salvation in time. That this offer is an offer of the teacher’s self, and so that the teacher 
becomes not the tool of learning but the object of it, is incompatible with, and an offense to, the 
Socratic theory.  
Second, Climacus argues that this reliance on the eternal nature of knowledge precludes 
the possibility of faith. In the Socratic view, the recollection of knowledge is held as sufficient 
means for the appropriation of knowledge. The Socratic problem is phrased in terms of 
overcoming a logical paradox. Such a phrasing, for Climacus, elides the more fundamental and 
actual problem: the problem of knowledge is not how it is logically possible, but how it is 
actually appropriated as true. By positing the eternal nature of truth, the Socratic method 
precludes this possibility of appropriation: as always and everywhere true, knowledge would 
exist objectively without regard for the subject. Insofar as it is purely objective, such a 
knowledge would resemble more the approximations of historical calculation than it would the 
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passionate commitments of faith. In both cases, the subject is held to have an exterior and 
accidental relationship to knowledge. The subject approaches knowledge as a spectator, either of 
the objective calculations and approximations of history or of the eternal necessities of ideal 
truths. In both cases, the subject’s decision is irrelevant. In both cases, faith is impossible. 
This line of critique, which is a theological critique of both scientific positivism and 
philosophic idealism, is continued in CUP, especially in the first section of the book’s second 
part, titled “Something About Lessing.” It is in engaging with Lessing’s “ugly broad ditch” 
between “contingent historical truths” and the “eternal truths of reason” that Climacus formulates 
his much discussed notion of the leap of faith.170 This leaping Kierkegaard is the Kierkegaard 
who valorizes decision as constitutive of subjectivity, truth, and faith. It is the Kierkegaard who 
critiques history and Platonic metaphysics as indecisive. It is the ostensibly radical 
fundamentalist Kierkegaard of Fear and Trembling.171 And it is the Kierkegaard of Carl Schmitt, 
																																																						
170 It is worth noting that neither Kierkegaard nor any of the pseudonyms ever use a Danish phrase that could 
credibly be translated as “leap of faith.” The invention of the phrase invents an ambiguity in the use of “of,” 
suggesting that faith provides or has ownership over the leap—this is purely accidental, because the English phrase 
is a “translation” of a Danish phrase that never was. That a translation can invent that which it is translating in the 
very process of translation is one example of the logic of the fetish construct to be critiqued shortly. It is also worth 
noting that this notion is really, from the beginning, two: the leap discussed by Climacus is the leap necessary in 
order to “leap” over Lessing’s ditch between history and eternity. This leap is considered with the formal and a 
priori problem of philosophically defending faith. The sort of leap discussed by Silentio, on the other hand, makes 
no reference to Lessing, but instead references Abraham. The problematic here is not formal and philosophical but is 
more obviously existential and actual. For a careful and helpful overview of some of these distinctions, often passed 
over in secondary literature (such as by the Marxists named above), see: M. Jamie Ferreira’s “Faith and the 
Kierkegaardian Leap,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Hannay & Marino (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 
171 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Repetition, trans. Hong & Hong (Princeton University Press, 1983). 
The text has become a sort of locus classicus for the topic of Kierkegaard and religion. But this is a relatively new 
development: in his lifetime, Kierkegaard sold only 250 copies of the text. It sold barely more than that in the eight 
decades after his death. Indeed, according to Google Books ngram viewer, the book was rarely cited before the mid-
1930s, and did not grow to its current popularity until the 1940s. Its relative success in the ‘30s is likely due to the 
Jewish-French philosopher Jean Wahl’s Études Kierkegaardiennes, which largely introduced Kierkegaard to 
Europe. This European engagement with Kierkegaard grew in the ‘40s, as the French existentialists, most of all 
Camus and Sartre, developed Wahl’s work. Around the same time in Germany, Kierkegaard received a decidedly 
anti-humanist treatment by Martin Heidegger. Heidegger, however, was less concerned with the drama of Fear and 
Trembling and more concerned with the existential analytics of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety. The text’s 
popularity has also benefited from its relatively early translation into English and publication in the Princeton 
University Press Kierkegaard’s Writings series—Fear and Trembling was the sixth of 27 manuscript volumes, plus 
12 volumes of journals and notebooks, published by Princeton. Regardless of the recency of its popularity, the text 
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who praises this Kierkegaard when he writes of “a Protestant theologian who demonstrated the 
vital intensity possible in theological reflection in the nineteenth century” (PT, 15).172 It is also, 
importantly, the Kierkegaard who leaps out of the world; that is, the Kierkegaard rejected by 
Marxists like Lukács, Adorno, and Novack. 
This is the Kierkegaard who wrote not under his own name, but as Johannes Climacus, in 
the case of Fragments and CUP, and as Johannes de Silentio, in the case of Fear and Trembling. 
A reading of this decision to sign these particular texts under a pseudonym will help us transition 
from a rehearsal of the philosophical argument concerning time and eternity to a reading of the 
role that this particular argument plays within Kierkegaard’s general project. 173 The choice of 
Johannes Climacus is especially relevant here: “Johannes Climacus” is an ironic pseudonym that 
refers to a 6th-century Christian monk who lived twenty years as an ascetic hermit at the foot of 
Mount Sinai. Certainly, the philosophic arguments rehearsed above, the ones given by Climacus, 
are not without merit. Indeed, certain of Climacus’ motifs—the relationship between eternity and 
																																																						
has undoubtedly become canonical, and any engagement with Kierkegaard and religion is expected to address it. I 
will do so, but only minimally. The reasons for this will become clear, but for now they can be summarized like this: 
The pseudonymous nature of the text gives the impression that the arguments expressed are Kierkegaard’s, but they 
are not. As I will show in my reading of CUP, Kierkegaard uses his pseudonyms to ironically perform arguments 
that resist propositional framing in straightforward philosophical treatises. That is, Kierkegaard does not always 
write what he means, and any treatment of Fear and Trembling should account for that. As they often do not, the 
text carries baggage, a thick history of misguided interpretation (some of which I will address)—none of which I 
want to cosign. For more on Kierkegaard’s 1930s reception, particularly among Wahl’s Jewish milieu, see: Melissa 
Fox-Muraton, “Faith in the Mode of Absence: Kierkegaard’s Jewish Readers in 1930s France,” Kierkegaard Studies 
Yearbook 2016, 189-216. 
172 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans.  trans. Schwab.  (University of Chicago Press, 2006). But it is far from 
clear that Schmitt’s endorsement from Kierkegaard, even this caricaturized Kierkegaard, is coherent. On this point, 
see Geoffrey Bennington’s excellent Scatter 1: The Politics of Politics in Foucault, Heidegger, and Derrida, 
especially pages 193-197. Bennington demonstrates that Schmitt’s lack of engagement with the Kierkegaardian 
notion of repetition—which is central to the passage that Schmitt misleadingly paraphrases—complicates the 
relationship between the singular and the universal in a way totally absent in Schmitt’s overtly ontological account.  
173 Because Kierkegaard did sign some texts under his own name throughout his career, because he could always do 
so and had no necessary reason not to do so, the choice to use a pseudonym is always something of a decision in the 
sense I have developed. What is important here is not only the pseudonyms’ philosophical description of decision, 
but also how Kierkegaard himself makes actual decisions: that is, an existentialist reading of decision should be 
attentive to the ways in which the philosophical understanding of decision as a category informs—or doesn’t 
inform—actual decisions made. 
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the temporal, the necessity of decision—recur throughout Kierkegaard’s corpus, both his “first 
authorship” of the pseudonyms and his “second authorship,” which consists of works typically 
signed in his own name. But a too myopic view of these arguments decontextualized from their 
function within Kierkegaard’s larger project might well lead, and have indeed led, to the fascistic 
Kierkegaard in whom Schmitt imagines he finds an ally. 
Given Climacus’ reliance on the category of the leap, it is perhaps important to note that 
Climacus the monk’s only surviving text, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, describes a program by 
which one can raise one’s soul to God through a series of increasingly stringent ascetic rituals.174 
Needless to say, to climb a ladder is not to leap. Further, Kierkegaard writes under the name of a 
monk but has this “monk” write that “the monastic movement itself was an enormous 
abstraction, monastic life a continued abstraction” (CUP, 401). But to concretely live life, to not 
abstract from life, Kierkegaard tells us in this very same text, “is the task” of the Christian (CUP, 
164). I suggest that these cracks in the text ought to be read as moments of what Derrida calls 
auto-deconstruction: moments in text where what one says somehow runs away from what one 
wants to say. Here, Climacus wants to present some philosophical arguments concerning the 
relationship between time and eternity. Yet, what Kierkegaard actually writes reveals that what 
Climacus wants to say is not the whole story: these little slips and cracks that emerge in the text 
call into question “Climacus’” control over his apparently very controlled arguments. The text, 
operating as “merely a kind of lunacy” (CUP, 17), undoes itself, loses control of its play. Toward 
the end of CUP, Kierkegaard has Climacus write about using the intellective powers of 
understanding “in order then to lose the last foothold of immanence, and to exist, situated at the 
edge of existence, by virtue of the absurd” (CUP, 569). Such an existentialist radicalization or 
																																																						
174 John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, trans. Russell (Paulist Press, 1982). 
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hyper-rationalization of reason is precisely what Kierkegaard, via Climacus, is up to in the above 
arguments: Kierkegaard uses Climacus’ use of reason to argue against reason; Kierkegaard uses 
Climacus’ use of philosophy to argue against itself. Climacus is reasonable through and through, 
but, precisely by maintaining such reasonableness, never quite reaches these absurd edges of 
existence, which are revealed and gestured toward in this very failure. 
Climacus’ thought is internally coherent, but he makes little effort to apply this thought to 
actuality. This distinction between thought and actuality is Kierkegaard’s most important 
contribution to an emancipatory political theology. It is difficult to connect the formal and 
philosophical arguments of Climacus with the political critiques signed elsewhere in 
Kierkegaard’s own name. Yet, this is precisely what Kierkegaard’s use of the name of Johannes 
Climacus suggests would happen: these are the arguments of a hermit, of one who has abstracted 
from life. In this view, the apparent discrepancy, or at least lack of an intrinsic relation, between 
Climacus’ philosophical arguments and Kierkegaard’s political arguments would be precisely 
Kierkegaard’s point: the logic of philosophy does not identify with the actuality of existence.  
The critique does receive a few moments of explicit formulation in CUP. Typically these 
elaborations rely on a distinction between reality (Realitet) and actuality (Virkelighed).175 The 
distinction is operative in the following passage, which is one of the most clear in all of 
Kierkegaard’s corpus on the difference between reality and actuality: 
Greek philosophy assumed as a matter of course that thinking has reality. In reflecting 
upon it, one must come to the same result, but why is thought reality confused with 
																																																						
175 For more on this distinction, see: Gabriel Ferreira da Silva, “Kierkegaard on the Relations between Being and 
Thought,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2015, 3-20. da Silva ends her article with this tantalizing suggestion: “If 
theoretical access to Virkelighed as such is forbidden, it follows necessarily that the domain in which one can deal 
with it must be something else” (19). The second section of this chapter argues that this “something else” is found in 
a materialist political theology. 
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actuality? Thought reality is possibility, and thinking needs only to reject any further 
questioning about whether it is actual (CUP, 328). 
The argument here seems to be that thinking produces a real content that is entirely detached 
from actual existence—the “abstractions” of philosophical thought are real insofar as they are 
really thought, and perhaps they are even real insofar as they cohere to universal laws and 
necessities, as with mathematical thought, but they are not actual in the sense of finding concrete 
articulation in existence. Put another way, thinking is always ideal and universal: it can only use 
received and communicable general concepts. Existence, though, contains something irreducibly 
particular and incommunicable. This incommunicability of subjective experience is what later 
analytic philosophers of mind will call qualia, and it is also what contemporary 
phenomenologists and post-phenomenological continental philosophers might refer to as simply 
the “secret.” In each instance—Greek philosophy, analytic philosophy, continental philosophy—
the same basic tenet holds, and this whether any particular philosopher or religious believer 
wishes it to be the case or not: “the particular cannot be thought, but only the universal” (CUP, 
326). 
Because it does not account for existence, which cannot be thought as such, the identity 
of thinking and being is only ever an invention or product of thought, not a feature of existence; 
hence the sentence that names this section: “The identity of thinking and being is won in pure 
thinking” (CUP, 335). That is, the identity of thinking and being is a philosopheme. Kierkegaard 
frames the argument like this: 
The philosophical thesis of the identity of thinking and being is just the opposite of what 
it seems to be; it expresses that thinking has completely abandoned existence, that it has 
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emigrated and found a sixth continent where it is absolutely sufficient unto itself in the 
absolute identity of thinking and being (CUP, 328). 
The proposition of the identity of thinking and being seems to imply a sort of equality between 
thinking and being. Thinking and being, identical, would be both isomorphous to and equal with 
one another. There appears to be no privileged place within this identity. Such an understanding 
of equality, we should note, is the very understanding employed by Schmitt, wherein difference 
is disruptive, chaotic, troublesome. In this logic—which, Kierkegaard is saying, is the 
philosophical logic—equality is only possible amongst isomorphic equals. Yet, as my previous 
engagement with Schmitt demonstrated, such claims to equality and identity should be treated 
with suspicion. A binary relation given as equal often elides a more fundamental privileging of 
one term over the other. In the case of Schmitt, “friendship,” understood as identity and 
sameness, was found to control and dominate the binary of friend and enemy. Here, Kierkegaard 
argues, the term “thinking” is actually dominating the allegedly equal partnership of thinking and 
being: the relationship is thought, it is not being. Or, in a shorter hand, the relationship is thought 
and it is not: “This pure relation between thinking and being, this pure identity, indeed this 
tautology . . . does not mean that the thinking person is, but basically only that he is a thinker” 
(CUP, 123). 
The recognition that the identity of thinking and being is a philosopheme—a 
“philosophical thesis”—allows Kierkegaard to reintroduce into the identity, in order to 
destabilize it, his existential category of actuality. A rethinking of thinking along the lines that 
this category suggests will demonstrate the ways in which the Kierkegaardian critique of the 
identity of thinking and being is important for his understanding of decision in general and 
religious decision in particular: the privileging of actuality (Virkelighed) over reality (Realitet) 
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informs the way in which Kierkegaard thinks—actually thinks—of religious belief, which will 
prove inseparable from religious praxis. Before tracing this line of argument, though, I think it is 
important to once again address the Marxist charge that Kierkegaard ignores worldly struggle in 
favor of an idealist escapism. More provocatively, I want to suggest that Kierkegaard, even when 
he operates in an apparently deconstructive and highly theoretical register, as he does here by 
demonstrating the philosophical control of difference within the philosophical thesis of the 
identity of thinking and being, is fundamentally a dialectical-materialist thinker. Consider the 
following passage, which is somewhat awkwardly placed in the middle of a lengthy and rather 
byzantine discussion of the paradoxical nature of Christian truth: 
Suppose the speculative thinker is the restless resident who, although it is obvious he is a 
renter, yet in view of the abstract truth that, eternally and divinely perceived, all property 
is in common, wants to be the owner, so that there is nothing to do except to send for a 
police officer, who would presumably say, just as the subpoena servers say to Gert 
Westphaler: We are sorry to have come on this errand (CUP, 214). 
Gert Westphaler is the title character of Norwegian playwright Ludvig Holberg’s 1722 five-act 
play, “Gert Westphaler, or, the Loquacious Barber.” The reference to this play is important for 
several reasons. The first concerns its plot: In the play, Gert Westphaler, the loquacious barber, is 
seen losing customers because of his insatiable appetite for conversation. Westphaler talks until 
his customers leave—and even this does not stop him. That is, Kierkegaard refers to a play about 
a worker who loses money because of a penchant for talking. Svend Kragh-Jacobsen, in this 
introduction to Holberg’s collected plays, notes that this is a motif of Holberg’s:  
The play (“Gert Westphaker, ir, the Loquacious Barber”) is a comedy of character, 
closely related to the first, and one of the most famous, of Holberg’s comedies of 
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character, “Den politiske Kandestøber” (“The Political Tinker).The talkative Master Gert 
is a spiritual cousin of the politically eloquent Master Hermann; both are workers, and—
when they do not abandon their trades in order to talk—good workers, but they are both 
possessed by fixed ideas. In the barber comedy there is a suggestion that Master Gert was 
a politician, but Holberg has stressed his loquacity and reserved the satire of the ignorant 
but conceited amateur politicians for the play about the tinker (7).176 
Holberg’s plays are about workers and politicians who fail to improve material conditions 
because they talk too much, because they are “possessed by fixed ideas.” And so the reference to 
Gert Westphaler helps us understand the first part of the above passage from Kierkegaard: 
Westphaler, like any speculative thinker, is under the impression that he does not have to pay 
rent because he ais aware of the eternal truth that private property is a lie. Of course, Kierkegaard 
is saying, such knowledge of eternal truth has little to do with police action. In actuality, owners 
own and renters rent, and this despite whatever eternal philosophy has to say. Ideal truth claims 
do not affect material emancipation. 
According to Kragh-Jacobsen, “Gert Westphaler” was originally performed in five acts. 
However, the loquacious barber proved too loquacious not only for his clients, but also for the 
actual audience of the play: fed up with Westphaler’s chattiness, audiences frequently left the 
theatre before the show’s conclusion. And so Holberg, apparently interested in the plight of the 
working class, sees his political performance undermined in the very same way that he describes: 
Westphaler talks too much and loses clients; Holberg, via Westphaler, talks too much and loses 
audience. Is Kierkegaard, who is also “talking” quite a bit through a loquacious author in 
Johannes Climacus, using this reference as a means of critiquing the project of enacting political 
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change through interminable philosophical meditations—even true, undeniably true, 
meditations? It seems to me that Kierkegaard’s acknowledgement that the text is “merely a kind 
of lunacy” suggests so. The philosophical critique of idealism always points to its own limit: rent 
is a lie, but the police, who have internalized this lie, are actual. More generally, this recognition 
of loquacious philosophy’s political limits marks a nascent existential critique of ideology: The 
actual functioning of ideology does not depend upon logical or philosophical coherence, because 
actuality does not depend upon thinking. If existentialism is to overcome the limits of idealism, it 
cannot rely on only deconstructively pointing out the tensions and philosophical contradictions 
of idealist claims. The struggle for emancipation needs to occur not in the ideal realm of thought, 
which is where the elites would prefer it to happen, but in actuality. 
Of course, Gert Westphaler was actually loquacious—this was precisely his problem—
and so this privileging of “actuality” should be further specified. If thinking is real but not actual, 
and if existence is actual, then existence must have some content that is independent of thinking. 
Existence, then, not only resists conceptualization but also places a sort of outer limit on it: 
because of their radical incompatibility, thinking can never appropriate the actuality of existence.  
That thinking and existence stand in this asymmetrical nonrelation—that actuality is not 
identical to thinking; that the reality of thought is different from the actuality of existence—is 
crucial for a project of a materialist political theology: If existence and actuality are basically 
unattainable in thought, then the measures by which existence and actuality are judged cannot be 
found in the categories of thought. This incompatibility between the actualities of political 
existence and the calculations of reason and thinking suggests that a political theology 
responsive to Kierkegaardian existentialism cannot ground itself in the sort of statistical 
programs—Caputo’s tax code readjustments, for example—that have become standard operating 
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procedure in neoliberal regimes: a political program that is oriented by statistical or even logical 
arguments will always risk deep disappointment when applied to actuality. This inability to 
govern actuality by thought, and this inability to measure the truth of an actual program 
according to the measures of thought, implies a strong materialism not only in Kierkegaard’s 
program, but indeed in any program—such as Derrida’s—that rejects the (actual) identity of 
thinking and being.177 
And so from an existentialist critique of the identity of thinking and being, Kierkegaard 
articulates the basic groundwork for any materialist understanding of the relationship between 
ideas—or, as Kierkegaard and Derrida would each sometimes have it, between philosophy as 
such—and material actuality. Once this materialism is established, it becomes easier to reread 
Kierkegaardian arguments as not ideal, as his Marxist critics have it, but more strongly as 
dialectical-material, as his Marxist critics would want it. For example, Kierkegaard writes that 
“the logical system must not be a mystification, a ventriloquism, in which the content of 
existence emerges cunningly and surreptitiously” (CUP, 111). Targeting Hegel’s argument 
concerning the identity of the history of philosophy with the philosophy of history, Kierkegaard 
is here arguing that a philosophical system cannot, in actuality, deduce the events, both mundane 
and world historical, that constitute actual existence. Things do not do what thinking says they 
should do. And so any confluence between historical events and speculative philosophy—and 
again Kierkegaard is thinking of the Hegelian metanarrative of the development of world spirit—
is a sign that the philosopher has smuggled in empirical actuality under the appearance of pure 
rationality. Europe, for example, was not the site of the pinnacle of philosophical achievement 
																																																						
177 That Schmitt tried to construct just such a politics of truth, and that Schmitt was decisively guided by an anti-
Marxist, and so anti-materialist, polemic, only further suggests the materialist interest in rejecting this sort of 
identitarian philosopheme. 
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because the world spirit rose with the sun in the east and hit a high point over Europe in the 
center, which is what Hegel argues. Instead, Europe seemed to be the pinnacle of philosophical 
achievement because of Hegel’s own Eurocentric geographical, political, and historical location. 
And so Hegel’s particular existence becomes the impetus for a philosophical rationalization of its 
own supremacy. Which is to say, Hegel, according to Kierkegaard, has reverted to a pre-Lessing 
and pre-critical understanding of the relationship between the accidental truths of history and the 
eternal truths of reason: where Lessing saw a ditch, Hegel saw perfect identity. 
This line of critique is materialist in that it rejects the reduction of actuality to ideal 
categories. The critique applies to both those idealist tendencies that think of ideas as productive 
of or identical to reality (Hegel) and those idealist tendencies that substitute actual action with 
intellectual activity (Gert Westphaler, liberals). In much the same way that knowing the truth of 
(the lie of) private property does not lead to an emancipation from private property, neither does 
knowing a philosophical program lead to “knowing” actual existence. The argument is most 
compelling when applied to those who think of ethics in terms of cognition and not action: “Am 
I the good because I think it or am I good because I think the good? Not at all” (CUP, 330). And 
again: “To have thought something good that one wants to do, is that to have done it? Not at all” 
(CUP, 339). These passages show the incoherence of an ethics that privileges knowing and 
thinking over actuality: the very question “Am I the good?” reveals the absurdity of identifying 
as an individual with an abstract category of thought. The question confuses genera, and the 
thinker begins to abstract from his or herself in the very moment—an interrogation of what is 
good—that most requires concreteness, particularity, and actual action.178 
																																																						
178  Kierkegaard extends the critique to the entire relationship, or nonrelationship, of philosophy and existence: 
“Even if a man his whole life through occupies himself exclusively with logic, he still does not become logic” 
(CUP, 93).  
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And so thinking cannot substitute for actual action because thinking and actuality do not relate. 
The argument is similar to Marx’s critique of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the 19th century French 
anarchist theorist. In a letter dated December 28, 1846, Marx writes the following about 
Proudhon: 
He (Proudhon) fails to see that economic categories are but abstractions of those real 
relations, that they are truths only in so far as those relations continue to exist. Thus he 
falls into the error of bourgeois economists who regard those economic categories as 
eternal laws and not as historical laws which are laws only for a given historical 
development, a specific development of the productive forces. Thus, instead of regarding 
politico-economic categories as abstractions of actual social relations that are transitory 
and historical, Mr. Proudhon, by a mystical inversion, sees in the real relations only the 
embodiment of those abstractions. Those abstractions are themselves formulas which 
have been slumbering in the bosom of God the Father since the beginning of the world.179 
Marx’s critique of Proudhon is structurally analogous to Kierkegaard’s (and Marx’s) critique of 
Hegel. Proudhon, according to Marx, has devised a link between allegedly eternal economic laws 
and particular historical circumstances. Likewise, Hegel, according to Kierkegaard, has devised a 
link between eternal philosophical truths and his own particular circumstances. In each case, the 
critique is more subtle than might first appear. On one level, Hegel and Proudhon are each 
critiqued for inverting the relationship between the historical and the eternal: They write as if 
historical events and circumstances were manifestations of eternal, God-given truths. As I argued 
																																																						
179  Karl Marx, Letter to Pavel Annenkox, December 28, 1846. Retrieved: 
http://hiaw.org/defcon6/works/1846/letters/46_12_28.html. The content of this letter was later incorporated in 
Marx’s 1847 text, originally written in French, Misère de la philosophie.  
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in the first chapter, and as is becoming more clear here, any attempt to legitimate historical 
circumstances through an appeal to divine truth can only reify an ideological conception of God 
as divine law giver. I take both Kierkegaard and Marx to subscribe to such a critique of the 
ideological use of God. But their critiques are operating on another level, too. Here, the concern 
is not that of an ideological inversion of the particular and the universal, but of the construction 
of the universal as such. For Marx, economic “laws” are better thought of as descriptions of 
contingent historical truths. Indeed, the very notion of universal law implies an entire essentialist 
ontology to which neither Marx nor Kierkegaard subscribe. And so, from this perspective, the act 
of “inverting” the relationship between the particular and the universal is better understood as the 
process by which the universal is created as such. The myth of an eternal law is created in the act 
of abstracting from the particular. An ideal authority is invented for the sake of securing the 
intelligibility and credibility of the material order. This, in brief, is the materialist critique of 
ideology as deployed by both Marx and Kierkegaard. 
According to Marx, Proudhon, by inventing an eternal law, displaces the site of actual 
political struggle. In the idealist view, social and political change occurs by way of changing our 
relation to the eternal. This is the inverse of Marx’s materialist conception of political struggle, 
according to which our relation to the eternal—which is only ever an invention of thought—is 
changed by changing material conditions. Simplified, for Proudhon, according to Marx, one must 
change ideas in order to change actual material relations; whereas for Marx, one must change 
actual material relations in order to change ideas. Marx continues: 
Still less does Mr. Proudhon understand that those who produce social relations in 
conformity with their material productivity also produce the ideas, categories, i.e. the 
ideal abstract expressions of those same social relations. Indeed, the categories are no 
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more eternal than the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. 
To Mr. Proudhon, on the contrary, the prime cause consists in abstractions and 
categories. According to him it is these and not men which make history (ibid). 
And so the ideological creation of eternal laws and the concomitant inversion of the concrete 
with the general denies the agentic power of human activity in political emancipation. Concepts 
and ideal categories, not people, become political actors. For Marx, every ideological distortion 
adheres to this general structure: whereas people create ideas, ideology says that ideas create 
people. This ideological apparatus suggests that any successful act of liberation would have to 
take place on the level of ideas—liberation would become a matter of talking, and Gert 
Westphaler would be a revolutionary. But this notion of a loquacious revolutionary is precisely 
the ideological distortion imposed on the oppressed by the oppressors for the sake of 
undermining the possibility of actual revolution: the ideological understanding of oppression is 
that the oppressors are suffering an intellectual flaw, that they have misunderstood the truth, that 
they need some epistemological clarification on the truth content of eternity. In reality, say Marx 
and Kierkegaard, the oppressors are acting out of self-interest and power, and the correction of 
injustice must be fought on this level of actuality, not ideality: 
It is only possible to achieve real liberation in the real world and by employing real 
means . . . people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, 
housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. Liberation is a historical and not a 
mental act.180 
That liberation is a historical—that is, actual, existing—and not a mental act is the materialist 
presupposition of Marx’s critique of political economy and the materialist conclusion of 
																																																						
180 Karl Marx, The German Ideology Part 1: Feuerbach, Opposition of the Materialist and the Idealist Outlook. 
Retrieved: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm 
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Kierkegaard’s critique of the identity of thinking and actuality.181 Life, and so emancipation, is 
lived actually, not ideally. 
So far, I have suggested that Kierkegaard’s materialism is implied by his existentialism: 
because existence separates thinking from actuality, any attempted liberation or emancipation of 
existing individuals must take place not ideally in thought but materially in actuality. Yet, to 
speak of Kierkegaard as belonging to the same tradition as avowed atheists Jean-Paul Sartre (for 
whom atheism is a precondition for existentialism, because it is the lack of God that assures that 
human existence precedes essence)182 and Albert Camus (who explicitly critiques Kierkegaard 
throughout The Myth of Sisyphus),183 not to mention Marx, seems to miss something central to 
Kierkegaard’s project, or at least something central to Kierkegaard’s own self-understanding: 
Christianity. 
What is the relationship between Kierkegaard’s Christianity and his existentialism? 
Importantly for this project—which is interested in defending the convergence of religious and 
																																																						
181 The relationship between Kierkegaard and Marx receives a treatment that is more subtle than those cited above in 
Sylviane Agacinski’s Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kierkegaard, trans. Newmark (University of Florida 
Press, 1988), especially pages 207-215. However, Agacinski’s reading does cosign the prevailing view that, on the 
one hand, Kierkegaard and Marx are in agreement in that there is an “adversarial relation” between “the religious 
and the political orders,” but that, on the other, the difference between Marx and Kierkegaard is that Marx identifies 
with and privileges the political, and Kierkegaard the religious. However, Agacinski does complicate this 
association of Kierkegaard with religion over against politics. She does this by recognizing that both Marx and 
Kierkegaard can be in agreed critique of bourgeois Christianity: “The destruction of Christianity by a politicized 
Church or by a so-called religious State is therefore just as easily denounced from Kierkegaard’s point of view as 
from Marx’s” (212). But even here, two things should be noted: First, as will become clear in the chapter’s next 
section, Kierkegaard does not reject a politicized church. Indeed, he wants one. What he rejects is a reactionary and 
capitalist church. Second, and related, such a framing of Marx as resistant to a “religious state” too quickly accepts a 
modern, metaphysical, and orthodoxical understanding of “religion.” It is that modern religion, and not the religion 
of Thomas Müntzer, for example, whom Marx admiringly cites in On the Jewish Question, that is opposed to a left 
political project.  
182 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Macomber (Yale University Press, 2007): “Man first 
exists: he materializes in the world, encounters himself, and only afterward defines himself. If man as existentialists 
conceive of him cannot be defined, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and 
then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature since there is no God to conceive it” (22, 
emphasis mine). 
183 For Camus, Kierkegaard is ultimately unable to live with absurdity; he “wants to be cured.” The turn to religion is 
this attempt at a cure. See: Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. O’Brien (Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), especially 
page 13. 
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secular political projects—does Kierkegaard’s Christianity mark a substantial enough difference 
as to render his project fundamentally different or even opposed to those thinkers named above? 
How can Kierkegaard, who claims to first and always seek the kingdom of God, be squared so 
neatly with Marx, for whom the emancipation of the proletariat requires the abolition of religion?  
Any squaring between the two—and any convergence between secular and religious 
political projects—cannot be defended on grounds of orthodoxy, at least if orthodoxy is 
understood as an intellectual commitment to propositional truth claims. That is, and again 
echoing Derrida’s critique of theology, if theology means metaphysical speculation and the 
affirmation of propositional truth claims, then theology can never have anything to do with the 
atheist or secular left. In such a case, theology would make an enemy of this left because of its 
own prior metaphysical positions. And if a left political project strives above all for the 
emancipation of the oppressed—and this is how I understand it—then such a theology would 
have to be rejected as not only reactionary, but also as unloving, that is, as an anti-Christ. 
But as Kierkegaard’s emphasis on actuality demonstrates, there is another way of 
understanding both religion and theology. In this view, orthodoxy loses its privileged position 
over orthopraxis. Which is not to say that a loss for orthodoxy implies a symmetrical gain for 
orthopraxy: Kierkegaard does not reverse a hierarchy, but instead displaces the hierarchical 
relationship altogether. Echoing Marx’s critique of Proudhon, the content of proper praxis would 
no longer be considered deducible from the eternal truths of orthodoxy, because orthodoxy 
would no longer be described as a set of eternal truths. Instead, and more radically, orthodoxy 
would be resignified as a type of actually existing political-theological project: to be a Christian 
and to believe the truths of Christianity would require the decision to act as a Christian.  
	 204	
In other words, if theology is not to be antithetical to emancipation, then truth cannot be 
thought metaphysically. This non-metaphysical truth is articulated in Kierkegaard’s oft-quoted 
claim, which risks becoming a slogan, that “subjectivity is truth.” At first blush, the claim might 
be read as a reduction of truth to inwardness, as if the rejection of objective criteria meant the 
valorization of an internal state or condition. In such a view, what would determine veracity or 
falsity would not be the measure of some objective content, but instead the mode by which a 
person relates to objectivity. Truth would be dispositional, a psychological effect or mood. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard sometimes comes close to saying just this: 
Objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said 
. . . At its maximum, this ‘how’ is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of the 
infinite is the very truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus 
subjectivity is truth . . . The passion of the infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor, 
for its content is precisely itself. In this way the subjective how and subjectivity are the 
truth (CUP, 202/203). 
Here, Kierkegaard seems to be—and is—distinguishing between an objective what and a 
subjective how, and is using this distinction to help articulate his theory of truth. Similar 
passages are found in Fear and Trembling, in which Kierkegaard, via his pseudonym Johannes 
de Silentio, spends comparatively more ink applauding Abraham’s dispositional, passionate faith 
than he does explicitly critiquing the content of this faith—filicide. Such an emphasis on 
disposition at the expense of content leads Caputo, a professed Kierkegaard sympathizer, to 
argue that “in Fear and Trembling we see the first signs of a distorted conception of religion that 
emerges in the last years of his life, where the demands of God above are so overwhelming that 
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they can completely annul the significance of life on earth” (HK, 52).184 This conception of 
religion is “distorted,” according to Caputo, because,  
It is one thing if the absurd simply means a marvel that exceeds human reason, something 
of which an omnipotent God is capable but which is beyond our understanding, like 
making Sarah pregnant again at an advanced age. But it is quite another thing (and this is 
the problem with Fear and Trembling) to approve of a divine command to kill an 
innocent child, which seems to be absurd in a stronger sense, not simply exceeding 
reason but flatly contradicting all reason (HK, 53). 
That is, according to Caputo, Kierkegaard has improperly transposed the transcendent category 
of the absurd into an immanent ethics: Kierkegaard is on solid ground when he speaks of the 
absurd as synonymous with the unknowability of God, but goes too far when he suggests that the 
absurd is precisely to know something about God—here, for example, to know that God has 
demanded filicide. In other words, Caputo criticizes Kierkegaard for not being ideal enough—for 
letting religion say too much about worldly affairs.  
Hågglund similarly critiques Kierkegaard for giving too much credence to the “demands 
of God” in especially Fear and Trembling. According to Hågglund, Kierkegaard argues that, 
To prove your religious commitment, you must be able to renounce your secular devotion 
to any form of living on—including the living on of your most beloved child—by virtue 
of your complete faith in the eternal (TL, 128).185 
While Caputo sees Abraham’s planned filicide, and Kierkegaard’s seeming endorsement of it, as 
a distortion of religion, and while Hågglund sees it as the logical and terrible fulfillment of 
religion, both Caputo and Hågglund are in agreement that Kierkegaard has gone too far, that his 
																																																						
184 John Caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard (WW Norton & Company, 2008). 
185 Martin Hågglund, This Life: Secular Life and Spiritual Freedom (Random House, 2019). 
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emphasis on passion and inwardness has dangerously removed consideration of the wellbeing of 
others from political decision making. This is a sort of crusader Kierkegaard willing to do 
anything to anyone for the sake of pleasing his God. 
Certainly, Caputo’s and Hågglund’s concerns are justifiable: Nobody can credibly argue 
that an emancipatory political theology should endorse filicide. At the least, such a program 
would not be particularly emancipatory for the child. In the next section, I will more closely 
demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s political theology is guided by fairly straightforward and clear 
norms: none of which could possibly be construed to endorse filicide. For now, two responses 
can briefly be offered. 
First, the most honest response should be to accept these obvious and justifiable concerns 
with Kierkegaard’s apparently terrorist and homicidal inclinations, but to note that they are not, 
in the most literal analysis, Kierkegaard’s at all: Fear and Trembling was written by Johannes de 
Silentio, and, as my treatment of Johannes Climacus argued, one cannot quickly identify 
pseudonymous words with what Kierkegaard wants to say. In this reading, one should accept that 
Johannes de Silentio has described an absolutely terrifying and irresponsible type of religion. For 
what purpose would Kierkegaard have de Silentio do this? Perhaps, as George Pattison has 
suggested, to demonstrate that the decision for religion is not easy, not even sane.186 Here, rather 
than read Kierkegaard’s famous “three stages of existence” as a progression from the aesthetic, 
through the ethical, and to the religious, we would read all three spheres as ultimately 
indefensible. This would be Kierkegaard as deconstructive to the endt: the religious sphere is not 
																																																						
186 In his The Philosophy of Kierkegaard: “we will be chary of simply identifying Johannes de Silentio’s praise of 
Abraham with kierkegaard’s having taught that Abraham was right to do what he did. Rather, Kierkegaard might be 
read as asking us simply to consider how, if we once concede that situations analogous to this do arise in the lives of 
individuals seeking to live the moral life, we ourselves might act in such a pass” (132). 
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the telos of human living, but is another internally contradictory and ultimately indefensible way 
of life. 
The second response is to also accept that nobody should endorse filicide, but to more 
clearly situate de Silentio against other of Kierkegaard’s works. For example, is this terrifying 
Kierkegaard the same Kierkegaard who writes, in his own name, that “the beggar is infinitely 
more important than the king, infinitely more important, because the Gospel is preached to the 
poor” (TM, 44)?187 Or is it the Kierkegaard who writes that “faith turns its back on the eternal in 
order to have it at its side this very day” (SW, 156)?188 Putting the various positions in such a 
direct confrontation—they do not cohere—at the least suggests that there is more to the story 
than the simple read whereby Kierkegaard conceives of religion by way of blind willingness to 
kill. 
With Caputo’s and Hågglund’s concerns, we have the opposite problem of relation as that 
between Marx and Kierkegaard. With Marx, the question was how to square Kierkegaard’s 
Christian commitments with an apparently secular political program. Now, the problem raised by 
Caputo’s and Hågglund’s readings is how to situate the emancipatory potential of Kierkegaard’s 
political program with his apparent religious fundamentalism and its apparently murderous 
sympathies. Although approached from differing and antagonistic angles—Kierkegaard is here 
too religious, there too worldly—the basic problem is the same: How to relate Kierkegaard’s 
politics with his theology?  
This question of the relationship of politics and theology, the question of political 
theology, seems to be the crux of the issue: for Marxists and Kierkegaardians, and for 
																																																						
187 Søren Kierkegaard, The Moment and Late Writings, ed.Hong & Hong, trans. Hong & Hong (Princeton University 
Press, 1998). 
188 Søren Kierkegaard, Spiritual Writings, ed. Pattison (Harper Collins, 2010). 
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deconstructive Kierkegaardians like Caputo as well as for deconstructive anti-Kierkegaardians 
like Hågglund, Kierkegaard’s religious commitments seem antithetical to or at least in tension 
with a leftist political program. To address this question, we have to return to—or, in 
Kierkegaardian language, repeat—the topic with which this chapter opened: the Christian 
paradoxical relation of the eternal and the temporal. There, it was seen that the Christian 
conception of truth is paradoxical because it holds that neither eternal truths nor historical 
approximations are grounds for faith commitments, yet precisely the combination of the two—
that the eternal is given in, as, and through time—is both the content of truth and the absurd 
ground of faith. Neither the one nor the other on their own are the content of faith, yet the two 
together become precisely that. Such was the argument of Philosophical Fragments, and it 
seemed to demonstrate that Christianity is a theological response to the limits of philosophical—
specifically Socratic and Lessingian—thinking. Now, though, after this analysis of the 
divergence between thinking and actuality, we are able to repeat this account of Christian truth in 
a way that is more explicitly political.  
Kierkegaard himself, via Climacus, gestures toward this political repetition. The account 
is given in Philosophical Fragments and happens quickly over the course of a couple of 
important and dense pages. In these pages, we see Kierkegaard at the height of his speculative 
and theoretic powers. That he uses reaching these heights as an occasion for arguing the privilege 
of existence and actuality over speculation is, for Kierkegaard, what makes his thought Christian: 
at the highest high there is ultimately found “the poor and despised” (JP3 pg 232; entry 2793).189 
Here is the important passage wherein Kierkegaard begins to articulate this theological epistemic 
privilege of the poor: 
																																																						
189 Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Volume 3, ed. Hong & Hong; trans. Hong & Hong (Indiana University 
Press, 1999).  
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The paradox came into existence through the relating of the eternal, essential truth to the 
existing person. Let us now go further; let us assume that the eternal, essential truth is 
itself the paradox. How does the paradox emerge? By placing the eternal, essential truth 
together with existing. Consequently, if we place it together in the truth itself, the truth 
becomes a paradox. The eternal truth has come into existence in time. That is the paradox 
(CUP, 209). 
The passage demands some clarification. Kierkegaard begins by repeating his position from 
Philosophical Fragments that “the paradox” is that the eternal can and does relate to the existing, 
and so temporal, person. However, he quickly looks to “go further” by assuming “that the 
eternal, essential truth is itself the paradox.” What does this mean? Kierkegaard here is clarifying 
his position by specifying the content of “the eternal.” It is one thing to say that something called 
the eternal structurally relates to something called the temporal, as if “the eternal” and “the 
temporal” were abstract and contentless philosophemes. But Kierkegaard is not relying on empty 
categories of thought.. This passage begins to fill in some of that missing content by “assuming” 
that the eternal is “itself the paradox.” On the one hand, then, “paradox” in Kierkegaard’s text 
means that the eternal exists in, through, and as the temporal. But this position leaves the 
semantic intention of its terms empty: what do the eternal and the temporal signify? Kierkegaard 
is attempting an answer to those questions by “assuming” that, on the other hand, “the eternal” 
that relates to the temporal in such a way is, precisely, “the paradox.”  
I suggest that this passage demonstrates Kierkegaard struggling to articulate an 
existentialist and materialist notion of truth. What he is not doing—or is no longer doing—is 
thinking of paradox as the extrinsic relation between the eternal and the temporal. Instead, he is 
arguing that the eternal truth itself is precisely this paradoxical involvement with its other. This 
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can be clarified again through analogy with Marx. Above, we saw that Marx critiqued bourgeois 
economics for acting as if material circumstances are particular manifestations of ideal laws. 
According to such a view, the eternal law of exchange exists in God’s mind, and particular 
circumstances come about accidentally and according to these eternal laws. The Marxist critique 
demonstrates that such a program is an ideological obfuscation of the invention of such eternal 
laws: whereas the bourgeois economist wants to give the impression that he or she is appealing 
to eternal truths in order to deduce particular circumstances, Marx argues that such an economist 
is actually producing these laws in the very act of appealing to them. In much the same way, 
Kierkegaard is here providing an ideology critique of the category of eternity as such: it is not as 
if the eternal exists independently and above the temporal, dictating and producing accidental 
manifestations of eternal law along the way. Rather, what is called the eternal has only ever 
existed in, as, and through its manifestation in the temporal. That there appears an other to the 
temporal—and we call this other the eternal—is precisely what the eternal is. That is: “The 
paradox” is not that two distinct realms, the eternal and the temporal, have come into contact. 
Rather, “the paradox” is that the eternal is only insofar as it exists always already in, as, and 
through the temporal. The eternal is the appearance of itself in the temporal. 
Such a complication of the relationship between these three terms—paradox, eternal, 
temporal—is important for Kierkegaard’s project because it affirms the privileged place 
accorded to existence in Kierkegaard’s understanding of truth. In this complication, Kierkegaard 
existentially specifies the philosophical problem of the relation of eternity to time as posed by 
both Socrates and Lessing. The categories of the eternal and the temporal are actual only if they 
exist. “The eternal,” understood as an ideal philosopheme, has reality or thought-content insofar 
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as and whenever it is thought. But such reality is not actual if the eternal does not exist: without 
existence, there is no actuality, only thinking. There is actually nothing outside existence.  
But, according to Kierkegaard, if the truth exists in actuality, and if every single 
individual also only exists in actuality, then each single individual finds him or herself in a 
position of necessary confrontation with the truth. Actual existence becomes the place where 
each person must decide how he or she is to actually relate to the truth. That is, existence 
becomes “the time of decision” (CUP, 212). Here, by framing existence as the time and place of 
deciding how to relate to the truth, which has already been understood as the passionate 
commitment to live according to thought content, Kierkegaard advances his position another 
step: not only would a speculative retreat from existence be a retreat from truth, but such a retreat 
is actually impossible. No single individual has the ability to stave off engagement with 
existence. Idealism is an intellectual effort to sublate the particularities and actualities of 
existence into the allegedly higher ideal realm of pure thought, but such attempts can never 
succeed in removing the thinker from existence:  
The fraud of speculative thought in wanting to recollect itself out of existence has been 
made impossible. This is the only point to be comprehended here . . . The individual can 
thrust all this (the necessity of actually engaging with existence) away and resort to 
speculation, but to accept it (existence) and then want to cancel it through speculation is 
impossible, because it (existence) is specifically designed to prevent speculation (CUP, 
209). 
That is, the speculative thinker, by relying on a coherence of thinking and being that elides 
actuality, removes him or herself from decisively engaging with truth in existence: idealism has 
reality, but not actuality, no decision, and so is basically untrue.  
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So far, these meditations have situated a few important Kierkegaardian concepts in a 
dialectical, as opposed to static, relationship with each other. The temporal, the eternal, passion, 
existence, truth, actuality, paradox, and, now, decision: these concepts cannot be defined without 
reliance on each other. Indeed, in some cases, such as with the Kierkegaardian understanding of 
paradox, the concepts’ relations with each other and even with themselves are the semantic 
definition of the concept. Always privileging actuality, Kierkegaard understands concepts by 
their actual, dynamic relations in existence. Importantly, this lack of structural simplicity—as our 
understanding of paradox changes, for example, so must our understanding of the eternal, which 
in turn affects an understanding of what counts as actual, which is now read back on our 
understanding of paradox, and so on—prevents the transmission of simple propositional truth 
claims: no single proposition can be communicated without a dynamic reference to other 
propositions.  
Kierkegaard is aware of the befuddling effect that such an incommunicability will have, 
and, for this reason, writes that “lunacy and truth are ultimately indistinguishable” (CUP 194). 
Why indistinguishable? Because whether or not these dialectical—and, admittedly, highly 
theoretical—meditations have any actual relationship with actual existence cannot be proven by 
the content of the meditations themselves. Truth cannot be propositionally communicated, but 
only existentially actualized. It will always remain possible that Kierkegaard has only ever 
invented a more subtle idealist system, or even a highly sophisticated ironic literary production. 
Whether CUP is a theoretical treatise that captures something of actuality or is a purely fictional 
novel cannot be decided by the content explicated within CUP’s pages.  
Paradoxically enough, that the decision as to CUP’s plausibility or credibility cannot be 
determined only by referencing the content of the text is exactly what the content of the text 
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argues. As Boris Groys points out, this textual resistance to the easy appropriation of a text’s 
truth is a motif of Kierkegaard’s:  
A philosophical text is first and foremost a thing, an object among many other objects, 
which, by virtue of its objectivity, remains separated from the subjectivity of the reader—
and likewise from the subjectivity of its author—by an unbridgeable gulf. The reader has 
to leap over this gulf in order to identify himself with the text, but no one and nothing can 
force him to make such a leap” (IA, 2).190 
Because truth is no longer thought of as an objective content but as an actual relation the existing 
individual takes towards any objectivity, the reader of CUP can only accept CUP’s truth through 
a leap of appropriation. Indeed, the necessity of a leap is exactly the truth content of the book. 
Once that leap is made, and so once the book’s ideal content is confirmed as true through 
actuality, then the reader engages the text not as a spectator approaching an objective content, 
but as an engaged—“infinitely interested,” is Kierkegaard’s phrase—participant. Deciding to 
participate with any objective content will always involve a high degree of risk: the content 
might be wrong, misleading, dangerous. CUP could always be only lunacy.   
This relationship to the truth differs from the metaphysical religious understanding—
which is Schmitt’s understanding—in that it does not hold truth to be a transcendent mystery 
overpowering our limited epistemic powers. This metaphysical regime of transcendent and 
mysterious truth is “paradoxical” only in the first sense described above—that the eternal as 
transcendent could relate to the temporal as immanent. But such an understanding does not think 
the eternal itself according to this logic of paradox, and so still maintains a representative 
structure of truth as coherence between objectivity (even if transcendent, hyperbolic, saturated, 
																																																						
190 Boris Groys, Introduction to Antiphilosophy (Verso, 2012). 
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or whatever) and subjectivity. Truth is not yet action, and passionate commitment to action is not 
yet possible. That is, faith is not yet possible: 
When the eternal truth relates itself to an existing person, it becomes the paradox. 
Through the objective uncertainty and ignorance, the paradox thrusts away in the 
inwardness of the existing person. But since the paradox is not in itself the paradox, it 
does not thrust away intensely enough, for without risk, no faith; the more risk, the more 
faith; the more objective reliability, the less inwardness; the less objective reliability, the 
deeper is the possible inwardness. When the paradox itself is the paradox, it thrusts away 
by virtue of the absurd, and the corresponding passion of inwardness is faith (CUP, 209). 
“When the paradox itself is the paradox,” that is, when truth is understood as the actualization of 
itself in existence, only then is faith possible. Any structure that makes mystery, transcendence, 
historical approximations, or eternal laws the object of knowledge—any system that posits a 
transcendental term of knowing—cannot offer faith, because any such structure understands truth 
as the (even asymmetrical) coherence of thinking and being and not as the passionate actualizing 
of thinking in existence, in the time of decision. Kierkegaard is not arguing that the objective 
truth is uncertain and interminable, and so can never be known. More radically, Kierkegaard is 
arguing that the objective truth is the absurd, paradoxical truth that objectivity is only ever 
actualized in existence. This actualization is faith: “Instead of the objective uncertainty, there is 
here the certainty that, viewed objectively, it is the absurd, and this absurdity, held fast in the 
passion of inwardness, is faith” (CUP, 210). 
And so faith is, as of this moment in the text, a passionate holding fast of the absurd. What 
happens next in CUP is more than an example of a leap. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, what happens 
next is the leap—absurd, paradoxical, and intellectually offensive as it is: 
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What, then, is the absurd? The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence in 
time, that God has come into existence exactly as an individual human being, 
indistinguishable from any other human being (CUP, 210). 
A comma separates, on the one hand, “the eternal truth” and “existence,” and, on the other hand, 
“God” and “an individual human being,” Jesus Christ. By a leap marked by a comma, 
Kierkegaard moves from the “eternal” to “God,” from “existence” as a category to Jesus as an 
individual, actual human being. Kierkegaard spends no time defending this leap. He only marks 
it with a comma. Indeed, he spends much time lamenting and lampooning it: to leap from the 
eternal as a philosopheme to God as an individual person is absurd, an offense, a “crucifixion of 
the understanding” (CUP, 564).  Precisely for these reasons is faith a necessarily passionate act.  
Nowhere does Kierkegaard defend the decision to leap. And he certainly does not attempt 
to convince anyone else to make the leap. However, while Kierkegaard does not argue for the 
leap, he does argue that one must choose whether to leap or not. The eternal happiness offered by 
Christianity is found only in the leap, and so cannot be a reason to leap—the reason for the leap 
can only come about through the leap. There is no good reason, and there are plenty of bad ones, 
according to Kierkegaard, to be a Christian.  
 
Christian Praxis: “Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the 
truth.”191 
 
The emphasis on truth as action is emphasized in Kierkegaard’s retelling of Pontius Pilate’s 
questioning of Jesus. The Gospel of John tells the story like this: 
																																																						
191 Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Hong & Hong (Princeton University Press, 1991), pg. 205 
	 216	
So Pilate entered his headquarters again and called Jesus and said to him, “Are you the 
King of the Jews?” Jesus answered, “Do you say this of your own accord, or did others 
say it to you about me?” Pilate answered, “Am I a Jew? Your own nation and the chief 
priests have delivered you over to me. What have you done?” Jesus answered, “My 
kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would have 
been fighting, that I might not be delivered over to the Jews. But my kingdom is not from 
the world.” Then Pilate said to him, “So you are a king?” Jesus answered, “You say that I 
am a king. For this purpose I was born and for this purpose I have come into the world—
to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth listens to my voice.” Pilate said 
to him, “What is truth?” 
After he had said this, he went back outside to the Jews and told them, “I find no guilt in 
him (Jn 18:33-38). 
And Kierkegaard’s interpretation 
If Pilate had not asked objectively what truth is, he would never have let Christ be 
crucified. If he had asked the question subjectively, then the passion of inwardness 
regarding what he in truth had to do about the decision facing him would have prevented 
him from doing an injustice (CUP, 229). 
Pilate, by framing the question of truth ontologically—“what is truth”—is presupposing an 
understanding of truth as ideal and not as actual. That is, Pilate’s questioning implies that the 
content of truth is a proposition that Jesus can deliver in response to an inquiry—as if truth was 
something to be communicated in speech. Such a questioning, though, obfuscates the actual 
structure of truth. Asking the question subjectively would entail not asking for an ontological 
ideal content, but would instead entail asking about the action required by a commitment to truth. 
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According to Kierkegaard, Pilate’s question to Jesus, if Pilate was actually interested in the truth, 
should have been, “What should I do?” Instead, Pilate asks an ontological question and so rejects 
his possible role in the actualization of truth: 
When a person has before his eyes something as immensely big as the objective truth, he 
can easily cross out his fragment of subjectivity and what he as a subjective individual 
has to do. Then the approximation-process of objective truth is symbolically expressed by 
washing one’s hands, because objectively there is no decision (CUP, 230). 
Which is to say, Pilate’s recourse to ontology shields Pilate from the necessity of making a 
decision. In much the same way that Schmitt’s appeals to ontological anti-Semitism attempted to 
shield him from the embarrassment of actual anti-Semitism—remember that, according to 
Schmitt, proper Jew-hatred has nothing to do with personal feelings of animus toward any actual 
Jew—Pilate here is appealing to Jesus’s silence on ontological matters as a way of “washing his 
hands” of responsibility. Of course, washing one’s hands to avoid a judgment itself constitutes a 
decision in actuality. Schmitt did not appeal to ontological truths but decided to construct said 
truths as a way of masking his decisive role in their very construction; likewise, Pilate decides to 
ask about ontology and not praxis as a way to mask his own decision to hand Jesus over for 
crucifixion. 
And so Kierkegaard’s treatment of Pilate’s questioning demonstrates the privileged place 
of decision in Kierkegaard’s political theology: each individual is faced with the necessity of 
making a decision as to whether or not he or she will accept this responsibility. In the first 
instance, Kierkegaardian decision is not what to do, but whether or not one will accept 
responsibility as such. The various attempts to identify being with thinking that have been 
discussed so far are but various means of rejecting this primordial decision; that is, to argue 
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ontologically that everything has been decided in advance is but one way of washing one’s hands 
of the need to make actual decisions. 
The potential problem, as I see it, is that Kierkegaard has heightened the tension of 
decision to such a degree that Pilate’s actions seem reasonable. Or rather, since Kierkegaard did 
not place Pilate in front of Jesus, the truth of the difficulty of decision—the difficulty of asking 
Jesus what to do—is such that Pilate’s decision to abrogate his authority appears reasonable. 
Apparently, with neither ontological nor historical grounding, the individual existing person 
looking to make such a decision can rely only on his or her own dogged faith. Such a reasonless 
faith, which leaps over any philosophical or historical ground offered to it, becomes an act of 
extreme difficulty. Indeed, the absolute difficulty of faith constitutes faith’s specific difference 
from other forms of assent—say, historical or philosophical knowing. In those epistemic 
discourses, one is never completely responsible: historical authorities, the objective truths of 
logic, etc., all serve to reduce personal liability in that these factors operate as objective 
determinants of future actions. One can always defend an action by claiming that it was done 
according to the best evidence available at the time and so on.192 But faith commitments, which 
are decisions for which the single individual is entirely responsible, foreclose the possibility of 
appeals to objective authorities of this kind. This lack of external authority puts the faithful in a 
rather precarious and terrifying situation. 
It is not surprising, then, that Kierkegaard himself never claimed to have made such a 
leap. Indeed, he questioned whether it wouldn’t be better to prevent anyone from making such a 
leap at all. In his own name, he writes: 
																																																						
192 This happens in actuality—all the time. For example, Hillary Clinton, in 2014, writing of her vote in favor of the 
war in Iraq: “I thought I had acted in good faith and made the best decision I could with the information I had” (HC, 
127). The description of faith and decision as determined by information is as un-Kierkegaardian as possible. 
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I want honesty. If this, then, is what the generation or the contemporaries want, if they 
want straightforwardly, honestly, candidly, openly, directly to rebel against Christianity 
and say to God, "We cannot, we will not submit to this power"-but, please note, this is to 
be done straightforwardly, honestly, candidly, openly, directly-well, then strange as it 
might seem, I go along with it, because I want honesty. Wherever there is honesty, I am 
able to go along with it; an honest rebellion against Christianity can be made only if one 
honestly acknowledges what Christianity is and how one relates oneself to it . . . I do not 
dare to call myself a Christian; but I want honesty, and to that end I will venture (TM, 
48/49). 
Clearly, Kierkegaard is not acting as an apologist for Christianity. In these texts signed in his 
name, Kierkegaard is critical not only of the Christendom of the state church of Denmark, but 
perhaps even of Christianity as such. At least, Kierkegaard is open to an honest criticism of 
Christianity—and even an honest rebellion against God. Such an openness to rebellion is far 
from the unquestioning faith of Abraham found in Fear and Trembling, and again suggests that 
the pseudonymous texts should be read as ironic representations of positions with which 
Kierkegaard himself does not necessarily agree. In this view, Knausgaard and Derrida, the one 
rejecting God and the other refusing to decide, and not Schmitt, who aggressively and 
unquestioningly decides in favor of (a violent, anti-Semitic, and deeply metaphysical) 
Christianity, are actually aligned with Kierkegaard. On this matter of not necessarily aligning 
with those who profess to share one’s religious commitments, Kierkegaard writes: 
If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the true idea 
of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth, and 
if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of infinity, although 
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his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is there more truth? The one 
prays in truth to God although he is worshipping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the 
true God and is therefore in truth worshipping an idol (CUP, 201). 
This passage, which seems to suggest that the truth of faith is not determined by professed belief 
in God but by passion, comes only a few pages before the aforementioned important discussion 
of the paradoxical nature of truth. By foregrounding that discussion of truth with this recognition 
that an “idol” might be more “true” than the “true God,” Kierkegaard is preparing the reader to 
abandon any a priori conceptions of religious truth. It is as if he is saying: I am about to speak of 
eternity and of eternal truth, but do not think that by this I necessarily mean the Christian God 
prayed to in our Danish churches.  
On the one hand, such an openness to rebellion against God and such a destabilization of 
the God/idol binary should be read as a critique of any reified understanding of Christianity as a 
set of objective doctrinal truths. According to Kierkegaard, any religion that identifies itself with 
the preservation and communication of a set of doctrinal truth claims has nothing to do with the 
actual truth. In that it would look to communicate the eternal truth, which would be held to exist 
objectively and independently of existing individuals, a regime that showed myopic concern with 
doctrinal and orthodoxical purity would be a variation of the Socratic theory of pedagogy, and so 
would encounter all of the already discussed problems that face this theory. 
In this sense, desires to protect and preserve doctrinal Christian truth claims undermine 
the actual truth of Christianity. Kierkegaard articulates this argument in more explicitly political 
terms toward the end of CUP: 
The Church theory assumes that we are Christians, but now we must in a purely objective 
way have it made sure what the essentially Christian is in order to secure it against the 
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Turk and the Russian and the Roman yoke, and valiantly battle Christianity forward by 
having our age form a bridge, as it were, to a matchless future, which is already glimpsed. 
This is sheer aestheticism. Christianity is an existence communication. The task is to 
become a Christian or to continue to be a Christian, and the most dangerous illusion of all 
is to become so sure of being one that all Christendom must be defended against the 
Turk—instead of defending the faith within oneself against the illusion about the Turk. 
(CUP, 608). 
That is, obsessions with defining the difference between Christianity and its others—especially 
when these obsessions are pursued for the sake of defending an alleged supremacy or purity of 
the Christian, ala Schmitt—are not instances of defending the faith but are instead instances of 
undermining faith via a displacement of existential responsibility onto objective criteria: faith 
becomes not a project of actualizing existential truth, but instead a project of demarcating and 
defending hierarchical ontological categories. This resistance to Christian xenophobia stands in 
stark contrast to Schmitt, who unbelievably claimed that “never in the thousand year struggle 
between Christians and Muslims did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend 
Europe out of love toward the Saracens or Turks” (CP, 29).193 In Kierkegaard’s view, the 
privileging of a European over a Turk on the grounds of professed religion is precisely the 
idolatrous temptation to be avoided. That is, if Christianity is a religion of actualizing existential 
truth, then these efforts to abstract from existence in the realm of objective orthodoxy are 
essentially anti-Christian. 
And so just as Gert Westphaler’s loquaciousness on the issue of workers’ rights should 
not be confused with actually improving labor conditions, a profession of Christian faith should 
																																																						
193 Carl Schmitt, Concept of the Political, trans. Schwarb. University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
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not be confused with actually being a Christian. Which is not to say Kierkegaard is himself 
claiming to actually be a Christian—far from it. He is resisting the idealization of Christianity: 
This resistance is not for the sake of securing his own privilege as a true Christian over and 
against the orthodox frauds, but is for the sake of not allowing Christianity to become a 
bourgeois tool of oppression, class signification, or xenophobia: he is not claiming to be a 
Christian, but he is claiming that the elites’ appropriation of orthodoxy and doctrine for their own 
self-interested purposes—just like Hegel’s appropriation of “rationality” for his own 
Eurocentrism; just like Prodhoun’s appropriation of “eternal economic laws” for his own 
anarchism—is a thoroughly ideological, not Christian, project. 
But even given that he is not claiming to be a Christian in his attack on Christendom, 
Kierkegaard risks a slippage here, because the talk of actual Christianity is different from the talk 
of rebelling against God: On the one hand, Kierkegaard announces a desire for truth and honesty 
at all costs—even if this means dismissing Christianity; on the other hand, he provides a defense 
of actual Christianity against its idealist and orthodox imposters. How can these two positions be 
squared? How can Kierkegaard claim that he is willing to rebel against God and also claim that 
his critique of orthodoxy is its anti-Christian nature, that is, its own rebellion against God? In 
other words, why would Kierkegaard care that these imposters are rebelling against God, if he 
himself is prepared to do so? Or, how can Kierkegaard claim that he is defending a true 
understanding of actual Christianity as not concerned with describing and preserving its 
difference from others, but also make this very point by describing and preserving the difference 
of actual Christianity against its others? From what grounds is Kierkegaard launching his attack 
on Christendom? 
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The response cannot simply be that Kierkegaard has no ground from which he critiques, 
or that he has leapt over any such ground. Such a response would, after all, also be available to 
those whom Kierkegaard critiques: anyone could simply say that their projects are absurd, that 
truth is subjective, that ground is a metaphorical philosopheme and that they prefer the 
metaphorical philosopheme of leaping, and so on. Such “relativism” is not what Kierkegaard is 
doing. In February 1855, Kierkegaard wrote a newspaper article titled “Salt.” In it, he 
admonishes the Christian Danish elite of his day: 
If in the Christian view there is any difference for God, then the beggar is infinitely more 
important than the king, infinitely more important, because the Gospel is preached to the 
poor! But see, to the pastors the king is infinitely more important than the beggar. ‘A 
beggar, how will he help us?’ You rag of velvet, did Christianity come into the world in 
order to have help from human beings, or in order to help them, the poor, the beggar, 
since the Gospel is preached to the poor? (TM, 44). 
Rags of velvet, the infinite importance of a beggar—these are passionate charges and 
commitments, free of any irony or deferral. Clearly, Kierkegaard does not intend his project as a 
critique of the possibility of critique, as if the rejection of the actuality of the identity of thinking 
and being prevented any sort of normative commitment. Clearly, Kierkegaard is willing to 
passionately make definitive judgments concerning the content of Christianity. So, the Christian 
might be an idolater and the idolater might be a Christian, and Kierkegaard might be willing to 
rebel against God, but none of this means that Christianity does not have a determinable content: 
Because Christianity is not a doctrine, it holds true, as developed previously, that there is 
an enormous difference between knowing what Christianity is and being a Christian . . . 
To say that Christianity is empty of content because it is not a doctrine is only chicanery. 
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When a believer exists in faith, his existence has enormous content, but not in the sense 
of a yield in paragraphs (CUP, 380). 
That is, Kierkegaard is not or has never claimed to be a Christian—and he is not even sure he 
wants to be one—but he does know what a Christian is. That he can know Christianity without 
being a Christian is an effect of the distinction of knowing and existing earlier articulated. 
Kierkegaard has not and has never claimed to actualize the truth content of Christianity—which 
does not mean he does not know what that content is. Indeed, according to Kierkegaard, knowing 
this content is not difficult at all. The difficulty in being a Christian is not in the knowing, but in 
the existing:  
Christianity is no doctrine; all talk of offense with regard to it as doctrine is a 
misunderstanding, is an enervation of the thrust of the collision of offense, as when one 
speaks of offense with respect to the doctrine of the God-man, the doctrine of Atonement. 
No, offense is related either to Christ or to being Christian oneself (PC, 106). 
A theological engagement with Christianity should not be ordered to uncovering a hidden 
doctrinal truth, but toward better actualizing the demands of Christian existence. In that it 
demands a change in existence—a becoming Christian—Christianity “is not an intellectual but 
an ethical initiation” (JP, 2793).194  
																																																						
194 Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Volume 7, ed. Hannay et al. (Princeton University Press, 2014). The 
role of “ethics” in Kierkegaard is ambivalent and sometimes inconsistent. Some works, such as the second volume 
of Either/Or valorize ethics over and against aesthetics: without ethical guidance, aesthetic passion is fleeting, and so 
the aesthetic stage of life gives rise to the superior ethical. Other texts, such as Fear and Trembling, seem to critique 
ethics and impose the same sort of teleological critique (the advancement of one stage to the other) to the ethical 
stage as Either/Or imposed on the aesthetic stage. Yet other texts, notably The Concept of Anxiety, distinguish 
between Christian ethics (“second ethics”) and non-Christian ethics (“first ethics”). While a “Christian ethics” seems 
impossible given the arguments of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s notebooks do suggest that, ultimately, this 
dual-ethics program is the one he actually held. For a helpful guide to some of these different uses of ethics, see: 
Roe Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard’s View on Normative Ethics, Moral Agency, and Metaethics,” in Blackwell 
Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Stewart (Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 113-125.  
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All of this is very consistent with Kierkegaard’s existential dialectical materialism. On 
the one hand, truth must actually exist, and the person in truth must actualize this truth in his or 
her existence. In this way, it is not surprising that the truth of Christianity is the actual life praxis 
of Christians. Actual orthodoxy is orthopraxy. At the same time, an apparent tension—that 
Kierkegaard is willing to disobey God but passionately critiques those who disobey God—is 
addressed not ideally, as if Kierkegaard’s positions could be squared with each other by 
sublating each within some higher conceptual apparatus, but materially: the actual, material 
demands of Christianity are such that Kierkegaard can be unsure if he wants to actualize them 
(that is, he is unsure if they are true) and also be absolutely certain that the elites have not. 
And so Kierkegaard’s rigorous methodological and theoretical observations lead to the 
general structural point that if Christianity has truth, this truth must actually exist. Returning to 
Pilate’s questioning of Jesus, then, we can now say that Pilate should not have asked Jesus what 
truth is, but what he should truly do. Pilate provides an early example of a false engagement with 
Christianity: instead of asking what to do, Pilate puts Jesus on the cross—and washes his hands 
of it. But now, we can further specify this critique of Pilate: while it is the case that if Pilate was 
interested in truth he should have been interested in praxis and not ontology, it is also the case 
that he should not have needed to formulate this interest as an interrogative. That is, because 
Christianity is not a doctrine, Pilate did not need to ask Jesus to communicate some cognitive 
truth content. That content had already been given in advance, and was the reason for Jesus’s 
placement in front of Pilate to begin with.  
Jesus does indeed communicate an answer to the question “what should I do?”, but he 
does this through a non-semantic and non-intellectual form of communication. As Derrida notes, 
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to ask for a communication is not necessarily to ask for a cognitive transmission of knowledge.195 
Kierkegaard is arguing the same: Jesus communicates not through a semantic or cognitive 
discourse, but through the actual praxis of his life. As actual, the content of Christianity is not 
something that is communicable through a philosophical treatise—here as everywhere, existence 
is irreducible to thought. The argument here is that Jesus’s pedagogy—distinctly juxtaposed to 
Socrates’—is one of initiation into an orthopraxic community. Recall that, above, Kierkegaard, 
in his journals, wrote that Christianity is “not an intellectual but an ethical initiation.” The full 
entry reads: 
Certainly, Christianity has never been—indeed, it has abhorred being—a mystery in the 
sense of existing only for a few brilliant minds who have become its initiates. No: God 
has chosen the lowly and the despised—but still there was no lack of initiation. It is not 
an intellectual but an ethical initiation, personality’s enormous respect for inclusion in the 
Christian community, and this respect is not expressed in assurances and by making a 
fuss, but existentially, in action (JP, 2793). 
According to this, one enters into the true Christian community not through the proffering of 
assurances or doctrine, but through existential action. Such is the truth of Christianity, which 
reflects Kierkegaard’s theoretical understanding of the relationship between the eternal and the 
temporal: the eternal, objective truth is found in an existential, orthopraxic community. And so 
had Pilate asked Jesus, “what should I do?”, his situation would have not been any closer to the 
truth: what he should have done was act as if he belonged to the praxical community Jesus had 
established, and, precisely by acting as such, actually belonged to it. The very act of formulating 
a discursive question is already a displacement of the site of decision: rather than ask Jesus how 
																																																						
195 See especially, “Signature Event Context,” from Margins of Philosophy, trans. Bass (University of Chicago 
Press, 1982) 
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to behave, as if Jesus were a Socratic teacher possessing eternal secrets, one should act with 
Jesus in the praxis demanded by and in the Christian community.196  
This understanding of Christianity as primarily orthopraxic—or, this reinscription of 
orthodoxy along the lines of orthopraxy—is demonstrated throughout Christian scripture, but 
nowhere more strikingly than in Matthew 19:16-24:  
And someone came to Him and said, “Teacher, what good thing shall I do that I may 
obtain eternal life?” And He said to him, “Why are you asking Me about what is good? 
There is only One who is good; but if you wish to enter into life, keep the 
commandments.” Then he said to Him, “Which ones?” And Jesus said, “You shall not 
commit murder; You shall not commit adultery; You shall not steal; You shall not bear 
false witness; Honor your father and mother; and You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself.” The young man said to Him, “All these things I have kept; what am I still 
lacking?” Jesus said to him, “If you wish to be complete, go and sell your possessions 
and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow Me.” But 
when the young man heard this statement, he went away grieving; for he was one who 
owned much property. 
And Jesus said to His disciples, “Truly I say to you, it is hard for a rich man to enter the 
kingdom of heaven. Again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a 
needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.” 
																																																						
196 This resistance to dialoguing with Jesus stands in sharp contrast to late 20th century currents in especially 
Catholic hermeneutic theology that spoke of religion as a sort of “conversation.” Such a conversational approach 
would entirely obfuscate the need for decision via its perpetual deferral—by definition, conversations are 
interminable. For an example of this hermeneutering of theology, see: Frederick Lawrence, “Grace and Friendship: 
Postmodern Political Theology and God as Conversational,” in The Fragility of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and 
the Human Good (University of Toronto Press, 2017). 
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The rich man, foreshadowing Pilate, interrogates Jesus not about the truth, but about the good—
that is, about another metaphysical “transcendental.” Jesus immediately rejects the possibility of 
an ontological interpretation of the question: he does not want to address the question by 
philosophically clarifying what is the good. There is only one who is good—God—and this 
divine goodness has nothing to do with the praxical community that Jesus is establishing: Jesus 
tells the man to not concern himself with being good, but instead to commit to and perform a set 
of clearly articulated commands.197 When the man claims that he has followed the 
commandments given, Jesus adds another, which proves too much: sell your possessions and 
give to the poor. Only upon completion of this task—which is never actually completed—can the 
rich man follow Jesus. That is, the following of Jesus is determined by action and coherence to 
clearly given praxical demands. It is not the case that the rich man could countersign doctrinal or 
orthodoxical positions and find himself included in the community by doing such. This sort of 
community would be ideal, grounded in propositions and cognitive adherence—but it would not 
be actual, and so it could not, according to the materialist existentialism Kierkegaard has 
developed, be rightly said to exist at all. 
The same understanding of Christianity as an orthopraxic community is shown in the 
epistle of James, which is one of the most cited New Testament books in all of Kierkegaard’s 
corpus, and which Kierkegaard claimed was his “favorite”:198 
																																																						
197 For Kierkegaard, ontology and existentialism only cohere—which is another way of saying actuality and thinking 
only identify—only in the person of God: “Existence itself is a system—for God, but it cannot be a system for any 
existing spirit” (CUP, 118). 
198 For an overview of Kierkegaard’s use of and deep appreciation for James, see: Richard Bauckham, “James in 
modern and contemporary contexts,” in James: Wisdom of James, disciple of Jesus the Sage (Routledge, 1999), 158-
208. And also: Kyle Roberts, “James: Putting Faith to Action,” in Kierkegaard and the Bible: Tome II: The New 
Testament, ed. Stewart (Ashgate, 2010). 
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What use is it, my brethren, if someone says he has faith but he has no works? Can that 
faith save him? If a brother or sister is without clothing and in need of daily food, and one 
of you says to them, “Go in peace, be warmed and be filled,” and yet you do not give 
them what is necessary for their body, what use is that? Even so faith, if it has no works, 
is dead, being by itself. 
But someone may well say, “You have faith and I have works; show me your faith 
without the works, and I will show you my faith by my works.” You believe that God is 
one. You do well; the demons also believe, and shudder (Jm 2:14-19). 
As with the passage from Matthew, the profession of faith—precisely here, the profession of the 
orthodox proposition of monotheism—is not a sufficient, or even helpful, criteria for initiation 
into the Christian community. Whereas Kierkegaard claims that truth can never be known as 
distinct from lunacy, here the author of James writes that belief in God can never be known as 
distinct from the demonic: in both cases, material praxis, not ideal content, is decisive.199 Or, as 
																																																						
199 Kierkegaard is aware that his reinscription of orthodoxy as a demand for orthopraxy, and the alignment with the 
epistle of James that this reinscription effects, places him in a minority position within his Lutheran tradition. Or, 
given Luther’s known animus toward the epistle, places Kierkegaard in a place of confrontation with Luther. 
Kierkegaard, in an unusually diplomatic moment, decides against arguing with Luther directly, and instead 
addresses the issue indirectly. According to Kierkegaard, Luther decided that “in order to set things straight, James 
must be shoved aside.” But, Kierkegaard says, if Luther was “in our own generation” he would surely say that 
“James must be drawn forward a little.” Kierkegaard goes on to praise “Lutheran doctrine,” which “is excellent, is 
the truth.” However, despite this excellency, Kierkegaard wonders if  “Luther—this man of God, this honest soul!—
overlooked or perhaps really forgot a certain something that a later age, especially ours, may perhaps stress only far 
too much.” Namely, “that I am not an honest soul but a cunning fellow.” That is, according to Kierkegaard, the 
doctrine does not address the needs and existential actuality of real individuals. Taken together—the claim that 
Luther was not of his generation, while elsewhere Kierkegaard writes that “you do not have the right to appropriate 
one word of Christ’s, not one single word, you have not the slightest to do with him, you do not have the remotest 
fellowship with him if you have not become so contemporary with him in his basement that you, just like his 
contemporaries, have had to become aware of his admonition: Blessed is he who is not offended at me!” (PC, 37); 
the praise of doctrine, while the privileging of doctrine is ruthlessly attacked throughout Kierkegaard; and the 
suggestion that Luther does not address actual existences, while these are the only things Kierkegaard wants to 
address—all of this more than suggests that Kierkegaard’s apparent devotion to Luther and protestantism masked a 
deep and serious critique of what he saw as some fundamental Lutheran positions. This possible antipathy toward 
Luther might also be evidenced by Kierkegaard’s affinity with Marx, who above was seen to praise Luther’s rival 
Thomas Müntzer. All quotations are from: Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, trans. Hong & Hong 
(Princeton University Press, 1990); pgs. 24-26. A similar critique of the excellency of doctrine not translating into 
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the author of James also writes: “prove yourselves doers of the word, and not merely hearers 
who delude themselves” (Jm 1:25).200 
In both cases, the aspiring Christian is told that the initiation into Christianity is one of 
specific, material action. Such passages could be quoted at length (eg, Matthew 7:21, which has 
Jesus say, “Not everyone who says to Me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but 
he who does the will of My Father in heaven.”). For Kierkegaard, all such passages are clear in 
intent and content—the difficulty, as always, is not in the understanding but in the doing:  
I open the NT and read: ‘If you want to be perfect, then sell all your goods and give to the 
poor and come and follow me.’ But scholarship helps us in our task of not wanting to 
understand, namely, not wanting to act accordingly . . . The New Testament is very easy 
to understand, but so far I have found tremendously great difficulties in my own self 
when it comes to acting literally according to what is not difficult to understand (JP, 
2872). 
That is, the act of reading scripture does not require advanced historical critical biblical 
scholarship.201 While Kierkegaard’s reading of philosophical texts are clearly deconstructive and 
rigorously theoretical, and while I have been at pains to show that Kierkegaard presumes a 
materialist methodology that leads to sustained and sophisticated ideology critique with Marxist 
affinity, his readings of the bible are intentionally surface-level. When it comes to scripture, 
Kierkegaard is less a proponent of the “hermeneutics of suspicion” as he is suspicious of 
																																																						
existential praxis is given in Kierkegaard’s journals: “The doctrine in the established Church and its organization are 
very good. But the lives, our lives—believe me, they are mediocre” (JP, 6727). 
200 On reading James as a description of “the actions or praxis that constitutes the faithful way of life,” see: Warren 
Carter & Amy-Jill Levine, “James,” in The New Testaments: Meanings and Methods (Abingdon Press, 2013), 283-
297. 
201 On Kierkegaard’s resistance to biblical scholarship, which he holds as unpassionate and so irrelevant to actual 
religious decision, see: Lee Barrett, “Kierkegaard and Biblical Studies: A critical response to nineteenth-century 
hermeneutics,” in Blackwell Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Stewart (Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 143-154. 
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hermeneutics, or any other literary protocol, as such. For Kierkegaard, all such attempts to 
impose a hermeneutical-critical protocol of reading onto scripture serve the function of 
withdrawing from the necessity of actualizing praxis. Kierkegaard writes to such an imagined 
hermeneut: 
If you happen to be a scholar, then please do see to it that in all this learned reading 
(which is not reading God's Word) you do not forget to read God's Word. "But," you 
perhaps say, "there are so many obscure passages in the Bible, whole books that are 
practically riddles." To that I would answer: Before I have anything to do with this 
objection, it must be made by someone whose life manifests that he has scrupulously 
complied with all the passages that are easy to understand; is this the case with you? 
God's Word is given in order that you shall act according to it, not that you shall practice 
interpreting obscure passages (FSE, 29). 
Unlike Schmitt, who allegedly grounded his arguments concerning friendship and enmity on 
philological and historical research—shaky and questionable as it was—Kierkegaard 
intentionally avoids engagement with critical biblical scholarship, precisely because the bible 
does not tell him to engage with scholarship but to engage with the actual, material realities of 
his world. If reading the bible did not entail engagement with material actuality in this way, for 
Kierkegaard, it would not be true. 
And so when applied to philosophical texts, Kierkegaard’s privileging of existence leads 
to a rigorous theoretical critique of idealist philosophy. When applied to scripture, though, his 
existentialism does not encourage a deconstructive protocol, but instead an intentionally naïve 
and first order type of surface reading. While the methods might appear different, both are 
guided by Kierkegaard’s overarching concern for actuality and existence. When dealing with the 
	 232	
complexities of Hegelian and Lessingian idealism, this concern articulates itself in an equally 
rigorous and complex manner—as was demonstrated in his discussion of the paradoxical nature 
of truth, for example. When dealing with the straightforward ethical commands of scripture, this 
concern articulates itself in an equally straightforward, yet still quite rigorous, manner. 
Kierkegaard uses two types of rigor—theoretical and praxical—both of which are ultimately 
concerned with defending the privileged position, now both theoretical and praxical, of material 
existence. Indeed, Kierkegaard rewrites an understanding of both theory and orthodoxy along the 
lines of an orthopraxy of material actuality. Far from resisting materialism, then, and far from 
offering mutually exclusive views of here religion and there politics, Kierkegaard is a materialist 
everywhere. 
What has become clear, though, is that Kierkegaard does not believe that scripture is the 
only source for this orthopraxic content: remember that the Turk and the idolater might belong 
more truly to this orthopraxic community than does the orthodox Christian. The point is not that 
scripture has a monopoly on proper praxis, but that philosophy in particular and “thinking” in 
general cannot provide this material. Necessary praxis cannot be deduced from a priori logical 
axioms. An ugly broad ditch separates the two. In other words, it is impossible to know that 
praxis is helpful by measuring it against some independent philosophical or logical system—the 
argument is not just anti-Hegelian, but anti-Kantian: Praxis concerns particular existences, not 
universal maxims. What, then, are the specific criteria for involvement in this existential 
community? What practices are intended in this call to orthopraxis? 
The next chapter will deal extensively with these questions. But to conclude this 
engagement with Kierkegaard, it can be noted that his answer is rather clear: Christian praxis is a 
commitment to improving the lives of the poor. As we’ve seen, he finds the command to give to 
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the poor an example of one of the clearest commands in scripture. It is also likely that 
Kierkegaard—despite his suspicion of hermeneutics—is interpreting these biblical passages 
through an anti-capitalist frame. In his journals, Kierkegaard envisions an alliance between his 
existential understanding of Christianity, guided by an overarching concern for the poor, and 
communism: 
The conflict concerning Christianity will no longer be a conflict about doctrine. (This is 
the conflict between orthodoxy and heterodoxy.) The dispute (occasioned also by the 
socialist and communist movements) will be about Christianity as a form of existence. 
The problem will be about loving one’s “neighbor,” attention will be directed toward 
Christianity’s life, and Christianity will essentially accentuate conformity with his life. 
The world has gradually consumed those myriad illusions and partition walls by which 
people have ensured that the question was merely about Christianity as a doctrine. The 
rebellion in the world shouts: We want to see action! (NB7, 450). 
Elsewhere, Kierkegaard gives enough hints as to suggest familiarity with a socialist critique of 
capitalism: “The first barrel of gold, says the capitalist, will be the most difficult to gain; when 
one has that, the rest comes to itself” (CD, 25).202 This notion of the mystical self-production of 
capital—that it “comes to itself”—is of course essential in Marx’s critique of capitalist political 
economy in Capital. And Kierkegaard also makes clear that possession of private property is 
antithetical to love of neighbor: “All earthly and worldly property is, strictly speaking, selfish, 
envious, its possession, envious or envied, is bound either way to impoverish others. What I 
have, no one else can have; the more I have, the less can anyone else have” (CD, 115). And for 
																																																						
202 Soren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses: The Crisis and the Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. Hong & Hong 
(Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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all of his talk of equality before God, Kierkegaard does claim, converging with Marx, that all of 
humanity can be split into “two great classes”: 
To be able to give and to have to receive is a way of dividing humanity into two great 
classes, and as soon as this difference is uttered in all its brevity, everyone is able to 
expand on it and to connect it with many happy or burdensome memories and with many 
joyful hopes or painful expectations as to what is to come (SW, 45). 
From beginning to end, Kierkegaard identifies Christianity with a praxis for the improvement of 
the actual conditions of the poor and the dispossessed. To fight for the poor in this way is how 
one shows love of God. Indeed, such a struggle of the class of those who have to receive against 
the class who is able to give is to be waged in God’s name: “If at a given time the forms under 
which one has to live are not the most perfect, if they can be improved, in God’s name do so” 
(AN, 49).203 
Ultimately, this is the only decision with which Kierkegaard is concerned, and it is the 
one decision that is unavoidable: To love God through those who need, or to hate God through 
those who have. A passionate commitment to the poor, actualized in existence, lived 
enthusiastically, is the truth that Kierkegaard yearns to actualize. Calculations, idealisms, 
ideological appeals to eternal truth, hermeneutics, and loquaciousness will all temper and 
displace this decision, will all try to control praxis through concerns with orthodoxy, rationality, 
and reasonableness. To enthusiastically risk a decision against these powers for the sake of love 
for the poor is how one is initiated into the orthopraxic community: 
The world has no more knowledge of enthusiasm than a capitalist has of love, and you 
will always find that indolence and stupidity are primarily intent upon making 
																																																						
203 Søren Kierkegaard, Armed Neutrality, and an Open Letter, trans. Hong & Hong (Simon & Schuster, 1969). 
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comparisons and upon imprisoning everything in comparison’s muddied ‘realism.’ 
Therefore do not look around; ‘Greet no one on the way;’ do not listen to cries or shouts 
which will trick you out of your enthusiasm and fool its power into laboring on the 
treadmill of comparisons. Do not let it disturb you that the world calls your enthusiasm 
crazy, calls it self-love—in eternity everyone will be compelled to understand what 























The previous chapter argued that Søren Kierkegaard articulated a dialectical materialist 
philosophy and a socialist politics informed by his deep existential commitment to Christian 
orthopraxy, which was read as itself a form of orthodoxy. While Kierkegaard’s socialist 
commitments were clear, and while he clearly derived them from biblical precepts, Kierkegaard 
did not provide either a systematic normative political theology or an analytically rigorous 
critique of modern capitalist culture. Indeed, this lack of both systematic politics and analytical 
rigor was an important part of Kierkegaard’s larger theological project: that the poor are poor is 
obvious, that they should not be poor is divinely commanded, and any complication of this 
situation can only be an ideological attempt at diverting proper praxis.  
 While wanting to maintain Kierkegaard’s moral clarity and exigency, this final chapter 
will provide a more analytically careful reading of one especially important site of contemporary 
emancipatory struggle: the relationship between race and class. Building on James Cone’s 
classical formulation of black theology, this chapter argues against ontological understandings of 
race and in favor of universalist anti-racist and anti-capitalist praxis. In a sense, direct 
engagement with the question of the relationship between race and class recapitulates this 
project’s general argument in favor of a postmodern political theology of decision. Indeed, the 
question of race, and especially ontologized race, has been something like this project’s “b-plot” 
from the very beginning: Schmitt’s ontologization of decision was, in material terms, an 
ontologization of Nazi race science, and so ontology and race proved inextricable for his project. 
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This critique of ontology was then generalized through a reading of Derrida, whose own anti-
essentialist position on race and racism remains an undertheorized dimension of his work.204 
Finally, Kierkegaard, while saying too little about race specifically, critiques idealism in such a 
way as to render any ontology, including racial ontology, directly antithetical to Christian praxis.  
The first section of this chapter explicates two underappreciated dimensions of Cone’s 
project that have emancipatory potential: his epistemic privileging of self-determination and his 
understanding of religious decision as necessarily “risky.” Epistemologically, Cone draws from 
the existentialist tradition to argue that Christian “truth” is determined by the self-determination 
of the oppressed and exploited. In short, the truth is that the oppressed and exploited should not 
be so, and so any action or claim is only “true” insofar as it promotes their self-determination. 
For Cone, the truth revealed by God is that all people should live lives of self-determination 
unfettered by material, social, and political limitations.  
Yet, Cone recognizes that the impossibility of knowing “God” means that any theology 
that grounds truth claims in the identity of God and truth can only do so self-critically and 
provisionally—that is, riskily. Importantly, this risk is not just the philosophical one of making 
uncertain claims dependent on an uncertain metaphysics. More immediately, what Cone calls 
“the risk of faith” refers to the fact that acting according to an epistemology of emancipation will 
necessarily put one in conflict with societal power structures. Indeed, truth is determined by 
one’s directness in addressing these structures, and so the extent to which one conflicts with the 
																																																						
204 See: Jacques Derrida, “Racism’s Last Word,” Critical Inquiry 12.1 (1985) and Derrida’s rather biting reply to 
Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon’s response to “Racism’s Last Word”: “But, beyond . . . (open letter to Anne 
McClintock and Rob Nixon),” Critical Inquiry 13.1 (1986). See also Derrida’s 2003 keynote address at the 
University of California Humanities Research Institute’s conference titles “tRaces: Race, Deconstruction, and 
Critical Theory,” accessible at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfXdYefgKjw. 
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powerful becomes a measure of truth. While such a counter-cultural impulse was evident in 
Kierkegaard, counter-hegemonic praxis becomes a central Christian tenet in Cone’s work. 
While this articulation of truth as risky counter-hegemonic praxis is a potentially 
revolutionary theorization, Cone’s implementation of it suffers from analytic ambiguity 
regarding the precise relationship between class exploitation and racial oppression and the 
methods of emancipation appropriate to each. While he tends to associate emancipation with 
self-determination, or “freedom,” he rarely fills out the content of this demand. The chapter’s 
second section, then, argues that Cone, especially in his first three works, implicitly associated 
“black” with “poor,” and so anti-racism with anti-capitalism. An interrogation of these dyads 
directly relates to the debate concerning Cone’s alleged “ontologization” of blackness.  
Responding to this charge, which is argued mostly convincingly by Victor Anderson and J. 
Kameron Carter, I will accept that Cone sometimes does use ontological categories for 
understanding blackness and so sometimes does ontologize blackness. However, the 
impossibility of such an ontologization—there is no such metaphysical thing as race, because 
there is no such thing as a metaphysical concept, and so there cannot be an ontological category 
called blackness, whiteness, redness, or whatever else—means that Cone’s gestures toward 
ontologization must obfuscate a more basic referent, which will have to be read. This is not to 
deny that something called “race” actually functions to explain oppressions, or that actual people 
do “believe in” race and so take is as motivational of decisions. The point is the much more 
limited one that, because there is no ontological, transhistorical substance called “race,” any 
explanation of racial logics and racisms cannot itself be ontological: not ontology, but history 
and politics are the realms for both understanding and resisting racism. 
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I argue that this tension between ontological language and the impossibility of ontology 
as such points toward another fundamental tension within Cone’s project: Cone articulates two 
tropics of blackness. On the one hand, blackness is a term that marks a position of structural 
exploitation, and it is in this structural sense that Cone can say things like “being Black in 
American has very little to do with skin color.”205 Ultimately, this understanding of blackness as 
metonymic signifier calls for an explicitly anti-capitalist praxis that incorporates, but is not 
reducible to, anti-racism. On the other hand, blackness also sometimes refers to an ascriptive 
identity imposed upon people for phenotypical reasons largely having to do with perceived skin 
color. It is in this sense that Cone can write about things like “physical blackness” (BTBP, 15) 
and can speak of the need to “accept the beauty of blackness” (BTBP, 18). This sense of 
blackness calls for explicitly anti-racist practices that might or might not include, but are never 
reducible to, anti-capitalism. While both senses of blackness coherently function within 
particular and circumscribed language games, and while political programs of anti-capitalism 
and anti-racism should be pursued ruthlessly, Cone’s ontologizing problems arise when the two 
senses cohere in the single, semantically overdetermined signifier “black.” When this 
convergence occurs, structural oppression is read as necessarily inhering within the “physical 
blackness” of particular people. It is this convergence of the structural with the ascriptive that 
ontologizes the particular, historical, and contingent understanding of blackness as suffering. 
Concluding this section by reading historical census data concerning demographics and 
economic status, I historicize Cone’s ontologizing tendencies by arguing that his association of 
black with poor does not account for growing economic disparities within, as well as between, 
ascriptive “races.” In the political economy of the 1960s and early 1970s, Cone could more or 
																																																						
205 James Cone, Black Theology and Black Power (Orbis Press, 1997), pg. 151. 
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less rightfully argue that anti-racism was a form of anti-capitalism. Now, though, with growing 
inequalities within ascriptively black communities, this assumption is less tenable, and so must 
be supplemented.  
The chapter’s third and final section argues that such a supplement is best pursued using 
the analytical tools of Marxist political economy. Importantly, Cone himself suggests this 
possibility, and so my suggested Marxist reinterpretation of Cone should be read as a building 
upon, and not a departure from, Cone’s project. Cornel West’s political theology—which is 
explicitly attentive to the relationship between race and class and rejects ontologized 
understandings of race—provides a possible Marxist clarification of Cone. West is able to 
provide an analytical political theology that engages both tropics of blackness without reducing 
or ontologizing blackness as suffering. Moreover, West’s particular form of universalism 
demonstrates that Marxist political economy provides tools necessary for both anti-racism and 
anti-capitalism, without reducing either one to the other. For both West and Marx, anti-racism 
and anti-capitalism are understood as complementary but not identical in a sense that is 
analogous to the non-identical complementarity between racism and capitalism. Part of the 
novelty of my argument here is that there is an anti-racist argument within Marx’s work, and that 
this is made explicit in West. My claim is not that socialism would necessarily lead to a post-
racial society—as I demonstrate below, I do not hold this position. Nor am I promoting anti-
capitalism as a replacement for anti-racism. Instead, my more basic point, drawing on West, is 
that Marxist political economy is a better tool for resisting racism than are ontological 
approaches. 
 Before turning to that argument in earnest, it would be helpful to briefly position this 
anti-ontological understanding of race and anti-racism in contrast to some popular contemporary 
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formulations. This anti-ontological position, developed throughout this chapter, draws partly 
from the dialectical materialist and anti-metaphysical arguments articulated in this project’s 
previous chapters, but also from Cone’s axiomatic proclamations concerning the universal 
necessity of self-determination (which, through West, I read materially). That is, it considers 
anti-racism an axiomatic position. Anti-racism is not an ideal to be achieved, but is a non-
negotiable commitment. Implementing policies and defending norms grounded in this 
commitment will have revolutionary implications in a society that does not share this axiom. As 
Cone demonstrates, this simple axiom has the potential to also revolutionize epistemological and 
theological methodologies.  
As will become important in the discussion of Cone’s two tropics of blackness, this 
categorization of anti-racism as axiomatic differs from a socialist critique of capitalism, which is 
not axiomatic but is induced from historical and material analyses of particular forms of market 
economies and production schemes reliant on private property. As Marx’s own abolitionist 
commitments demonstrate, while racism and capitalism have historically mutually reinforced 
each other, especially in America and its predecessor colonies since at least the 17th century, anti-
racism is an axiomatic position that is both above and besides argument, while anti-capitalism is 
a non-obvious position that requires “scientific” study. Both anti-racism and anti-capitalism, 
though, are ultimately measured by material means and almost always overlap in their concrete 
commitments, for example in favor of the democratic production and control of goods; the 
abolition of police, jails, and ICE; and the smashing of predatory high finance and banking. Any 
marginal position that adheres to one but not the other political program—for example, the 
endorsement of a socialist planned economy that excludes a racial underclass,206 which would be 
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anti-capitalist but not anti-racist, or the endorsement of a “black Wall Street,” which would be 
anti-racist but not anti-capitalist—should be rejected, as total emancipation is possible only if 
both an axiomatic commitment to anti-racism and a scientific commitment to anti-capitalism are 
implemented without negotiation. 
Importantly, and like Kierkegaard’s critique of Gert Westphaler’s loquaciousness, this 
axiomatic commitment to anti-racism also implies that calls for discussion, listening, dialogue, 
rethinking, conversations, hugging,207 and so on are only ever deferrals of positions that should 
be immediately implemented.208 In the twenty-first century, any particular need to listen and 
dialogue is evidence only of years of an intentional deafness and isolation. Poor people and the 
racially oppressed, presumably, know that they do not want to be poor and do not want to be 
oppressed, and so do not need to listen to anyone to learn this. Of course, and as Cone’s entire 
project demonstrates, there is always room for learning, escalating, and radicalizing. But this 
sense of dialogue—a nearly kenotic sense wherein the point of dialogue is to get beyond 
dialogue—is radically different from any colloquial or commonsense understanding of 
“dialogue.” 
This commitment to not listening anymore—the time for listening has passed—is 
antithetical to the dominant “race relations” framework of racism, which is pointed toward in all 
these calls for discussion, listening, and so on. The race relations framework thinks of racism as 
primarily a problem of bias against, discrimination toward, or oppression of one “race,” typically 
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black, by another, typically white.209 As Stephen Steinberg shows, this race relations framework 
has dominated the sociology of race from its institutional inception in the 1930s and achieved 
mainstream hegemony via government programs and documents such as the Moynihan Report210 
and the Clinton Race Initiative.211 Because of its attention to the relationship between ascriptive 
races, reliance on this framework typically leads to concerns with disparities in economics, 
health, education, and so on. Generally, this concern with disparities leads to a normative 
preference for representationally equitable diversity: Diversity becomes the solution to the 
problem of disparities.  
 Sara Ahmed212 and James Thomas213 each argue that the race relations framework has 
achieved hegemonic status within the academy largely through its institutionalization in 
“diversity offices” and the like. A performance of petit bourgeois cultural capital (and, more and 
more, material capital), the discussion of diversity as solution to the problem of disparity, as 
Cedrick Michael-Simmons notes, displaces the actual site of violence: “If I were an employer, 
why wouldn’t I want to hire a specialist to train workers to believe that their own identities and 
unconscious biases are the main sources of inequality, instead of exploitative workplace 
practices?”214 Unfortunately, this displacement has been internalized in theological texts 
concerned with racism. Books such as Can ‘White’ People Be Saved? Triangulating Race, 
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Theology, and Mission,215 and Redisciplining the White Church: From Cheap Diversity to True 
Solidarity216 assume that the problem with racism is one of disparities and so follow closely the 
race relations paradigm. Can White People Be Saved? begins by rehearsing the familiar statistics 
concerning pay inequalities between different ascriptive identities, and then claims that these 
economic inequalities “revolve around race.” Swanson ostensibly distances himself from “cheap 
diversity” discourses, but opts to substitute these discourses for one of “segregation.” This 
theologization of what is mostly a bureaucratic and administrative discourse, in turn, functions to 
provide “activist” and “on the ground” credibility for advocates of the race relations framework. 
That is, by internalizing race relations arguments and then externalizing them through pastoral 
and ministerial care, the theology of race relations provides a post-facto justification and 
authority for the original dissemination of the race relations framework. 
From the perspective developed in this text’s previous chapters, there are at least three 
problems with the race relations framework, and so with the dominant theological discourse 
concerning race and anti-racism.  
The first problem concerns the these discourses’ ambiguous relationship to capital. As 
Walter Benn Michaels argues, the race relations framework substitutes a critique of the fact of 
inequality for a critique of lack of diversity.217 This language of diversity, though, is categorically 
incapable of addressing economic inequality, and so does not address the need for anti-
capitalism. Indeed, the race relations framework’s language of diversity, which is a possible 
response to the problem of oppression, is qualitatively different from the language of inequality, 
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which is an analytic category that responds not to oppression, but to exploitation. “Economic 
diversity,” although promoted by the institutions critiqued by Ahmed and Thomas, is nonsensical 
as an emancipatory project: the goal for an emancipatory politics is not the equal representation 
of poor and rich, exploited and exploiter, but of the total abolition of both the capitalistic 
structure productive of poor and rich and the systematic racism that feeds and is fed by capitalist 
structures. In other words, because of its preference for diversity discourses over inequality ones, 
the race relations framework tacitly countersigns the acceptability of “disparities” caused by the 
market. A critique of the exploitative difference between poor and rich is displaced by, as 
opposed to supplemented with, a myopic attention to the internal differentiation of the poor. 
Finally then, and as Adolph Reed Jr. has commented, the race relations framework, ostensibly 
anti-racist, serves the disruptive role within the proletariat formerly enacted by racism itself.218 
 Secondly, from a deconstructive and anti-metaphysical perspective, the race relations 
framework too quickly accepts reified—that is, ontological—notions of race. Too often the race 
relations paradigm, which has no anti-metaphysical critical impulse, accepts at face value 
colloquial and commonsensical understandings of race. This is a political problem because such 
pop-sociological framings are unaware of or unconcerned with the ideological and historical 
dimensions of these categories—and it is precisely these ideological and historical dimensions of 
race, not the empty ontological dimension, that needs to be addressed in order to smash the 
infrastructural possibility of racism as such. As womanist theologian and anti-racist activist 
Charlene Sinclair argues, “blackness gives us more than a clue to the marginalized people in the 
United States; if probed deeply, it reveals the infrastructure that supports the alienating 
oppression of those at the bottom . . . Once this infrastructure previously hidden by the cloak of 
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melanin is revealed, structural transformation, not merely recognition, becomes the 
imperative.”219 The race relations framework—hoping for equal representation, lacking an anti-
capitalist critique, and endorsing colloquial ontologized understandings of race—begins and ends 
with this cloak of melanin.  
While Sinclair is attuned to the ways in which blackness covers structural injustice—and 
Cone will similarly focus on blackness—the same anti-metaphysical argument can and should be 
made in terms of whiteness. Here, the pertinent critique is against any metaphysical notion of 
whiteness in general and any construction of “whiteness” that adheres to a Platonic participatory 
metaphysics in particular: It is only with such a metaphysics—logocentric, impossible, doubly 
fake—that an impoverished white warehouse worker forced by his supervisor to urinate in a soda 
bottle can feel some sort of ascriptive solidarity with, for example, Jeff Bezos. It is only through 
a metaphysical and essentialist perspective that this fictional worker and Bezos both participate 
in some metaphysical thing called whiteness. That is, it is also only through such a metaphysical 
perspective that Bezos and other capitalist oligarchs can be read by white workers as “racial 
friends” as opposed to “class enemies”—this substitution of racial fraternity for class enmity 
being one of racism’s most enduring and pernicious effects. In this way, Martin Luther King’s 
arguments concerning the deleterious effects of racism on white people should be understood as 
referring not only to the spiritual disease of enforcing racial hierarchy, but also to the material 
damage caused by the proliferation of racist, and so anti-solidaristic, practices. That notions as 
patently absurd and ontologically groundless as white supremacy, racial hierarchies, and so on 
have achieved some purchase on people’s lived experience, especially when this purchase is 
																																																						
219 Charlene Sinclair, “Toward a Twenty-First Century Black Liberation Ethic: A Marxist Reclamation of 
Ontological Blackness” from The reemergence of liberation theologies: Models for the twenty-first century, ed. 
Cooper (Palgrave Macmillan,2013) 
	 247	
harmful to white workers material interests, is only further evidence of the need to critique the 
entire metaphysical-ideological enterprise from the infrastuctural ground up: White racism 
should be rejected and resisted everywhere for both its dehumanizing and violent treatment of 
ascriptively black people and for its role in occluding the possibility of cross-racial class 
solidarity. All of which is to say: The metaphysical fiction whiteness—which has gained actual 
power along the lines of other deeply-reified fictions like money, property, and so on—is a 
problem for both anti-racism and anti-capitalism. The race relations paradigm, which accepts at 
face value the foundational existence of “whiteness,” cannot account for the full breadth of the 
category’s depravity. 
Thirdly, from a dialectical materialist perspective, and gestured toward directly above, 
this emphasis on disparities within the oppressed formally elides the problems of economic, 
health, education, and so on inequalities. That is: As of 2018, there were 38.1 million Americans 
in poverty. Of these, 20.8%, or roughly 7.9 million, self-identified as black. A focus on 
disparities would suggest that the problem here is that black people are over-represented amongst 
the impoverished by roughly 8%, or 2.8 million people. From a materialist perspective, though, 
the immediate problem with these statistics is that 38.1 million Americans live in poverty.220 
While a critique of disparity is important for understanding and ultimately undoing this basic 
inequality, the race relations framework encourages the substitution of this infrastructural 
critique with a diversity one. While this materialist perspective is sometimes critiqued as 
“reductionist” or “colorblind,”221  it is important to note that the abolition of poverty would 
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disproportionately benefit black people more than would a mere correction of current disparities. 
According to general population demographics, there “should be” 5.1 million blacks living in 
poverty. A move toward this proportionate representation of the poor would, thus, require 
“lifting” 2.8 million black people out of poverty (and a lowering of 2.8 million whites into 
poverty). Instead, a total abolition of poverty according to a universalist anti-capitalist regime 
would “lift” 7.9 million self-identified black people out of poverty. The focus on disparities and 
a diversification solution, then, ultimately helps not only the poor in general, but the black poor 
in particular, much less than would a critique on the possibility of economic inequality as such. 
In other words, not diversity offices but Marxist political economy, through its own anti-racist 
and anti-capitalist analyses and commitments, has the potential to actually resist both racism and 
capitalism, and so has the potential to improve the lives of both the racially oppressed and 
economically exploited. Anti-capitalisms that promote white supremacy and anti-racisms that 
promote capitalism—and I am arguing that the race relations and structural racism frameworks 
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are examples of the latter—are both deeply antagonistic to this totally emancipatory Marxist 
critique, which I find explicitly in West and implicitly in Cone. 
 
The Risk of Faith 
 
J. Kameron Carter has described James Cone’s ontology as an “I-Thou” ontology: 
“Because the I-Thou relationship is constitutive of existence and therefore of what it means to 
be—this is Cone’s ontology, as I have cast it—the I-Thou relationship does not pass away.”222 
That is, Cone begins with the simple premise that every person is an “I.” This I-ness, though, is 
not recognized in exploitative and discriminatory relationships, which follow a model not of I-
Thou, but of I-It. The correction of this I-It relationship into an I-Thou one is, according to Cone, 
the project of emancipation. To the extent that Cone is making an apodictic claim regarding how 
things really are—every person is an I—Carter’s rendering of Cone’s position as ontological 
coheres. Yet, and as will become both a merit of and a problem within Cone’s work, this 
ontological claim is also operative on existential and, most of all, theological registers. That is, 
while Cone is making an ontological claim here, he is doing so through reference to a theological 
position: For Cone, it is above all the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ that both 
reveals and confirms the “I-ness” of each person. This is Cone’s interpretation of the imago dei, 
and it is foundational for his project in general.  
 That this theologically-informed ontological claim has existential and political 
implications is made clear when Cone provides semantic content to his understanding of “I-ness” 
and to the imago dei. For Cone, the imago dei is primarily a declaration of freedom from 
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externally imposed restriction, especially those that prevent or occlude the ability to pursue self-
determination. That is, Cone is identifying freedom from oppression and freedom to create as 
divine attributes, and thus, by extension through the imago dei, as human attributes: “To be 
human is to be in the image of God--that is, to be creative . . . The image of God refers to the 
way in which God intends human beings to live in the world” (BTL, 99).223 And so the “I” that is 
recognized in Cone’s I-Thou ontology signals the divinely-secured freedom to create free of 
external obstruction: “In order to be free, a person must be able to make choices that are not 
dependent on an oppressive system” (BTL, 102). And again: “A man is free when he can 
determine the style of his existence in an absurd world; a man is free when he sees himself for 
what he is and not as others define him. He is free when he determines the limits of his 
existence” (BTBP, 28). 
 And so Cone’s theological axiom that every person is created for the sake of freedom has 
an intrinsic relationship to political praxis. Cone is reading the imago dei as meaning that the 
human person was created to freely determine his or her own “limits of existence.” Understood 
in this way, the human person is not “free” in an internal or abstractly spiritual sense, but is free 
as created in the image of the self-determining God. For Cone, then, there is an intrinsic 
relationship between theology understood as discourse about God and our understanding of 
quotidian human existence: because humans image God, to talk about God is necessarily to talk 
about the ontological reality of humans.  
As Cone himself notes, since the beginning of Christian theology, the imago dei has been 
subject to vast and mutually exclusive interpretations (BTL, 95-100). And so it is worth asking 
where and how Cone is settling on his understanding of the doctrine as implying self-
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determination. As I have shown above, the claim has a certain syllogistic coherence, wherein the 
transitive property seems to suggest that God’s limitlessness implies humanity’s. Yet, Cone is 
typically wary of such a procedure, preferring to speak, with Barth, of the absolute qualitative 
difference between God and creature (BTL, 51; BTBP, 37, 86), even if he sometimes suggests 
that Barth’s emphasis on difference results in a God too far removed from historical projects 
(GO, 107).224 Indeed, Cone more often speaks of the impossibility of knowing God in se. This 
apophatic commitment problematizes any easy analogy between God and creature, especially 
one articulated in typically metaphysical terms such as omnipotence. 
When Cone does use analogical language to relate God and creature, he tends to do so in 
terms of what Carter calls an analogia existentia (RTA, 171). For Cone, both God, as Jesus, and 
creature share in the struggle against exploitation and oppression. Importantly, this analogous 
relationship—both God and human resist exploitation, although in irreducibly different ways 
because God is not just a participant in the struggle for freedom but is the creator of the 
possibility of freedom—exists purely because of God’s decision to enter human history as 
oppressed. God takes on the role of freedom fighter, and so we can, in a phrase that will prove 
problematic, “become black with God” by likewise taking on this role. This association of God 
and struggle will become more important shortly, but for now the pertinent point is simply that 
the relationship between God and creature, for Cone, is one that takes place predominantly in 
history and in the very real and concrete historical project of emancipation. This is a relationship 
qualitatively different than the syllogistically accented transitive relationship described above.  
All of which leaves the question open: If Cone says that the imago dei means that humans 
share in God’s ontological freedom to create—that is, in the freedom of self-determination—but 
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if Cone is both hesitant to use ontological language to refer to God in se and prefers to speak of 
the relationship between God and creature as one of a shared historical struggle, then from where 
does the important language of self-determination come? Although identifying influence is not 
my primary concern, it is a historical fact that the language of self-determination was prominent 
in the Black Power tradition to which Cone appealed. And not only self-determination, but also a 
resistance to integration, a penchant for nationalism, and a sympathy for “third world” anti-
imperial resistances were all popular political motifs for both Black Power advocates and 
Cone.225 Cone, for his part, would not deny this convergence between the political commitments 
of Black Power and the theological commitments of his own black theology. Indeed, such a 
convergence is the point of Black Theology and Black Power: “My concern is to show that the 
goal and message of Black Power is consistent with the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Indeed, I have 
even suggested that if Christ is present among the oppressed, as he promised, he must be 
working through the activity of Black Power” (BTBP, 48). The possibility of this convergence 
between radical secular politics and political theology is one of my major points in this text. 
Yet, this convergence functions ambiguously in Cone’s work. The convergence between 
ontological claims concerning self-determination and political ones is harbored, for Cone, by 
theology. In this sense, which for all of Cone’s radicalism is, as Derrida argued, the classical 
sense, theology becomes the discourse that secures the identity of thinking and being—or, more 
specifically here, the identity of politics and ontology. As I will show shortly, Cone is aware of 
the risk that this identity runs, and takes steps to account for it. Yet, despite Cone’s awareness of 
this risk, this association of theology, ontology, and politics opens the possibility of the 
ontologization of a too-particular understanding of blackness. This, in short, will be the charge 
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levied against Cone by Anderson. My point here is that this ontologization was prefigured from 
the very beginning of Cone’s project, which begins with a theo-politically informed ontological 
axiom concerning self-determination. While Anderson will argue that this ontologization is a 
problematic element of Cone’s work, and while my reading of Derrida’s and Kierkegaard’s 
deconstructive and existentialist critiques of ontotheology would likewise resist this 
ontologization, the close proximity Cone has established between ontology and politics, a 
proximity governed by theology, also potentially historicizes and so denaturalizes ontological 
claims. And so while Cone does display ontologizing tendencies from the beginning, and while 
he does sometimes revert to an ontologized language when speaking theologically, he also, from 
the very beginning, understands ontology in an explicitly political, historical, and contingent 
way. That his ontological axiom concerning self-determination is, if not informed by, at least 
intentionally convergent with the political positions of the Black Power movement is precisely 
what one would expect given my previous discussion of the “double fake” structure of all 
metaphysical decision. That is, Cone’s ostensibly theologically informed ontological claims 
might always actually be informed by the particular political commitments of Stokely 
Carmichael. Yet, Cone demonstrates and sometimes even declares that this undecidability—who 
is working here? Stokely Carmichael or Jesus Christ? What’s the difference?—is the proper 
relationship between theology, ontology, and politics. 
This question of ontology will return in this chapter’s next section. For now, I want to 
refocus on the novel and potentially radical effects of Cone’s onto-theo-political commitment to 
the axiom of self-determination—whatever its motivation and whatever its source. In Black 
Theology and Black Power, Cone relies on Albert Camus’ theorization of the absurd to articulate 
the political effects of this ontological axiom. Cone notes that, for Camus, “the absurd” is neither 
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the world nor the person, but instead arises in the encounter of the person with the world (BTBP, 
11). The locating of the absurd in the relationship between world and person allows Cone to both 
maintain his ontological commitment concerning freedom and the imago dei while recognizing 
that these ontological and theological truths are not empirically manifest in the world. This 
empirical contradiction with an ontological truth is, according to Cone, constitutive of the black 
condition:  
It is not that the black man is absurd or that the white society as such is absurd. Absurdity 
arises as the black man seeks to understand his place in the white world. The black man 
does not view himself as absurd; he views himself as human. But as he meets the white 
world and its values, he is confronted with an almighty ‘No’ and is defined as a thing. 
This produces the absurdity (BTBP, 11). 
The white world’s resistance to black self-determination means that the white world subjects 
black people to “I-It,” as opposed to I-Thou, relationships. In his less ontological moments, Cone 
will contrast the presence of this I-It structure not with the ontological affirmation of the “I-ness” 
of black people, and so with the ontological truth of the unavoidability of I-Thou relationships, 
but with a futurally-oriented utopian critique concerning what “ought to be”: 
Truth is a question not only of what is but of what ought to be. What is, is determined by 
the existing societal relations of material production, with the ruling class controlling the 
means of production as well as the intellectual forces which justify the present political 
arrangements. What ought to be is defined by what can be through the revolutionary 
praxis of the proletarian class, overthrowing unjust societal conditions (GO, 38).  
His use of the category of “truth” means that Cone is not simply contrasting empirical reality 
with ontological reality. He is doing this, of course: one of the productive dialectics throughout 
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Cone’s work is that between empirical reality and ontological reality. Black, poor, and exploited 
people ontologically are people, even if they are not treated as such. Cone will never waver on 
this, and he considers it a basic, important, and inarguable axiom. Yet, as mentioned above, if 
Cone stopped here he would be subject to deconstructive criticisms concerning the distinction 
between thinking and being, as if Cone was only concerned with allowing an ontological 
structure—and one that, given empirical injustices, could only be considered a fiction—to ideally 
critique empirical reality. This is not what Cone is doing. Instead, Cone is here claiming that the 
“truth” is that black, poor, and exploited people ought to be treated as they really are—as I’s. 
 Cone most directly articulates the relationship between this actualizing epistemology and 
the discipline of theology in A Black Theology of Liberation. It is here that Cone declares that 
“there is no real speech about God except in relationship to the liberation of the oppressed” (88) 
and that “whatever theology says about God and the world must arise out of its sole reason for 
existence as a discipline: to assist the oppressed in their liberation” (4). This understanding of 
theology as a discourse of assisting the poor and oppressed in their quest for self-determination is 
consistent not only with Cone’s reliance on the imago dei, but also with his understanding of 
Jesus as primarily God’s incarnated declaration that God is on the side of the oppressed in 
general and, in the American context, the side of poor blacks in particular (BTL, 125-130). 
Moreover, this affirmation that true theology has its “sole reason for existence” in the assistance 
of liberation helps us reread Cone’s initial interpretation of the imago dei: now with this 
understanding of theology as necessarily pro-liberation, Cone’s translation of God’s 
omnipotence into an affirmation of human self-determination reads less problematically 
metaphysical than it might have initially. The theological claim of omnipotence, Cone now 
makes clear, can never have been anything but a statement concerning the liberation of the 
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exploited and oppressed. A Black Theology of Liberation extends this program of an 
emancipatory reading of theological categories in chapters on the theological motifs of 
revelation, God, Jesus, the human, and the church.226 
While Cone is by no means the first to argue that theology should or does serve 
emancipatory ends (and that it should but does not is part of Cone’s institutional critique), his 
project is marked by its interpretation of emancipation according to the norm of self-
determination. That is, Cone’s epistemology does not make the formal argument that truth is 
actual or needs to be actualized in order to be true, nor does it adopt the left-liberal position that 
the poor and exploited should be granted some sort of preferential privilege or treatment when 
making decisions. Cone’s point is much stronger: the truth is, everyone has a (theological, 
ontological) right to self-determination. This right must be primary, and so cannot be denuded by 
or translated into any ethical regime that does not take this axiom of self-determination as 
determinative. The failure of some Christians to oppose slavery, to free the poor from bondage, 
and from treating all people as I’s, that is, the existence of what Cone calls “white Christianity,” 
is the result of not internalizing the axiom of self-determination. “Christian ethics” must be, but 
has not been, thought with constant and unique reference to the oppressed’s occluded self-
determination: “Theologians of the Christian church have not interpreted Christian ethics as an 
act for the liberation of the oppressed because their views of divine revelation were defined by 
philosophy and other cultural values rather than by the biblical theme of God as the liberator of 
the oppressed” (GO, 183). No philosophical morality and no “cultural values,” which must 
																																																						
226 In doing so, Cone relies on a recursive, even sometimes aphoristic, style. I am suggesting here that the axiom of 
self-determination is one of the central motifs by which Cone interprets his theological tradition. Other motifs, all 
related, would include Christ as liberator, the blackness of God, the unknowability of God, and the demand of 
freedom. Cone likely adopted elements of this style--wherein central motifs are recurrently used to interpret various 
data--from his deep reading of Barth, who used a similar style. See: George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: 
The Shape of His Theology (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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include juridical regimes, can determine the validity or normative weight of any ethics. Indeed, 
given the predominance of exploitation, a subservience to dominant philosophical moralisms and 
cultural mores is a sure sign of a reactionary ethics—that is, an ethics against the liberation of the 
oppressed. Cone is arguing for a radical rejection of any and all norms, laws, politics, and ethics 
that do not begin and end with the right of self-determination. 
 Throughout his project, Cone applies this standard unremittingly, and sometimes with 
controversial if not intentionally provocative results. Consider, for example, Cone’s treatment of 
the question of revolutionary violence’s relationship to the Christian ethic of non-violence: 
“Violence is not primarily a theoretical question but a practical question, and it should be viewed 
in the context of Christian ethics generally and the struggle of liberation in particular” (GO, 180). 
For Cone, any analysis of violence that begins with anything but the axiom of self-determination 
must be misguided. Such misguided analyses would include those ostensibly Christian ethical 
programs that take as axiomatic not freedom, but instead non-violence.227 In the concrete, this 
task entails beginning not just with the formal principle of self-determination, but specifically 
with those people whose self-determination is occluded—variously in Cone, the poor, blacks, 
and, more encompassingly, “the oppressed.” The poor, black, and oppressed, not philosophers, 
not theologians, not judges, and certainly not professional-managerial-class “race relations” 
administrators, determine the truth about violence and liberation:  
In dealing with the question of violence and black people, Black Theology does not begin 
by assuming that this question can be answered merely by looking at the Western 
																																																						
227 And also would include libertarian political theorists who appeal to the so-called “non-aggression principle.” The 
problem here would not only be that be that the non-aggression principle actually functions to “aggressively” defend 
property rights (see: Matt Zwolinski, “The Libertarian Nonaggression Principle,” Social Philosophy and Policy 32.3 
(2016), 62-90), but more simply that libertarians begin with something other than an undying commitment to self-
determination. In short, Cone relativizes a position on “aggression” for the sake of defending self-determination, 
while libertarians relativize self-determination for the sake of resisting so-called aggression. 
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distinction between right and wrong. It begins by looking at the face of black America in 
the light of Jesus Christ. To be Christian means that one is concerned not about good and 
evil in the abstract but about men who are lynched, beaten, and denied the basic needs of 
life (BTBP, 141). 
Allowing the self-determination of the oppressed to guide his ethics, Cone turns Nietzsche on his 
head. For Nietzsche, “slave morality” involves the reactionary substitution of a “good-evil” 
moral matrix in place of an “aristocratic” moral matrix of “good-bad.” The slave, for example, is 
denied the freedom to pursue self-determination. For aristocratic morality, which is based on 
sentiment, this denial would be “bad.” In slave morality, which reacts against aristocratic 
sentiment and so is a morality of re-sentiment, the denial of self-determination becomes “good” 
in contrast to the “evil” of the slave master who denies this self-determination. And so that which 
is originally considered “bad” by aristocratic morality is, through the process of slave morality 
ressentiment, revalued as “good.” Likewise, that which is “good” according to aristocratic 
morality, for example actualized self-determination, is read as “evil” by slaves.228 
 Cone’s study of actual American chattel slave morality, especially read through his 
absolute privileging of the right of self-determination, totally undermines Nietzsche’s 
configuration. Central to Nietzsche’s account is the notion that slave morality is resentful and 
reactionary: a social situation is imposed, and a reaction against this situation and the seeming 
impossibility of resistance leads to a valorization, a making “good,” of what should be, according 
to aristocratic norms, “bad.” Cone disputes this rendering of slave morality as reactionary by 
noting slaves’ active resistance to their oppression. The tenets of slave morality were not formed 
in reaction to aristocratic noble values, but were instead inspired by a need and desire for self-
																																																						
228 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. and ed. Kaufmann (Vintage, 1989) 
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determination. For example, concerning theft, “black slaves made a distinction between 
‘stealing’ and ‘taking.’ Stealing meant taking from a fellow slave, and slave ethics did not 
condone that. But to take from white folks was not wrong, because they were merely 
appropriating what was in fact rightfully theirs” (GO, 192). A similar ethical logic guided an 
endorsement of deception and lying if done for the sake defending slaves’ lives and wellbeing. In 
these cases, Cone is not arguing that the slaves begrudgingly accepted the pragmatic necessity of 
stealing and deception. Such a rendering would maintain a negative moral connotation. Much 
more strongly, Cone is arguing that, for the slaves, stealing and deceiving were good because 
they worked toward and promoted self-determination. While theft and deception occurred in a 
context of violent oppression and so resisted others, the judgment that these activities were good 
occurred independently of the ideological machinations of master morality. The actual site of 
reactionary morality is found not in this endorsement of theft and deception, but in the master’s 
morality constructed to deny the slaves’ right of self-determination. In short, “slaves did not feel 
themselves bound to white morality” (GO, 192). 
 In the case of slave violence, Cone frequently makes positive statements concerning slave 
rebellions and the killing of slave owners. Nat Turner and John Brown are heroes, unambiguous 
heroes, in Cone’s telling. The black abolitionist minister Henry Highland Garnet, who “even 
argued that it was both a political and Christian right that slaves should rise in revolt against their 
white masters by taking up arms against them,” is approvingly cited more than a few times 
(BTBP, 96; BTL, 36-37; GO, 29, 48, 141, 176, 178, 196, 220). Perhaps most powerfully, Cone 
critiques Theo Lehmann’s interpretation of slave spirituals as promoting otherworldly, as 
opposed to this-worldly, liberation. For Cone, such a reading fails to account for “the role of 
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spirituals in resurrections in which many whites were killed” (SB, 134n37).229 Indeed, for Cone, 
black theology originated in these acts of divine violence: Black theology “came into being when 
the black clergy realized that killing slave masters was doing the work of God” (BTL, 27). 
Moreover, what is needed now is not a domesticating move away from this founding violence. 
Instead, given the persistence of oppressive violence, Cone considers it a “sin” to “try to 
understand enslavers, to love them on their own terms.” Rather than understand and love 
oppressors, “the oppressed now recognize their situation in light of God’s revelation, they know 
that they should have killed their oppressors instead of trying to love them” (BTL, 54). 
 This is all consistent with the axiomatic foundation and argumentative thrust of Cone’s 
entire project. In a phrase that could have been written by any number of controversial but 
ultimately emancipatory revolutionaries—including Fidel Castro (“history will absolve me”)230 
and Ernesto Guevara (“a people without hate cannot triumph over a brutal enemy”)231—Cone 
summarizes his position: “In the moment of liberation, there are no universal truths; there is only 
the truth of liberation itself, which the oppressed themselves define in the struggle for freedom” 
(BTL, 106). Killing slave masters is the truth of God, because the truth of God is that the 
oppressed should be set free. Cone is arguing for a radical and complete revaluation of all morals 
according to the highest value of emancipation as measured by the norm of self-determination.  
																																																						
229 James Cone, The Spirituals and the Blues: An Interpretation (Orbis Books, 1992). 
230 Fidel Castro, The Declarations of Havana (Verso Books, 2018) 
231 A study of the relationship between Cuba and the Black Panthers, and so by extension Cone, is just outside the 
scope of this project. However, it should at least be noted that the Panthers’ emphasis on self-determination was one 
shared by the Cuban revolutionaries. This association suggests the possibility of a more originally internationalist 
perspective to Cone’s thought than is typically admitted, even by Cone himself. See: Ruth Reitan, “Cuba, the Black 
Panther Party, and the US Black Movement in the 1960s: Issues of security,” New Political Science 21.1 (1999), 
217-230. For the Cuban emphasis on self-determination, see: Ernesto Guevara, “At the United Nations,” in Che 
Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution (Ocean Press, 2003), pgs 325-339, wherein Guevara argues 
that colonialism is a process of suppressing self-determination. 
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 Because of its centrality to not only Cone’s ethics, but indeed to his entire theology, any 
engagement with Cone that styles itself sympathetic should not domesticate, explain away, or 
ignore Cone’s radicalism on this point. Such is the approach taken by, for example, D. Stephen 
Long in his Divine Economy: Theology and the Market.232 After suggesting that “black theology” 
“could easily resemble fascism,” Long argues that, actually, “it is unclear that black theology 
advocates any possible employment of violence based purely on its effectiveness” (170). Long 
continues: 
Cone’s own defense of violence could be construed as consistent not with Luther’s 
voluntaristic conception of warfare (which seems ineluctably to lead to Clausewitz) but 
with that of Thomas Aquinas, who argued for the legitimacy of tyrannicide if it furthered 
the common good . . . And the ‘any means necessary’ that Cone asserts has primarily to 
do with ‘selective buying, boycotting, marching, or even rebellion.’ He does suggest that 
‘all acts which participate in the destruction of white racism are Christian,’ but he also 
maintains that it ‘is not possible to speak meaningfully to the black community about 
liberation unless it is analyzed from a Christian perspective which centers on Jesus 
Christ.’ 
Long’s concern here seems to be to convince moderate Christians that Cone’s calls for violence 
are not as radical as they might seem—that, actually, Cone is a Thomist, that “any means 
necessary,” means boycotts, and that, perhaps, the depiction of anti-racism as definitionally 
Christian is a rhetorical ploy by which Cone can “speak meaningfully to the black community.” 
The problem here is not only that Long directly contradicts Cone, who clearly and explicitly 
																																																						
232 D. Stephen Long, Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (Routledge, 2000). 
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positions his ethics as anti-Thomist,233 but also that Long reinscribes Cone—or a domesticated 
version of him—within the left-liberal “status quo” that Cone so forcefully resists. In doing so, 
Long has to impose erasure on Cone’s fundamental privileging of self-determination: whether or 
not “violence” is necessary—or, whether or not an act is violent according to a Christian ethic if 
violence still means something bad, regrettable, unfortunate—is precisely determined “purely on 
its effectiveness” at promoting and defending self-determination. 
 Moreover, this downplaying of Cone’s radical commitment to self-determination 
simultaneously exaggerates the radicalness of Cone’s demands and underestimates the severity 
of the crisis to which Cone is responding. That the rather mundane content of Cone’s demands—
to be treated as a human—could demand killing is evidence of the depth of racism and 
exploitation in America. Cone juxtaposes a small ask—to be treated as a person—with a radical 
consequence—killing—and so shows the asymmetry at play: the exploiters will fight to the death 
in order to maintain their hegemonic structures. In this sense, Cone reads John Brown, Nat 
Turner, and other martyrs not as aggressors, but as individuals who decided to live out self-
determination whatever the consequences—even if they involve violence: “This is Black Power, 
the power of the black man to say ‘Yes’ to his own ‘black being,’ and to make the other accept 
him or be prepared for a struggle” (BTBP, 8). 
 But as the fates of Nat Turner and John Brown show, such a living out of self-
determination is a risky, sometimes fateful, endeavor. Cone is aware of and does not shy away 
from this risk: living a free life in an oppressive society will necessarily cause conflict, as one’s 
																																																						
233 “The problem of identifying Christian ethics with the status quo is also found in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. 
While they differed regarding the role of faith and reason and theological discourse, they agreed that the slave 
should not seek to change his civil status through political struggle . . . For Thomas, slavery was a part of the natural 
order of creation. Thus ‘the slave, in regard to his master, is an instrument . . . Between a master and his slave there 
is a special right of domination’” (GO, 182). 
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life becomes both a symbolic judgment and a material resistance to the powerful. This sense of 
physical risk—the risk of martyrdom—is the primary sense Cone intends “risk” in Black 
Theology and Black Power. There, and working from the axioms articulated so far, Cone writes 
that “theology is not an intellectual exercise but a worldly risk” (BTBP, 84). This is because the 
task of theology is not (only) the production of discursive analyses of emancipation, but instead a 
“worldly” project of it. Because God’s truth is that the poor shouldn’t be poor, that the oppressed 
should be set free, and that all should have a right to self-determination, any discourse that does 
not produce real emancipatory fruits cannot be considered true. Cone is completely aligned with 
Kierkegaard on this point: it is one thing to say that God is for the poor, it is quite another to join 
the poor in their fight for freedom. Theology without this praxical element, for Cone, is white 
theology. 
 Important there is that Cone’s discussion of the emancipatory thrust of theology 
inherently expands beyond the narrow confines of institutional theological discourse. Cone’s 
claim is a universalist one. For Cone, God did not say that theologians should fight for the poor, 
but more generally that the poor should be free. It is in this derivative sense of reflection on 
God’s command that theology is necessarily an emancipatory project, but so too, in Cone’s 
rendering, ought be every discourse. Politics, economics, hard sciences, trades, literature, quite 
literally everything: all of this should be directed for the sake of the emancipation of the poor, 
which is the truth of God.234 This universalization of a necessarily risky project has been 
critiqued by some, such as Delores Williams, for imposing more suffering, work, and risk on 
																																																						
234 Cone’s universalist understanding of emancipation fits well with Ivan Petrella’s suggestion of “undercover” 
liberation theology. Petrella argues that theologians interested in liberation, precisely as interested in liberation, 
should look to imbue influence in secular spheres of knowledge and power. Liberation theology has been limited, 
Petrella argues, by its myopic attention to ecclesial and ministerial matters. This chapter’s next section will move 
Cone’s argument in this “undercover” direction. See: Ivan Petrella, “Liberation Theology Undercover,” Political 
Theology 18.4 (2017), 325-339. 
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those who are already especially suffering, working, and at risk.235 For Williams, Cone’s 
emphasis on and privileging of liberation reduces scripture’s multiple valences to a 
unidimensional emancipatory narrative. Williams looks to broaden Cone’s perspective through 
interpreting the biblical story of Hagar, an Egyptian slave and Ishmael’s surrogate mother (SW, 
15-32). In Williams’ retelling, the Hagar story demonstrates that God not only acts through 
liberation and emancipatory projects. Instead, God also consoles and comforts; God is not only 
about emancipation, but also survival: “God’s response to Hagar’s (and her child’s) situation was 
survival and involvement in their development of an appropriate quality of life, that is, 
appropriate to their situation and their heritage” (SW, 5). 
 Leaving aside the unanswered question of how “heritage” determines what counts as “an 
appropriate quality of life,” Williams is correct that the bible contains a plethora of stories 
wherein God does not act as liberator—or where God does not support liberation at all.236 At the 
same time, Cone does account for lamentations and spiritual sustenance, especially as found in 
the slave spirituals. The dispute between Williams and Cone on this point—the point of 
privileging emancipation or more even-handedly valuing both emancipation and survival—might 
well be read as an unsolvable antinomy: both programs appeal to both scripture and experience, 
and both present relatively self-coherent narratives. Moreover, Cone is aware in advance of 
Williams’ critique. Throughout his early texts, Cone writes that “freedom is not a gift but a right 
worth dying for” (BTBP, 12) and that “now it is incumbent upon us to behave like free persons” 
(BTL, 139). Cone is aware that his prescriptions are risky and dangerous, and prescribes them 
																																																						
235 Delores Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Orbis Books, 2013), esp. pgs. 
19-21 and 127-157. For a review of this critique, see: Andrew Prevot, Theology and Race: Black and Womanist 
Traditions in the United States (Brill, 2018), esp. pgs. 6, 51-52. 
236 This line is pursued by William Jones in Is God a White Racist? A Preamble to Black Theology (Beacon Press, 
1997). 
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anyway. Williams, on the other hand, is also aware of the risk of danger, and uses this risk as a 
reason for supporting, at least occasionally, a survivalist perspective. The two apparently offer 
simply different measurements of the reward of risk. 
 However, there is at least one point on which Williams seems to misread, as opposed to 
disagree with, Cone. Williams is concerned that Cone does not account for the particular risks 
his program of emancipation would impose upon women of color in general and black women in 
particular. This critique, though, misses that Cone’s project primarily imposes a burden onto the 
privileged, rich, white, male and so on. This disproportionate burden is the effect of Cone’s 
beginning with the axiom of self-determination. For Cone: 
A man is free when he accepts the responsibility for his own acts and knows that they 
involve not merely himself but all men. No one can ‘give’ or ‘help get’ freedom in that 
sense. In this picture the liberal can find no place. His favorite question when backed 
against the wall is ‘What can I do?’ One is tempted to reply, as Malcolm X did to the 
white girl who asked the same question, ‘Nothing’ (BTBP, 28) 
Because Cone is concerned with the self-determination of the poor and oppressed, only the poor 
and oppressed can be the active subjects of liberation. Charity does not promote self-
determination. Yet, because this command to be free is universal, and so applies not only to the 
poor and oppressed but also to the rich and the oppressors, all are called to join the struggle. It is 
in this universal sense that “there are places in the Black Power picture for radicals, that is, for 
men, white or black, who are prepared to risk life for freedom. There are places for the John 
Browns, men who hate evil and refuse to tolerate it anywhere” (BTBP, 28).237 That is, Cone is 
																																																						
237 Cone’s language here, as usual, is androcentric. While Derrida demonstrated the difficulty--if not impossibility--
of separating “language” from “thought,” the question for Cone remains: Does this androcentric language reveal a 
structural privileging of men or men’s experience? As usual, the answer should account for the double-fake structure 
of all metaphysical categories--and “men,” like “woman,” wherever it operates essentially is a metaphysical 
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calling upon the oppressors to give up their positions of power and join the oppressed; Cone is 
arguing for a program of self-proletarianization for the sake of a solidaristic promotion of self-
determination. It is in this sense of needing to be oppressed so that one can coherently fight for 
the self-determination of the oppressed that allows Cone to write that “only the oppressed are 
truly free!” (BTL, 92). Thus, when Cone claims that “now it is incumbent upon us to behave as 
free persons” (BTL, 139), he is in effect arguing that it is now incumbent upon us to be 
“identified with the struggle of the unfree” (GO, 135).  
 And so Cone’s emphasis on the self-determination of the poor articulates the particular 
manifestation of a universal truth: “There is no universalism that is not particular” (GO, 126). 
Williams’ penchant for particularity obfuscates this universalist drive, and so unintentionally 
lessens the burden that Cone has placed on the oppressors. By disengaging the powerful—those 
who create a need for a survivalist ethic in the first place—Williams has created an ethic of 
pseudo-nationalist withdrawal incapable of creating long term emancipatory change. Whereas 
other particularist movements and activists—such as the Combahee River Collective238 and 
																																																						
category. And so the answer to the question of Cone’s alleged sexism is twofold. First, Cone does not privilege 
men’s experience because there is no such thing as men’s experience--that Cone privileges, or thinks he privileges, 
“black experience” will be critiqued in this chapter’s next section. Second, I have been arguing that Cone’s project is 
a universalist one. In this sense, Cone’s preference for the signifier “man” over “human” might rhetorically exclude 
women--if either of these categories even have meaning--but his project is structurally and political open to 
everyone. In short, Cone’s linguistic prejudices should be read as faults according to his own higher logic--they are 
not examples of evidence of a deeper misogyny.  
238 “Combahee River Collective Statement,” accessible at: https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-
history/combahee-river-collective-statement-1977/. Two universalist positions are especially worth citing: 
“Although we are in essential agreement with Marx’s theory as it applied to the very specific economic relationships 
he analyzed, we know that his analysis must be extended further in order for us to understand our specific economic 
situation as Black women.” Here we see an effort not to withdraw from a political-economic program, but to expand 
it, that is, to move it closer to universalism. And when Barbara Smith, one of the document’s writers, articulates her 
understanding of “identity politics,” one cannot but read it as simpatico with Cone’s understanding of the 
universalist intention of self-determination: “This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of 
identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our 
own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression. In the case of Black women this is a 
particularly repugnant, dangerous, threatening, and therefore revolutionary concept because it is obvious from 
looking at all the political movements that have preceded us that anyone is more worthy of liberation than ourselves. 
We reject pedestals, queenhood, and walking ten paces behind. To be recognized as human, levelly human, is 
enough.” 
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Claudia Jones239—recognized that, ultimately, “survival” was dependent upon a massive, 
political restructuring of capitalist society, and so accounted for a universalist perspective, 
Williams’ emphasis on survival has too removed her program from any larger political project. 
Williams’ survivalist ethic might genuinely help the oppressed “find a way out of no way,” and 
might offer real spiritual sustenance and mutual aid. Yet, such gestures—which are real, and not 
merely symbolic—cannot, by definition, take the risky action necessary to structurally overthrow 
the systems that make spiritual sustenance and mutual aid necessary in the first place. In this 
sense, Williams’ critique of Cone’s project does not have much purchase on an emancipatory 
political theology.  
 This demand to join the oppressed in their struggle for freedom again associates Cone 
more with the radical revolutionary tradition than it does the boycotts, dialogues, and marching 
suggested by Long and the race relations framework. Cone is more Che Guevera than Robin 
DiAngelo. Where Guevara writes, “in a revolution one wins or dies, if it is a real one” (CGR, 
386), Cone writes, “when the Spirit of God gets hold of a man, he is made a new creature, a 
creature prepared to move head-on into the evils of this world, ready to die for God . . . To be 
possessed by God’s spirit means that the believer is willing to be obedient unto death” (BTBP, 
58-59). Where Guevara writes that “to die under the flag of Vietnam, of Venezuela, of 
Guatemala, of Laos, of Guinea, of Colombia, of Bolivia, of Brazil—to name only a few scenes 
of today's armed struggle—would be equally glorious and desirable for an American, an Asian, 
an African, even a European,”240 Cone writes that “it seems not only appropriate but necessary to 
																																																						
239 “Our party, based on its Marxist-Leninist principles, stands foursquare on a programme of full economic, 
political and social equality for the Negro people and of equal rights for women. Who, more than the Negro woman, 
the most exploited and oppressed, belongs in our party?" Claudia Jones, “An end to the neglect of the problems of 
the Negro woman!” accessible at: https://www.newframe.com/from-the-archive-an-end-to-the-neglect-of-the-
problems-of-the-negro-woman/ 
240 Che Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, ed. Lovemand & Davies (University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pg 174. 
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define the Christian community as the community of the oppressed which joins Jesus Christ in 
his fight for the liberation of humankind” (BTL, 3). Cone cites Stokely Carmichael, not John 
Lewis. Cone writes not about marching, but about Molotov cocktails: “We know, of course, that 
getting rid of evil takes something more than burning down buildings, but one must start 
somewhere” (BTL, 26). 
 All of this is morally and logically consistent with Cone’s original emphasis on the imago 
dei,  his “I-Thou ontology,” and his understanding of truth as the actualization of the poor and 
oppressed’s self-determination. In order to dispute Cone on this point of violence and radicalism, 
or on the associated point of survivalism as compared to risky emancipation, one would need to 
either dispute his original premises or demonstrate how this radicalism does not follow. 
However, as I have demonstrated with respect to Long, such a reinterpretation of Cone will 
always risk a downplaying of the depth of American racism and exploitation. Instead of arguing 
against Cone on the point of violence, then, or instead of domesticating Cone by reinscribing him 
within a bourgeois race-relations framework, I accept that his theology is radical, provocative, 
and emancipatory unto death. Yet, even within his own framework and self-understanding, there 
is room to sharpen and specify Cone’s presentation. While Cone consistently affirms the absolute 
epistemic privilege of emancipation, he also repeatedly affirms that his analyses as to the specific 
contents of both emancipation and oppression are open to revision. That is, while Cone is 
absolutely clear that the oppressed should be emancipated “by any means necessary” (BTL 48, 
104; GO, 172), he is also clear that the question as to which of these “means” is in fact 
“necessary” remains open: “Since God’s will does not come in the form of absolute principles 
applicable for all situations, our obedience to the divine will involves the risk of faith” (GO, 
190). That is, Cone has established an axiomatic politics that presupposes the truth that the 
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oppressed should be emancipated. But he has not established a concrete politics by which to 
enact this emancipation. He is open to violence, but has not divinized violence in a “fascist” way, 
because he is open to “violence” only if it contributes to the emancipation of the oppressed. And 
so Cone places the reader in a rather uncomfortable, if not downright aporetic, situation: The 
poor must be liberated by any means necessary, but nobody yet knows what those means are. 
This situation is what Cone intends by the risk of faith, the need to act without knowledge of the 
outcome, and without knowledge of what action is required: “Ethics in this context is a terrible 




 Victor Anderson’s charge that Cone ontologizes blackness is, by now, well known.241 In 
short, by ontologization Anderson has in mind any discourse that identifies a substantial essence. 
Ontological blackness, Anderson argues, is the discourse that articulates an essentially suffering 
black identity. In such a discourse, suffering and blackness are interchangeable and transferable, 
perhaps even synonymous, with each other. In Anderson’s reading, these essentialist discourses 
serve to alienate actual black people. This alienation is the result of an asymmetry between the 
essentialized ideals of blackness—especially black masculinity and black genius, defined as 
creative expression of some black virtue (resistance, struggle, perseverance, again masculinity) 
																																																						
241 See not only the aforecited texts by Carter, Prevot, and Sinclair, but also Tevor Eppeheimer’s “Victor Anderson’s 
Beyond Ontological Blackness and James Cone’s Black Theology: A Discussion,” Black Theology 4.1 (2006), 87-
106, Timothy McGee’s “Against (white) Redemption: James Cone and the Christological Disruption of Racial 
Discourse and White Solidarity” Political Theology 18.7 (2017), 542-559, and my “Black Hollyhock: Postmodernity 
in the Text of Black Theology,” Black Theology 18.1 (2020), 75-94, some of which I draw on in what follows. For 
Anderson’s critique, see not only his Beyond Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious and 
Cultural Criticism (Bloomsbury Academic, 2016) but also his “Black Ontology and Theology,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of African American Theology, ed. Pinn & Cannon (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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formed in reaction to oppression—and the lived experience of black people. That is, ontological 
blackness’s identification of blackness with a suffering substance erases all those who 
existentially identify as black and yet not with this ontological substance named black suffering.  
According to Anderson, Cone’s project follows these general ontological contours. 
Important here is Anderson’s critique that Cone, despite his own self-presentation, is not 
actually grounding his theology in “black experience.” Instead, Cone is ontologizing some 
particular experience and then hermeneutically privileging this ontological category as a means 
by which to interpret all “black” experience: “For Cone, the culture of black survival and black 
revolutionary consciousness constitute ontological schemes for interpreting the existential 
meaning of blackness” (BOT, 397). In this way, Cone is ostensibly “defining black existence by 
black experience,” but is not open with the fact that these governing experiences are both 
carefully curated and unnecessarily given ontological status.  
In responding to this charge, and in looking to go “beyond” it (RTA, 159), J. Kameron 
Carter has argued that Anderson does not engage carefully enough the particularly theological, 
or “pseudotheological,” component of Cone’s ontologizing. According to Carter, the properly 
theological problem with Cone’s ontologization is its immanentization of the transcendent:  
The breakthrough in Cone’s thought unravels in that his program unwittingly reinscribes 
the aberrant theology (or pseudotheology) of modern racial reasoning. This occurs 
insofar as Cone’s ontology disallows transcendence and thus recapitulates the inner logic 
of modern racial reasoning (RATA, 158). 
In making this critique, Carter is primarily concerned with the ways in which Cone’s reliance on 
Paul Tillich’s existential ontology, and so by extension Heidegger’s existential ontology, has led 
to a reduction of the transcendent otherness of God. Operating with a univocal understanding of 
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being, Cone is incapable of accounting for the “covenantal,” that is racially impure and so anti-
racist, character of Christ. Without an account of Jesus’ covenantal flesh, Cone is unable to 
overcome his ontologized understanding of race, which now signifies an immanent 
understanding of race. Against such immanence and univocity, Carter argues that “what is 
needed is a vision of Christian identity that calls us to holy ‘impurity’ and ‘promiscuity,’ a 
vision that calls for race trading against the benefits of whiteness so as to enter into the 
miscegenized or mulattic existence of divinization” (RTA, 192). 
While I agree with his assessment that Cone’s ontological language draws from Tillich’s 
existential ontology—and that this reliance might present its own unique set of problems—and 
while I countersign Carter’s efforts to establish an anti-essentialist understanding of race, 
Carter’s reinterpretation of Anderson’s critique ultimately softens Anderson’s critical edge. 
Anderson is correct that Cone, at least sometimes, identifies blackness and suffering. It is 
unclear to me, contra Carter, that a proper accounting of transcendence and “covenantal flesh”—
to say nothing of “miscegenized or mulattic existence,” categories that seem to multiply, not 
undo, racial logics—would necessarily alleviate these potential problems. Nor is it clear how a 
“vision” of these categories would allow one to “enter into . . . the existence of divinization.” 
Carter seems to be implying here that racism and oppression are matters of improper ontology, 
that exploitation is the result not of power and material interests, but of bad vision. Indeed, to 
argue that Cone’s identification of blackness with suffering is the result of a Tillichian 
existential ontology, and not some material experience, Carter must rely on a philosophical 
idealism against which his own preoccupations with flesh and history would suggest. That is, 
while Cone might be receiving the concept of an “ontological symbol” from Tillich, this does 
not mean that Tillich is determining Cone’s particular identification of blackness with 
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suffering—indeed, Tillich does not talk about blackness, and so cannot be determinative for 
Cone on this issue. Some other material must be informative. In this sense, a diachronic 
genealogical accounting of Cone’s ontology, which Carter provides, cannot explain the 
particular, synchronic content of this ontology. Moreover, if my previous arguments that all 
ontology masks a prior non-metaphysical decision are correct, then Cone’s ontology—which 
both Anderson and Carter detect—must have a non-ontological referent, or must somehow 
signify a non-ontological content. Identifying this non-ontological referent is this section’s task.  
In the previous section, I argued that Cone axiomatically declares the absolute right of 
self-determination. The question here is: What is the “self” that Cone intends when he makes 
this axiomatic declaration? In the most general sense, this self is simply “the oppressed.” In God 
of the Oppressed, Cone claims that Jesus is “the liberator of the oppressed” (GO, 74, 82); the 
liberation that Jesus the liberator enacts happens when “the oppressed realize their fight for 
freedom” (GO, 127); this freedom, in turn, is “defined by the oppressed” (GO, 135). Similar 
claims are made throughout Cone’s corpus. Yet, the fact remains that Cone often specifies “the 
oppressed”—that is, makes clear who is oppressed—in two related but ultimately non-identical 
ways. Sometimes, the oppressed are poor. Sometimes, the oppressed are black.  
Perhaps surprisingly given their more straightforwardly racial titles—although, as I will 
argue, given historical political-economic realities, not surprisingly at all—Cone’s tendency to 
speak in terms of class was more pronounced in his early texts. Consider the following passage 
from Black Theology and Black Power, which clearly identifies the poor as the emancipatory 
subject of self-determination:  
Jesus had little toleration for the middle- or upper-class religious snob whose attitude 
attempted to usurp the sovereignty of God and destroy the dignity of the poor. The 
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Kingdom is for the poor and not the rich because the former has nothing to expect from 
the world while the latter’s entire existence is grounded in his commitment to worldly 
things. The poor man may expect everything from God, while the rich man may expect 
nothing because he refuses to free himself from his own pride (36). 
And a few pages later, in the same text: 
God unquestionably will vindicate the poor. And if we can trust the New Testament, 
God became man in Jesus Christ in order that the poor might have the gospel preached to 
them; that the poor might have the Kingdom of God; that those who hunger might be 
satisfied; that those who weep might laugh. If God is to be true to himself, his 
righteousness must be directed to the helpless and the poor, those who can expect no 
security from this world. The rich, the secure, the suburbanite can have no part of God’s 
righteousness because of their trust and dependence on the things of this world (45). 
Cone even puts on God’s voice to say: “I became poor in Christ in order that man may not be 
poor” (BTBP, 46). The sentiment is repeated throughout A Black Theology of Liberation (“The 
kingdom is for the poor,” 107, 121) and God of the Oppressed (“the phrase ‘all are oppressed’ 
can only be understood from the perspective of the poor,” 137). In these same texts, however, 
Cone also identifies the emancipatory and privileged subject not with “the poor,” but with black 
people. In these moments Cone writes that “to be free is to be black” (BTL, 108), that “black 
people must use blackness as the sole criterion for dialogue” (BTBP, 148) and that “the 
blackness of God means that God has made the oppressed condition God’s own condition” 
(BTL, 67).  
Cone suggests a reconciliation of these two positions by metonymically relating them. 
The pertinent passage appears early in A Black Theology of Liberation: 
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We cannot describe God directly; we must use symbols that point to dimensions of reality 
that cannot be spoken of literally. Therefore to speak of black theology is to speak with 
the Tillichian understanding of symbol in mind. The focus on blackness does not mean 
that only blacks suffer as victims in a racist society, but that blackness is an ontological 
symbol and a visible reality which best describes what oppression means in America . . . 
Blackness, then, stands for all victims of oppression who realize that the survival of their 
humanity is bound up with liberation from whiteness (BTL, 8). 
And so these differing claims as to the identity of the emancipatory subject—poor, black—are 
not meant, in Cone’s logic, to compete with or exclude each other. Rather, Cone is suggesting 
that we read his use of “black” and “blackness” “symbolically.” It is such a symbolic—really, 
metonymic—usage that allows Cone to write passages like the now famous conclusion to Black 
Theology and Black Power:  
Being black in America has very little to do with skin color. To be black means that your 
heart, your soul, your mind, and your body are where the dispossessed are. We all know 
that a racist structure will reject and threaten a black man in white skin as quickly as a 
black man in black skin. It accepts and rewards whites in black skins nearly as well as 
whites in white skins (BTBP, 151). 
Other instances of this metonymic use of blackness are found throughout Cone’s oeuvre. For 
example, in God of the Oppressed we read that Jesus “is black because he was a Jew” (GO, 123). 
Here, blackness is metonymically substituting for any marginalized group, as the particularity of 
both Jewishness and blackness are meant to metonymically refer to generic oppression. And 
again, “in America,” Cone says, “God’s revelation on earth has always been black, red, or some 
other shocking shade, but never white” (BTBP, 150). Such a claim could only be coherently read 
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from within the metonymic hermeneutic Cone describes above: Jesus is “red” or “black,” but 
never white, because “red” and “black” represent particular manifestations of violent oppression 
in America—indigenous genocide and chattel slavery. It is in response to the continuation and 
persistence of the racist oppression of black people that Cone identifies Jesus, who is always 
with the oppressed, with blackness. In this sense,  Jesus is black because black people are 
oppressed. Jesus is black because blackness metonymically represents oppression, and not for 
any ontological reason.  
In such a structure, Cone’s use of racial categories is best understood as a metonymic 
generalization of a particular—and particularly pernicious—site of oppression. Cone is 
universally against all structures that limit or oppose self-determination, and this universalist 
position is particularized in and through Cone’s anti-racist commitments. A particular, empirical 
oppression—racism—is read against an axiomatic universalist commitment to self-
determination, and the discrepancy between what is and what should be is critiqued. Such is one 
tropic of blackness in Cone’s work, and it explains the freedom with which he translates “black” 
as “poor,” and vice versa: Blackness signifies an oppressed structural position.  
While such a structural approach has the advantage of avoiding what Ivan Petrella calls 
monochromatism—the belief, which Petrella finds throughout liberation theology but especially 
in black theology, that color, not social position, should be both epistemically and 
soteriologically privileged—it faces at least two important challenges.242  
The first challenge concerns the transhistoricism of any structural approach to racism.243 
For Cone, Jesus is both red and black, but never white; blackness stands for victims of 
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oppression, but only those who conceive of their oppression as “bound up with a liberation from 
whiteness.” And even when Cone is thinking explicitly in terms of class interests, he relies on the 
antagonistic category of whiteness: “Either we side with oppressed blacks and other unwanted 
minorities as they try to redefine the meaning of existence in a dehumanized society, or we take a 
stand with the President or whoever is defending the white establishment for General Motors and 
US Steel” (GO, 201). By associating General Motors and US Steel with the “white 
establishment,” and not with the corporate oligarch class, and by thus identifying white as the 
antithesis of not only red and black but also worker and poor, Cone ensures that his structural 
analysis is always anchored in antagonism to whiteness. Thus, while Cone’s use of blackness is 
not ontological in the sense of transhistorical—Cone never claims that blackness exists outside 
of history, but argues that it is the product of European modernity (BTBP, 16)—his 
understanding of whiteness is both transhistorical and overbroad. It is only by a trick of racecraft 
and participatory metaphysics that a 17th-century colonist, a factory line worker at GM, a highly 
paid executive at GM, and a 20th century white supremacist can all occupy the same structural 
location in an analysis of oppression. Incidentally, this same trick allows the “white” worker at 
GM to find some sense of shared, racial accomplishment in the earnings of the “white” 
executive. But in order to overcome the exploitative poverty—both white and black—that Cone 
wants to overcome, the white worker must see the white boss as a class enemy, not a racial 
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content, it must make reference to some other “structure,” and so “racism” loses its status as transcendental 
signified. Again, this is simply the problem with any structuralism that does not account for the post-structural 
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friend. Such a possibility is foreclosed by Cone’s transhistorical identification of “whiteness” as 
occupying a dominant place in the generic structure of oppression. In this sense, and contra 
Anderson, the racial ontological category at work in Cone’s project is less “the blackness that 
whiteness created” as it is the whiteness that whiteness created. This use of whiteness would 
have to be rejected for reasons both normative—we should not countersign, even for the sake of 
critique, false and ideological categories created for the sake of oppression—and theoretical—
there can be no transhistorical, metaphysical category of whiteness because there can be no 
transhistorical, metaphysical category. 
The second challenge this structural approach faces is its relatively unconvincing 
phenomenology of racism. In daily life, race does not function as a structural location, and, 
contra Cone’s claim that “blacks are those who say they are black, regardless of skin color” 
(BTL, 69), the oppression imposed upon black people is largely due to their status in an 
ascriptive category that does relate to “skin color.” Race as an identity is given, not chosen. This 
recognition that race is an ascriptive and so not a descriptive category—which Cone’s 
structuralism argues, as “black” comes to describe a structural location—is important for 
addressing Anderson’s critique of an ontological identification of blackness and suffering. Not 
only does this ontology imply that language is descriptive of a pre-linguistic realm—where 
“black” describes the ontological reality of “black” suffering—but it also imposes arbitrary and 
often alienating distinctions within the ascriptive group. Consider historian Touré Reed’s critique 
of Ta-Nehisi Coates’ praise for Barack Obama. Coates lauds Obama for “downloading black 
culture . . . for living black, for hosting Common, for brushing dirt off his shoulder during the 
primaries, for marrying a woman who looked like Michelle.” According to Reed: 
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For Coates, Obama’s blackness is derived not from legal or cultural frameworks that 
classify people with his parentage as black; Obama’s blackness is wed to his embrace of 
specific consumer tastes, dating choices, idiomatic expressions and, ultimately, swag. To 
be sure, Coates sees the aforementioned markers of racial authenticity as outgrowths of a 
common experience. But African Americans whose experiences deviate from what 
Coates sees as “the black experience” are not really black. Indeed, while Coates lauds 
Obama for his decision to embrace black culture, he describes the former president as 
less black than another African American Chicago politician, mayor Harold Washington. 
To be clear, Coates sees Obama as less black than Mayor Washington because Obama’s 
experiences do not conform to Coates’ view of “the black experience” (TF, 124). 
Against this view that the performance of something called black culture renders one black, Reed 
argues that “since race is an ascriptive category, Obama is unquestionably black, in my view, 
irrespective of his personal predilections or behavior” (TF, 139). In my view, Reed’s position is 
unquestionably more phenomenologically correct than is Coates’. On a quotidian level, it is 
purely an imposition based on phenotype that causes suspicious looks, distrust, street crossing, 
wallet clutching, and any other instantiation of the mundane yet exhausting slew of racist 
practices. In these instances, the practitioner of a racist act cannot possibly be deciding whether 
or not someone is black based on their structural location relative to oppression or their 
adherence to an alleged black culture—they know none of this information. And so a structural 
view does not account for the empirical realities of racist practices. Moreover, by identifying 
blackness with a particular cultural script, the structural view performs the essentialization of 
particularities that rightfully troubled Anderson. Thus, while the structural view might seem to 
be a less essentialist and less metaphysical regime than an ascriptive approach, and this because 
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race and color are (allegedly) dissociated, it ends up retaining reference to some essentialized 
characteristic. The structural view, not the ascriptive one, essentially identifies “black” with 
“suffering.”  
Cone, while typically claiming to follow a structural-metonymic approach, does often 
implicitly rely on this ascriptive understanding. For example, he writes that “there is little 
evidence that whites can deal with the reality of physical blackness as an appropriate form of 
human existence” (BTL, 15) and that “the black experience is only possible for black persons” 
(BTL, 26). While this latter reference to black experience might tend toward Coates’ cultural 
reification, Cone is clear here that something outside of culture—“black persons”—governs the 
possibility of living “black experience.” This governing agent, moreover, seems to have to do 
with “physical blackness.” Cone even suggests that the ascriptive quality of race is so intricately 
connected to “physical blackness” as to call for a sort of nationalist withdrawal or separation: 
“Until white America is able to accept the beauty of blackness, there can be no peace, no 
integration in the higher sense. Black people must withdraw and form their own culture, their 
own way of life” (BTBP, 18). While I do not think this program of withdrawal is ultimately 
coherent with Cone’s distinctly political emancipatory program, the pertinent point here is that 
Cone has black people forming “their own culture” after their withdrawal. Culture, in this 
instance, is the effect and not the cause of oppressions based on ascriptive group belonging. This 
logical structure is repeated and clarified when Cone claims that “the black community is an 
oppressed community primarily because of its blackness” (BTL, 126). 
This ascriptive blackness is the second tropic of blackness in Cone’s project. 
Independently, each tropic is internally consistent. And although I have argued that the ascriptive 
approach is ultimately more phenomenologically accurate, it might well be the case that the 
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structural approach offers more possibilities for cross-racial solidarity—as evidenced by Cone’s 
repeated applauding of John Brown. Recognizing various merits and demerits of both tropics 
might suggest the adoption of a bricolage approach, pulling from one or the other discourses 
depending on occasion. This, more or less, is the approach suggested by Timothy McGee. For 
McGee, Cone’s ambiguity “marks his refusal to allow a stabilizing operation to operate 
unchecked in both racial and theological discourses. In fact, for Cone, theology becomes another 
iteration of whiteness precisely when it functions as a kind of regulatory or stabilizing discourse” 
(AWH, 547). That is, Cone’s ambiguous use of the signifier black—in McGee’s rendering, Cone 
employs sometimes “literal” and sometimes “symbolic” uses of blackness—is meant to 
rhetorically destabilize “white” attempts at stabilization or regulation. In this way McGee argues, 
against Anderson, that Cone actively resists reinscribing “the blackness that whiteness created” 
by actively avoiding reinscribing any regulated or stable understanding of blackness.  
The problem with this approach is twofold: First, McGee primarily reads and defends 
Cone’s ambiguous use of “black,” but is not attentive to the related ambiguity concerning the 
identity of the emancipatory subject. Perhaps there is some rhetorical merit to “destabilizing” 
racial discourse, but there is also surely merit in identifying the actual subject of emancipation, 
and this identification is rendered difficult when blackness remains ambiguously 
overdetermined. Ultimately, especially when asking the question as to the emancipatory subject, 
the emphasis on and celebration of ambiguity undermines Cone’s sharpness, radicalness, and 
moral clarity. When Cone has raised the stakes as high as he has—where the identity of the 
emancipatory subject has total moral and epistemological privilege—then an unambiguous and 
unflinching commitment as to the identity of the political actor is both necessary and 
unavoidable. In other words, McGee has utilized the ambiguity found in Cone’s work as a way 
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by which to avoid making the necessary decision as to whose experience and whose self-
determination is to be privileged.  
This decision is necessary because, despite Cone’s sometimes synonymous treatment of 
them, black and poor are not identical. This non-identity of blackness and poverty relates to the 
second problem with McGee’s applauding of Cone’s ambiguity: While McGee wants to prevent 
“whiteness” from imposing a stabilizing or regulating regime onto Cone’s work, he is inattentive 
to the governing forces already at work within Cone. Above, I argued that Cone’s axiomatic 
endorsement of self-determination, which is operative throughout his political theology, cohered 
with the political norms of the Black Power movement. While Cone might theologically ground 
his appeals to self-determination in a doctrine of divine omnipotence, it is undeniably the case 
that Cone’s language was shared by his political interlocutors. A similar historical, contingent 
influence is, I suggest, at work in both Cone’s ambiguous employment of blackness and his 
ambiguous identification of the emancipatory subject. 
The two mutually-reinforcing ambiguities that I have described each contribute to an 
implied association of blackness with poverty and whiteness with wealth. Occasionally, as with 
Cone’s discussion of General Motors, this implied association becomes explicit.244 When Cone 
wrote Black Theology and Black Power in 1969, this association of black and poor had more 
empirical support than it does in 2020. This is because Cone’s early texts were not in a position 
to comment on or deal with the exorbitant wealth inequality that has proliferated inside black 
America over the past couple of decades. This growing inequality within the “black community” 
poses a problem for Cone’s project in two ways: First, median black wealth, in America, has 
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risen substantially since the writing of Cone’s early works. This alone makes an identification of 
blackness with poverty difficult. Secondly, the growing wealth disparity in black America has 
forced a stronger decision between a racial nationalism that cuts across class divisions and a 
class solidarity that cuts across ascriptive racial groups. Importantly, and as this chapter’s next 
section will argue, this decision between racial and class solidarities does not at all imply a 
decision between anti-racism and anti-capitalism—indeed, quite the contrary. 
On the one hand, since the publication of Cone’s first works, the black middle class has 
grown in ways Cone did not anticipate. In 1969, only 28% of black Americans had completed 
high school. By 2015, that number was 88% (in the same time, white high school graduation 
rates increased from 51% to 93%).245 The percentage of black American college graduates has 
risen from 5% to 23% (white graduation rates have risen from 10% to 36%) (ibid). Likewise, 
black median adjusted household income has nearly doubled since the writing of Cone’s text, 
from $24,700 in 1967 to $43,00 in 2014 (ibid). Black poverty rates have decreased from 34.7% 
to 21.8%. Black infant mortality and life expectancy—measures of quality of life and access to 
material care—are down 67.4% and up 11.5 years, respectively.246  
At the same time, these absolute material gains were not equitably shared amongst black 
people. While the percentage of black Americans earning over $100,000 per year in adjusted 
dollars has grown from 3% in 1969 to 15% in 2016, 46% of black Americans still earn less than 
$35,000 per year.247 Moreover, in 1969, 26.9% of black Americans earned under $15,000 per 
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year; by 2018, that number had fallen only to 19.2%.248 In 1968, the median black American’s 
income placed her at the 25th percentile in annual income nationally. By 2018, that number had 
risen to the 35th percentile. This relative increase up the income ladder, though, was more than 
offset by the much larger growth in income disparity between the median earner and the poor: In 
1968, a person at the 35th percentile earned 69% of the national median. By 2016, that number 
had fallen to 49% of the national mean. That is, while the median black American improved her 
position relative to other racial groups, this relative improvement masks a larger decrease in 
wealth relative to the median earner.249 In absolute terms, this means 3.03 million more black 
Americans live in extreme poverty today than when Cone wrote Black Theology and Black 
Power. Yet, 6.39 million more black Americans make more than $100,000 per year now as 
compared to the time of Cone’s writing. There are both more poor and more wealthy black 
Americans now than then. 
My point here is the narrow one that both the median economic situation of black 
Americans has improved since Cone’s early texts and that the suffering of the poorest black 
Americans has worsened since the same time. This inter-racial wealth disparity means that 
Cone’s 1960s and 1970s penchant for freely translating “black” with “poor,” and vice versa, is 
not credible in the 2020s. All of which is to say, in 1968, especially in the socialist-friendly 
Black Power milieu in which Cone was writing, an endorsement of black self-determination 
could be read as an endorsement of self-determination of the poor. This possibility means that 
Cone’s synonymous treatment of black and poor could always have masked an implicit 
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privileging of neither black nor poor per se, but instead of the black poor, oppressed and 
exploited, in particular. In this way, rather than an intentional ambiguity meant to rhetorically 
destabilize white hegemonic conceptions of blackness, Cone’s two tropics of blackness did not 
problematize each other in Cone’s writing because they did not represent two materially different 
realities. Such an understanding of universal emancipation as determined by the particular dual-
oppressions of the black poor would nicely bring together the various ambiguities in Cone’s text, 
as well as represent a unified political program of both anti-racism and anti-capitalism. However, 
such an interpretation of Cone would mean that Cone did not write a black theology of 
liberation, but instead a black poor theology of liberation. Such a theology would specify 
blackness economically and would specify poverty racially: Race and class, racism and 
capitalism, would be resisted within a single political-theological program. Cone would be a 
critic, not an adherent, of the structural racism and race relations frameworks. 
However, although this ordering and clarifying of the relationship between his two 
tropics can be imposed onto Cone’s texts, Cone himself does not offer such a solution. In his 
political-economic situation there was no need for him to do so: Cone’s penchant for easily 
translating between these two tropics of blackness—and the associated two identifications of the 
emancipatory subject—was governed by the contingent, historical moment in which Cone 
originally structured his program. It was a moment in which blackness could reasonably signify 
poverty, and could do so without making this signification explicit. Yet, the late-20th and early 
21st centuries have seen an aggravation of income inequality in the globe generally and in black 
America in particular. This aggravation has brought about a new political economic moment, and 
so has made the once-easy convertibility of black and poor no longer possible. Cone did not 
adequately adapt his double-tropic structure for this new political-economic reality. And so a 
	 285	
different discourse, one capable of addressing not only disparities between “races” but also 
within “races,” is needed.  
 
For a Marxist Anti-Racism 
 
 In 1980, Cone wrote a paper for Michael Harrington’s Institute for Democratic Socialism 
titled “The Black Church and Marxism: What Do They Have to Say to Each Other?”250 In it, 
Cone provides his most sustained treatment of the relationship between black liberation theology 
and Marxist political economy. He begins with a sort of apology for his lack of engagement with 
socialism in general and Marxism in particular: “It was an intellectual failure on my part that I 
did not deal with Marxism and socialism when I wrote Black Theology and Black Power which 
was published in 1969. Neither did the issue of socialism appear in my A Black Theology of 
Liberation and God of the Oppressed” (BCM, 4). Cone is not being quite fair to himself here. 
God of the Oppressed, for example, includes a six page section titled “Feuerbach, Marx, and the 
Sociology of Knowledge” (GO, 36-42). In this section, Cone countersigns the classic Marxist 
formulation that the ruling ideas of an epoch are the ideas of the epoch’s ruling class to ask 
“what is the connection between dominant material relations and the ruling theological ideas in a 
given society?” (GO, 39). From this generally Marxist philosophical critique, Cone goes on to 
proclaim that truth is always interested and partial. Thus, “the assumption that theological 
thinking is objective or universal is ridiculous” (GO, 41). All of this coheres quite nicely with 
Cone’s total epistemological privileging of the self-determination of the oppressed. 
																																																						
250 James Cone, “The Black Church and Marxism: What Do They Have to Say to Each Other?” Institute for 
Democratic Socialism (1980) 
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 Cone is also incorrect that he “did not deal with Marxism and socialism when I wrote 
Black Theology and Black Power.” In fact, this text contains some of Cone’s most orthodox 
Marxist arguments, some of which might be considered reductionist by both the later Cone and 
by those working from within his liberal reception. On the Civil War and abolition, Cone writes 
that “the north could appear to be more concerned about that blacks because of their work toward 
the abolition of slavery. But the reason is clear: Slavery was not as vital to their economy as it 
was to the south’s” (BTBP, 76). Cone again argues that racial emancipation and segregation have 
economic motives when, in this same text, he writes that “when whites saw that it was no longer 
economically advantageous to worship with blacks, they put blacks out of their church as a 
matter of course” (BTBP, 104). Finally, Cone says that “the ghetto” exists “to further the social, 
political, and economic interests of the oppressor” (BTBP, 36). While none of these claims—and 
others like them that can be found in A Black Theology of Liberation251—mention Marx 
specifically, each one relies on a sort of political-economic logic much more at home with 
Marxism and contemporary Marxist historiographies of slavery than with the potentially 
reductionist structuralism of the race relations framework. 252 
 In these early moments Cone argues that economic interests and power inequalities, more 
so than structural racism, are ultimately responsible for the origin and perpetuation of not only 
chattel slavery but also contemporary racial injustices and inequalities. Yet, in the 1980 article on 
Marx, Cone complicates his position on this question of the causal priority of economics. On the 
one hand, he still argues that the Marxist position is analytically correct. On the other hand, he 
																																																						
251 “And as long as black labor was needed, slavery was regarded as the only appropriate ‘solution’ to the ‘black 
problem.’ But when black labor was no longer needed, blacks were issued their ‘freedom,’ the freedom to live in a 
society which attempted to destroy them physically and spiritually” (BTL, 14) 
252 For such histories, see the aforementioned Racecraft and Ellen Meiskins Wood’s Peasant-Citizen and Slave 
(Verso Books, 1989). 
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worries that such an economic emphasis is bad strategy, that it puts off more than calls in. For 
Cone in 1980, the Marxist infrastructure-superstructure dyad is analytically correct, but 
politically less than helpful:  
When Marxists have been forced to face the question of race, they have always made it 
secondary to the economic question and the class struggle. While this may be 
scientifically correct, the way in which Marxists put forward their perspective on race and 
class is usually offensive to the victims of racism (BCM, 6).  
It is important to read this hesitation in accordance with Cone’s epistemological privileging of 
emancipation. Doing so clarifies Cone’s argument: He is not arguing that the Marxist critique of 
the economic foundation of slavery is incorrect, that blackness is a transhistorically oppressed 
category whose very essence involves subjection, or anything of the sort. He is not even arguing 
that Marxists were once correct, but that now racism has taken on a life of its own. Cone’s 
interest is not in disputing the analytic accuracy of Marxist analyses, which he endorses and 
perhaps independently endorsed even before he read Marx on the topic of slavery. Instead, Cone 
is merely asking what political purchase such a critique has in a normative program of total self-
determination. Ultimately for Cone, the “truth” of Marxism is not found in its analytic accuracy 
but in its worth as a tool for emancipation. 
 So, despite this hesitation, how does Cone value Marxism’s use as an emancipatory tool? 
Quite highly. As his infrastructural economic arguments suggest he would, Cone writes that “I 
do not think that racism can be eliminated as long as capitalism remains intact” (BCM, 5).253 The 
																																																						
253 Cone is not arguing that the elimination of capitalism would bring about the elimination of racism, but that the 
elimination of racism would require the elimination of capitalism. For Cone, anti-capitalism is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the promotion of anti-racism. This distinction is important because it allows Cone to avoid 
either race or class reductionism: He is not arguing that socialism would bring about a post-racial world. Nor is he 
arguing that anti-racism requires anti-capitalism. This latter point is the one made by Reed and Benn Michaels 
above: capitalism is flexible enough to incorporate anti-racism within itself.  
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overthrowing of capitalism becomes an explicit political program for black theology, and Cone is 
at pains to spread the recognition of this program. In a moment that might read as out of touch in 
the contemporary context, which is rightfully wary of implicit Eurocentrisms, Cone goes so far 
as to argue that the black church’s lack of engagement with Marxist theory is one of racism’s 
deleterious effects. The passage deserves to be quoted at length:   
Black churchpeople need to take this critique  (the Marxist critique of capital) seriously. 
We can say that in the history of our struggle, the oppression of black people was so 
extreme in every segment of our community that there was no opportunity for a 
comprehensive scientific analysis of American society, including a critique of capitalism 
and a consideration of socialism. Blacks were not a part of a European intellectual class 
but the descendants of African slaves. They simply responded to the most pressing 
contradiction in their historical experience: namely slavery and racism. They did not 
define their struggle as being against capitalism per se, and they did not recognize the 
need for a revolution as defined by Marxism. Blacks wanted to end racism as defined by 
slavery, lynching, and Jim Crow laws. Now, however, we have a small group of black 
intellectuals in the church and in other areas of black life who can provide the necessary 
leadership. They can and should offer black people a critique of capitalism and an 
alternative vision of social existence (BCM, 8). 
And so Cone believes that a Marxist critique of capitalism is essential to overcoming racism in 
America, but that its presentation, which seems to minimize the importance of racial justice, has 
been “offensive” to black Americans in general and black Christians in particular. It is unclear if 
Cone considers himself one of the “small group of black intellectuals” who “can and should offer 
black people a critique of capitalism,” but it is clear that he supports such an effort. Which is to 
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say, Cone is arguing here that Marxist anti-capitalism must become a more attractive tool for 
black liberation than it historically has been. Yet, this becoming does not entail a shift in the 
material content of Marxist analysis, but instead an increased openness from Marxists to the 
questions and particular concerns of black people and a complementary openness from black 
skeptics of Marxism regarding socialism as an alternative “social existence.”254 Possibly echoing 
Fred Hampton, Cone declares the need to “take a stand against capitalism and for democratic 
socialism, for Karl Marx and against Adam Smith, for the poor in all colors and against the rich 
of all colors, for the workers and against the corporations” (BCM, 9).255  
What is needed, then, is a Marxist critique of capital that epistemologically privileges its 
political use as a tool for total emancipation. More specifically, Cone is arguing here that 
Marxism must position itself in such a way that it appeals to people who identify racism, not 
capitalism, as the most pressing and immediate form of oppression in their lives. Above, I 
suggested that Claudia Jones and Barbara Smith’s Combahee River Collective offered responses 
to this challenge. For them, the Marxist response to anti-racism was a universalizing of Marxist 
programs. In response to a perceived neglect of black women by Marxist organizations, Jones 
and Smith each argued that a truly Marxist program would universally include all materially 
oppressed people—including black women. In this sense, Jones and Smith offer a Marxist 
																																																						
254 Of course, Cone writes of an “alternative vision of social existence” and not more directly of an alternative social 
existence. This retreat from axiomatic commitments to a plea for imagination, so common in Cone’s idealist 
reception but typically uncommon in Cone’s texts, indicates that Cone himself, despite intellectually acknowledging 
that anti-racism is ultimately impossible without anti-capitalism, is perhaps one of the “black churchpeople” whose 
understandable preoccupation with “the most pressing contradiction” in their existence has prevented a complete 
acceptance of the necessity of socialism. That is, Cone never speaks of the need for a vision of black humanity. He 
accepts and forcefully declares black humanity, and the rest follows suit. Here, though, Cone shows a slight 
hesitation, introduces the trope of vision, and so does not quite make socialism an axiomatic commitment on the 
level of anti-racism. 
255 The Hampton passage echoed by Cone: “We don’t think you fight fire with fire best; we think you fight fire with 
water best. We’re going to fight racism not with racism, but we’re going to fight with solidarity. We say we’re not 
going to fight capitalism with black capitalism, but we’re going to fight it with socialism.” “Power Anywhere Where 
There’s People,” speech delivered at Olivet Church, 1969. Transcript accessible at: 
https://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/fhamptonspeech.html 
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criticism of Marxists, and so strengthen the relationship between anti-racist and anti-capitalist 
commitments. For both, the response to racism is not race relations, but more Marxism. 
Shortly, I will argue that Cornel West provides an articulation of Marxism’s anti-racism 
that responds to Cone’s call for a politically “true” Marxism. Before doing so, though, it is worth 
briefly responding to Cone’s claims that “white socialists seem to be white first and socialists 
second” (BCM, 3) and that “many liberal white-led groups were inclined” to “preserve class 
solidarity at the expense of racial justice” (CLT, 46).256 Undoubtedly, there have been white 
socialist racists and white socialists who did not consider anti-racism to be a truly socialist 
project. For example, the once-Marxist historian Eugene Genovese, although he became a 
conservative later in life, responded to the fact of Marx’s abolitionism by absurdly criticizing 
“the retreat of Marx, Engels, and too many Marxists into liberalism.”257 Of course, this response 
is only possible because Marx did in fact maintain a strong abolitionist perspective. Marx’s 
writings on the American Civil War are illuminative on this matter.  
Although typically neglected by both Civil War historians and Marxist theorists, Marx’s 
writings on the American Civil War provide some of the most explicit articulations of Marx’s 
anti-racist position. For Marx, the Civil War was predominantly a war over slavery. Rejecting 
both federalist and geo-political interpretations—according to which, respectively, the war was 
either an ideological battle between federalist and republican political theories or a proxy war 
between England and France—Marx argued that the war was explicitly and truly fought over 
																																																						
256 While Cone references “liberal white-led groups,” the context in which he does so—a critique of class-solidarity 
politics that preserve racial solidarity—demonstrates that he is in fact speaking of socialists, not liberals. This 
slippage only reflects Cone’s adoption of the popular American vernacular according to which “liberal” means 
“leftist.” 
257 Eugene Genovese, In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History (Pantheon, 
1971), pg. 321. Genovese’s apparently critical association of liberalism with abolitionism is just another example of 
the incredible semantic breadth the signifier “liberal” has acquired. Such a breadth is what allowed Schmitt to depict 
the Bolsheviks as liberals.  
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slavery. Rather than a war for secession, according to Marx, the southern plantation class was 
primarily interested in expanding the scope of slavery into both the northern and the newly-
founded midwestern states. Writing during the war, Marx writes that a confederate victory would 
result in “not a dissolution of the Union, but a reorganization of it, a reorganization on the basis 
of slavery, under the recognized control of the slaveholding oligarchy.”258 Indeed, and against 
reductionist interpretations like Chantal Mouffe’s, for whom Marx was only concerned with 
factory production, Marx argues that: 
Direct slavery is as much the pivot upon which our present-day industrialism turns as are 
machinery, credit, etc. Without slavery there would be no cotton, without cotton there 
would be no modern industry. It is slavery which has given value to the colonies, it is the 
colonies which have created world trade, and world trade is the necessary condition for 
large-scale machine industry . . . Slavery is therefore an economic category of paramount 
importance.259 
And so rather than constrain his analyses to industrial production understood as trade unionist 
factory production, Marx contends that slavery stands in the center of 19th century global 
capitalism. That is, slavery abolitionism was a critical and axiomatic tenet of Marx’s anti-
capitalist program: For communism to come, slavery had to go. Indeed, slavery’s centrality to 
global capital made the American Civil War the frontline of the international workers’ 
revolution. Marx says as much in a letter, unreturned, to Abraham Lincoln: 
The working classes of Europe understood at once, even before the fanatic partisanship of 
the upper classes for the Confederate gentry had given its dismal warning, that the slave-
																																																						
258 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in the United States,” from Marx and Engels Collected Works, volume 19 (Progress 
Publishers, 1964), pg. 51. 
259 Karl Marx, “Letter to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov,” from Marx and Engels Collected Works, volume 38 
(International Publishers, 1975), pg. 101-102.  
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holders’ rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy crusade of property against 
labor, and that for the men of labor, with their hopes for the future, even their past 
conquests were at stake in that tremendous conflict on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Everywhere they bore therefore patiently the hardships imposed upon them by the cotton 
crisis, opposed enthusiastically the proslavery intervention of their betters — and, from 
most parts of Europe, contributed their quota of blood to the good cause.260 
In this same letter, Marx makes clear that racism from white workers, especially northern 
industrial workers, toward black slaves had worked to prevent a socialist revolution. The war, 
Marx thought, had the potential to create a sense of class solidarity between white workers and 
the soon-to-be-freed black slaves. Yet, Marx remained concerned that state-capitalist interference 
and persisting white racism would occlude such solidarity. For this reason, Marx levied 
particularly harsh criticism toward racist American whites. This is especially true of Irish-
Americans, who as immigrants, Marx thought, should be better allies of black slaves. Where the 
Irish should have seen a class friend, they instead saw a racial enemy: “The Irishman,” Marx 
writes, “sees in the Negro a dangerous competitor” (MECW 19, 264).261 Upon the abolition of 
legal slavery, it is this ideological sense of racial competition amongst the working class that 
would prevent socialist revolution.  
Against this racial fracturing of the proletariat, Marx demands an axiomatic anti-racism. 
Writing five months after Robert E. Lee’s surrender, Marx warns Lincoln that any tolerance of 
racism or racial inequality would not only undo the war’s potential gains, but would also damn 
																																																						
260 Karl Marx, “Address of the International Working Men's Association to Abraham Lincoln, President of the 
United States of America,” The Bee-Hive Newspaper, November 7, 1865. Accessible: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/iwma/documents/1864/lincoln-letter.htm 
261 And so again the friend-enemy distinction is read in ideological terms. In this sense, Schmitt’s program was less a 
novel defense of Nazism as it was a participation in a long line of racist ideologies. 
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America to a future of violence: “Let your citizens of today be declared free and equal, without 
reserve. If you fail to give them citizens’ rights, while you demand citizens’ duties, there will yet 
remain a struggle for the future which may again stain your country with your people’s blood . . . 
We warn you then, as brothers in the common cause, to remove every shackle from freedom’s 
limb, and your victory will be complete.”262All of which is to say that whatever the personal 
views of historians and polemicists writing under the banner of Marxism, it is clear that Karl 
Marx was a passionate and committed anti-racist who held these positions axiomatically. Part of 
responding to Cone’s call to articulate the anti-racist character of Marxist anti-capitalism is 
surely a ressourcement of these decidedly anti-racist positions. 
 
Conclusion: Cornel West’s Decisions 
  
Cornel West works out of this anti-racist Marxist tradition in order to develop an explicitly anti-
racist and anti-capitalist political theology, and does so in a manner consistent both with Cone’s 
epistemological privileging of the oppressed and with Cone’s emphasis on the riskiness of faith. 
More, West’s project is decidedly anti-metaphysical in a way consistent with both Derrida’s and 
Kierkegaard’s critiques of metaphysics.263 Finally, West accounts for Cone’s two tropics of 
blackness in a way less ambiguous and more analytically careful than Cone’s own approach. 
 Among theologians, West’s most influential work is his Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-
American Revolutionary Christianity.264 It is in this text that West, building on and specifying for 
																																																						
262 Karl Marx, “To the People of the United States of America,” The Workman’s Advocate, October 14, 1865. 
Accessible at: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/iwma/documents/1865/to-americans.htm 
263 “I’m a prophetic thinker without a thick metaphysics . . .  I have a very strong antimetaphysical bent.” From: 
Cornel West, The Cornel West Reader (Civitas Books, 2000), pg. 216. 
264 Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity (Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2002). 
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the black American context George Mosse’s Toward the Final Solution: A History of European 
Racism,265 develops his genealogy of white supremacy. West’s genealogical aim is to “give a 
brief account of the way in which the idea of white supremacy was constituted as an object of 
modern discourse in the West,” and he approaches this aim by interrogating the “discursive 
conditions for the possibility of the intelligibility and legitimacy of the idea of white supremacy 
in modern discourse” (PD, 47-48). Importantly, by revealing the conditions of possibility of 
white supremacy, West is able to discuss and criticize racism without positing an ontological 
black subject. In this way, West’s genealogy is more Nietzschean than Foucaldian; indeed, 
elsewhere West criticizes Foucault’s methodology for what he sees as its still Kantian emphasis 
on the constitution of subjectivity. According to West, Foucault’s “Kantian questions lead him to 
downplay human agency, to limit the revisability of discourses and disciplines and thereby to 
confine his attention to a specific set of operations of power, i.e.; those linked to constituting 
subject” (AEP, 225).266 West is decidedly not interested in a Foucaldian genealogical 
construction of the development of black or white subjects. Quite the opposite is the case: The 
creation of black and white subjects, for West, is an effect of material and discursive productions 
of white supremacy.  That is, West argues that the material and discursive structures of European 
modernity, which themselves respond to the material interests of a European capitalist class and 
the epistemological interests of a European scientific elite, create the possibility of race as a 
modern category. This critical attention to the development of a hegemonic racist discourse 
productive of race allows West to avoid some of the ontological traps, especially those relating to 
whiteness, that problematized Cone’s project.  
																																																						
265 George Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism (Howard Fertig, 1978) 
266 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (University of Wisconsin Press, 
1989). 
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 Specifically, West argues that the scientific and philosophical structures of European 
modernity, especially in the subjective idealism of Descartes and the preoccupation with 
organization and classification of Linaeus, “promotes and encourages the activities of observing, 
comparing, measuring and ordering the physical characteristics of human bodies” (PD, 48). This 
penchant for classification, in turn, was informed by, on the one hand, the classical Greek 
aesthetic privileging of lightness, and on the other hand, cultural biases that read European mores 
as more civilized than others. The result is a scientific, cultural, aesthetic, and philosophic 
discourse that “prohibited the intelligibility and legitimacy of the idea of black equality in 
beauty, culture, and intellectual capacity” (PD, 48). Discursively, blackness was created for the 
sake of securing the possibility of hierarchical thought. 
 An attention to these discursive productions demonstrates the way in which phenotype is 
always already interpreted in extra-biological terms, and can help explain how discrimination on 
“racial” grounds is possible. For West, capitalist economic forms alone are not enough to explain 
this possibility (PD, 49). The development of capitalism required a proletariat class, but did not 
require that this class be subject to racial divisions. Some other explanatory mechanism—still 
rooted in history, not ontological myth—becomes necessary to explain this development, and 
West argues that the discursive productions of European modernity offer such an explanation. In 
critiquing these discursive structures, West aims to show that  “the everyday life of black people 
is shaped not simply by the exploitative (oligopolistic) capitalist system of production, but also 
by cultural attitudes and sensibilities, including alienating ideals of beauty” (PD, 65). These 
alienating “attitudes and sensibilities” might serve the ideological function of reifying perceived 
racial differences—where the white worker is taught to alienate the black worker; that is, is 
taught to privilege racial enmity over class solidarity—but also operate on a relatively 
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independent level of quotidian racist practice. When the white worker has no material power 
over the capitalist class, it is to such discursive “power” over black people that he turns. When 
his entire philosophical matrix is implicitly informed by an organizing and hierarchical logic, 
such a turn to discursive power serves not only to establish some level of supremacy over non-
white others, but also works to confirm the credibility of the white worker’s own self-
understanding: the fact that the white worker “knows” that the black worker is of an inferior race 
itself becomes proof of this superiority. This ideological feedback loop, which is the structure of 
white identity, would be threatened by black power—material or discursive—and so the white 
person is encouraged to quell all practices in this direction. And so, as was the case with Schmitt, 
a racist discursive structure can quickly acquire material force—often with deadly and violent 
results. In this sense of a multi-layered false consciousness, wherein an economic infrastructure 
and a discursive superstructure mutually inform and aggravate each other,  a Marxist reduction 
of the discursive to the material, for West, “is not wrong; it is simply inadequate” (PD, 49).  
And so West demonstrates that the association of ascriptive and metonymic forms of 
blackness, which remains ambiguous in Cone, has been historically produced: the association of 
phenotype and economic status is a historical and contingent one. This emphasis on historicism 
means that West’s elevation of discursive productions as necessary explanatory components in 
the formation of racism should not be read as a retreat from Marxist materialism, but as an 
expansion of historical materialism to extra-economic spheres. Following Marxist theorists of 
culture like Raymond Williams, Theodor Adorno, and Antonio Gramsci, West holds that  culture 
and cultural norms are not abstract and free floating phenomena, and are certainly not 
ontological ones, but are instead material productions that require agents, power, and interests. 
For the purpose of developing a postmodern political theology of decision, and especially one 
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responsive to the need for an anti-racist Marxism as propounded by Cone, this reliance on 
historical and material analyses—West refers to his style of genealogy as “a genealogical 
materialist analysis” (CWR, 261)—is important for two primary reasons. First, West’s locating of 
truth in historical material processes places him firmly within a critical pragmatic tradition—
West calls it “prophetic pragmatism”—that understands philosophy as essentially, not 
accidentally, political. Second, West’s rejection of metaphysical or ontological security both 
allows for the possibility of decision and requires it. As we will see, West associates this need for 
groundless decision with both Christian faith and a risky engagement with and overcoming of 
race. 
West clarifies his understanding of the relationship between anti-metaphysics and 
prophetic pragmatism in the following passage: 
The claim is that once one gives up on the search for foundations and the quest for 
certainty, human inquiry into truth and knowledge shifts to the social and communal 
circumstances under which persons can communicate and cooperate in the process of 
acquiring knowledge. What was once purely epistemological now highlights the values 
and operations of power requisite for the human production of truth and knowledge 
(AEP, 213).  
As I indicated above, this methodology is at work in West’s genealogy of white supremacy, 
which begins not with ontological categories or essential truths, but with a thick historical 
description of particular actors, arguments, structures, and interests. The “truth” of white 
supremacy is found in its particular and contingent historical productions—indeed, it is from 
within operations of power that all truth is produced. This radically contextual and historical 
epistemology neatly coheres with my previous arguments concerning the double-fake structure 
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of all metaphysics. There, my point was not just that all metaphysics necessarily fail—they do, 
and Derrida showed this—but also that, because of this necessary failure, all ostensibly 
metaphysical truth claims have to be obfuscations of some non-metaphysical position. And so 
Schmitt’s ontological racism was not only theoretically falsifiable, but also masked an existential 
commitment to anti-Semitism. West’s point here is that all truth claims—and Derrida would be 
in agreement that truth as such is a metaphysical gesture, perhaps the metaphysical gesture par 
excellence—depend upon what he calls “operations of power.” In such a critical scheme, the 
philosopher becomes responsible for detecting, revealing, and resisting political interests and 
powers at work in the construction of truth claims. This critical posture toward all truth claims 
was what allowed West, acting as a philosopher in this prophetic pragmatist sense, to both 
demonstrate the artifice and contingency of white supremacy and show the work performed by 
white supremacy for particular, capitalist, scientific, and political interests.  
But if truth is always responsible to particular interests and operations of power, then the 
philosopher needs the analytical tools necessary for not only logical or theoretic, but now also 
political critique. Here, too, the determination of which tools are necessary is the product of 
historical development. For West—and for Cone, although in a more hesitant way—the most 
powerful analytic tool for unmasking operations of power is the Marxist critique of capitalist 
political economy. This is not because of some preternatural privilege of Marxism or dogmatic 
commitment on the part of West. Rather, Marxism is privileged as an analytical tool because it 
offers the best means for critiquing the economic infrastructure that ultimately makes possible 
not only racist practices but also interpretations of these practices. That is, Marxism, as a 
political critique of philosophical and pseudo-philosophical productions, is capable of critiquing 
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both aspects of the double-fake structure of metaphysics: both racism and its underlying political 
economy are critiqued by Marxism. 
And so West’s historical materialism not only adds analytical clarity and historical 
specificity to Cone’s approach—which, as I have shown, does in fact account for the particular 
history of American anti-black racism, but does not always account for the historically 
constructed nature of whiteness—but also provides a strategy for resisting interpretations of 
Cone dependent on the race relations framework. Recall that above, I argued that the race 
relations framework—and I have suggested that certain idealizing receptions of Cone fall within 
this framework—critiques racism on racism’s own terms. That is, the race relations framework 
argues against explicitly racial injustices such as wealth disparity, but lacks the analytical tools 
and political will necessary for a critique of the possibility of wealth inequality as such. West has 
provided the means by which to resist these readings, which are unconcerned with the 
relationship between ideological reifications and their underlying infrastructural supports.  
Prophetic pragmatism, then, is explicitly anti-racist in a way that is critical of the actual 
structural conditions of possibility of racism. In this sense, West’s prophetic pragmatism 
responds to Cone’s call for a politically useful, that is attractively anti-racist, Marxism. Unlike 
race relations approaches that are explicitly anti-racist but ultimately only better integrate the 
ascriptively oppressed into capitalist exploitation—and so only respond to one tropic of 
blackness in Cone’s work—prophetic pragmatism presents itself as a double critique of the 
double-fake structure of all racisms: ascriptive oppressions should be fought and resisted both 
because of their inhumanity and because of their role in disrupting class solidarity.  
This emphasis on class solidarity as itself an anti-racist practice was implied in the early 
Cone’s metonymic tropic of blackness—according to which one could “become black” by 
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fighting with the poor—but was never made explicit. By the time of The Cross and the Lynching 
Tree, though, this metonymic association between blackness and poverty had weakened, and so 
too had Cone’s openness to class-solidarity as a form of anti-racism. Cone had become 
increasingly concerned that a class-solidarity politics did not account for the particularity of 
black suffering. Again, West’s historical materialism offers a response to this challenge. First, 
West is in agreement with Cone that any “colorblind” valorization of the proletariat misses the 
very proletarian racism that is partly responsible for the group’s continuing inability to revolt 
against the capitalist class. West is clear that “the proletariat itself is a construct that is shot 
through with all kinds of divisions, cleavages, heterogeneities and so on” (CWR, 224). West’s 
earlier discussion of the reactionary problems caused by white proletarian racism—it is a critique 
that mirrors Marx’s criticism of Irish anti-black racism almost perfectly—demonstrates that these 
“divisions, cleavages, heterogeneities, and so on” are weaponized by the capitalist class to 
maintain the proletariat’s exploitation. Yet, West is also clear that the divisions intrinsic to the 
proletariat are mirrored by divisions intrinsic to any ascriptive identity group, including black 
people. As early as 1987, West writes about the “increasing class division” within black 
America, and about the “significant black middle class, highly anxiety-ridden, insecure, willing 
to be co-opted and incorporated into the powers that be, concerned with racism to the degree that 
it poses constraints on upward social mobility” (CWR, 284). Moreover, West is attentive not only 
to these racial differences within the proletariat and class differences within ascriptive racial 
groups, but also to the ways in which “feminist, gay, lesbian, and ecological modes” of 
oppression intersect with all of the above.  
Yet, ultimately, these various forms of oppression do not all follow the same logic, and 
West argues that we should be wary of the ways in which capital interests can mask themselves 
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as anti-racist, anti-homophobic, green, and so on. It is for this reason that West argues that, given 
precisely this multiplicity of oppressions, and given that “the majority of humankind experiences 
thick forms of victimization” (CWR, 370), “Marxism today becomes even more important” 
(CWR, 222). While ascriptive oppressions call for equality—and West fights for equality 
everywhere—the emancipatory logic of Marxism calls for a total restructuring of the economic 
infrastructure that undergirds all of these various forms of oppression. In short, capitalism 
exploits, while racism, sexism, homophobia, and so on discriminate. “Once we lose sight,” West 
writes, “of the reasons why the working people, the working poor and the very poor, find 
themselves with very little access to resources—once we lose sight of that, which was analyzed 
by the Marxist tradition, once we lose sight of this, then we have little or no analytical tools in 
our freedom fight” (CWR, 222). The role of the prophetic pragmatist is to resist all suffering, but 
to do so by using particularized ascriptive suffering as a “springboard” for a revolutionizing of 
the capitalist structure that both feeds off and feeds inter-proletariat discriminations (CWR, 504). 
So far, I have described West’s anti-racist Marxism in primarily philosophic terms—
albeit terms that are philosophic in the prophetic pragmatic, which is to say primarily political, 
sense with which West is consciously working. The question remains, though, as to the 
relationship between West’s politics and his Christian faith commitments. For Cone, the 
incarnation of God in Jesus Christ reveals God’s absolute epistemic and political privileging of 
the right of self-determination for the oppressed. Although West argues that his anti-
metaphysical historical materialism is implied by Christian apophaticism, he makes no such 
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Christocentric move.267 Indeed, West criticizes Cone’s Christocentrism as “too thick.”268 And 
again, while West believes, like Kierkegaard, that the bible makes strong and clear commands to 
alleviate the plight of the poor, he also looks to incorporate “the progressive possibilities of all 
secular ideologies” (CWR, 359) and does not believe that Christianity is a necessary starting 
point for any emancipatory politics (CWR, 370). 
What role, then, does Christianity play in West’s program? The question is especially 
pointed given that West’s Christianity is one free of any metaphysics and totally non-necessary 
for emancipatory political praxis. For West, Christianity is a matter of neither metaphysical truth 
nor moral suasion, but is instead a matter of sanity. His reflections on the issue are some of the 
most moving of his corpus: 
On the existential level, the self-understanding and self-identity that flow from this 
tradition’s insights into the crises and traumas of life are indispensable for me to remain 
sane. It holds at bay the sheer absurdity so evident in life, without erasing or eliding the 
tragedy of life. Like Kierkegaard, whose reflections on Christian faith were so profound 
yet often so frustrating, I do not think it's possible to put forward rational defenses of 
one’s faith that verify its veracity or even persuade one’s critics. Yet it is possible to 
convey to others the sense of deep emptiness and pervasive meaninglessness one feels if 
one is not critically aligned with an enabling tradition. One risks not logical 
inconsistency, but actual insanity; the issue is not reason or irrationality, but life or death 
(AEP, 233). 
																																																						
267 “The paradox of the Christian tradition is that it precludes its own descriptions from grasping the truth; that is, the 
Christian notion of the fallenness of human creatures does not permit even Christian descriptions to be true. This is 
so, because, for Christians, Jesus Christ is the Truth and the reality of Jesus Christ always already rests outside any 
particular Christian description . . . Jesus Christ is literally the Truth, the Truth which cannot be intellectually reified 
but rather existentially appropriated by finite human beings with urgent needs and pressing problems” (PD, 98). 
268 Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America (Routledge, 2012), pg. 116. 
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And again: 
My prophetic outlook is informed by a deep, historical consciousness that accents the 
finitude and fallenness of all human beings and accentuates an international outlook that 
links the human family with a common destiny; an acknowledgement of the inescapable 
yet ambiguous legacy of tradition and the fundamental role of community; a profound 
sense of the tragic character of life and history that generates a strenuous mood, a call for 
heroic, courageous moral action always against the odds; and a biblically motivated focus 
on and concern for the wretched of the earth that keeps track of the historic and social 
causes for much (though by no means all) of their misery (CWR, 359). 
Of course, West’s religious commitments are not mere psychological tools. They are, after all, 
commitments: 
Of course, the fundamental philosophical question remains whether the Christian gospel 
is ultimately true. And, as a Christian prophetic pragmatist whose focus is on coping with 
transient and provisional penultimate matters yet whose hope goes beyond them, I reply 
in the affirmative, bank my all on it, yet am willing to entertain the possibility in low 
moments that I may be deluded (AEP, 233) 
West is here admitting that the fight for emancipation, for him, would be an impossible one were 
it not for a hope in justice that seems possible only with God. Overwhelmed by the 
perniciousness of capital and seemingly infinite oppressions, despaired by our lack of progress, 
haunted by the realist knowledge that death will come before the revolution, angered that none of 
this is necessary, surrounded by needless and heavy death, West, tragically but hopefully, turns 
to God for life. His is a Christianity free of metaphysical escapism or delusion, attuned 
sensitively to secular misery, committed to liberating the exploited and freeing the oppressed—
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that is, it is a Christianity in love with the wretched of the world, and it is that which allows West 
to believe another world is possible. It is a possibility without metaphysical assurance. Without 
this metaphysical security, and with the tragic knowledge of his necessary mortality, West must 
pursue justice and must fight capital knowing that he does so “against the odds.” He is in 
complete agreement with Cone on this point, as both agree that the truth is we must fight for 
freedom even if the truth is that we will lose. This, then, is the decision they make, and with 
which we are charged: For freedom; that is, for Marxism. 
 Now, Cone ends his article on the black church and Marxism with this: “Perhaps what we 
need today is to return to that good old-time religion of our grandparents and combine with it a 
Marxist critique of society” (BCM, 10). The construction and defense of such a political 
theology has been the goal of this project. When my grandmother, once a nun, lost her son, she 
said he was still with us. A few days later, a penny rolled from under the couch, and she said, 
Look, there he is. The good old-time religion of my grandparents is not metaphysics. It is similar, 
I think, to Derrida kissing his shawl. It is also similar, I think, to Cone dreaming of molotov 
cocktails flying in as if from heaven. In his last words, Jesus told the disciples to go and teach 
what he had commanded, and he assured them, “lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the 










 The previous chapter argued that James Cone and Cornel West articulate political 
theologies responsive to the challenges of postmodernity. In that sense, Cone and West 
exemplify the sort of postmodern political theology for which this project argues: their political 
theologies have anti-racist, anti-capitalist, and non-metaphysical commitments. Of course, and as 
my deconstructive reading of Cone showed, a commitment to these positions does not 
necessarily lead to an uncomplicated enactment of them. But in a real sense, this possibility of 
failure is not only beside the point, but is the point: Cone and West have axiomatically decided 
against these modern projects, and so have initiated decisively postmodern political theologies. 
That the details remain sometimes fuzzy—that, as I said in my reading of Cone, we are 
committed to fighting for justice by any means necessary but do not know what the necessary 
means are in advance—does not signify a lack of rigor. Rather, such a indeterminable position, 
wherein a politics is necessary but not known, is the necessary effect of any true decision.  
 Shortly, I will offer a brief reading of the abolitionist John Brown. Doing so will 
demonstrate the potential radical and revolutionary consequences of a decisively emancipatory 
political theology. Before doing so, though, it is worth briefly recapitulating the argument so far: 
 In the project’s introduction, I described capitalism, racism, and metaphysics as the three 
modern regimes to which a postmodern political theology must respond. Of these, I held that 
capitalism maintained a privileged order, as racism is largely born out of and feeds into a 
generically exploitative capitalist structure. Metaphysics, on the other hand, provides the 
intellectual tools for capitalism and racism to both defend and reify their political projects. In this 
view, metaphysics is nothing but a reification of a prior non-metaphysical decision. And so while 
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an overthrowing of capitalism-racism is the immediate material task of an emancipatory political 
theology, such a project should be wary of metaphysical devolutions. Any appeal to metaphysics, 
in this understanding, can only ever be reactionary in a technical sense, and so should be avoided 
and critiqued wherever it appears. Moreover, each of these regimes prevents or hides actual 
political decisions. Capitalism pretends that the distribution of goods and wealth is decided by 
the invisible hand, but this pretense only hides the underlying reality that decisions are made by 
the hand of the capitalist. Racism, likewise, tries to ontologically decide the “racial” character of 
everyone in advance. Blackness, whiteness, and any other “race” is given ontologized content 
that exists outside of any actual material practice. Again, though, this apparent decision actually 
masks a more basic and underlying oppressive one: racial myths are not decided by ontology, but 
by particular actors, usually capitalist, pursuing particular ends, usually the anti-solidaristic 
fracturing of the proletariat. In both cases, some metaphysical structure is relied on: invisible 
hands and ontological races are metaphysical concepts. An emancipatory political theology must 
decide against such ideological obfuscations.  
 Carl Schmitt might have offered such a radical political theology. Indeed, for many on 
the contemporary left, Schmitt does just that. However, my reading of Schmitt demonstrated that 
Schmitt’s ostensible radicalism falls short on two levels. First, Schmitt’s alleged decisionism is 
only an ontologization of a racial—specifically, anti-Semitic—hierarchy. For Schmitt, every 
“decision” as to friend and enemy is decided not by the dictator or sovereign, as he might 
sometimes imply, but is instead “decided” in advance as if by God. However, this metaphysical 
decisionism—which could only ever be an indecisionism, because there remains no room for any 
decision as to friend and enemy—is itself an obfuscation of the real place of decision in 
Schmitt’s text: namely, Schmitt’s text. Schmitt’s own particular anti-Semitism and reactionary 
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theology produce the allegedly ontological identification of Jew with enemy. That is, Schmitt’s 
anti-Semitic God and anti-Semitic political theology is a textual invention. The problem with 
Schmitt’s program for an emancipatory left, then, is not only his valorization of capitalism and 
anti-Semitism, but is also his divinization of these horrors. There are decisions at work in 
Schmitt’s text, but they are not the one he presents.  
 Schmitt’s particular decisionistic structure—where the actual political decision occurs 
under the cover of an ostensibly metaphysical one—is generalized in my reading of Jacques 
Derrida. Here, we see that there is no and can be no metaphysical decision, because there is no 
and can be no thing as metaphysics. This is because all metaphysics must rely on some 
transcendental signified that both controls and is outside of semiotic referring and signifying. But 
precisely as both controlling, and so related to, but outside, and so independent of, signifying, 
such a transcendental signified is impossible. Moreover, this deconstruction of the possibility a 
transcendental signified quickly reveals a deconstruction of reference and signification as such: 
not only are transcendental signifieds a fake, but so too is any signified held to purely present 
determined meaning. Every signified is always already a signifier.  
The unavoidable fact of this interminable referring without transcendental security is 
what Derrida means when he says that there is no outside text. Without an outside text, though, 
theology in particular suffers: without a transcendent logos responsible for securing the 
meaningful relationship of signifier and signified, without a transcendent logos responsible for 
securing the identity of thinking and being, theology, which names this transcendent 
signified/logos “God,” cannot credibly claim the truth. For some, such as Martin Hågglund, this 
deconstruction of truth requires and promotes a “radical atheism.” For others, such as John 
Caputo, this deconstruction of metaphysics is both made possible by and engages in a religious 
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“passion for the impossible.” In this latter view, far from employing an atheistic methodology, 
deconstruction is itself a sort of religion. In my view, however, both the atheist and theist 
interpretations of Derridean deconstruction fail to engage the most radical element of Derrida’s 
project: the deconstruction of the identity of thinking and being. With this identity deconstructed, 
theology understood as true, metaphysical discourse about God is surely impossible. Indeed, all 
metaphysics is impossible. Yet, this theoretical critique, precisely by rupturing the identity of 
thinking and being, does not itself preclude the possibility of God—and even less does it 
preclude religious faith. Indeed, only with metaphysical necessity deconstructively rendered 
impossible is religious faith possible. This sort of faith, however, would need to concern itself 
with praxis over dogma, with hope over certainty, and with indeterminacy over determined and 
determinable truth. 
Ultimately, Søren Kierkegaard and James Cone offer this sort of religion. Yet, any turn to 
the religious here should be careful to avoid reinscribing the pretense of necessity, as if only a 
theological or religious frame can offer a credible response to the challenges of postmodernity. 
Such a gesture would be entirely modern, and it is this entirely modern gesture—and I mean 
modern in the now established denigrating sense of endorsing metaphysical and political 
violence—that is offered by John Milbank and his “radical orthodoxy” theology. For Milbank, 
secularism necessarily endorses a “violence” and a “nihilism” because it lacks the proper 
“peaceful” ordering made possible by a transcendent dimension. Without transcendence, 
Milbank argues, we are left with only competing claims to power, wherein difference implies 
antagonism. Against this rather bleak view of the secular world, the Norwegian author and 
essayist Karl Ove Knausgaard describes a secular longing for the world that promotes love and 
peace. For Knausgaard, the imposition of transcendence onto the world of immanence is itself a 
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violent gesture: Knausgaard wants to belong to this world, with all of its grittiness and quotidian 
failures, even as he wants to improve this world. A religious interpretation, for Knausgaard, 
would necessarily relativize this world, and so would fetter his pursuit for worldly love. With 
this sort of secular desire, it is Milbank’s insistence on ontology and transcendence, not anti-
metaphysical “nihilism,” that introduces violence. This possibility of a secular rejection of the 
religious—the possibility of a decision for the secular—must always remain credible if faith is to 
remain possible and not necessary. A decision is only impossible if it is deciding between 
competing, non-reducible, but ultimately live and credible choices. 
While Knausgaard opts for secularism, his fellow Scandinavian Kierkegaard opts for 
Christianity—at least sometimes. This sort of Christianity, though, ends up looking a lot more 
like both Derrida’s deconstruction and Knausgaard’s secularism than it does Schmitt’s 
Christianity. This is true on at least two accounts. First of all, Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
theoretically mirrors Derrida’s project through its own deconstructive gesture: Where Derrida 
deconstructs the identity of thinking and being, Kierkegaard deconstructs the identity of “reality” 
and “actuality.” Reality, for Kierkegaard, refers to the ideal “truths” of thinking. Reality is the 
domain of idealism. Actuality, on the other hand, refers to what actually happens. Something can 
be ideally “true,” but so long as it remains unmanifested in existence, it will never actually be 
true. There is actually nothing outside existence. And so Kierkegaard’s deconstruction, which 
resembles Derrida’s, brings him into contact with a thinker like Knausgaard, for whom, like 
Kierkegaard, truth is a thing of the world. 
Importantly, though, Kierkegaard is not here offering a romantic praise of worldliness or, 
as some of his politically motivated critics have it, of inwardness. While his philosophy is a 
materialist one in this sense of valorizing existence, Kierkegaard populates this materialist 
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structure with a decidedly anti-capitalist, if not outright “socialist,” content. For Kierkegaard, 
such a politics is obviously given by the bible. Any deferral or avoidance of these obviously anti-
capitalist biblical precepts, in turn, can only ever be a sign of idealist subterfuge. However, 
because idealism is not “actual” in the sense established above, such avoidance of biblical 
precepts is actually a promotion of an alternative, non-Christian and capitalist politics. The truth, 
for Kierkegaard, is that one must join and fight with the poor against exploitation. This is far 
from Schmitt’s metaphysical capitalism-racism. 
Finally, this materialist and anti-capitalist political theology is further specified by James 
Cone, who, in turn, is supplemented by Cornel West. Cone continues this project’s development 
of a non-metaphysical understanding of truth by relativizing all truth claims according to an 
orthopraxic privileging of emancipation. For Cone, much like for Kierkegaard, the truth is that 
the exploited should not be exploited and that the oppressed should not be oppressed. Something 
is true only to the extent that it supports this orthopraxic, material demand. His emphasis on 
actual material change makes of Cone a necessary and helpful critic of contemporary “race 
relations” and “diversity” frameworks of anti-racism. For Cone, and for the sort of 
deconstructive political theology developed in this project, these anti-racist frameworks too 
easily rely on ontologized accounts of race and racism. While clearly opposed to Schmitt’s 
reactionary politics—he is a racist, and these frameworks are anti-racist—this reliance on 
metaphysics should and does disturb the sort of materialist politics that interests Cone. After all, 
because ontology can only ever obfuscate an underlying decision, these ontologizations must be 
read critically in order to reveal the infrastructural work they do. In the case of the race relations 
framework, I argue that racial ontologizations serve the function of disrupting cross-race class 
solidarity. That is, some contemporary anti-racist projects support—intentionally or not—pro-
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capitalist ends. For Cone, such a pro-capitalist anti-racism simply will not do, because such 
measures fail to live up to the measure of total emancipation. 
Against these racial ontologizations and the political economies that they might endorse, 
Cone distinguishes—if not always carefully—between two senses of “blackness.” On the one 
hand, blackness refers to people have been ascriptively assigned membership into a racial group 
called “black.” On the other hand, blackness metonymically refers to oppression as such. In this 
metonymic sense, blackness is both part of and a privileged particular example of a larger 
exploitative, capitalist structure. In the words of Claudia Jones, black workers become the super 
exploited in racist capitalism. At this point of identifying two distinct but related forms of 
violence—racist oppression and capitalist exploitation—Cornel West becomes a necessary 
supplement to Cone. It is West, more so than Cone, who is able to carefully hold distinct while 
simultaneously addressing these two violences. In doing so, West relies on a “prophetic 
pragmatism” that looks much like Kierkegaard’s materialist existentialism and Cone’s 
epistemological privileging of the oppressed. For West, the primary task of philosophy is to 
critique the power imbalances that cause and the interests that motivate particular truth claims. 
Truth is always constructed—not only textually, but also politically (which is not to say that 
Derrida’s emphasis on text was apolitical, but is to show the opposite: that Derrida’s emphasis on 
text was always indissociable from the political). With this understanding of philosophical and 
theoretical as serving political ends, West fully understands and appropriate the double-fake 
structure of all metaphysics. Schmitt was doing politics, but pretended to do philosophy. West 
accepts that all philosophical pretense will likewise involve political decisions, and decides to 
render explicit that terrain. The philosopher, then, for West and for this project’s trajectory, 
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becomes a political actor and critic. Anti-metaphysical, anti-capitalist, and anti-racist: such is 
Cornel West’s project. 
But is it theology? Is it political theology? For West, his project is religious—if not 
theological—in that he personally relies on a groundless faith in his fight for justice. Religion is 
not necessary for this project: a Knausgaardian secularism remains possible and credible. But, 
West argues, religion—specifically for him, a heavily apophatic and Kierkegaardian 
Christianity—is deeply helpful. It is a faith in God, and a love of others that West reads as 
religious, that allows him to continue a pursuit for justice despite the knowledge that death will 
come before the revolution. Knowledge here, against all metaphysics, does not dictate practice. 
In fact, quite the opposite: West, and others like him, fight despite the knowledge, the “truth,” 
that their fight will likely come up short. But only if failure is really possible can one truly decide 
to risk it all.  
  In sum, this project constructively argues the following: A postmodern political 
theology should respond to the modern regimes of capitalism, racism, and metaphysics. In doing 
so, it cannot rely on ontologized categories, racial or otherwise (Schmitt). Indeed, it cannot rely 
on metaphysics or ontology at all, because no metaphysics is ever possible (Derrida). Not relying 
on metaphysical security in its fight for justice, a postmodern political theology should always 
leave open the possibility of an actual secularism, which, contra Milbank, is far from necessarily 
violent (Knausgaard). While this secularism is necessarily possible, one can always groundlessly 
decide to choose Christianity—however, doing so comes with a set of rather stringent 
orthopraxic demands (Kierkegaard). In particular, a Christian political theology ought to 
universally decide against both capitalism and racism (Cone). Without the security of 
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metaphysical surety, one might find in religion a source of unique hope, a source of inspiration 
that cries out: another world is possible (West). 
Granted, so far my readings have been primarily of texts in the narrow and standard 
sense. With the exception of appeals to social science, economics, and history in especially the 
project’s first and last chapters, my method has been primarily deconstructively textual. Yet, I 
have relied on deconstructive reading—accented by a certain existentialism—to argue for the 
necessity of material engagement in actual existence. Political theology is not primarily—or 
even—getting right the history of ideas. It is certainly not idealism. A truly postmodern political 
theology decides to argue and fight in material reality, in this world. As I have shown, it might 
produce theories—the deconstruction of thinking and being; an epistemology of actualization; an 
epistemological privileging of the oppressed and exploited—but the role of theories is to be 
understood in the Marxist sense:  
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force 
must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon 
as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it 
demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. 
To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter.269 
The question concerning theory, as both Cone and Marx have it, is whether or not a theory is 
radical enough as to grip the masses. Yet, as I have been arguing, part of what is important in a 
postmodern response to modernity’s challenges is decision. Modern capitalism, racism, and 
metaphysics are all deeply indecisive in the sense that they each obfuscate the site of true 
																																																						




decision. Rather than play modernity’s game on this point of apparent indecision, a postmodern 
political theory ought to do its work on the infrastructural level, where actual decisions are 
actually made. The first step of revolution is to decide to revolt, and this cannot be done ideally. 
But this embrace of groundless decision seems at odds with the Marxist-Coneian valorization of 
theory’s gripping ability. On the one hand, the actual and lonely existing individual—as 
Kierkegaard would have it—must decide to revolt. On the other hand, the theories by which one 
can fight a revolution must be appealing enough as to grip the potential revolutionary. The 
appeal of revolutionary theory is meant to convert the working class—a class for the rich—into 
the proletariat—a class for itself.  
 What, then, is the relationship between an embrace of decisionism and an embrace of 
theories—which are not so much “decided” as they are discovered in the text of the world of 
which there is no outside? Again, Kierkegaard provides the crucial link: The first revolutionary 
decision is surely to revolt, but this revolt ought to be understood as a leap. Recall that for 
Kierkegaard, one never has a good reason—only bad ones—to make the leap of faith. It is not 
until after the leap is made that something like religious sense can be found. Indeed, the truth of 
religion, for Kierkegaard, is that one must first leap. Importantly here, any sense or coherence 
that is discovered while leaping will always remain interminable, undecidable, “objectively 
uncertain.” More than uncertain, such insights and commitments will appear outright mad from 
the outside. If they did not seem mad, then a leap would not be necessary. 
 This embrace of madness, where decision and theory, where activity and passivity, where 
implementation and passion all implicate each other, is how we should understand the life and 
work of John Brown. Brown is most remembered for his 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry, a 
Confederate arms depot. But Brown’s work as a committed abolitionist did not begin in 1859. 
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Brown had not only been a prominent activist in the New England abolitionism scene for 
years—where he gained the friendship of Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, and Henry 
Thoreau, among others—but had launched several violent attacks on slave owners and 
plantations throughout the 1850s. Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry is not a one off event, the 
effect of a madman’s acute manic episode, but is instead continuous with a life committed to 
justice—whatever the cost, and by any means necessary.270 
This question of insanity has often framed the conversation concerning Brown. As Ted 
Smith notes, the frame of the question seems to assume a dichotomy between pure violent 
insanity, on the one hand, and rational freedom fighting, on the other.271 Interestingly, one’s 
assessment of Brown’s mental health does not necessarily imply a value judgment on his 
violence either way. For example, the claim that Brown was insane seems to have achieved its 
formal narratological structure when it was introduced by Asahel Lewis, a newspaper editor and 
friend of Brown’s, as a defense for Brown during the abolitionist’s trial.272 Likewise, Henry 
Alexander Wise, Virginia’s governor at the time of Brown’s raid, was committed to the notion 
that Brown was not a “madman,” but instead a “fanatic.”  
For his part, Brown is as clear as possible: “I am not insane, nor have I ever been” (JBS, 
102). While not wanting to rely on a defense of insanity—which would undermine the 
decisiveness with which Brown led his life according to emancipatory ends—Brown is aware of 
the paradoxical difficulty, the Catch 22 scenario, of proving his own sanity. To this end, Brown’s 
																																																						
270 Several Brown biographies demonstrate this lifetime of commitment quite well. Among those, W.E.B. DuBois’ 
John Brown remains especially important. Louis Decaro’s Fire From the Midst of You: A Religious Life of John 
Brown (New York University Press, 2002) and David Reynolds’ John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed 
Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights (Vintage, 2006) are also noteworthy in this regard. 
271 Ted Smith, Weird John Brown: Divien Violence and the Limits of Ethics (Stanford University Press, 2015), pgs. 
24-30. 
272 Louis DeCaro, John Brown Speaks (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 
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defense is both brilliant and seemingly informed by a distinctly apophatic sensibility: “My 
observation teaches me that insane people know more on all subjects than all the rest of the 
world. I am not of that opinion in regard to myself . . . Insane persons, so far as my experience 
goes, have but little ability to judge of their own sanity; and, if I am insane of course I should 
think I know more than all the rest of the world. But I do not think so.” (JBS, 102-103).273 
Brown’s claim is that he cannot be considered insane, because he exhibits epistemic humility. 
With this defense, Brown approaches something like the aforementioned tension between 
decisive action and the acceptance of received theory. The analogy becomes sharper when 
considering the fact that Brown’s appeal to epistemic humility is not an ironic gesture on his 
part. Instead, Brown always and everywhere relativizes and contextualizes his personal, political, 
and theological commitments. Brown’s claim that he does not know much is one of the most 
common motifs of his life. While citations and examples could be provided ad nauseam, one 
particular moment captures Brown’s generally apophatic particularly well. After his arrest, and 
while he was held in a Virginia prison, David Eichelberger, editor of Charlestown’s Independent 
Democrat journal, submitted a list of interview questions to Brown. Searching for a means to 
situate Brown within the contemporary political arena, Eichelberger asks Brown, “to what 
political part do you belong?” To which Brown, in writing, replies: “To God’s party. (I think).” 
With this parenthetical “I think,” Brown recognizes, accepts, and leaps into absolute 
metaphysical indeterminacy. Brown belongs to God—he thinks. And to belong to God is a very 
simple thing—he thinks. Brown reflects on scripture and notes that it “teaches me that all things 
whatsoever I would that men should do to me, I should do even so to them. It teaches me, 
																																																						
273 It seems to me that Brown’s commentary on so-called sanity could be relevant for debates in contemporary 
theory concerning mental health and illness, the psychiatrization of political marginality, the social construction of 
madness (Foucault), the inescapability of madness (Derrida), and so on. While interesting and potentially important, 
Brown’s possible contribution to this subject can only be provisionally flagged here. 
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further, to ‘remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them.’”274 Receiving these 
commands, Brown has simply “endeavored to act up to that instruction” (ibid). For this reason, 
because Brown has simply followed that word of God, he “believes that to have interfered as I 
have done—as I have always freely admitted I have done—in behalf of His despised poor was 
not wrong, but right” (ibid.) 
Where Kierkegaard spoke of the Christian need to simply read and follow biblical 
precepts, Brown simply did read and follow biblical precepts. But he always does so with the full 
knowledge that he lacks full knowledge. Brown is, quite literally, “ready to die” for “the God of 
the oppressed and the poor” (JBS, 74), but is not entirely sure that he belongs to God’s party. He 
is only sure that he thinks he does. All of which is to say, an “I think” separates the hope that 
Brown is following God from the sure knowledge that he is. An “I think” separates metaphysical 
assurance from hope. Thinking, here not metaphysical but purely existential, thinking about the 
meaning of his life, thinking about losing his life, in other words, allows for Brown’s faith. 
Brown has faith because his thinking might be wrong—which also means Brown’s faith is that 
his thinking is true. Thinking does not and has never secured knowledge, but disrupts it—only 
the insane have secured and determinate knowledge, to know in this way is insane—and so 
creates a rupture between self and world that can only be overcome through action. Faith, 
thinking faith, allows Brown to leap, quite literally leap and run and hide and crawl and limp, 
into revolution. 
 Brown is a saint of postmodern political theology because Brown decides to fight for 
abolition—against capitalism, against racism—without any metaphysical assurance of either 
correctness of belief or surety of outcome. But if, as Marx would have it, Brown’s saintly life is 
																																																						
274 John Brown, Speech to the Court, November 2, 1859. Accessible: 
https://nationalcenter.org/JohnBrown'sSpeech.html. 
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to remain sufficiently attractively radical as to grip the masses, then his life must be presented in 
all of its radical tension. As Kierkegaard would have it, only with this tension—only with the 
real possibility that Brown is insane—is a decision for Brown possible. It is a decision with 
which Brown himself is faced. On the one hand, Brown is unquestioning in and totally 
committed to his project for emancipation. The day before his execution, Brown writes: “Today 
is my last day upon Earth. Tomorrow I shall see God. I have no fear, I am not afraid to die” (JBS, 
93). This is the confidence of a martyr who belongs to God’s party. At the same time, Brown, in 
the solitude of his cell, awaiting his death, reflects on annihilation, and seems to accept the 
possibility that his death will permanently mark his departure from the world he still somehow 
loves. His prison bible marks and underlines Revelation 13-14: “And cinnamon, and odours, and 
ointments, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and wheat, and beasts, and sheep, 
and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men. And the fruits that thy soul lusted after are 
departed from thee, and all things which were dainty and goodly are departed from thee, and 
thou shalt find them no more at all.” This is the somber reflection of a martyr who thinks that he 
will never know if he belongs to God’s party.  
This undecidable position—God or not, God’s party or not—is neglected by every 
metaphysics that feigns to decide the truth in advance. This undecidable position is also 
neglected by the capitalist’s hidden hand and the racist’s ontologizing myths. But it is also from 
within this indeterminacy that Derrida turns to his shawl, that Knausgaard holds his daughter’s 
hand, that Kierkegaard leaps, that Cone prays for a Molotov cocktail, and that West hopes that 
another world is possible. For although or because metaphysical assurance is a modern myth, and 
a violent one at that, these thinkers—these actually existing individuals—have decided that the 
despair of a life lived under capital is best fought, not accepted. Modernity’s capitalism and 
	 319	
racism, under the mythical cover of metaphysics, challenge any postmodern political theology in 
all of the ways discussed throughout this project. John Brown, and all of the saints, heroic and 
mundane, secular and religious, successful and failed, Che Guevara and Fred Hampton and Jesus 
Christ, and the millions of permanently secret revolutionaries whom posterity has not 
remembered and never will, all of these saints lived lives whose radicalness cannot help but grip. 
Theirs is a grip that challenges as it welcomes. Theirs is a grip that holds on to solidarity through 
their deaths, which, depending on our decisions, can be but always might not be redeemed. 
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